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ABSTRACT 
Can consensus building processes, as practiced in the US, be used to resolve 
infrastructure disputes in Japan?  Since the 1990s, proposals to construct highways, 
dams, ports and airports, railways, as well as to redevelop neighborhoods, have been 
opposed by a wide range of stakeholders.  In response, there is a growing interest among 
Japanese practitioners in using consensus building processes, as practiced in the US, in 
order to resolve infrastructure disputes.  Scholars and practitioners in the field of 
negotiation and dispute resolution, as well as policy transfer theorists, have raised 
concerns about cross-border transfers by referring to a variety of contextual differences 
between the “importing” and “exporting” countries. 
 
This dissertation investigates the relationship between the context and the introduction of 
consensus building processes from two perspectives: the adaptation of consensus building 
processes for the Japanese context and the organizational changes that seem to be 
required to allow processes from the US to work in Japan.  Without process adaptation 
and organizational change, consensus building processes are unlikely to be helpful in 
resolving infrastructure disputes in Japan, considering the breadth and depth of the 
contextual differences—in organizational, normative, and regulative realms—between 
Japan and the United States.  The Japanese context for infrastructure planning was 
investigated through in-depth interviews with 40 practitioners in Japan. 
 
In order to explore possible strategies for adaptation and organizational change, I have 
closely observed an 18-month pilot test of a consensus building process for road 
intersection improvements in Tokushima, Japan as an instance of adaptation and 
organizational change.  My close observation of this experiment identified a range of 
creative adaptation.  Based on these observations, I argue that process adaptation and 
organizational change must occur simultaneously when consensus building processes are 
transferred to a foreign location. 
 
Dissertation supervisor: Lawrence E. Susskind 
Title: Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning 
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Introduction 
In Japan, intractable public disputes have slowed down the efficient delivery of 
public infrastructure (shakai-shion) in the last few decades1.  Consider the 
following: 
・ Gaikan Highway: In the early 1960s, the Ministry of Construction 
announced a grand plan for the Gaikan Circumferential Highway.  The 
project sought to prevent traffic from coming into central Tokyo by building 
a bypass.  However, local residents in the western part of Tokyo mobilized 
a successful social movement against the project; they struggled to protect 
the environment of predominantly residential neighborhoods.  The plan 
was abandoned until the late 1990s when the level of through-traffic in 
Tokyo became unbearable.  The Ministry, as well as the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government, vigorously pursued the implementation of the 
plan.  Various public involvement techniques, imported from Europe and 
the US, were used.  However, there is no foreseeable prospect of building 
the bypass forty years after the plan was first offered. 
・ Watershed Management Plans: Japan has a relatively unique watershed 
environment: stream gradients are generally steep and the land is 
susceptible to flash floods.  The government has traditionally tried to 
                                                 
1 In this dissertation, public infrastructure includes highways and roads, seaports, airports, railways, 
watershed management facilities (e.g., dams and levees), waste management facilities, and other urban 
structures (e.g., urban renewal schemes) that are developed by public or quasi-public agencies. 
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manage flooding by building dams upstream.  In the early 
1990s,environmentalists opposed the construction of certain new dams.  In 
response, the River Law was amended (in 1997) to require public 
participation in formulating master plans for river environment 
management (kasen seibi keikaku) for each watershed.  Paradoxically, the 
creation of this public participation provision triggered a new wave of 
disputes over watershed management.  For example, the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport established the Yodo River Watershed 
Committee in 2001 as a vehicle for public participation.  In January 2003, 
the committee prepared a draft proposal for watershed management.  That 
included the discontinuation of five dam construction projects2.  Following 
their recommendation, however, the government made a unilateral decision 
to discontinue two dam projects, instead of five, in July 20053.  Local 
newspapers applauded the decision because it was the first of its kind.  
Committee members, however, are fighting the government’s decision 
because all recommendations were not accepted. 
・ Urban Renewal Schemes: Intractable public disputes can be found even at 
the neighborhood level.  The most notable are those over the plans for 
urban renewal (toshi sai-kaihatsu).  An urban renewal scheme 
                                                 
2 MLIT Yodo River Watershed Committee. (2003, January). Arata na kasen-seibi wo mezashite: 
yodo-gawa suikei ryūiki iinkai teigen. Osaka, Japan. 
3 MLIT Kinki Regional Development Bureau. (2005, July 1). Yodo-gawa suikei 5-damu-ni tsuite-no 
hōshin. Osaka, Japan. 
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consolidates fragmented land titles into a jointly held property, facilitating 
large redevelopment projects.  Floor space created by the development is 
sold off to cover the cost of redevelopment.  This scheme is legally 
institutionalized through the Urban Renewal Act (toshi sai-kaihatsu hō) of 
1969 and there has been over one thousand such plans implemented across 
the country.  Theoretically, urban renewal provides benefits to everyone: 
property owners will be able to live in new condominiums, developers can 
make profits, and the public will be able to enjoy widened streets and 
improved urban infrastructure.  After the Japanese economic “bubble 
burst” in the early 1990s, however, urban renewal schemes have become 
particularly difficult because of uncertainties in their profitability as well as 
heightened interest in preserving the lifestyle of traditional Japanese 
neighborhoods.  Property owners and tenants are concerned about the 
additional costs they have to pay.  Those who want to protect historical 
buildings and neighborhoods are willing to chip in to protect against the 
“bulldozing” of their neighborhoods. 
These are just a few examples of recent public disputes surrounding the 
provision of infrastructure in Japan.  It is unlikely that the number of such 
disputes will decrease in the near future.  On December 7 2005, the National 
Supreme Court ruled that the neighbors of a proposed infrastructure 
project—those within the study area for environmental impact assessment—have 
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legal standing to request an injunction.  Previously, legal standing was only 
granted to those with property rights within the project site4.  The court reversed 
its decision because the Law on Suits Against the Government (gyōsei sosyō hō) 
was amended in April 2005 by the National Diet.  Now, backed by a right to sue, 
neighbors and environmental groups opposed to infrastructure projects are likely 
to rush to court.   
Because of these disputes, infrastructure planning efforts in Japan do not satisfy 
the “four good outcomes of negotiated settlements” (i.e., fair, efficient, stable, and 
wise) suggested by Lawrence Susskind5.  First of all, planning and 
implementation are generally inefficient.  Planning processes and 
implementation efforts are often delayed by local opposition.  Such delays cause 
opportunity costs as well as additional management costs to the government.  
For instance, it is estimated that the nation’s gross domestic product will increase 
by 1.3 trillion yen (approximately 11 billion USD) by reducing the time necessary 
for implementation6.  Second, planning processes are sometimes unfair because 
they do not necessarily ensure the full participation of stakeholders.  For 
example, Japanese advocates for increased public involvement in transportation 
planning point to the existence of “silent majority” not been involved in the 
                                                 
4 Following a Supreme Court’s ruling in 1999. 
5 Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J. (1987). Breaking the Impasse: Consensual approaches to resolving 
public disputes. New York, NY: Basis Books. pp. 21-33. 
6 Tada, N., Morichi, S., Fukuda, D. and Tsutsumi, M. (2004). Economic effects by shorting project 
periods of public works (in Japanese). Journal of the Japan Society of Civil Engineers, 765(IV-64), 
91-103. 
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planning processes.  Third, the outcomes are often unwise.  Even though Japan 
boasts advanced construction technologies, negotiations with local stakeholders 
usually do not produce creative trade-offs.  Finally, planning processes are often 
unstable because of bureaucratic planning processes as well as political 
interventions.  This issue will be reviewed in Chapter 4. 
Of course, it is not necessarily a “bad” thing that such public disputes occur.  
The fact that the public can protest infrastructure projects and government action 
is a sign that democratic governance is working.  Public disputes cannot emerge 
if the government suppresses protests through coercive measures.  For Japan to 
progress as a democratic nation, however, disputes—or conflicting 
interests—need to be handled in a way that minimizes their negative side-effects.  
For instance, protracted disputes often harm relationships among concerned 
parties, such as government agencies, civil society organizations, and 
neighborhood groups, by accelerating the process of what social psychologists 
call “escalation7.”  Unless such disputes are resolved, stakeholders will be faced 
with increasingly difficult barriers to finding mutually beneficial solutions. 
In order to deal with recurring disputes, a concept called “conflict management 
systems design” emerged in the US in the 1990s.  The idea is to institutionalize 
procedures for conflict management so that disputants can prevent social and 
political conflicts of interest from developing into intractable disputes.  In other 
                                                 
7 Pruitt, D. (1994). Social conflict: Escalation stalemate and settlement. New York, NY: Free Press. 
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words, the idea is to identify streams of recurring disputes where there is a lack of 
an appropriate system to handle conflict in a productive way.  Such institutional 
thinking might be applied to public disputes over infrastructure projects in Japan: 
If there were appropriate systems for managing such conflicts in Japan, Japanese 
society might be able to reduce the problems associated with protracted public 
disputes by institutionalizing better systems for handling them. 
Learning from abroad: its pitfalls 
In analogous situations, the Japanese government has traditionally learned from 
and appropriated institutional innovations from abroad.  For example, 
fundamental institutions of modern Japan after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, 
such as police and postal systems, were designed by imitating their counterparts 
in European nations8.  John Campbell even argues that many of Japan’s policy 
solutions were borrowed from other nations without carefully considering their 
compatibility with the problems that Japan faced9.  There are numerous 
examples of “learning from abroad” in recent years: the Freedom of Information 
Act from the US10, “Next Steps” initiatives from Britain11, public involvement 
                                                 
8 Westney, E. (1987). Imitation and innovation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
9 Campbell, J. (1992). How policies change: The Japanese government and the aging society. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
10 Repeta, L. (2003). The birth of freedom of information act in Japan: Kanagawa 1982. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT-Japan Program Working Paper Series. 
11 Nakano, K. (2004). Cross-national transfer of policy ideas: Agencification in Britain and Japan. 
Governance, 17(2), 169-188. 
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processes for highway planning from European countries12, workshop meetings 
from the US13, and the public comment system from America. 
In order to deal with growing number of infrastructure disputes in Japan, there 
is interest within the community of policymakers and scholars in the fields of civil 
engineering and public policy as to how consensus building processes, which are 
used in the US to deal with similar disputes, might be used in Japan.  Consensus 
building is “a process of seeking unanimous agreement14.”  It also entails 
elaborate processes, tailored to the needs in each situation (its details will be 
explained in Chapter 2).  In principle, it may be useful for Japanese society to 
incorporate consensus building processes into its conflict management systems to 
handle recurring infrastructure disputes more effectively. 
But there are risks.  One cannot “transplant” such institutional arrangements 
from one place to another without considering a wide range of institutional factors.  
For example, Dolowitz and Marsh, who studied the transfer of policymaking 
instruments, argue that there are three types of failures—uninformed transfer, 
incomplete transfer, and inappropriate transfer—commonly observed in such 
                                                 
12 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. (2001). dōro keikaku gōi keisei kenkyū-kai teigen. 
Tokyo, Japan. 
13 Sanoff, H. (2000). Community participation methods in design and planning. New York, NY: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
14 Susskind, L. (1999). An alternative to Robert’s rules of order for groups, organizations, and ad hoc 
assemblies that want to operate by consensus. In Susskind, L., McKearnan, S., and Thomas-Larmer, J. 
(Eds.) The consensus building handbook. (pp. 3-57). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. p. 6. 
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transfers across nations15.  Practitioners of consensus building and alternative 
dispute resolution also argue that such processes must be carefully tailored to the 
local context in order for them to function effectively. 
Process adaptation and organizational change 
Drawing on lessons from the field of policy transfer, organizational studies, and 
conflict management systems design, I argue that two types of transformation 
must typically occur when consensus building processes are transferred from one 
place to another16. 
The first type of transformation involves the adaptation of consensus building 
processes.  Even though consensus building processes are indeed tailored to 
individual situations in the US to some extent17, unique cultural context in the 
target location outside the US are likely to require these processes to be adapted 
more than they are commonly adapted in the US.  Policy transfer theorists argue 
for the importance of adaptation by pointing to various failures caused by 
inappropriate transfers18.  Practitioners and instructors who operate at the 
international level also point to a range of contextual differences and the risk of 
applying procedural models without adapting them19.   
                                                 
15 Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (2000). Learning from abroad: The role of policy transfer in 
contemporary policy-making. Governance 13(1), 5-24. 
16 The need for process adaptation and organizational change is further discussed in Chapter 3. 
17 Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J. (1987). p. 77. 
18 Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (2000). 
19 Consensus Building Institute (1997). Exporting dispute resolution: Are there limits? CBI Reports, 
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The second type of transformation involves organizational changes in response 
to consensus building introductions.  To use a new set of techniques for 
deliberation, such as consensus building processes, requires users to create new 
patterns of interaction among themselves.  For instance, an ethnographic study 
by Stephen Barley revealed that the introduction of CT scanners in hospitals 
changed commonly observed patterns of interaction between radiologists and 
technologists20.  Individuals who want to benefit from using a new 
technology—not only a physical technology but also a social technology—might 
have to change their patterns of interaction, or their implicitly shared 
theories-in-use21.  In order to maintain the authenticity of consensus building 
processes, the users—sponsors, facilitators, government agencies, civil society 
organizations, and other stakeholders—may have to change their relationships.  
Meanwhile, scholars of conflict management systems design argue that the 
introduction of conflict management systems is indeed an occasion for 
organizational change22.   
If the users in Japan do not change their current ways of interacting, but merely 
try to overlay new consensus building processes on existing institutional 
                                                                                                                                                    
1997 Fall. Cambridge, MA: Consensus Building Institute; Menkel-Meadow, C. (2003). 
Correspondences and contradictions in international and domestic conflict resolution: Lessons from 
general theory and varied contexts. Journal of Dispute Resolution, 319-352. 
20 Barley, S. (1986). Technology as an occasion for structuring: Evidence from observations of ct 
scanners and the social order of radiology departments. Admin. Science Quarterly, 31, 78-108. 
21 Argyris, C. and Schon, D. (1996). Organizational learning II. Reading, MA: Addition-Wesley 
22 Constantino, C and Merchant, C. (1996). Designing conflict management systems: A guide to 
creating productive and healthy organizations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
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arrangements, they are likely to be disappointed with the results.  The new social 
technologies may have to be modified to such a great extent that they will not be 
recognizable as “consensus building processes” any more if the environment does 
not change.  Policy transfer theorists have observed many instances in which 
public policy instruments are transformed to such a great extent that the adapted 
versions have completely different sets of goals and means23.  Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, a legal scholar in the field of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR), warns that such processes can even be “abused” or “corrupted” when they 
are transferred outside the US24. 
The site: improving the Kita-josanjima Intersection 
In order to examine the organizational changes that might be required when 
consensus building processes are imported to Japan, I studied an experimental 
effort to improve a road intersection (kōsaten) in Tokushima City.  The site is the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection on National Route 11.  The experimental effort was 
designed to test the applicability of consensus building as practiced in the US in 
the Japanese context.   
The experiment was initiated in the fall of 2004 by the Tokushima River and 
Road Office, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT).  
Shikoku Chapter of the Japan Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE) and a local 
                                                 
23 Dolowitz, D. (Eds.) (2000). Policy transfer and British social policy: Learning from the USA? 
Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press. 
24 Menkel-Meadow, C. (2003). p. 326. 
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not-for-profit organization called Commons designed and implemented the effort 
to improve the intersection with the help of non-partisan neutrals25.  The goal of 
the experimental project was to formulate consensus-based recommendations for 
improving the usability and safety of the Kita-josanjima Intersection.  There was 
a commitment to implement the recommendations within fiscal year 2006 
(between April 2006 and March 2007).   
The neutrals prepared a conflict assessment.  This involves interviewing a 
complete slate of possible stakeholders and developing detailed recommendations 
regarding whether and how to proceed with the consensus building process26.  
The final report was published in March 2005, drawing on in-person interviews 
with 54 individuals, and suggested “stakeholders would be able to find 
consensus-based solutions through the dialogue between stakeholders27.”  The 
Committee for the Improvement of Kita-josanjima Intersection (CIKI) was 
convened on July 22, 2005 and held five meetings over eight months.  It 
produced consensual recommendations, including eight proposed improvements 
to the intersection, on February 10, 2006. 
From the inception of the project, I was involved as a participant observer and 
                                                 
25 “Non-partisan neutral” refers to an outside helper who facilitates interactions between stakeholders 
without taking sides with particular stakeholders. 
26 Consensus Building Institute and Land Use Law Center at pace University School of Law (2000). 
Conducting conflict assessments in the land use context: A manual. Cambridge, MA: Consensus 
Building Institute.  
27 JSCE Shikoku and Commons (Stakeholder Assessment Team). (2005). Kita-jōsanjima-chō kōsaten 
kōtsu-anzen hōsaku-kentō-no-tameno kankeisya bunseki chōsa (saishū hōkoku-sho). 
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provided information about how consensus building processes are practiced in the 
US28.  My close observation of the experiment revealed a range of creative 
process adaptations in the consensus building techniques and a range of 
organizational changes.  These transformations emerged from the creative minds 
of the Japanese practitioners involved.  They worried that certain features of 
consensus building, as practiced in the US, were unacceptable in Japan because 
they did not fit with Japanese “common sense (jōshiki)” and other contextual 
factors.  The Japanese practitioners, however, were careful not to transform the 
processes to such extent that they jeopardized the core idea of consensus building.  
Indeed, they adjusted their own rules (i.e., experienced an organizational change) 
in order to maintain the authenticity of consensus building processes 
notwithstanding apparent psychological and institutional barriers to such changes.   
Organization of this dissertation 
This dissertation consists of nine chapters.  In Chapter 1, I review the history 
of infrastructure-related disputes in Japan.  Even though Japan is often portrayed 
as a country known for its harmony, wa in Japanese, modern Japan is rife with 
public disputes over the construction of dams, highways, railways, airports, and 
other types of infrastructure.  In Chapter 2, I briefly review the current practice 
of consensus building in Japan with particular attention to “what has been 
transferred to Japan.”  Chapter 3 offers a review of general accounts related to 
                                                 
28 I was also asked to record stakeholder meetings and prepare meeting minutes and transcripts. 
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transfers of other social technologies including policy instruments.  In this 
chapter, I present an analytical model that addresses how two kinds of 
transformations—adaptation of the technology and organizational change—occur.  
In Chapter 4, I outline the context to which consensus building needs to be 
adapted in Japan.  This is based on in-depth interviews with forty practitioners of 
urban and regional planning in Japan.  Japanese practitioners talk about being 
responsive to a number of common contextual factors.  From Chapter 5 to 
Chapter 8, I present my observations of the Kita-josanjima experiment.   
Chapter 5 familiarize readers with the local context of the Kita-josanjima 
Intersection: location, geography, history, and other background conditions.  In 
Chapter 6, I describe the experimental effort in chronological detail.  It is a story 
of people in Tokushima working hard to help stakeholders find acceptable ways to 
improve the intersection by using consensus building processes.  Chapter 7 offer 
my reflections on the experiment, based in large measure on feedback from those 
involved.  In Chapter 8, I summarize the process adaptations and organizational 
changes I observed in the Kita-josanjima experiment.  In order to insure the 
“appropriateness” of the adaptations imposed in response to the Japanese context 
(i.e., to make sure that the changes did not violate the core values of consensus 
building), I include comments from a few experienced consensus building 
practitioners in the US.  In the final chapter, I argue for the importance of both 
process adaptation and organizational change in using “imported” processes in 
facilitating the importation of social technologies from one country to another. 
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Chapter 1  25 
Chapter 1: Difficulties of Infrastructure Planning in 
Japan 
Introduction 
In the last few decades, Japan has made substantial progress in promoting more 
widespread involvement of non-governmental actors in public policy-making.  
The legal system has increased public accountability through the enactment of the 
Not-for-Profit Organization (NPO) Act in 1998 and the Freedom of Information 
Act in 1999.  Various branches of the administrative system, both at the local and 
national levels, have introduced mechanisms to solicit greater input from 
non-governmental entities.  The cabinet directive of March 23, 1999 requires 
national government agencies to solicit paburikku comento (public comments) 
before implementing regulatory policies.  During the fiscal year of 2004, 486 
draft regulations were subjected to public comments, and the total of 1,415 
comments were received by government agencies29. 
Nevertheless, the legacy of mutual distrust among government, business and 
civil society continues to hinder the development and implementation of a wide 
range of public policies and programs aimed at addressing important social, 
economic and environmental issues.  In particular, construction of large-scale 
                                                 
29 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. (2005, September 27). “kisei no settei matawa 
kaihai ni kakawaru iken teishutu tetuduki”-no jissi jōkyō. Press Release. 
 26  Chapter 1 
infrastructure projects, such as highways, dams, railways, and airports is often 
challenged by citizen groups, environmental groups, local residents, and local 
governments.  As an introduction to this dissertation, I will briefly review the 
difficulties of infrastructure planning in Japan, and explain how Japanese society 
is trying to adopt a new approach to handling public disputes. 
Historical context: Before World War II 
Even though Japan is often stereotyped as the country of harmony (wa), 
disputes have always existed.  Public disputes are not an emerging phenomenon 
at all.  Several anthropological studies indicate the existence of environmental 
disputes, for example, in the Edo Era (1603-1867).  Most environmental 
problems across the country during the period were concerned with pollution 
caused by mining30.  Proposals to develop gold, copper, and lead mines were 
often opposed by local farmers and fishermen whose livelihood could be severely 
damaged by water pollution.  For instance, a transboundary water dispute 
emerged between the domains of Iyo (Kagawa) and Awa (Tokushima) in the early 
19th century: a copper mine in Iyo on the upper stream of Yoshino River polluted 
the river and fishermen in Awa down the river suffered31.  Local residents 
observed shoals of dead fish floating on the river.  Samurais from the domain of 
Awa negotiated with the mine developer, Sumitomo, for a halt to the project.  
                                                 
30 Iinjima, N. (2000). kankyō mondai no shakai-shi. Tokyo, Japan: Yūhikaku. p.22. 
31 Ando, S. (1991). kinsei kōgai-shi no kenkyū. Tokyo, Japan: Yoshikawa Kōbun-kan. p.255-273.; 
Iijima, N. (2000). p. 33-34. 
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Because of Sumitomo’s political power and a lack of formal authority, the 
officials from Awa encountered difficulties in compelling Sumitomo to take 
measures to alleviate pollution.  In general, however, petitions by local farmers 
and fishermen to shut down polluting mines in the early Edo era were often 
approved by the domain governments because the production of rice was seen as 
more important than mining32.  In the later period, however, the value of mineral 
resources started to grow and developers offered monetary compensation to 
farmers in order to continue their operations33.  In addition to these mining 
disputes, minor disagreements over the development of rice fields, the production 
of Japanese gelatin (kanten), and the operation of river transport were reported 
across the country in the Edo era34.  Generally speaking, environmental disputes 
in the Edo era did not have national implications the way they have in later 
periods. 
Large-scale public disputes over infrastructure developments appeared in the 
Meiji Era (1868-1912) following rapid industrialization.  The dispute over the 
operation of the Ashio Copper Mine in Gunma Prefecture is one of the 
best-known environmental disputes in Japan.  Poisonous effluents from the 
copper mine devastated the surrounding forests and farmlands.  In response, 
affected communities launched protests against the operation of the mine as early 
                                                 
32 Iijima, N. (2000). p. 22 
33 Iijima, N. (2000). p. 22 
34 Ando, S. (1991). 
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as 1890.  Frustrated by the inaction of the Meiji national government, Shozo 
Tanaka, a diet member from the area, made a direct petition to the Meiji emperor, 
which was a serious crime at that time.   
There were similar incidents of industrial pollution in other parts of Japan, such 
as Bessi in Shikoku.  In addition to the disputes over industrial pollution, 
newspapers reported various instances of public protest against railway 
construction and water resource management projects35.  In the Meiji Era, the 
railway was considered as an essential piece of infrastructure for modernization 
and the economic prosperity of the nation.  Both public agencies and private 
companies vigorously pursued construction.  As a result, public disputes 
between railway developers and local residents occasionally emerged.  In 1893, 
for instance, villagers in Kaitō Province in Aichi Prefecture asked Kansai Railway 
Co. to refrain from surveying land during the rice-cropping season36.  The 
developer ignored the request.  Fueled by defiance, as many as 3,000 villagers 
mobilized to barricade the project site.  The village head and police officers tried 
to mediate, but in vain.  Only after the prefectural governor issued an order to 
the developer to halt the survey for two days, did local residents return to their 
normal life.   
Infrastructure disputes were present, albeit not prevalent, even before the 20th 
                                                 
35 Nihon Toshi Center (1989). shinbun ni-miru shakai-shihon seibi no rekishi-teki hensen (meiji taishō 
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century.  However, such disputes become less visible as the militaristic regime 
took over the government in the early 20th century.  For instance, local residents 
in the Town of An-naka in Gunma Prefecture opposed the development of a lead 
refinement facility in 193737.  The developer responded by characterizing those 
opponents as “non-patriots (hi-kokumin)” who opposed to the production of 
alloyed metal for military equipment.   
Historical context: Between World War II and the 1980s 
After the war, infrastructure projects in Japan did not encounter much 
opposition.  Severe bombing during the war devastated almost the entire 
urbanized area of Japan.  The need for rapid recovery and reconstruction of 
infrastructure, especially in urban areas, took the form of nationwide support of 
the developmental state38.  A study of newspaper articles from this period 
suggests that the severe lack of resources (i.e., food, electric power, and 
employment opportunities) between 1936 and 1950 led the public to feel that the 
nation must develop infrastructure at any cost, in order to meet basic needs39.  
Immediately after the war, government agencies launched various war recovery 
projects (sengo fukkō jigyō) focused on reconstruction of essential infrastructure, 
such as streets, bridges, and parks.  Some planners regarded devastation as an 
                                                 
37 Iijima, N. (2000). pp. 98-100. 
38 Johnson, C. (1982). MITI and the Japanese miracle: The growth of industrial policy, 1925-1975. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
39 Nihon Toshi Center (1987). shinbun ni-miru shakai-shihon seibi no rekishi-teki hensen (shōwa ki). 
Tokyo, Japan: NIRA 
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invaluable opportunity for comprehensive urban reforms by constructing 
European-like boulevards and greenbelts40.  The cabinet issued draft guidelines 
for urban redevelopment in October 1945—only 2 months after the end of the war.  
Several major cities in Japan, such as Nagoya, Hiroshima, and Sendai succeeded 
in developing wide boulevards as part of the city grid.   
This push for infrastructure development continued for at least two decades.  
A number of major infrastructure projects, including the Tōmei Highway between 
Tokyo and Nagoya, the Metropolitan Highway System (shuto-kōsoku) and other 
trunk roads in downtown Tokyo, and the Tōkaidō shinkansen High-speed Railway, 
were developed without much disruption, compared to the current level of 
resistance to infrastructure development.  Prominent events, such as the Tokyo 
Olympic Games in 1964 and Osaka Expo in 1970, served as symbolic target 
deadlines for the completion of major infrastructure projects.   
In the late 1960s, various social movements, seeking to curtail industrial 
pollution and other public nuisances (kōgai), and ensure compensation for those 
who suffered from related health problems, surfaced in various parts of the 
country.  Their efforts resulted in a number of civil suits against the government 
and major industries.  After losing several important lawsuits, such as Minamata, 
the government reacted by establishing stringent environmental regulations41.  
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The Environmental Dispute Coordination Committee, which sought to resolve 
pollution-related disputes through mediation and conciliation, was established as 
an independent agency of the national government in 1970.  However, as new 
environmental laws which required stringent control of pollution have been 
enacted, the intensity of public disputes over environmental issues has gradually 
faded42.  One author points out the following changes in the context for citizens’ 
movements in the mid-1970s: the shift in the government’s regional policies, a 
reduction in the number of municipalities with “revolutionary (kakushin)” 
mayors43, and the declining influence of social movements in general44.  In a 
nutshell, there is a disjuncture between the social movements for better 
environment that burgeoned in the 1970s and the environmental protests against 
infrastructure after the mid-1990s. 
Two major lawsuits requesting the removal of existing infrastructure—Osaka 
International Airport and shinkansen in Nagoya—were brought to the courts in 
the 1970s.  In the former case, the Ministry of Transport reached a series of 
settlements with the majority of more than 20,000 plaintiffs by promising to 
reduce noise levels as well as by limiting operation time45.  In the latter 
                                                 
42 McKean, M. (1981). Environmental protest and citizen politics in Japan. Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press. 
43 Mayors not affiliated with the Liberal Democratic Party. 
44 Hasegawa, K. and Funabashi, H. (1985). shinkansen kōgai towa nani-ka. In Funabashi, H., 
Hasegawa, K., Hatakenaka, S. and Katsuta, H. (Eds.) shinkansen kōgai. (pp. 1-60). Tokyo, Japan: 
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45 Gresser, J., Fujikura, K. and Morishima, A. (1981). pp. 339-341.; Kameyama, S. (1997). kōkū 
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shinkansen case, after two defeats on the plaintiff’s side, the Japan National 
Railway and local residents reached a settlement in 1986 regarding noise 
abatement measures. 
During the same period, infrastructure projects in the fringe areas of the Tokyo 
Metropolitan District (23 Special Wards: tokubetsu-ku) encountered intensive 
opposition from local residents.  Various communities in Tokyo launched 
campaigns against road construction, out of fear of health hazards caused by 
automobile emissions and other environmental impacts of automobile traffic.  In 
fact, it was an era of smog in Tokyo; in 1971, as many as 28 thousand people filed 
claims with the Tokyo Metropolitan Government charging that they suffered from 
photochemical smog (kōkagaku sumoggu)46.   In response to the protest against 
a road project, Ryokichi Minobe, the Governor of Tokyo, announced that, “no 
road shall be constructed if anyone objects to the project47.”  Many road projects 
in Tokyo, including the Gaikan Highway project, were officially put on hold.  
Disputes over highway and road construction proposals in the 1970s were 
temporarily suspended, not because they were resolved but because controversial 
road projects were withdrawn.   
Waste management in Tokyo was another difficult matter for the metropolitan 
                                                                                                                                                    
coordination commission), 11. 
46 Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Bureau of Social Welfare and Public Health. (undated). 
Kōkagaku sumoggu chūihō-tō hatsurei nissū oyobi kōkagaku sumoggu-ni-yoru to-omowareru higai 
todokede jōkyō-no suii. [WWW Document] URL 
http://www.fukushihoken.metro.tokyo.jp/kanho/smog/ todokede.html  
47 Akiyama, T. et al. (2001). juumin sanka no michi zukuri.. Kyoto, Japan: Gakugei Shuppan. 
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government.  The governor declared a War on Trash (gomi sensō) in 1971.  The 
need for waste management plants (i.e., incinerators to reduce the volume of 
trash) was evident because landfills in the Tokyo bay area were reaching their full 
capacity.  Nevertheless, communities around the sites proposed for incinerators, 
such as Suginami communities, fiercely opposed such projects.  In order to 
ameliorate this opposition, the government started to build “repayment” facilities 
(kangen shisetsu) such as heated swimming pools and community halls adjacent 
to incinerators so that host communities would be more willing to accept them.  
It has become a common practice in Japan to provide such side-payments to local 
communities in return for accepting waste management facilities.   
Most infrastructure disputes in the 1970s were triggered by the narrow interests 
of local communities.  Community-based opposition was often characterized in 
terms of the NIMBY (Not-In-My-Backyard) syndrome.  In response, some 
projects were abandoned.  Others were built when the host community was 
compensated enough through side-payments (such as auxiliary facilities built in 
exchange for waste management plants).  The conflict between the government 
and host communities was kept at the manageable level for public officials 
because the focus was solely on the appropriate level of compensation.  In other 
words, public disputes could be “privatized” through side-payment mechanisms48.   
In the 1970s, large-scale infrastructure projects such as the development of 
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airports, highways, and high-speed trains in rural areas did not face as much 
opposition did as their counterparts in Tokyo.  Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, 
who published a grand plan for infrastructure development, was one of the most 
popular prime ministers since WWII; his approval rate reached 62% when he was 
elected in 197249.  In addition, the national government turned “public bads,” 
such as nuclear power plants, into attractive facilities for rural communities 
through various compensatory schemes50.  The dispute over the New Tokyo 
International Airport (Narita) between local farmers and the government, which 
was intensified by the involvement of communist activists, was one of the few 
instances of an irresolvable dispute over large-scale infrastructure development in 
a rural area in the 1970s51. 
Current issues: After the 1990s 
In the mid-1990s, public outcry against large-scale infrastructure projects of 
various kinds surfaced in different parts of Japan.  Proposals to build dams, 
highways, rapid railways (shinkansen), and airports are now contested not only by 
local residents but also by the media, political groups, and environmental 
advocates.  The costs and benefits of each infrastructure project suddenly 
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became a subject of national debate in the mid-1990s.   
The construction and operation of the Nagara River Estuary Barrage was one of 
the first few cases harshly criticized by environmental groups and the national 
media.  The barrage was going to be constructed by the Water Resources 
Development Public Corporation (mizu shigen kōdan) using subsidies 
administered by the Ministry of Construction and local prefectures.  In the early 
1990s, environmentalists became concerned about its potential impacts and 
questioned the promised benefits of flood management and irrigation.  Members 
of the national Diet, both for and against the project, became involved and what 
was a local dispute over a river barrage evolved into a nationwide debate.  The 
level of interest in the Nagara dispute can be measured by the newspaper 
coverage; between 1990 and 1995, the Tokyo edition of the Yomiuri Shinbun 
newspaper released 122 articles related to the Nagara Barrage52.  While the 
construction of the barrage was completed in 1995, the Nagara dispute triggered a 
social movement against dam construction across the country.   
More recently, the land reclamation of Isahaya Bay has generated a massive 
dispute between the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery (MAFF) and 
local fishermen.  Immediately after the partial completion of the project in 1997, 
the production of seaweed (nori) and the catch of fish near the project site 
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Tokyo’s national edition, its Chubu regional edition released 367 articles between 1990 and 1995. 
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dropped substantially.  The community of fishermen filed a lawsuit requesting an 
injunction against the project.  They are still fighting in court, debating the 
causal relationship between the project and the reduction in the production of 
seaweed.   
These disputes are not exceptional.  There were a number of other public 
disputes over large-scale infrastructure development projects in the 1990s, 
including the following53: 
• Highways 
− Gaikan Highway (Tokyo); and 
− Ken-ō-dō Highway (Tokyo) 
• Dams and watershed management: 
− Chitose River Drainage Canal (Hokkaido); 
− Kawabe River Dam (Kumamoto);  
− Tokuyama Dam (Gifu); 
− Yamba Dam (Gunma); and 
− Yoshino River Daijū Barrage (Tokushima); 
• Land reclamation over wetlands: 
− Fujimae Tidal Flat (Nagoya); 
− Nakaumi (Shimane); and 
− Sanbanze (Chiba);  
• Railways: 
− Nagano Shinkansen High-speed Railway (Nagano and Gunma); and 
− Odakyu Commuter Railway Elevated Structure (Tokyo); 
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• Airports: 
− Kobe Airport (Hyogo); and  
− Shizuoka Airport (Shizuoka) 
 
The number of articles published in Yomiuri Shinbun (newspaper) also 
indicates the surge of interest in infrastructure development and associated public 
disputes in the middle of 1990s (see Figure 1-1).  Between 1990 and 1994, 33 
related articles were published.  In contrast, 130 articles were published between 
1995 and 1999.  In 2000, the number surged to 84, which is the highest in the 
years surveyed.  These numbers indicate the heightened interest in infrastructure 
projects. 
In response, the government, in particular the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
and Transport (MLIT, formerly the Ministry of Construction (MoC) before 
January 6, 2000), introduced new initiatives to counter such opposition.  
Examples of such initiatives are: 
 
• Dam Project Deliberation Committees (dam tō jigyō shingi iinkai) 
[Since 1995 MoC has been organizing a dozen committees to evaluate 
controversial dam projects in the shingikai format.]; 
• 1995 amendment to the River Law (kasen hō) 
[The new law required watershed management authorities to prepare master 
plans with public participation.]; 
• Mandatory project evaluation (jigyō hyōka) on all projects 
[After 1998, project evaluation is required before each project receives 
construction funds.]; 
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• Public involvement in highway and airport planning 
[MLIT has produced several guidelines for public involvement in 
infrastructure planning.]; and 
• Budget cut in infrastructure-related projects 
[The Koizumi Cabinet (April 2001-) has cut back on the government 
spending on infrastructure development.]. 
 
Notwithstanding those initiatives, many public disputes have not yet been 
completely resolved, although they have probably been lessened in the last few 
years.  The prolonged economic downturn in Japan since 1992 could have 
generated popular support for increased public spending through more 
investments in infrastructure development.  In the past, Japan has successfully 
adopted a kind of Keynsian policy: government increases its investment in public 
 
Figure 1-1: Number of Newspaper Articles on Infrastructure Disputes 
Search results from the Yomiuri Shinbun Database.  Articles published by in the Tokyo morning edition that 
contains the following combinations of keywords were selected from the database: (kōkyō-jigyō and 
hantai-undō), (kōkyō-jigyō and jūmin and hantai), and (kōkyō-jigyō and shimin and hantai).  Duplicate 
results were removed. 
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works in order to stimulate money flows and reduce unemployment.  In the 
1990s, however, the downward economy did not lead to strong public support for 
new infrastructure development. 
Possible causes of opposition to infrastructure development in the 
1990s 
Why did the number of high-profile public protests against infrastructure 
development increase in the latter half of the 1990s?  Several explanations are 
possible, even though there is probably no definitive answer to the question.   
First, the rise of public concern over a new round of global environmental 
issues such as sustainable development, global warming, and long-term health 
risks of chemical substances appears to have rekindled popular concern about 
environmental issues in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The interest of Japanese 
citizens in public policies appears to have shifted from infrastructure development 
in particular to the protection of the natural environment in general. 
Second, exposure of corruption related to public works projects worsened the 
public image of infrastructure development projects.  Since the first half of the 
1990s, corruption involving politicians as well as bureaucrats has been reported 
by the media.  “Decent from the heaven (amakudari),” the practice of 
corporations hiring ex-bureaucrats for lucrative compensation, became highly 
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criticized54.  For instance, the Japan Highway Public Corporation created a 
number of spin-off companies, managed by its retirees, and provided excessively 
“sweet deals” for them; those privately-owned companies made profits from 
exclusive contracts and distributed the spoils to ex-civil servants.  The image of 
the construction industry continued to slip, particularly after the arrest of 
Kanemaru Shin, who allegedly received illegal contributions, in 1993.   
Those two trends of the early 1990s can be spotted again in newspaper coverage.  
For instance, the number of articles containing the term “global warming (chikyū 
ondanka)” or “global environment (chikyū kankyō)” surged in 1989 to 683, from 
60 in the previous year.  Its peak was in 1992 when the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development was held in Brazil in June.  The 
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Figure 1-2: Number of Newspaper Articles on Global Environment and 
Warming 
Search results from the Yomiuri Shinbun Database.  Articles published by in the Tokyo morning and 
evening edition that contains chikyū kankō or chikyū ondanka.  Duplicate results were removed. 
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number of articles on corruption related to infrastructure projects surged in June 
1993, when the mayor of Sendai City was arrested for accepting bribes from 
several major contractors in Japan.  It may not be a coincidence that more than 
35 years of dominance by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ended after the 
general election in July 1993, immediately after the surge of concern over 
corruption related to infrastructure projects.   
There are still several other possible causes of the surge in opposition to 
infrastructure projects.  Infrastructure disputes might be caused by the 
decreasing level of trust in Japanese bureaucracy.  This argument is related to the 
second thesis mentioned above, but deals more with general attitudes toward 
government.  The level of public distrust of the conduct of bureaucrats is said to 
 
 
Figure 1-3: Number of Newspaper Articles on Corruptions in Infrastructure 
Projects 
Search results from the Yomiuri Shinbun Database.  Articles published by in the Tokyo morning and 
evening edition that contains kōkyō-jigyō and oshoku.  Duplicate results were removed. 
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have reached its height in the 1990s55.  Distrust in the bureaucracy might have 
led to distrust in large-scale public projects prepared by those distrusted 
bureaucrats. 
Fourth, environmentalists and others opposed to specific construction projects 
seized the opportunity to broadcast their concerns using the new media of the 
1990s.  In contrast to NHK news, which paid meticulous attention to factual and 
neutral coverage of key stories, a new program called News Station favored 
stories that were more interesting and stimulating from the perspective of the 
average citizen, not of journalists56.  Coverage of infrastructure disputes was 
more detailed, and anchors occasionally provided critical commentaries of the 
government’s decision to build some large-scale public project.  Of course, the 
Internet might also have facilitated a transition to new ways of obtaining 
newsworthy information. 
Fifth, the number of public disputes may have increased simply because the 
number of controversial public projects increased.  Between 1985 and 1995, the 
level of direct investment in construction by the government sector increased by 
6.1 per cent per year on average, while the gross domestic product (GDP) 
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increased by 4.3 per cent per year during the same period57.   
Lack of an institutionalized system for dispute resolution 
While the factors listed above have contributed to the re-emergence of protests 
against infrastructure projects in the 1990s, I will focus on another possible factor.  
That is, the lack of an institutionalized system for handling controversies over 
infrastructure development proposals in the 1990s.   
Formal public participation procedures, such as voluntary public hearings 
(kōchō-kai) and consultative meetings (setsumei-kai) before planning decisions 
are made, were institutionalized by the Urban Planning Act (toshi keikaku hō) of 
1969.  In 1970, the Public Nuisance Dispute Resolution Law (kōgai funsō shori 
hō) was enacted.  This established an institutionalized system to assist in the 
resolution of disputes between private parties over public nuisances, such as air 
and water pollution, excessive noise, and offensive odors.  In 1984, the Cabinet 
issued a directive regarding environmental impact assessment, which required 
additional public scrutiny from the perspective of environmental protection.  At 
the same time, public officials engaged in various informal negotiations with 
important community figures—so-called nemawashi in Japan58.   
I argue, however, these mechanisms for ensuring greater government 
                                                 
57 Source: MLIT. kensetsu tōshi mitōsi (Construction Investment Forecast) and Economic and Social 
Research Institute. kokumin keizai keisan (System of National Account). 
58 Reed, S. (1993). Making common sense of Japan. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
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accountability increased the number of public disputes because they made no 
provision for reconciling the conflict views that they were designed to amplify.  
If these mechanisms had been effective in handing the rising number of 
infrastructure disputes in the 1990s, the conflicts would not have escalated to the 
extent I have previously discussed.  A new arrangement that can resolve 
infrastructure disputes is needed to head off prolonged disagreements that are 
unlikely to yield positive outcomes for everyone involved. 
Japanese tendency to emulate institutional innovations 
Examples of emulation 
In analogous situations, the Japanese government has traditionally sought to 
learn from relevant institutions in foreign countries.  In fact, the Japanese 
government seems to be one of the most earnest borrowers in the world.  Eleanor 
Westney analyzes three cases of organizational emulation in late 19th century in 
Japan immediately after the collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate in 186759.  
Fundamental institutions of the state, such as policing and the postal system, were 
designed based on the information that public officials gathered during their study 
trips to the West.  John Campbell supports her argument by saying, 
Many of Japan's policy solutions came more or less directly from abroad.  
Such borrowing can be partly explained by Japan as the "rational shopper," the 
image of "Japanese decision-makers clutching a list of desired institutions, 
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engaging in painstaking comparative shopping, and selecting the brand most 
suited to their tastes and needs." But such borrowing of innovations implies that 
the borrower already has tastes and needs, when in fact problem definitions and 
priorities themselves were heavily influenced by the policy solutions available 
from the West60. 
Campbell’s argument seems to suggest that the practice of borrowing institutional 
arrangements from abroad is almost “habitual” for policy-makers in Japan.   
The trend is still present in Japan.  In his study of the introduction of the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to Kanagawa Prefecture in the early 1980s, 
Lawrence Repeta says,  
Explaining the possibility of creating such a system was much simpler; (the 
person who advocated the new system) simply cited the examples abroad.  
Feasibility had already been demonstrated by FOIAs operating in the United 
States and other countries.  The Japanese have never been shy about learning 
from abroad61.  
More recently, Koichi Nakano studied the transfer of “agencification” policy 
from Britain to Japan in the late 1990s62.  The British arrangement for 
agencification was initially studied by a few Japanese economic bureaucrats who 
were seconded to the Japanese embassy in London.  Their report caught the 
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attention of a parliamentarian, Hakuo Yanagisawa, who was seeking a way to help 
the LDP restructure government agencies in Japan.  Mainly because 
“agencification” legitimized the reduction in the number of public servants 
(kōmu-in), the British model was introduced to the community of policy 
entrepreneurs in Japan.   
Imported techniques for public participation 
The introduction of public comment periods for new regulations, which was 
adopted following the cabinet’s directive on March 23 1999, is another example 
of recent policy transfer to Japan.  In this case, the U.S. government was putting 
pressure on the Japanese government to introduce and improve the public 
comment system as a part of its demand for open markets63.   
In the field of infrastructure planning, the MLIT has tried to attend to the 
increasing level of opposition against highway projects by borrowing the idea of 
public involvement (paburikku inborubumento) from the US and Europe.  Early 
examples include participatory planning for the Ueki Bypass project in 
Kumamoto Prefecture in 199764 and the Tamayu Bypass project in Shimane 
Prefecture in 199865.  Later, it was applied to the most controversial Gaikan 
                                                 
63 US Embassy in Tokyo (2005, December 7). Annual reform recommendations from the government 
of the United States to the government of Japan under the U.S.-Japan regulatory reform and 
competition policy initiative. 
64 Miyaishi, A., Chitose, Y. and Mizokami, S. (1999). ueki baipasu keikaku ni taisuru pī-ai hōshiki no 
dōnyū. Proceedings from the Conference of Infrastructure Planning, 22(1). 9-12. 
65 MLIT Matsue Road Construction Office. (2000, April). tamayu kairyō jigyō ni okeru pī-ai dōnyū 
jirei (Introduction of PI to the Tamayu Improvement Project). Dōro Gyōsei Seminā, 1-6. 
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Highway project in Tokyo.  Open house (ōpun hausu) style exhibitions and 
various consultative committees have been organized since 2001.  However, the 
idea seems to have been less successful in Japan than the ministry anticipated.  
In fact, the dispute over the Gaikan highway still persists after three years of 
paburikku inborubumento efforts.   
Planners and architects in the private sector have also borrowed participatory 
planning techniques from the US, particularly in the 1990s.  A few pioneers 
studied “design game” methods from Henry Sanoff of North Carolina State 
University and “workshop meetings” proposed by Randolph Hester of UC 
Berkeley66.  In particular, participatory meetings in the “workshop 
(wāku-shoppu)” format have become popular in the context of machizukuri 
movement after the publication of “The toolbox for participatory design (sanka no 
dezain dōgu-bako)” by the Setagaya Community Design Center in 199367.   
In recent years, a few academic researchers have been active in introducing 
“consensus conferences (konsensasu kaigi)” from Denmark.  In 1998, a group of 
researchers experimented with the process by applying it to a discussion of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs)68.  A civil society group that specializes 
in the promotion of the idea was incorporated as a not-for-profit organization 
                                                 
66 Ito, M. (2001). kenchiku machizukuri ni okeru jūmin sanka shuhō to shite-no wākushoppu no 
kenkyū. Doctoral dissertation, Chiba University. 
67 Setagaya Community Design Center. (1993). sanka no dezain dōgu-bako. Setagaya, Japan: 
Setagaya Community Design Center. 
68 Wakamatsu, M. (2005). konsensasu kaigi to nihon de-no kokoromi. PI-Forum, 1(2), 23-27. 
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(NPO) in 1999. 
Such examples of “borrowing” are inexhaustible in Japan.  Even though 
almost all nations around the world draw lessons from the experiences of other 
countries, the Japanese seem to be particularly eager to do so.  It is one of their 
preferred strategies for finding solutions to emerging problems. 
Learning about consensus building processes 
In the last few years, there has been a growing interest among Japanese 
researchers and practitioners in learning about consensus building processes in 
order to resolve infrastructure disputes.  The five-step process for consensus 
building, which will be discussed in Chapter 2, was not discussed in Japan until 
the late 1990s.69 
There have been several efforts in Japan to learn more about consensus 
building processes in the U.S.  In June 1999, Scott McCreary, a practitioner 
based in California, was invited to a conference titled “Sanbanze International 
Forum (kokusai fōramu).”  In the conference, he provided a review of the history 
of planning and restoration of San Francisco Bay70.  In January 2001, Professor 
Lawrence Susskind from MIT was invited to Tokyo by Mitsubishi Research 
                                                 
69 Some aspects of consensus building, including a case study of the Alewife Task Force project, were 
introduced to Japan in the early 1990s as an alternative mode of public participation in environmental 
impact assessments (See Harashina, S. (1994). kankyō asesumento. Tokyo, Japan: University of the 
Air Press); however, the five-step process has not been discussed until recently. 
70 CONCUR. (undated). International Projects. [WWW Document] URL 
http://www.concurinc.com/worldprojects.html (visited 2005, February 14). 
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Institute (MRI) to give a public lecture on consensus building processes71.  In 
addition, he and David Laws, also from MIT, offered a half-day seminar on 
consensus building processes for the PI-Forum, a not-for-profit organization that 
promotes public participation in public decisions.  They presented an outline of 
consensus building and described its applications in the US. 
Between 1998 and 2002, I was invited by six prefectural agencies to give 
lectures for their employees on negotiation theories and consensus building 
techniques.  In October 1999, I presented an outline of consensus building 
processes at the 22nd Conference of Infrastructure Planning organized by the 
Japan Society of Civil Engineers72.  In July 2002, I had an opportunity to give a 
lecture for the Shikoku Chapter of the Japan Society of Civil Engineers.  My 
encounter with the researchers in Shikoku led to the experimental effort described 
in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Intractable public disputes over infrastructure developments in Japan since the 
1990s demonstrate the need for a new approach to infrastructure decisions (see 
Appendix 1-A for selected case studies).  Recognition of this need has led to a 
growing interest in consensus building.  In the next chapter, I will outline key 
                                                 
71 Mitsubishi Research Institute. (2001). gōi-keisei no aratana tenkai  [WWW Document] URL 
http://sociosys.mri.co.jp/PCW/resource/lsnote.pdf (visited 2005, February 14). 
72 Matsuura, M. (1999) Consensus building on public works projects using a third-party assistance. 
Proceedings of the Civil Planning Research Conference, 22(1), pp. 33-36. 
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features of the consensus building process practiced in the US and the way it was 
described to Japanese audiences. 
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Chapter 2: The Practice of Consensus Building in the 
United States 
In this chapter, I will provide an overview of the practice of consensus building 
in the United States.  The reason for reviewing these efforts—which have been 
documented extensively elsewhere—is to define precisely what is being 
transferred to Japan.  Without specifying the object being transferred to Japan, I 
cannot examine how it was (or wasn’t) adapted to take accounts of contextual 
differences. 
Even in America, consensus building processes are tailored to the particulars in 
each situation.  Consensus building is an “ad-hoc” procedural model that can be, 
or should be, tailored to each setting73.  Because of its flexibility, it is not so easy 
to say what the essence of consensus building is.  The five-step process 
described in this section primarily draws on lessons from two textbooks on 
consensus building—the Consensus Building Handbook and Breaking the 
Impasse74.  Some parts of the following descriptions about consensus building 
might not necessarily be fully endorsed by the entire community of consensus 
building practitioners in the US.  Nevertheless, the following describes what has 
been described to the relevant Japanese practitioners as consensus building 
                                                 
73 Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J. (1987). Breaking the impasse: Consensual approaches to resolving 
public disputes. New York, NY: Basic Books. p. 77. 
74 Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J. (1987).; Susskind, L., McKearnan, S. and Thomas-Larmar, J. 
(Eds.). (1999). The consensus building handbook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
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processes commonly practiced in the US.   
Terminology 
Consensus building processes have been introduced to Japan as konsensasu 
birudingu purosesu using katakana characters so that the term refers to a specific 
model of consensus building that is transferred from the US (see Figure 2-1).  
Sometimes the word shuhō (techniques) is used in place of purosesu (processes).  
Occasionally people prefer to use an abbreviation for such a long word; consensus 
building is often abbreviated as “CB,” resulting in people saying see-bee purosesu 
(CB Process).  Consensus building can also be translated as gōi keisei, which 
literally means the “agreement development.”  The term, however, can refer to 
almost anything that has something to do with public participation or negotiation.  
In order to avoid confusion, the term gōi keisei is deliberately not used in this 
dissertation to refer to consensus building practices in the US.   
Figure 2-1: “Consensus Building Processes” in Japanese 
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Historical context of consensus building in the US 
Early experiments 
The root of consensus building dates back to the 1970s when mediation and 
other conflict resolution techniques were applied to difficult public policy 
questions for the first time.  It is generally agreed that the first case of 
environmental conflict resolution was the mediation of a dispute over the 
construction of Snoqualmie River Dam75.  Snoqualmie River, situated on the east 
of Seattle, Washington, consists of three forks in the upper potion of the 
Snohomish River Basin flowing into Puget Sound.  For many years, recurring 
floods caused damage to the adjacent farmlands and other private properties.  In 
1968, the Army Corps of Engineers proposed a project to construct a dam in the 
Middle Fork of Snoqualmie River for flood management.  Because of 
considerable risks to the natural environment claimed by environmentalists, as 
well as possible urban sprawl that might be triggered by the reduced chance of 
floods, environmental organizations as well as Governor Evans opposed the 
Corp’s proposal.  After a careful examination of the conflict, Gerald McCormick 
and Jane McCarthy intervened to mediate the dispute in 197376.  With an 
endorsement from the governor, a stakeholder involvement process started in May 
1974.  The process sought to find a plan that would be acceptable to both 
                                                 
75 Dukes, F. (1996). Resolving public conflict: Transforming community and governance. New York, 
NY: Manchester University Press. 
76 Dembart, L. and Kwartler, R. (1980). The Snoqualmie River conflict: Bringing mediation into 
environmental disputes. In Goldman, R. (Ed.) Roundtable justice: Case studies in conflict resolution. 
(pp. 39-58). Boulder, CO: Westview. 
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farmers and environmentalists.  Stakeholders reached an agreement by the end of 
the year.  The new plan called for a smaller dam on the North Fork of the river, 
offset levies, flood easements, and a planning organization.  Following this 
success, the movement to apply mediation processes to environmental disputes 
spread across the country.  For instance, Gerald Cormick, the mediator for the 
Snoqualmie case, became involved in the mediation of Interstate Highway 90 on 
the west of Seattle in 197577.   
Meanwhile, on the other side of the US, an innovative approach to participatory 
planning was underway.  In 1975, the Massachusetts state government organized 
the Alewife Task Force (ATF) in order to prepare a plan for a multi-modal 
transportation facility to connect a subway with an existing highway78.  The task 
force was designed as a mechanism for public participation, which was required 
after the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act.  The ATF was 
assisted by a faculty member from MIT who served as its chairman.  With the 
assistance of that faculty member, members of the ATF, both proponents and 
opponents, jointly examined proposals from the state government.  In order to 
examine the initial proposal for a parking facility with 7,500 parking spaces, the 
                                                 
77 Patton, L. and Cormick, G. (1978). Mediation and the NEPA process: The Interstate 90 experience. 
In Jain, R.K. and B.L. Hutchings(Eds.) Environmental Impact Analysis: Emerging Issues in Planning. 
(pp. 43-54). Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
78 Susskind, L. (1977). The importance of citizen participation and consensus-building in the land use 
planning process. Cambridge, MA. Prepared for the Lincoln Institute Land Use Symposium (October 
27-29, 1977).; Susskind, L. (1981). Citizen participation and consensus building in land use planning. 
In deNeufville, J.I. (Ed.) The land use policy debate in America. (pp. 183-204). New York, NY: 
Plenum. 
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chairman suggested that the ATF examine other facilities of similar size.  
According to the chairman, everyone agreed that the proposed facility was 
oversized for the setting and “it changed the tone” of the discussion79.  The 
parking facility was downsized to 2,000 parking spaces, and a “linear park” 
concept was introduced as a part of the design of the adjoining area.  The group 
almost reached a consensus on a plan in 1977.  Reflecting on the experience with 
the ATF, Lawrence Susskind, who was the chairman, proposed a five-step model 
for “consensus building” as an alternative to conventional models of citizen 
involvement80.   
Development of the field 
After the first few successful experiments, the use of environmental dispute 
resolution grew substantially by the mid-1980s.  The following paragraph by 
Gail Bingham neatly summarizes the rapid growth of the field in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s: 
Nationally, by the end of 1977, 9 environmental disputes had been mediated.  
Another 11 were mediated in 1978, and 19 more were mediated in 1979.  By 
mid-1984, mediators and facilitators had been employed in over 160 
environmental disputes in the United States.  Compared to 1973, when only two 
individuals were beginning to develop a mediation practice for environmental 
disputes, there are now organizations and individuals in at least 15 states, the 
District of Columbia, and Canada offering environmental dispute resolution 
                                                 
79 Kolb, D. and Associates. (1994). When talk works: Profiles of mediators. San Francisco, CA: 
Jossey-Bass. 
80 Susskind, L. (1977). pp. 36-38; Susskind, L. (1981). p. 202. 
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services.  Others, elsewhere, are attempting to establish similar practices.81 
Susskind and McKearnan argue that there were five initiatives that 
characterized the rapid development of the field in the mid-1980s: seminal 
publications on environmental mediation, an expanding group of skilled 
individuals, creation of the National Institute for Dispute Resolution (NIDR) to 
provide funding, increased demand for training, and the creation of newsletters to 
publicize results82.  Breaking the Impasse, published in 1987, was the first 
publication, in a generally accessible form that outlined the five-step process for 
consensus building, which is explained later in this chapter83.   
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was one of the first few federal 
agencies to support experimentation with consensus building processes in the 
1980s.  It adopted negotiated rulemaking—a mediated strategy for preparing 
draft federal environmental regulations with the participation of stakeholders.  In 
1984, the EPA first deployed the process in determining nonconformance 
penalties for Clean Air Act violations84.   
The Army Corps of Engineers was another federal agency that utilized dispute 
                                                 
81 Bingham, G. (1986). Resolving environmental disputes: A decade of experience. Washington DC: 
Conservation Foundation. p. xvii. 
82 Susskind, L. and McKearnan, S. (1999). The evolution of public policy dispute resolution. Journal 
of Architectural and Planning Research, 16(2), pp.96-115. 
83 Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J. (1987). 
84 Susskind, L. and McMahon, G. (1985). The theory and practice of negotiated rulemaking. Yale 
Journal on Regulation. 133-165.; Susskind, L. and Van Dam, L. (1986). Squaring off at the table, not 
in the courts. Technology Review. 89(5). 39-40. 
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resolution techniques beginning in 1980s.  In particular, the Corps introduced 
techniques for improving its relationships with contractors.  The process, known 
as “partnering,” sought to bring relevant stakeholders (e.g., contractors, 
environmentalists, other government agencies) together from the outset of 
contractual relations in order to develop positive relationships85. 
A few state governments were also active in encouraging the use of 
environmental dispute resolution.  With help of the NIDR, state offices of 
mediation opened in Massachusetts, New Jersey, Hawaii, Wisconsin, and 
Minnesota in 198486.  The number of states with offices of dispute resolution 
expanded to 28 in 200087. 
The field continued to grow in the 1990s.  In fact, many institutional 
innovations involving the use of consensus building processes emerged in the 
1990s.  Federal legislation is one such example.  In 1996, the Administrative 
Dispute Resolution Act was enacted to encourage federal agencies to use dispute 
resolution processes.  Following on the decades of experience at EPA, negotiated 
rulemaking processes were institutionalized by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 
1998.  Such legislation facilitated the adoption of dispute resolution processes by 
                                                 
85 Consensus Building Institute. (1995). Partnering, consensus building, and alternative dispute 
resolution: Current uses and opportunities in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Fort Belfor, VA: 
Institute for Water Resources.; Tri-Service Committee. (1996). Partnering guide for environmental 
missions of the Air Force, Army, Navy. Fort Belvoir, VA: Institute for Water Resources. 
86 Susskind, L. (1986). NIDR’s state office of mediation experiment. Negotiation Journal. 2(4). 
323-327.; Dukes, F. (1996). p. 80 
87 Susskind, L., van der Wansem, M., and Ciccarelli, A. (2000). Mediating land use disputes: Pros and 
cons. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. 
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federal agencies.  In 1998, the Congress created the U.S. Institute for 
Environmental Conflict Resolution (USIECR) in Tucson, Arizona.  This 
organization assists federal agencies in using dispute resolution and other 
processes for resolving environmental disputes as well as maintaining a national 
roster of experienced mediation practitioners.   
In 1999, another seminal publication—the Consensus Building 
Handbook—was released as an edited collection.  The colossal 1147-page 
volume contains contributions from most experienced practitioners and scholars 
on every aspect of the consensus building in the public arena.  The process 
outlined in the handbook, in particular its Part I: A Short Guide to Consensus 
Building by Lawrence Susskind, constitutes what I call “consensus building 
processes” in this dissertation.  The five steps in the consensus building process 
are described in the following sections. 
Consensus building processes 
Consensus building processes are implemented in five steps.  This five-step 
model has provided the framework for explaining the processes in Japan.  In the 
following descriptions, technical terms in Japanese are shown in parenthesized 
italics. 
Convening (shō-shū) 
All processes start with convening.  Anyone who has an interest in building 
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consensus on a policy issue can convene.  In most cases, though, public agencies 
take the role of convenor (shōshū-sha).  A convenor, or a group of convenors, 
asks a neutral assessor (hyōka-sha) for an evaluation of the situation, known as a 
conflict assessment (funsō asesumento)88.  It is sometimes referred to as 
stakeholder analysis (sutēkuhorudā bunseki), as well, in the US.   
The assessor prepares the assessment report based on the information gathered 
through stakeholder interviews.  First, the convenor provides an initial list of 
stakeholder interviewees to the assessor.  The assessor conducts confidential 
interviews with each stakeholder in order to fully apprehend his or her interests 
(rigai) behind their stated positions (tachiba)89.  Information gathered in 
confidential interviews is not disclosed to anyone else including the convenor.  
Interviews can be conducted over the phone or in person, depending on resources 
available.  At the end of each interview, the assessor asks, “Who else should I 
interview in order to fully understand the situation?”  Those who are suggested 
are added to the list of interviewees.  The assessor completes the stakeholder 
interviews when no new person is added to the list, or when no new category of 
interests is likely to be represented by additional interviewees.   
                                                 
88 Consensus Building Institute and Pace University Land Use Law Center. (2000). Conducting 
conflict assessments in the land use context: A manual. Cambridge, MA: Consensus Building Institute. 
89 Fisher, R. and Ury, W. (1991). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in. New York, 
NY: Penguin. 
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The assessor then prepares a draft conflict assessment report (yobi hōkoku sho).  
The report categorizes and maps the interests of the stakeholders.  The report 
does not ascribe specific statements to individual interviewees.  For example, the 
report might say “Several stakeholders expressed concerns about the issue of X.” 
instead of “Mr. A expressed his concerns in …”  In preparing the report, the 
assessor prepares a “matrix,” summarizing categories of stakeholders and their 
views on key issues.  The matrix is used to structure the assessment even though 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Five-step Consensus Building Process Diagram in Japanese and 
English 
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it is not always included in the report.  At the end of the report, a list of 
interviewees is attached in order to demonstrate that a full range of stakeholders 
was contacted90.   
The draft report, including a recommendation regarding whether to proceed 
with consensus building, is distributed to all interviewees, including the convenor, 
in order to make sure that everyone’s interests are clearly represented.  Feedback 
is gathered by the assessor.  The convenor is not given a chance to review the 
draft before it is distributed to the other interviewees.  After incorporating 
stakeholder feedback, the assessor distributes the final report to the public as his 
or her assessment of the situation.  The submission of the report concludes the 
contract between the convenor and the assessor. 
After reviewing the conflict assessment, the convenor decides whether to 
initiate a consensus building process.  If the convenor decides to move forward 
with the process, he or she convenes the first meeting.  The assessor can assist 
the convenor in choosing the appropriate representatives to be invited to the 
meeting.  In some instances, a small group of key stakeholders is convened to 
form a steering committee.  The steering committee jointly prepares for the first 
meeting of all stakeholder representatives.  The assessor does not have to 
become the mediator for the full group.  In some cases, the steering committee 
                                                 
90 Note: This advice has not been transferred to Japan until recently.  In the experimental process 
described in Chapter 6, participating mediators were not aware of this when they started the process 
because I did not give instructions for it before starting the experiment (see p. 231). 
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evaluates proposals from multiple candidates for the mediator position and 
chooses the one that everyone prefers.   
The Consensus Building Institute has prepared a number of conflict 
assessments.  For example, it has prepared an assessment of stakeholders for the 
Northern Oxford County Coalition (NOCC).  The coalition was a group of 
stakeholders in Maine focused on pollution and public health concerns caused by 
the area's major employer, a large pulp and paper mill91.  A stakeholder analysis 
report for the NOCC has been translated by the author into Japanese as an 
example of stakeholder analysis in the US92.  Another example is the one 
prepared to assess a dispute over a commercial development in Assembly Square 
in Somerville, Massachusetts.  The highlight of the assessment is its conclusion: 
CBI suggested that stakeholder should not proceed to a consensus building 
process at that time because of pending lawsuits.  A neutral assessor must always 
provide a candid assessment of the possibility of reaching a meaningful 
agreement, even though he or she might be tempted to “sell” the consensus 
building process to potential clients. 
Because of this possible conflict of interest, there are two differing ideas 
regarding hiring an assessor and a mediator for each consensus building process.  
                                                 
91 Consensus Building Institute. (undated). Northern oxford county coalition. [WWW Document] 
URL http://www.cbuilding.org/projects/nocc/index.html (visited 2005, February 14). 
92 Consensus Building Institute. (1995, May 26). Stakeholder analysis: A report to the Northern 
Oxford County Coalition.  
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Some argue that it is most efficient to hire the assessor as the mediator if the 
process goes forward because he or she has become familiar with the interests 
underlying the dispute and developed relationships with each stakeholder93.  On 
the other hand, the possibility of being hired as a mediator to facilitate the actual 
stakeholder meetings gives an incentive for the assessor to offer a 
recommendation in favor of proceeding.  In order to avoid such a conflict of 
interest, assessing and mediation are sometimes deliberately assigned to different 
people.  For example, this often the case with projects administered by the 
Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution94. 
Clarifying responsibilities (sekinin-no-meikaku-ka) 
In the first meeting, the responsibilities of the individuals involved in any 
consensus building process are defined.  A mediator (mediētā), or a team of 
mediators, is introduced to manage of the process.  They moderate stakeholder 
meetings using facilitation (fashiritēshon) techniques—preparing meeting minutes, 
drafting an agreement, and organizing stakeholder caucuses as needed95.  The 
mediator should be knowledgeable about both the process as well as the substance 
                                                 
93 Susskind, L. and Thomas-Larmar, J. (1999). Conducting a conflict assessment. In Susskind, L., 
McKearnan, S. and Thomas-Larmar, J. (Eds.). The consensus building handbook. (pp. 99-136). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. pp. 131-2.; S. McCreary and B. Brooks (personal communication, 
November 19, 2004). 
94 L. Della Porta and J. Adams. (personal communication, November 17, 2004). 
95 In this chapter, the person who assists consensus building processes will be referred to as a 
“mediator.”  However, the person is sometimes referred to as a “facilitator” or a “process manager” 
in the US.  For example, Federal Highway Administration prefers the term “facilitator.”  See, 
FHWA and USIECR. (2002). Collaborative problem solving: Better and streamlined outcomes for all. 
Washington, DC. 
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of the discussions.  Because the mediator will handle the flow of communication 
among stakeholder representatives, it is imperative that he or she understands the 
language, including technical jargon, and is familiar with the local geography.  A 
mediator in a consensus building process is not simply a process manager but also 
an active assistant to the stakeholders in their problem-solving efforts96.  This 
non-partisan intervener is sometimes referred to as a facilitator (fashiritētā).  
Even though there are many discussions about the difference between a facilitator 
and a mediator, the differences are not crucial in designing a process because 
responsibilities must be clearly defined no matter what title is bestowed97.  In 
Japan, the role of facilitator has been recognized in the field of urban planning in 
the last few years, especially in the context of “workshop (wāku-shoppu)” style 
meetings.  The range of assignments given to Japanese facilitators, however, is 
quite limited: they are often brought in just to manage workshop meetings. 
A recorder (kiroku-sha) is often introduced as an assistant to the mediator.  
The recorder writes down key elements of each participant’s comments on a flip 
chart as the discussion moves forward.  The purpose of having the discussion 
recorded simultaneously is to create a “group memory” that meeting participants 
                                                 
96 Forester, J. (1999). Dealing with deep value differences. In Susskind, L., McKearnan, S. and 
Thomas-Larmar, J. (Eds.). The consensus building handbook. (pp. 463-494). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. pp. 466-7.  Forester, J. (1999). The deliberative practitioner. Cambridge, MA: MIT.  
97 Susskind, L., Amundsen, O. and Matsuura, M. (1999). Using assisted negotiation to settle land use 
disputes. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute for Land Policy.; FHWA and USIECR (2002). 
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can refer to as they progress98.   
The responsibilities of observers (bōchō-sha) must be determined.  First of all, 
stakeholder representatives have to decide whether to admit observers to their 
meetings.  In consensus building processes dealing with public policy issues, it is 
usual to allow the public to observe in order to ensure accountability99.  
Observers have to agree to abide by certain rules of conduct.  For example, they 
must refrain from disrupting conversations.  When they enter the meeting room, 
they must be given a statement that describes their responsibilities as observers.   
Finally, the responsibilities of each participant must be defined.  Each 
participant is supposed to represent a certain category of stakeholders who share 
an interest in the process and the outcome of the discussions.  Therefore, 
participants are expected to represent not just their own views but the groups they 
represent.  They are also expected to keep their group members informed on the 
meetings proceed.  Even though the discussion does not proceed in a highly 
formal fashion, such as the one prescribed by Robert’s Rules of Order, 
participants are expected to cooperate to make the most of each session100.  In 
order to allow the meeting facilitator to manage the meetings in a disciplined way, 
guidelines for participant conduct are usually agreed upon ahead of time. 
                                                 
98 Doyle M. and Straus, D. (1982). How to make meetings work. New York, NY: Jove. 
99 Susskind, L. (1999). An alternative to Robert’s rules of order for groups, organizations, and ad hoc 
assemblies that want to operate by consensus. In Susskind, L., McKearnan, S., and Thomas-Larmer, J. 
(Eds.) The consensus building handbook. (pp. 3-57). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. p. 25 
100 Robert H. M (1990). Robert’s rules of order (9th ed.). New York, NY: Scott Foresman. 
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All these responsibilities are codified in a document called ground rules 
(kiyaku).  The document describes the mission of this collective body of 
stakeholders.  The convenor should explicitly explain its expectations— what 
needs be decided by when—at the outset and include this information in the 
ground rules.  Ground rules, then, describe the responsibilities of participants, 
their alternates, other members of the public, the mediator, and other staff 
involved.  Ground rules also describe how the group will make decisions, how 
its proceedings will be made public (including the relationship with the media), 
and how subgroups will be formed if necessary.  An illustrative example of 
ground rules—for Delaware’s Coastal Zone Act Regulatory Advisory 
Committee—is included in the Consensus Building Handbook101. 
In addition to ground rules, the group has to have an agenda (giji shidai).  The 
agenda describes which issues will be discussed in what order.  It should also 
explain: How many meetings will be held at which intervals?  What will be 
discussed at each meeting?  How subcommittees will be organized and for what 
purposes?  By when is the group expected to reach an agreement?   
These all have to be agreed by all participants before deliberations start.  First, 
the mediator has to be accepted by everyone.  Second, the ground rules and the 
agenda have to be endorsed by all participants.  Without these elements wholly 
endorsed by all stakeholders at the outset, the process can fall apart in the middle, 
                                                 
101 Susskind, L. and Thomas-Larmar, J. (1999). pp. 124-7. 
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especially when those who have an interest in maintaining the status quo question 
the legitimacy of the mediator or the process.  Others might simply ignore the 
ground rules and disrupt the flow of the discussion.  Still others might want to 
discuss an issue that is completely off the agenda.  Even though such unexpected 
demands cannot be subdued completely, the likelihood of encountering serious 
barriers to consensus building can be reduced by reaching unanimous agreement 
ahead of time regarding the mediator, ground rules, and the agenda in the 
beginning. 
Deliberating (shin-gi) 
Consensus building processes are relatively straightforward once the actual 
deliberations begin.  They are similar to conventional blue-ribbon committees 
(shingikai) and other types of participatory committees (iinkai) in Japan in that 
members meet periodically face-to-face across a table102.  Each meeting is 
scheduled according to the agenda, which is agreed to by everyone at the first 
meeting.  The mediator works with stakeholders to prepare necessary reference 
documents for each meeting, inviting outside experts, managing the discussions, 
and preparing minutes (meeting summary: giji-yōshi) of what has been agreed.  
Meeting summaries must be agreed to by all participants, often at the outset of the 
subsequent meeting, before they are published. 
                                                 
102 For more information about the shingikai, see Schwartz, F. (1998). Advice and Consent: The 
politics of consultation in Japan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
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A technique that is particularly important in consensus building processes 
dealing with technical and scientific information is joint fact-finding (kyōdō jijitsu 
kakunin).  Public policy disputes are often intertwined with scientific questions.  
For example, the design of a highway hinges on the forecasted volume of traffic 
in the future.  Traffic volume is usually calculated by using elaborate traffic 
projection models that incorporate many exogenous parameters, such as land use 
patterns, population growth, and economic growth. 
When scientific information is one of the key factors in determining the level of 
benefits and impacts associated with different alternatives, each disputing party 
often cites contradicting scientific evidence to support its position.  This model 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Visual simulations of an offshore wind farm from the project sponsor  
(left) and an opposition group (right). 
 
Source: Cape Wind web site (left), Alliance to  
Protect Nantucket Sound web site (right) 
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of scientific advising in policy-making is known as adversary science103.  For 
example, in a dispute over the construction of an offshore wind farm in 
Massachusetts, both proponents and opponents released completely different 
projections of potential visual impacts (see Figure 2-3).  Each group postulated a 
different context to depict proposed wind towers, as is obvious from the visual 
simulations.  However, neither rendering is technically erroneous.  In a 
stakeholder dialogue process organized by the Massachusetts Technology 
Collaborative, it was recognized that both renderings are similar in terms of 
turbine location and dimensions104.   
Joint fact-finding has been introduced as an alternative to adversary science as 
well as to incorporate the best available scientific information into public 
deliberations.   It is a process through which participants “jointly frame research 
questions, specify the method of inquiry, select the researchers, and monitor the 
work, injecting their concerns at every appropriate point.105”  First, the 
stakeholders identifies key issues to be analyzed scientifically and other necessary 
technical information they are seeking.  The mediator then suggests a list of 
scientists who might be of help to the group.  The group must reach a consensus 
on the choice of such advisors.  Without an explicit agreement, some members 
                                                 
103 McCreary, S., Gamman, J. and Brooks, B. (2001) Refining and testing joint fact-finding for 
environmental dispute resolution: Ten years of success. Mediation Quarterly, 18(4). 329-348. 
104 Raab, J. (2005, October 2). Engaging stakeholders in energy and environmental policy and 
technology decision making in the United States. Presentation at the International Workshop on Social 
Decision Making Process. Tokyo, Japan.  
105 Ozawa, C. and Susskind, L. (1985). Mediating science-intensive policy disputes. Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, 5(1), 23-39. p. 33 
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are likely to question the validity of their advisors’ findings when they contradict 
initial stakeholder positions.  In some instances, scientists who have already 
sided with disputing parties are invited to the deliberation so that the stakeholders 
can fully understand the differences in assumptions and models behind conflicting 
conclusions.   
Scientific advisors must not have an interest in the outcome of the discussion, 
in the same way a mediator must maintain neutrality.  It is also desirable for the 
advisors to have the ability to present their findings in a way that can be 
understood by laypersons. 
Deciding (kettei) 
At some point in the discussion, the mediator should start preparing a draft 
agreement (gōi so-an).  Drafts should not be prepared by each stakeholder 
because they will be tempted to employ wording and tone most favorable to their 
own interest.  This is one of the tasks that can be undertaken most efficiently by 
a mediator.  The mediator brings the draft to each stakeholder in turn to see 
improvements they might have to suggest in order to maximize the likelihood of 
consensus.  This method is known as the single text approach (tan-itsu bunsho 
tetsuzuki), which is often used in the field of international diplomacy. 
Mediators should seek consensual decisions.  In order to find solutions that 
are acceptable to everyone involved, a mediator should suggest a package of 
solutions that allows parties to trade across issues of differing importance to them.  
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The idea of value creation through trades was first articulated by Vilfred Pareto, 
an Italian sociologist of the early 20th century.  By trading an item that has more 
value to other parties than one’s self, both parties can increase their level of 
satisfaction.  This mutual gains approach to negotiation is applicable to the 
agreement-seeking process in consensus building as well106.  The mediator 
should be alert to possible trades informed by the information gathered through 
participation in the dialogue as well as from the initial conflict assessment. 
Even though a unanimous agreement is always desirable, the process should 
not be protracted simply because a few participants might not agree with any 
proposal.  In practice, consensus building processes are occasionally concluded 
by an overwhelming agreement; however, Susskind says, “it would be hard to 
make a claim for consensus having been reached if fewer than 80 percent of the 
participants in a group were not in agreement.107”   
Each representative should sign the agreement108.  Once the agreement is 
reached among the stakeholder representatives, the agreement needs to be ratified 
by their constituents.  Ratification should not be difficult if each representative 
has tried to keep his or her constituents informed about the progress of the 
discussions.   
                                                 
106 Susskind, L., Levy, P., & Thomas-Larmer, J. (Eds.) (2000). Negotiating environmental 
agreements: How to avoid escalating confrontation, needless costs, and unnecessary litigation. 
Washington, DC: Island Press. 
107 Susskind, L.(1999). p. 33 
108 This advice was also not given to participating mediators in the experimental process when it 
started.  
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Implementing agreements (gōi-jikō no jitsugen) 
Consensus building does not end with the production of an agreement.  
Implementation is a part of the process.  Because consensus building does not 
substitute for formal decision-making by elected and appointed officials, 
agreements need to be linked to formal decisions.  An agreement is 
“recommendation” from a stakeholder group, even if government officials 
participated directly in the dialogue.  The stakeholder group should work to gain 
public support for their agreement.  The mediator can help by arranging 
meetings with high-ranking government officials, preparing press releases, and 
promoting the agreement to the media. 
When the agreement requires adjustments in order to respond to contingent 
situations, monitoring is crucial.  In such instances, arrangements to monitor 
implementation of an agreement must be incorporated into any final accord.  A 
mediator can assist stakeholders during the monitoring phase as well.  He or she 
can administer necessary technical studies from a neutral standpoint.   
The mediator can administer the funds required to compensate for unexpected 
outcomes.  For example, when abutters of an industrial development are worried 
about its possible impacts on their health in the future, the developer can deposit a 
certain amount of money held to be held in trust and paid to those who actually 
incur damages in the future109.  Such a contingent agreement can facilitate 
                                                 
109 Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J. (1987). p. 126. 
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consensus building because differences in estimates of likely outcomes can be 
finessed: abutters believe that such impacts will surface, and developers usually 
do not.  The mediator can offer to become the manager of the trust. 
No matter how an agreement is framed, stakeholders might want to reconvene 
and discuss how an agreement is being implemented.  The mediator can help 
them to reconvene and discuss newly emergent issues. 
Rationale for using consensus building processes 
A variety of benefits from adopting consensus building, instead of other 
conventional approaches to public participation, have been suggested by 
practitioners as well as theorists.   
Susan Carpenter and W.J.D. Kennedy illustrate four types of conventional 
strategies of government officials in dealing with public disputes110.  In 
particular, what they call “the Solomon Trap” crisply illustrates the problem of 
conventional public participation111.  It is a four-step process.  First, a public 
official solicits inputs from the public.  Second, the official prescribes a solution 
by referencing those inputs.  Third, stakeholding groups attack the official’s 
decision because it does not incorporate all of their requests.  Finally, the official 
is forced into a position to defend his or her decision.  When multiple 
                                                 
110 Carpenter S. and Kennedy W. J. D. (1988). Managing public disputes: A practical guide to 
handling conflict and reaching agreements. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
111 Carpenter S. and Kennedy W. J. D. (1988). pp. 22-26. 
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stakeholders have different interests, it is theoretically impossible to satisfy all of 
their requests.  However, the heightened expectation on the stakeholders’ side 
through the invitation to participate leads to frustration because all their requests 
have not been incorporated into a final decision. 
As an alternative to the conventional participatory approach that is likely to 
draw public officials into the Solomon Trap, they can step aside and take the role 
of facilitators who engage stakeholders to find a consensus-based solution112.  
Carpenter and Kennedy find the following five characteristics in such alternative 
approaches: 
• The decision maker is a facilitator; 
• The focus is on solving a problem; 
• Parties meet face to face to work out differences 
• Parties help shape the process; and 
• Decisions are made by consensus113. 
 
The consensus building process, described in the previous section, encompasses 
all five features.  When I recommend using consensus building processes to 
Japanese audiences, I use this line of argument (see Figure 2-4).  Therefore, 
consensus building processes have been suggested to Japanese audiences as an 
alternative to conventional participatory approach. 
                                                 
112 Susskind L. and Ozawa C (1984). Mediated negotiation in the public Sector: Planner as mediator. 
Journal of Planning Education and Research, 4(1), 5-15.  
113 Carpenter, S. and Kennedy, W.J.D. (1988). pp. 26-29. 
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The use of consensus building processes not only allows public officials to 
avoid falling into the Solomon Trap but also to produce positive outcomes.  
Susskind suggests four good outcomes of negotiated agreements: fairness, 
efficiency, wisdom, and stability114.   
                                                 
114 Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J. (1987). pp. 21-33. 
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alternative approach to Japanese audiences 
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Evaluating consensus building efforts 
Evaluation of consensus building efforts has been an essential part of the 
expansion of the field.  The practice of consensus building in the US has been 
evaluated periodically since the 1980s.  Gail Bingham published one of the first 
evaluations in 1986.  In the late 1990s, the Consensus Building Institute 
evaluated 100 cases of consensus building in the US through interviews.  More 
recently, the US Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution—an independent 
federal agency that promotes the use of consensus building in environmental 
policy-making—has been working to develop a framework for evaluating 
individual cases. 
Each consensus building effort can be measured in terms of process and 
outcome.  Evaluation of processes focuses on how effectively interactions were 
managed during the consensus building dialogue, while evaluation of outcomes 
tends to focus on the distribution of gains and losses before and after the dialogue.  
Even though process and outcome are not completely independent, this 
demarcation provides a convenient framework for evaluating consensus building 
efforts.  Judith Innes suggests the following 22 evaluation criteria, 8 for process 
and 14 for outcomes: 
• Criteria about Process 
− The consensus building process includes representatives of all 
relevant and significantly different interests. 
− The process is driven by a purpose that is practical and shared by the 
group. 
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− It is self-organizing 
− It follows the principles of civil discourse 
− It adapts and incorporates high quality information 
− It encourages participants to challenge assumptions 
− It keeps participants at the table, interested, and learning 
− It seeks consensus only after discussions fully explore the issues and 
interests and significant effort was made to find creative responses to 
differences 
• Criteria to Assess Outcomes 
− The process produced a high-quality agreement. 
− It ended stalemate. 
− It compared favorably with other planning or decision methods in 
terms of costs and benefits. 
− It produced feasible proposals from political, economic, and social 
perspectives. 
− It produced creative ideas for action. 
− Stakeholders gained knowledge and understanding 
− The process created new personal and working relationships and 
social and political capital among participants 
− It produced information and analyses that stakeholders understand 
accept as accurate. 
− Learning and knowledge produced within the consensus process were 
shared by others beyond the immediate group. 
− It had second-order effects, beyond agreements or attitudes developed 
in the process. 
− It resulted in practices and institutions that were both flexible and 
networked, which permitted a community to respond more creatively 
to change and conflict. 
− It produced outcomes that were regarded as just. 
− The outcomes seemed to serve the common good or public interest. 
− The outcomes contributed to the sustainability of natural and social 
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systems115. 
These evaluation criteria will be applied to evaluating the experimental consensus 
building effort described in the Chapter 7 of this dissertation.  It must be noted, 
however, that assessing the outcomes other than the contents of agreements is 
difficult because “they may not be identifiable long after a process is over.116” 
Conclusion 
As reviewed in this chapter, consensus building has become a highly 
formalized process in the US.  Even though process designs are usually tailored 
to each dispute or public participation effort, a considerable body of codified 
practice and examples is available for would-be adopters.  In fact, there is a 
“mushrooming” body of literature on public dispute resolution and consensus 
building processes117.  There are also US experts willing to act as resources, and 
some Japanese with growing skills and knowledge. 
As I suggested in the introduction of this dissertation, however, there is great 
danger in transplanting consensus building processes from the US to Japan 
without considering important differences in the context in the two countries.  
Consensus building techniques for public dispute resolution have been developed 
primarily in the context of urban and environmental planning in the US.  
                                                 
115 Innes, J. (1999). Evaluating consensus building. In Susskind, L., McKearnan, S. and 
Thomas-Larmar, J. (Eds.). The consensus building handbook. (pp. 631-675). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage. 
116 Innes, J. (1999). p. 640. 
117 Forester, J. (1999). The deliberative practitioner: Encouraging participatory planning processes. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. p. 165. 
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Therefore, such techniques are unlikely to be useful without further adaptation to 
the Japanese context.  In the next chapter, I will review theories pertaining to the 
international transfer of social technologies that might be useful in analyzing such 
adaptation of consensus building techniques. 
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Chapter 3: Analyzing the International Transfer of 
Social Technology 
Introduction 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to explore the interaction between 
context and governmental policy-making mechanisms by analyzing an instance of 
transferring the consensus building idea from the US to Japan.  As we reviewed 
in the previous chapter, consensus building processes have been developed 
primarily in the United States since the 1970s.  Therefore, it is likely that these 
processes are influenced by contextual factors in the United States where these 
processes have developed over 30 years.   
A number of institutional factors peculiar to the US may explain the emergence 
of consensus building in the US.  On the other hand, the institutional context in 
the US might have been the key to the success of consensus building in America.  
They might have been transformed over 30 years to respond to the unique 
demands in the US.  Consensus building processes, as they exist today, reflect a 
series of successes and failures in the field.  For instance, several philanthropic 
organizations in the US offered generous support for the application of dispute 
resolution techniques to environmental disputes.  These eventually evolved into 
consensus building processes.  Were it not for this initial investment by these 
organizations in the 1970s, would consensus building have been used at all?  If 
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those processes are transferred to a country where funding from philanthropic 
sources is not available, can the neutrality of mediators, paid by one of 
stakeholders, be assured? 
The “embeddedness118” of consensus building processes in the US context 
requires close attention to a possible cultural clash when they are transplanted to a 
different location.  If these processes are applied in foreign locations without any 
modification, they are unlikely to produce agreements as they do in the US. 
The impact of contextual differences on the international transfer of social 
technologies—the term which I employ to contrast them to physical 
technologies—has been studied by various academic disciplines.  In order to 
investigate the relationship between consensus building—a kind of social 
technology—and its context, lessons from studies of the relationship between 
other types of social technologies and their context are helpful in developing a 
theoretical framework for this dissertation research. 
In this chapter, I will review a range of theories pertaining to the international 
transfer of social technology with a special focus on the implications of contextual 
differences.  There are three categories of literature that I will focus on: 
international policy transfer, international transfer of organizational innovations, 
and the relationship between culture and negotiation.  In order to further my 
                                                 
118 Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. 
American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481-510. 
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discussion for the implication of context to social technologies, I will briefly 
review institutional theories on the relationship between institutions and 
individual actions.  By drawing lessons from a wide range of academic 
discipline, I will try to develop a model for analyzing an instance of transferring 
consensus building processes as an occasion of process adaptation and 
organizational change. 
International policy transfer 
For a variety of reasons government agencies around the world have introduced 
new policy initiatives by learning from experiences elsewhere, including those in 
foreign countries119.  Researchers have studied these phenomena from different 
perspectives—such as policy transfer, policy diffusion, policy convergence, policy 
learning, and lesson drawing120—even though they all have a common theme of 
studying “how policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one 
political setting (past or present) are used in the development of policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting.121” 
                                                 
119 Helco, H. (1974). Modern social politics in Britain and Sweden. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press. 
120 Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (2000). Learning from abroad: The role of policy transfer in 
contemporary policy-making. Governance, 13(1), 5-24. p. 5.; Stone, D. (2000, December). Learning 
lessons, transferring policy and exporting ideas. International workshop: Diffusion of environmental 
policy innovations. Berlin, Germany. 
121 Evans, M. and Davies, J. (1999). Understanding policy transfer: A multi-level, multi-disciplinary 
perspective. Public Administration, 77(2), 361-385. 
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Lesson drawing 
One of the earliest examples of analytical frameworks for studying 
international policy transfers is “lesson drawing” initially proposed by Richard 
Rose122.  Before lesson drawing, others have analyzed the subject by focusing on 
specific effects of policy transfer, such as the effect of giving “evidence” to the 
effectiveness of proposed policies123.  Rose proposes five alternative ways of 
lesson-drawing: copying, adaptation, making a hybrid, synthesis, and 
inspiration124.  He suggests that copying, a complete imitation of what happened 
elsewhere, is relatively difficult across national boundaries.  He introduces 
adaptation as an effort to adjust “for contextual differences a program already in 
effect in another jurisdiction.125”  Then he discusses the feasibility of lesson 
drawing by introducing the dichotomy of “total fungibility” (i.e., programs are 
applicable anywhere) and “total blockage” (i.e., programs are not applicable 
elsewhere at all).  By drawing on Japanese examples of organizational emulation 
after the Meiji liberation, he suggests that programs can be transferred to other 
countries by adapting them because the reality lies between total fungibility and 
total blockage.  He says, “In the real world we would never expect a program to 
transfer without some adaptation, but equally we would not expect public officials 
to develop a major program in total ignorance of what is being done by 
                                                 
122 Rose, R. (1991). What is lesson-drawing? Journal of Public Policy, 11, 3-29.; Rose, R. (1993). 
Lesson-drawing in public policy. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. 
123 Bennet, C. (1991). How states utilise foreign evidence. Journal of Public Policy, 11, 31-54. 
124 Rose, R. (1993). p. 27-34 
125 Rose, R. (1993). p. 30 
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counterparts elsewhere126.”  He also suggests that the lessons need to be “doubly 
desirable,” meaning that they have to be practical in the eyes of technical experts 
as well as attractive to politicians who make the ultimate decision to introduce a 
program to a country127. 
Policy transfer 
There is a growing interest in policy transfer among European researchers 
particularly after the increased influence of the European Union as a supranational 
body—a trend known as “Europeanization.128”  Bearing in mind the European 
context, Dolowitz and Marsh claim that the lesson-drawing framework, which is 
reviewed above, focuses only on “voluntary” policy transfers initiated by those 
who draw lessons from elsewhere129.  They argue that there are “coercive” kinds 
of policy transfer as well that are imposed by other governments and 
supranational bodies.   
Like Rose, the new generation of European “policy transfer” researchers 
support the importance of adaptation by pointing to failures that have already 
been caused by ignorance of cultural and institutional differences between two 
countries.  For instance, in an introduction to case studies of policy transfers 
from the US to Britain, Dolowitz says, “Particularly influential in the emergence 
                                                 
126 Rose, R. (1993). p. 42 
127 Rose, R. (1993). pp. 44-49 
128 Bomberg, E. and Peterson, J. (2000). Policy transfer and Europeanization: Passing the Heineken 
test? [On-line Serial] Queen’s Papers on Europeanization, 2. Belfast, UK: Queen’s University Press. 
129 Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (1996). Who learns what from whom: A review of the policy transfer 
literature. Political Studies, XLIV, 343-357. 
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of problems was policy makers’ failure to adapt American (and other foreign) 
models appropriately to their new setting, despite continual claims that they 
understood the importance of adapting 'foreign' models before implementing 
them130.”  Dolowitz and Marsh categorized unsuccessful transfers into three 
types commonly observed in policy transfer131: 
Uninformed transfer: The borrowing country may have insufficient information 
about the policy/institution and how it operates in the country from which it is 
transferred; 
Incomplete transfer: Crucial elements of what made the policy or institutional 
structure a success in the originating country may not be transferred, leading to 
failure; and 
Inappropriate transfer: Insufficient attention may be paid to the differences 
between the economic, social, political and ideological contexts in the 
transferring and the borrowing country132. 
The third kind of failure, inappropriate transfer, relates to the problems that occur 
after not adapting transferred policy instruments to the local context.   
Policy transfer theorists have been focusing on developing insights that can be 
applied to analyzing actual instances of policy transfer.  For instance, Dolowitz 
and Marsh’s model entails asking the following six questions: 
                                                 
130 Dolowitz, D. (Eds.) (2000). Policy transfer and British social policy: learning from the USA? 
Buckingham, PA: Open University Press. p. 1. 
131 In evaluating policy transfer they focus on “the extent to which policy transfer achieves the aims 
set by a government (p. 17)” while admitting the difficulty of defining success and failure. 
132 Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (2000). p. 17. 
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• Why do actors engage in policy transfer; 
• Who are they key actors involved in the policy transfer process; 
• What is transferred; 
• From where are lessons drawn; 
• What are the different degrees of transfer; and 
• What restricts or facilitates the policy transfer process.133 
 
These questions have been used to analyze a variety of instances of policy 
transfer134. 
Policy transfers to Japan 
Even though there are numerous examples of lesson drawing by various entities 
in Japan, as reviewed in Chapter 1, the actual process of transfer has not been 
studied empirically or systematically in a way that would respond to the six 
questions above135.  Koichi Nakano recently published a thorough study of the 
transfer of agencification policies from Britain to Japan136.  In 1996, a report on 
the British “Next Step” initiative for agencification, which was prepared by a few 
Japanese economic bureaucrats, caught the attention of a parliamentarian who 
was seeking for an idea for restructuring the government agencies in Japan.  
Because the idea of agencification facilitated the implementation of the LDP’s 
political agenda for the reduction in the size of central departments, the British 
model was transferred to Japan.  The final form of the agencification policy in 
                                                 
133 Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (2000). p. 8. 
134 Dolowitz, D. (Eds.) (2000).  
135 I will discuss Westney (1987) as a study of organizational change. 
136 Nakano, K. (2004). Cross-national transfer of policy ideas: Agencification in Britain and Japan. 
Governance, 17(2), 169-188. 
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Japan, however, is substantially different because “the civil service culture, the 
political incentive structures, and the legal-institutional frameworks were all 
different137.” 
Transnational networks of environmental activists 
I have so far reviewed theories on policy transfer that primarily focus on the 
behavior of government agencies and the performance of transferred policy 
instruments.  In recent years, however, there is a growing body of literature on 
the role of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in the 
international diffusion of environmental concerns, following their increasing 
influence in the policy-making arena in the last few decades138.  INGOs and 
other types of transnational environmental activists groups work toward their goal 
of transferring and implementing certain environmental policies by collaborating 
with a range of local non-governmental actors across borders.  The chance of 
their proposals evolving into actual environmental policy in the target country 
hinges on the political opportunity structure, which involves “those aspects of the 
political systems that shape the degree and avenues of access that individuals and 
groups have to political processes.139”   
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Like policy transfer theorists, various authors argue that transferred ideas for 
environmentalism need to be adapted, translated, or reframed for the context of 
the target location140.  An interesting feature of their strategies for policy change 
in foreign locations, however, is the use of “fluid approach” which focuses on 
changes in “the boundaries of what is considered acceptable behavior141.”  
Wapner elaborates his arguments as follows: 
States and economic actors ... are constructed and motivated by cultural frames 
of reference.  As a result, their nature, purposes, behavior and self-understanding 
get redefined as cultural frames themselves change. When NGOs try to shift the 
terms of cultural reference, then, they are not merely targeting ordinary citizens 
but are influencing the ideational structure within which states and corporations 
also operate142. 
For example, they promote movies with certain messages and engage local people 
in conservation activities in order to transform public perceptions on certain 
environmental issues.  Such transformations provide more political opportunities 
for social movements in the target country by legitimizing their values and 
                                                                                                                                                    
movement: Social movements, collective action and politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press. 
140 Steinberg, P. and Garcia-Johnson, R. (2001, February) Transnational environmental actors: Toward 
an integrated approach. Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention. 
Chicago, IL.; Jencar-Webster, B. (1998). Environmental movements and social change in the 
transition countries. In Baker, S. and Jehlicka, P. (Eds.) Dilemmas of Transition. (pp. 69-90). London, 
UK: Frank Cass.; Doyle, T. (2002). Environmental campaigns against mining in Australia and the 
Philippines, Mobilization, 7(1), 29-42. 
141 Wapner, P. (1995). Politics beyond the state: Environmental activism and world civil politics. 
World Politics, 47, 311-340. p. 326. 
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norms143.  Those strategies of INGOs for policy transfer are noteworthy because 
they suggest the possibility of “indirect” policy transfers by manipulating with the 
political opportunity structure for its advantage, rather than fighting against it as a 
barrier to the transfer.  
International transfer of organizational innovations 
International transfer of innovations 
Not only ideas for public policy are transferred internationally.  There is a rich 
body of writing that addresses international transfers of organizational forms and 
management techniques.  In particular, the rise of Japan as an economic 
powerhouse in the 1980s triggered interest among American researchers as to how 
Japanese techniques for organizational management, such as the Total Quality 
Management (TQM) and Toyota’s renowned Just-In-Time (JIT) method, could be 
transferred to the US144.  In more recent years, the rise of Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) following the trend toward globalization are particularly 
concerned about the effectiveness and the appropriate adaptation of their 
manufacturing processes and other production functions at their oversea 
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operations. 
Frameworks for transferring organizational innovations 
The influence of various contexts on the effectiveness of transferring 
organizational innovations has been studied by several researchers with a focus on 
the adaptation of the transferred technologies.  Jensen and Szulanski argue, 
“There is significant agreement … that some level of adaptation of firm specific 
assets is necessary to ensure the long-term survival of the subsidiary145.”  
Various authors have argued for adaptation in international technology transfer 
because of differences in culture146; social, organizational, and relational 
contexts147; and the “stickiness” of such international transfers148.  However, in 
the past MNCs in fact did little to adapt their own technologies to conditions in 
developing countries149.   
Several authors have suggested frameworks for thinking about adaptation in the 
transfer of production processes and other types of social technologies.  In 
particular, Mark Young suggests the following three strategies for adaptation by 
focusing on the introduction of Japanese manufacturing models to the US: 
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• To maintain Japanese manufacturing practices as they are employed in 
Japan; 
• To modify some or all of the Japanese practices, but to maintain the current 
features of the U.S. manufacturing environment; and 
• To modify some or all of the Japanese practices as well as the current 
features of the U.S. manufacturing environment150. 
By analyzing a few imported Japanese practices in the US, he suggests that the 
third strategy would be most promising.   
Other authors have also studied such transfers of production processes from 
Japan to the U.S. since the 1980s.  Lillrank reviews two failed instances of 
transferring ideas for the Quality Control Circle (QCC) and Time-based 
Competition (TBC) to the US and suggests that those ideas should be first 
abstracted and recreated to fit the local contexts151.  On the other hand, research 
and development centers in the U.S. owned by Japanese firms, which attempted to 
espouse American ways of management, gradually pulled toward the Japanese 
models because of their close relationships with their headquarters in Japan152. 
In general, the literature on the transfer of organizational innovations across 
borders suggest the existence of complex interactions between social technologies 
and the local context (after they are transferred).  Although several authors have 
focused only on the adaptation of such innovations, others have hinted at possible 
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changes in the “receiving” environment as a side effect of such transfers. 
Imitation and innovation: organizational emulations in Meiji Japan153 
For this dissertation, D. Eleanor Westney’s detailed analysis of the introduction 
of various institutional arrangements to Japan from abroad—the police, postal 
system, and the press—after the Meiji Restoration in 1867 is particularly 
instructive in suggesting a model for analyzing the transfer of consensus building 
processes.  She says,   
… while the resort to foreign organizational models in Meiji Japan was 
voluntary, the selection of models was constrained by a number of considerations 
which were "rational" by most standards, but which were not based primarily on 
the considerations of optimal compatibility with the Japanese environment that 
underlie the “rational shopper” image. ... Georges Bousquet, a French advisor to 
the early Meiji government, described his observations of Japanese organizational 
development as follows: 
… The last thing the Japanese consent to study is their own country, their 
needs, their own aptitudes; it is a question, in their opinion, not of knowing 
themselves, but of transforming themselves; not of what they are, but of what they 
want to become. ...  
The fit between the new institutions and their social environment was not the 
result of the perspicacity of the organization-builders nor of some kind of uncanny 
compatibility between the new and the existing social structures, but of the 
capacity of the new institutions for transforming the environment. ... The selective 
invocation of elements of the past, reinterpreted in the light of the needs of the 
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present, was an important part of the organizational development process in Meiji 
Japan, as it still is in Japan today154. 
First, she suggests the importance of changing the receiving environment, as well 
as adapting the imported innovation, when introducing a new institutional 
arrangement from a foreign country.  As suggested by other researchers 
reviewed in this section, international transfers of organizational innovations 
require appropriate adaptations of the imported innovations because local contexts 
can limit the effectiveness of newly imported systems.  In addition, she identifies 
various strategies that newly created organizations in Meiji Japan used to change 
the receiving environment by influencing people’s behaviors and perceptions.  
For instance, entrepreneurs of the Japanese postal service, which originally 
emulated the British model, successfully improved the public perception of its 
subcontractors in order to recruit well-qualified subcontractors and expand its 
network rapidly.  They also aggressively advertised and promoted the use of the 
postal service (e.g., by introducing prestamped postcards) in order to develop a 
market base required for organizational survival.  Those efforts to influence the 
environment, coupled with their own adaptations, could have improved the 
chance of their survival in the turbulent society after the Meiji restoration. 
Second, her case studies of entrepreneurs who designed new institutions after 
the Meiji Restoration suggest the possibility of learning from a foreign system in 
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a way that does not necessarily offer the best solution for the receiving society.  
Instead, the act of learning from foreign country could have a meaning in itself.  
Reformers in the Meiji Period introduced foreign innovations not only for the 
practical benefits from institutionalizing new organizations, but also in line with 
their personal beliefs about what Japanese society should be.  Policy transfer 
theorists, reviewed in the previous section, would probably consider such policy 
transfers as “inappropriate” because of their incompatibility with local 
conditions155.  Westney’s analysis, however, demonstrates the possibility of 
exploiting incompatibility to push for changes in the social context with which 
imported organizational innovations are supposed to fit. 
Transferring and institutionalizing negotiation and dispute resolution 
processes 
The international transfer of negotiation and dispute resolution techniques is an 
arena on which researchers have recently started to focus.  Even though there 
have not been many empirical studies of actual transfers, compared to the other 
fields of practice reviewed above, theoretical discussions particularly of the 
relationship between “culture” and the practice of negotiation and dispute 
resolution have continued for more than a decade.  In this section, those 
discussions, as well as emerging theories of conflict management systems design, 
will be reviewed. 
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Conceptual frameworks of the relationship between culture and the practice of 
negotiation and dispute resolution 
Culture is perhaps one of the prominent contexts that influence the 
effectiveness of negotiation and dispute resolution efforts.  In the past, several 
researches have tried to identify the relationship between nationality and 
negotiating behavior156.  Culture isn’t, however, a variable determined solely by 
a negotiator’s nationality.  Using the term “culture” can add confusion to 
scholarly discussions because people often assume different definitions of the 
term.  Attributing a “culture” to a particular population can lead to ignorance of 
diversity within that population.  For example, “the culture of Native 
Americans” could miss important “cultural” differences among tribes157.  
Organizational affiliation, gender, race, and other social factors also shape cultural 
identity158.  Therefore, studies that compare the practice of negotiation and 
dispute resolution among countries will not automatically reveal the subtle 
relationships between cultural contexts and effective public dispute resolution 
practice.  Instead, we need to “unpackage” a culture through a comprehensive 
examination of such relationships, based on detailed observations of carefully 
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selected instances of public dispute resolution159. 
I will not go into the myriad of discussions over the definition of “culture” 
because this dissertation is not an inquiry into cultural differences.  However, it 
is worth discussing the relationship between “cultural” properties and negotiation 
and dispute resolution strategies which have been studied by a number of authors.  
Jeanne Brett argues that culture influences negotiation in two ways: cultural 
“values” influence negotiators’ interests and priorities while cultural “norms” 
define acceptable behaviors in negotiation160.  In fact, a variety of indicators that 
help us identify such cultural norms have been suggested by anthropologists as 
well as organizational management scholars.  Such examples include, 
individualism-collectivism, power distance, contextuality, and 
monochronicity-polychronicity161. 
The first two indicators are suggested primarily by Geert Hofstede and applied 
to several studies of negotiation behavior162.  Among those four dimensions, the 
individualism-collectivism dimension has been most rigorously studied in the 
field of conflict management163.  A collectivist culture values gains to a group 
over gains to individual members.  Japan is often characterized as a collectivist 
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country164.  Power distance refers to “the extent to which the less powerful 
members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is 
distributed unequally165.”  In a culture where power distance is high, negotiators 
are likely to act according to their social status defined not by the context of each 
negotiation, but by the preexisting social structure. 
The other two dimensions emerged from the work of Edward Hall166. 
Negotiators influenced by a highly contextual culture assume that they share 
relevant information, knowledge, and norms with their counterparts without 
articulating them.  Therefore, contextual negotiators regard the clarification of 
facts and information, which usually takes place in less contextual negotiation, as 
unnecessary.  The monochronicity-polichronicity dimension concerns the sense 
of time.  Those with monochronic conception of time pay attention to and do 
only one thing at a time167.  Time is considered as a tangible resource to be 
allocated to each task.  In polychronic cultures, however, people discuss multiple 
issues at a same time.  According to Hall and Hall, “there is more emphasis on 
completing human transactions than on holding to schedules168.”  Negotiators 
often do not follow prearranged agenda and try to renegotiate formally agreed 
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upon items.  Researchers have identified Japan with high contextuality and 
polychronicity.   
Empirical studies of cultural influence on negotiation and dispute resolution 
One of the earliest comparative studies of dispute resolution practice 
internationally was produced by P. H. Gulliver, an anthropologist.  He studied 
how members of African community negotiated and mediated, and suggested 
differences in the role of mediation across cultures169.  Culture as a research 
agenda, however, has not drawn much attention in the field of international 
negotiation and dispute resolution170.  In recent years, several researchers have 
attempted to relate those four dimensions to differences in behaviors in and 
outcomes of negotiation simulations.  For example, Jeanne Brett and her team of 
international researchers have conducted a negotiation simulation for 228 students 
and managers from France, Russia, Japan, Hong-Kong, Brazil, and the US171.  
They related cultural differences in four dimensions, which are reviewed in the 
previous section, to differences in the level of joint gains created in each 
negotiation session.   
In the domestic U.S. context, there have been efforts to analyze the cultural 
attributes of indigenous people in negotiation and dispute resolution.  In Hawaii, 
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environmental dispute resolution efforts are often related to the concerns of native 
Hawaiians.  In an effort to reach agreement over the management of shared 
forest resources, stakeholders were engaged in a process that incorporates the 
tradition of ho’oponopono, which means “disentangling” in the Hawaiian native 
language172.  According to the tradition, each meeting begins and ends with a 
prayer or a chant.  Other steps uncommon in the US-based public dispute 
resolution processes were introduced to these mediation sessions.  In a case of 
regulatory negotiation following the enactment of the Indian Self-Determination 
and Education Assistance Act, mediators have assisted in investigating indigenous 
approaches to dispute resolution, including prayers and other ritualistic 
requirements173.   
There have been several ethnographic efforts in the US to document the 
relationship between the culture of specific professions and the choice of dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  When Talk Works by Kolb and associates reveals how 
subject matters affect the way practitioners mediate disputes174.  In Beyond 
Winning, Mnookin and others identify the characteristics of various negotiation 
strategies adopted by lawyers175.  Based on extensive interviews with the users 
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of the court systems, Ewick and Silbey illustrate how people differentiate three 
modes of interaction in the face of various legal questions176.  These works 
suggest that the choice of dispute resolution techniques is influenced by the 
context in which these techniques are used. 
International transfer of dispute resolution processes 
The risk of transferring various kinds of techniques for dispute resolution, 
including consensus building processes, has been pointed out by a variety of 
practitioners and researchers.  Franklin Dukes warns about the risk by pointing 
to the innate link between the procedures and the American context as follows:  
While there has been considerable use in other nations of public conflict 
resolution procedures developed in the United States, there is some question about 
their applicability.  The rapid development of the field in the United States has 
much to do with many conditions particular to American society177. 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow raises another point in the context of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR)178, by saying,  
Exportation of ADR techniques and theories must be culturally and politically 
sensitive to the host nations or cultures and recognize that ADR … can be abused, 
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corrupted, or transformed too much when it is 'transplanted'179.   
Her statement suggests the possibility of “too much” adaptation of the ADR 
processes when they are transferred to other locations.  This point is worth 
noting because it suggests the existence of core features of ADR processes that 
should not be transformed even when they are transferred to other locations.   
Finally, the Consensus Building Institute (CBI), a not-for-profit organization 
that specializes in providing consensus building assistance around the world, also 
suggests the following three concerns in importing and exporting these processes: 
their appropriateness to other cultural settings; the risk of ulterior motives held by 
partners in foreign locations; and the lack of process adaptation to new cultural 
contexts180. 
Even though the community of practitioners has worked internationally and 
warns about the risks of transplanting dispute resolution processes across borders 
without modifications, there has not been empirical research that addresses how 
contextual differences between exporting and importing countries influence the 
effectiveness of transplanted process in the new location.  Even though many of 
the practitioners involved understand the need for cultural adaptation, they do not 
know precisely how such process adaptation should be managed.  In fact, this 
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dissertation is an attempt to address this void through observation of an instance 
of international transfer, which will be described in detail after Chapter 5. 
Conflict management systems design (CMSD) 
Aside from the international context, there is a growing body of literature on 
conflict management systems design (CMSD) that suggests an approach to 
institutionalizing processes for handling recurring disputes between its members 
and with external parties more effectively181.  The effort of designing such 
“systems” for each organization, often for privately-owned corporations, is known 
as CMSD.   
Although CMSD is not primarily focused on the “transfer” of conflict 
management systems, it still is relevant to this dissertation in that it informs ways 
of institutionalizing systems at the “importing” location after such ideas are 
transferred from one place to another.   
Slightly different step-based design processes are suggested by different 
authors.  For instance, Ury, Brett, and Goldberg suggest the following four-step 
process for developing dispute resolution systems: getting started; diagnosis and 
design; putting the changes into place; and exit, evaluation, and diffusion182.  
Those steps, starting from stakeholder involvement and ending with 
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institutionalization, are followed in most approaches to CMSD183. 
Theories for CMSD particularly focus on the importance of organizational 
change.  Ury, Brett, and Goldberg suggest that the parties relevant to the kinds of 
dispute to which the new systems will attend should be involved from the outset 
in the process of diagnosis and design184.  Rather than imposing new processes 
for conflict resolution on those parties, designers of new conflict management 
systems are encouraged to involve them and induce a change among them.  
Constantino and Merchant elaborate this point by drawing lessons from 
organization development concepts and techniques, such as Lewin’s three-step 
“unfreezing, movement, and refreezing” process185.  Corinne Benderski adds to 
it by pointing out that failures in CMSD efforts are often triggered by not 
attending to the target organization's implicit cultural norms186.  
In sum, CMSD suggests that an organization has to reflect on its problems with 
its “theories-in-use” for handling conflicts and disputes, and engage in “double 
loop learning” for an organizational change187.  Even though strategies for 
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conflict management should be adapted to the unique setting in each organization, 
the organization may also need to experience a change by abandoning its 
traditional way of managing conflicts. 
Institutional thinking on the relationship between institution and 
individual action 
Unlike the transfer of physical objects, the transfer of social technologies asks 
individuals in the target location to follow what transferred technologies suggest.  
This suggests a potential conflict between individuals who seek to operate by the 
new social technology and the institutions that govern the actions of those 
individuals.  Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.188”  The 
relationship between institutions, organizations, and individuals has been 
investigated by many institutionalists.  In this section I will review two streams 
of institutional thoughts on the relationship between institutions and individual 
action. 
Isomorphism for increased legitimacy 
Studies of organizations have traditionally identified the goal of organizations 
with their survival and self-perpetuation by focusing on the relationship between 
an organization and its environment189.  For an organization to survive, it is 
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imperative that it acquires “legitimacy” within its environment in addition to 
necessary resources for its survival190.  An organization can achieve the 
legitimacy by adapting itself in order to comply with the institutions, such as state 
regulations and social norms, that regulate its environment.   
Early institutionalists in sociology, such as Parsons, Durkheim and Weber, 
regarded institutions as relatively static, beyond the control of individuals 
embedded in the society191.  Such institutions are supposed to guide individuals 
for rational action that ultimately transcend to the bureaucratization of 
organizations.  For example, Weber once referred to such institutions as an “iron 
cage” that binds human beings with formalized rules192. 
Neoinstitutional theorists in the field of sociology, however, view institutions as 
more socially constructed193.  Meyer and Rowan suggest that organizations 
incorporate externally legitimated formal structures even if they are inefficient as 
a means of production194.  The need for legitimacy forces an organization to 
adopt a certain formal structure so that it conforms to institutional pressure rather 
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than proven efficiency.  DiMaggio and Powell advanced the idea of institutional 
isomorphism in order to explain why organizations in a shared context become 
homogeneous195.  These theories address the interaction between organizations 
and their environments. Organizations adapt, albeit the changes may be 
superficial, in order to gain legitimacy. 
Organizational changes by structuring 
Other scholars of organization have offered micro-level views focusing on the 
relationship between the institution of an organization and its members.  In their 
view, institutions reside in each organization rather than in their environments.  
Inspired by structuration theory, recent studies of organizations indicate that the 
influence between the institution and individual action is not a one-way street196.  
Institutions are created and reinforced as a result of repeated interactions, while at 
the same time they regulate such interactions197.  In particular, Stephen Barley 
developed a sequential model of a structuring process in which institutions and 
actions are mediated by scripts which are “outlines of recurrent patterns of 
interaction that define, in observable and behavioral terms, the essence of actors’ 
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roles.198”  He tested the model by closely observing changes in the scripts 
deployed by radiologists and technologists after the introduction of CT scanners 
in hospitals.  Other studies of organizations from this structuration perspective 
also suggest the possibility of members of an organization transforming its 
institutions, or more precisely, its accepted patterns of interaction in order to 
benefit from new technologies199. 
Analytical framework: process adaptation and organizational change 
In this chapter I have so far reviewed theoretical frameworks that are helpful in 
analyzing the transfer of various kinds of social technologies—policy transfer, 
international transfer of organizational innovations, negotiation and dispute 
resolution, and theoretical accounts on the relationship between institutions and 
individual actions.  By applying the lessons from the reviewed literature to my 
initial question of transferring consensus building processes to foreign locations, I 
hypothesize that two types of transformation—process adaptation and 
organizational change—need to occur for any effort to import consensus building 
processes to be successful in helping stakeholders reach an agreement.   
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Need for adaptation 
Consensus building processes must fit with the environment in which they are 
used.  This requires a variety of adaptations for several reasons.  The first is to 
ensure legitimacy.  Potential users of consensus building processes gain 
legitimacy by adjusting some features of the processes to the norms, culture, and 
other dimensions that determine what is legitimate or not in the target country.   
The other reason for adaptation is to take account of the relevant institutional 
arrangements of the country.  For example, if there has already been an 
 Adaptation Change  in the context 
Policy transfer ・ Between total fungibility 
and total blockage 
(Rose) 
・ Problems of 
inappropriate policy 
transfers (Dolowitz and 
Marsh) 
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・ Adaptation of 
transferred innovations 
by MNCs 
— 
Intl. transfer of 
organizational 
innovations 
・ Imitation and innovation (Westney) 
・ Simultaneous modification to Japanese practices and 
U.S. manufacturing environment (Young) 
Negotiation and 
dispute 
resolution 
・ Culture and negotiation 
styles (Brett) 
・ Concerns about cultural 
differences 
(Menkel-Meadow) 
・ Conflict management 
systems design 
(Constantino and 
Merchant) 
Relationship 
between 
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individual 
actions 
・ Myth and ceremony 
(Meyer and Rowan) 
・ Mimetic isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell) 
・ Structuration (Barley) 
 
Figure 3-1: Theories of adaptation and change in the context 
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institutionalized system for negotiation between stakeholders in the foreign 
location, consensus building processes must be adapted so that they can coexist, 
or be integrated with, such established procedures. 
Need for organizational change 
On the other hand, consensus building processes might be effective in a foreign 
location without any process adaptation if the context, in which the processes are 
used, is transformed to match the US.  For instance, stakeholders who are 
participating in a consensus building effort in a foreign location might develop 
their own cultural norms regarding negotiation—similar to such norms in the 
US—through repeated interactions after being influenced by the norms in the US.   
Such transformations in the local culture are sometimes seen as “cultural 
imperialism” imposing American norms and values on other nations; however, 
international transfer of social technologies is nonetheless expanding both in the 
government and corporate sectors.  Patterns of interaction inevitably change in 
order to accommodate the use of newly adopted technologies, as illustrated in 
Barley’s study of the introduction of CT scanners200.  In addition, strategies to 
influence the perception of legitimacy, norms, and values in foreign countries are 
in fact pursued by transnational environmental organizations201.  It is highly 
unlikely that the contextual factors of a foreign location are so inflexible that an 
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imported social technology can’t be operational unless it entirely fits with the new 
context. 
In this dissertation, however, I limit the scope of my investigation into 
transformations in context to “organizational change.”  In the long run, for 
example, accepted patterns of interaction in any policy-making forums in Japan 
might completely change when consensus building processes become ingrained in 
policy-making.  That kind of change, however, is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation because the introduction of consensus building process to Japan has 
just begun and the transformation will probably take place over several decades.  
In addition, it is hard to identify the link between such widespread 
transformations in the society and the introduction of a specific social technology.  
Many other factors can contribute to transformation in the long run. 
Even in a short period of time, for a few pilot tests, however, it is likely that 
some organizational changes will take place in the institutions that utilize 
consensus building process—most likely in the convening agency.  Because 
consensus building processes have been developed by assuming various 
institutional arrangements in the US, organizations that use consensus building in 
Japan might have to assume new patterns of interaction and change their 
theories-in-use during the pilot tests.  Considering that approaches to conflict 
management systems design emphasize the importance of organizational change, 
it is likely that the first-time users of consensus building processes in a foreign 
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location will experience at least some changes in their ways of doing businesses. 
Dual transformation: transfer as an occasion for process adaptation and 
organizational change 
My inquiry into the international transfer of consensus building processes is 
quite straightforward if only one of the two possible types of 
transformation—adaptation to the imported process or organizational change in 
response to its use—is likely occur as a consequence of transfer.  I argue, 
however, not one of them but both forms of transformation occur at the same time 
when social technologies are transferred across borders. 
While contextual differences across borders require adaptation of social 
technology, organizations in the target location that utilize such processes also 
have to modify their ways of doing businesses.  The simultaneous nature of 
adaptation and organizational change after the transfer of a social technology is 
exemplified by how Japan leaned from foreign organizational innovations after 
the Meiji Restoration202.  Entrepreneurs who transferred innovations, such as 
police and postal systems from Europe, not only adapted those systems to the 
Japanese context, but also molded social perceptions to enhance the chance of 
success.  After reviewing the transfer of management techniques from Japan to 
the US, Young suggested that simultaneous modification to the Japanese practice 
and the US manufacturing environment would be the best strategy to reduce 
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friction between them203. 
Drawing on lessons from a variety of academic fields, I propose a hybrid model 
for analyzing international transfers of social technology: transfer of social 
technology as an occasion for process adaptation and organizational change (see 
Figure 3-2).  The effort to transfer a social technology brings the technology and 
the local context together.  If they happen to fit together no process adaptation or 
organizational change will occur.  When they do not, users of the imported social 
technology must adapt it as well as change their own ways of doing businesses in 
order to find a fit between context and the technology.  Such transformations do 
not occur all at once, particularly because local contexts, including accepted 
patterns of interaction, is not recognizable until users actually experiment with the 
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Figure 3-2: Transfer of social technology as an instance of adaptation and 
organizational change 
 114  Chapter 3 
imported technology.  Once users of the new technology recognize the friction 
between the context and the technology, they adapt it, as well as assume new 
ways of doing things, by trial and error in experimentation. 
Applying the framework to the Japanese setting: research questions 
The primary goal of this dissertation is to answer the following question: Can 
consensus building processes, as practiced in the US, be used to resolve 
infrastructure disputes in Japan?  Therefore, the analytical framework that I 
developed above needs to be fitted to the effort to transfer consensus building 
processes from the US to Japan.  Consensus building processes, as practiced in 
the US, were reviewed in Chapter 2.   
There are a variety of factors in the Japanese context relevant to the transfer of 
consensus building processes for resolving infrastructure disputes.  For instance, 
legal systems might limit the use of particular approaches to public participation.  
Culturally accepted patterns of behavior in negotiation might guide the 
conversation among stakeholders.  In a nutshell, context can be found in the 
current practice of handling infrastructure disputes in Japan.  Those contexts are 
explored in Chapter 4 through extensive interviews of forty planning practitioners 
in Japan. 
Figure 3-3 illustrates the application of the model for analyzing the 
international transfer of social technologies to an instance of experimenting with 
consensus building as practiced in the US.   
Chapter 3  115 
My key question about the usability of consensus building processes in Japan 
can be divided into the following sub-questions: 
1) Process adaptation: How should “foreign” consensus building 
processes be adapted to the Japanese context? 
2) Organizational change: How might Japanese organizations (e.g., 
government agencies and NGOs) have to change in order for them to use 
“foreign” consensus building processes effectively? 
Research methods 
This dissertation research contains two parts: 
Part 1: Description and analysis of the Japanese context in which public 
dispute resolution must take place.  This will be accomplished through 
Consensus 
building
Japanese context
Transfer
Japanese context 
transformed to enable 
use of consensus 
building
Organizational change
Adaptation
Consensus 
building 
adapted for 
Japanese 
context
fit
US context
Adaptation
 
Figure 3-3: Adaptation and organizational change in the transfer of 
consensus building processes to Japan 
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qualitative interviews and a thorough literature review; and 
Part 2:Identification of possible process adaptation and organizational change 
strategies that will permit effective use of foreign consensus building techniques.  
This will be accomplished through participatory observation of experimental 
efforts. 
Part 1: Description and analysis of the Japanese context 
An exploratory investigation is necessary because the context for introducing 
consensus building processes in Japan has to be fully understood before I examine 
process adaptation and organizational change in a particular experiment.  There 
are numerous studies that provide useful information about the Japanese context, 
such as governance structure, common patterns of interaction among Japanese, 
and legal constraints.  For example, anthropologists have suggested various 
portrayals of Japanese culture, and some are especially concerned with the way 
people interact204.  However, these studies do not articulate the theories-in-use in 
the context of infrastructure dispute resolution in Japan.   The concept of 
theories-in-use refers to “the theory of action which is implicit in the performance 
of (a given) pattern of activity205”.  For instance, several authors have studied 
such underlying patterns in the practice of urban planning, law, and mediation in 
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the US as reviewed in the previous section206.  The practice of infrastructure 
dispute resolution in Japan has not been studied in a similar fashion.  Previous 
research on infrastructure disputes in Japan focused more on the details of 
opposition strategies used in individual cases207.   
This dissertation, therefore, must start by reviewing the current practice of 
resolving infrastructure disputes, and then analyze the assumptions behind that 
practice.  In this step, my research methods include in-depth interviews with a 
number of practitioners and a qualitative analysis of transcripts.  I asked each 
interviewee to tell two stories of infrastructure disputes and/or public participation 
based on their experience.  I interjected questions to elicit the details of 
decision-making processes, interaction among stakeholders, and critical moments 
(Interview protocol is attached as Appendix 4-B; it is approved by the Committee 
on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects at MIT on May 04, 2005).  In 
order to allow interviewees to recreate their worldviews through interaction with 
the interviewer, semi-structured interviews were more appropriate (compared to 
more structured formats)208.  Each interviewee was asked to fill in a short 
paper-based survey before the interview.  My objective was to identify their level 
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of experience in the field, the nature of their involvement in disputes, and other 
background information.  All interviews have been transcribed for qualitative 
analysis in a similar way to the “profiles of planners” in the US209.  I analyzed 
interview transcripts and attached codes to important vignettes in order to identify 
various theories-in-use that Japanese practitioners fall back on in dealing with 
public disputes.  I used NVivo, a qualitative analysis software package, to 
organize these transcripts and codes.  Codes are examined and integrated into a 
theoretical account that explains the past and current practice of infrastructure 
dispute resolution in Japan and the influence of Japanese contexts210.  The 
findings from this part of the research are described in Chapter 4. 
Part 2: Identification of possible process adaptation and organizational change 
strategies 
Small-scale pilot tests are indispensable to understanding the applicability of 
consensus building processes in the unique operational environment of Japan.  
Toward that goal, I have examined how a new approach can operate in a real 
setting by organizing an experimental use of consensus building in Japan.  Pilot 
tests of such processes are in fact quite common.  For example, government 
agencies in Australia and England have recently experimented with the use of 
“mediation” processes in a few selected land-use disputes to test their 
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applicability211. 
Through observations and feedback from a pilot test I identified the areas in 
which the Japanese version of public dispute resolution will have to be most 
attentive.  I have gathered qualitative information, such as meeting transcripts 
(for both internal staff meetings and stakeholder dialogues), e-mail 
communications, and participant-observer vignettes, because my dissertation is 
concerned with how Japanese people act, rather than what they say they will do.  
An action encapsulates not only an observable behavior, or an espoused theory, 
but also the implicit process of reasoning that led to the particular behavior212.  
Barley and Tolbert also argue, “Information on actors' interpretations is crucial for 
assessing whether they consciously consider alternative courses of action and the 
costs and benefits associated with such choices.213”  Quantitative data are 
insufficient, albeit helpful, in identifying contextual factors and local knowledge 
that influence each participant’s behavior in a public dispute resolution context.  
On top of those concerns, Chalmers Johnson suggests that the complex Japanese 
political system, involving non-verbal communication and non-literal meanings of 
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words and symbols, requires a special attention to language214.  Therefore, the 
study of the pilot test results requires an ethnomethodology that can grasp the 
intersubjective meanings of language, patterns of non-verbal communication, and 
communicative rationalities that emerge from continuous interactions among the 
participants in the pilot test215. 
As suggested in the previous sections, a number of studies on the relationship 
between “culture” and negotiation, as well as conflict resolution, employed 
quantitative methods in order to measure difference in strategies, preferences, and 
behaviors among people from different cultures216.  However, this is not the only 
way to understanding such relationships.  Dialdin and Wall suggest two 
approaches to culture and mediation research as follows:  
(1) testing theory-driven predictions of the relationships between specific 
cultural characteristics and the third party (or disputant) behaviors; and 
(2) measuring these behaviors and then relating them back to the specific 
cultural characteristics217. 
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This dissertation assumes the second approach, starting with the measurement of 
actual behaviors, as well as their meaning for the participants.   
All interviews with the users of consensus building processes, as well as 
summaries of stakeholder meetings, have been transcribed in Japanese.  Some of 
the internal staff meetings have been transcribed as well.  I have analyzed the 
qualitative data from the pilot test, as well as those transcripts, and attached codes 
to important vignettes in order to identify various scripts218.  Codes are examined 
and integrated into a theoretical account that explains how participants sought to 
transform new consensus building processes, as well as the impact of their 
participation on their own organizational arrangements.   
Based on the framework outlined in the previous section, I searched for two 
types of vignettes.  First, I examined how the staff and public officials modified 
the consensus building processes from their original format in the US.  Instances 
of process adaptation have been sought in the transcript of internal meetings, as 
well as through a comparison between their final work plan and its US original.  
I also interviewed staff members and public officials to elicit the reasons behind 
the adaptation so that I could connect those instances of adaptation with the 
Japanese contextual factors found in Part 1 of this research.  However, 
adaptation may eliminate the most significant elements of the public dispute 
resolution imported from the US even though such adaptation may have been 
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necessary to fit the current Japanese context.  In order to check 
“appropriateness,” instances of process adaptation have been evaluated by a few 
leading practitioners of public dispute resolution in the US.   
Second, I have explored how the staff members and other stakeholding 
organizations took on new organizational arrangements as they organized the pilot 
test.  For instance, Barley studied the change in the relationship between 
radiologists and technologists after the introduction of CT scanners in hospitals by 
examining scripts—recurring patterns of interaction that defined the essence of 
each actor’s roles219.  My study took a similar approach by examining the 
recurrent patterns of interaction among the various actors in the pilot test, as well 
as the final arrangements (e.g., contracts) produced by the participating 
organizations.  I have tracked how they changed their patterns of interaction 
during the pilot test.  
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Chapter 4: The Japanese Context: A Qualitative Study 
Introduction 
The Japanese context will shape the adaptation and organizational change that 
will occur when consensus building is introduced.  Numerous studies have 
provided information on aspects of the Japanese context, such as the governance 
structure, commonly observed patterns of interactions among Japanese, and legal 
constraints.  For example, in portraying Japanese culture, some anthropologists 
have been especially concerned with the patterns of interaction220.  However, 
these studies do not describe the theories-in-use—the theory of action implicit in 
the performance of (a given) pattern of activity221.  Explication of these theories 
is critical to understanding the field of infrastructure planning and dispute 
resolution in Japan.  American authors have qualitatively studied such 
underlying patterns in the practice of urban planning, law, and mediation in the 
US222, but no comparable studies have been done for Japan.   Previous research 
on infrastructure disputes in Japan has focused more on the details of opposition 
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strategies used by various social movements in individual cases223.   
This chapter outlines findings from a qualitative study of contextual factors that 
have guided the government’s efforts in infrastructure planning and dispute 
resolution in Japan.  Most of the studies of public participation in Japan have 
been concerned with specific techniques or cases.  They do not discuss either the 
role of underlying planning processes224 or the common institutional backgrounds 
that guide the actions of individuals in different settings.  This study is probably 
the first synthesized attempt to understand “who does what, how, when and why” 
in the face of infrastructure disputes.  Analyses of interviews with 40 
practitioners of urban and regional planning in Japan reveal the existence of how 
contextual factors prompt individuals to take certain actions.   
Research method 
Interview protocol 
All interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner in informal settings.  
Most of the first contacts were made by e-mails (see Appendix 4-A for a sample 
letter of invitation).  In the first contact, I asked each interviewee to offer his or 
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her account of infrastructure planning efforts in which he or she had been 
involved. When the interviewee agreed to participate in the research, an interview 
protocol was sent to the subject by e-mail (see Appendix 4-B).  The interview 
protocol was designed to elicit the “structure” behind each action that the 
interviewee took in interacting with different kinds of individuals. 
An interview usually began by exchanging business cards (meishi).  Ordinary 
interactions for developing a rapport in Japanese business settings were followed: 
several minutes were spent discussing current affairs, my background, and other 
issues that were not directly relevant to the interview225.  The interview officially 
started when the subject signed a consent form.  First, the interviewee was asked 
to provide an account of the case.  Then, each was asked to describe instances of 
difficult interactions with other stakeholders. Interviewees were encouraged to 
provide detailed accounts of such difficult moments.   
If an interviewee began to relate generalized and abstract thoughts, I asked him 
or her to choose one or two of the most difficult interactions. When the subject 
finished his or her story, I asked about specific behaviors in the interaction. If the 
interviewee was not the person who took that particular action, I asked him or her 
to suggest why the actor might have behaved in the way described.  Finally, 
interviewees were asked to reflect on their experience by summarizing lessons 
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learned from it.  The answers revealed the existence of norms for appropriate 
behaviors that have influenced infrastructure planning in Japan.   
Interviewees 
Between January and December 2005 I interviewed 40 practitioners who had 
been involved in a total of 79 cases and projects.  The demographic backgrounds 
of the interviewees and attributes of the cases are summarized in Figure 4-1.   
I initially gained access to interview subjects through Japanese research 
partners with whom I had worked in my previous career as a think-tank policy 
consultant.  These partners include public officials at the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, and Transport; researchers at the University of Tokyo and the 
University of Tokushima; members of the research staff at the Central Research 
Institute of Electric Power Industry, Mitsubishi Research Institute; and personnel 
at other think tanks.  My colleagues at the PI-Forum, a not-for-profit 
organization for improving participatory governance in Japan, were also helpful in 
recruiting interview subjects.  To avoid recruiting subjects only from those 
whom I know well, I employed a snowball sampling strategy: I asked each 
interviewee to suggest a few individuals experienced in infrastructure disputes.  
Out of 40 interviewees, 21 were recruited on the basis of recommendations of 
other interviewees.   
The diversity of interviewees’ backgrounds was carefully considered to avoid 
generating a biased sample of Japanese practitioners.  To insure that my findings 
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could be generalized, interview subjects were evenly distributed among the 
following categories: 
• Profession: government officials; public corporation (kōdan) officials; think 
tank staff (including zaidan hōjin); urban planning (toshi keikaku) 
consultants; construction (kensetsu) consultants; and academics 
• Project Type: highway and road; urban planning; railway; watershed 
management; airport and port; and waste management. 
 
I concluded the recruitment process when additional interviewees began to offer 
no new information.   
 
Profession  
government official 9
public corp. official 7
zaidan staff 4
think tank 7
urban planning 
consultant 5
construction consultant 5
academics 3
Total 40
Interview Subjects by Profession 
  
Age Group  
30-34 8 
35-39 12 
40-44 5 
45-49 8 
50-54 5 
55-60 1 
60-65 1 
Total 40 
Interview Subjects by Age Group 
 
 
Project Type  
highway and road 28 
urban planning 11 
railway 6 
watershed management 16 
port and airport 11 
waste management 5 
others 2 
Total 79 
Projects by Project Type 
  
Project Location  
Tokyo and its suburbs 24 
regional cities and towns 29 
rural areas 21 
nationwide issue 5 
Total 79 
Projects by Project Location 
   
Figure 4-1: Interviewee demographics and project attributes 
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Professional Distribution 
Interviewees from a wide range of backgrounds were recruited.  The largest 
group was comprised of government officials.  Their age group is somewhat 
skewed toward younger generations.  Half of the interviewees are between 30 
and 39 years old. 
This does not represent a bias, however, because interviewees who were older 
than 50 years old—at least three of them—mentioned that they had faced no 
opposition when they were working in the field office many years ago.  Because 
of the prevalence of life-long employment in Japan, senior practitioners in 
managerial positions have not had much field experience in the last ten years.  
Therefore, senior interviewees had difficulties recalling any stories of interaction 
with the public.  The most senior interviewee reflected on his experience as a 
field officer in the 1950s as follows: 
Interviewer: Did you receive complaints (when you were the project leader at the 
field office in a small village in the 1950s)?  
Interviewee: Nah, when I was there.  So many communities wanted these 
projects.  …  During that period, I don’t know much about what 
happened in urban areas, but I was then in rural communities and 
the mood was for the recovery from the devastation of the war.  …  
I came to Tokyo in the early 1960s.  Even during that time, the 
Metropolitan Highway system (shuto-kō) was being built for the 
Olympic Game.  I was watching those in the field, but it was the 
era in which oppositions would not surface.  …  Everything had to 
be built for the Olympic Game.  Like, “bam! bam!”  When the 
shinkansen trains were being built, no one uttered the word 
“environment.”  It was the Shōwa 30s (i.e., 1955-1964).  You see, 
the Kasumigaseki Building, the Metropolitan Highway, and the 
Shinkansen.  So, we bulldozed everything from 1962 until the 
Olympic Game.   
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Project Type Distribution 
Cases are not equally distributed among project types.  Thirty-five percent of 
the projects mentioned in the interviews are related to highway and road projects.  
The majority of the initial set of interviewees was most experienced in the field of 
highway planning.  I could not gather many stories of railway development 
because there had not been many railway construction projects in Japan in recent 
years.  Another possible reason for the lack of railway-related stories was the 
organizational culture of the organizations that undertake their construction226.  
In my interviews, employees of railway companies showed relatively strong 
concerns about the confidentiality of the interview process compared to those 
hired by the government agencies.   
Interview settings 
All interviews were conducted in person.  Considering the delicate nature of 
interview topics (i.e., public-policy controversies), phone interviews would have 
been an inappropriate way to seek candid reactions from interview subjects for 
several reasons.  First, in-person interviews have the advantage of rapport 
between the interviewee and the interviewer.  Second, the amount and the quality 
of information exchanged through phone interviews are limited.  In in-person 
interviews, an interviewer can interject questions in response to interviewees’ 
physical and facial reactions.  During my interviews, many interviewees drew 
                                                 
226 Unlike many other countries, almost all railways are owned by private entities in Japan after 
privatization efforts in the late 1980s. 
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abstract drawings of the project site to better explain it—a kind of visual 
information cannot be transmitted over the phone.  Finally, phone interviews are 
particularly difficult in Japan because most of the middle-class staff in Japanese 
companies and government agencies do not have their own offices.  Their 
colleagues could easily overhear phone interviews.     
Most interviews took place in conferences rooms at the interviewee’s office.   
Even though I did not explicitly ask them to do so, interviewees carefully selected 
venues to avoid being overheard by their colleagues.  Other interviews were 
conducted outside the office to accommodate personal schedules.  Locations 
included a hotel room in Boston, an interviewee’s home in Tokyo, and coffee 
houses in various Japanese cities.   
The length of the interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 3 hours.  The shortest 
one was with a high-rank public official who offered almost no response to the 
majority of my questions.  All interviews were conducted in Japanese according 
to the interview guidelines.  Language was not a significant concern in my 
interviews, compared to similar researches conducted by non-native Japan 
specialists227.  In fact, my knowledge of specific jargon used by Japanese urban 
planning practitioners helped my interaction with the interviewees.   
All sessions were tape-recorded and transcribed in Japanese for further analysis.  
                                                 
227 Bestor, T., Steinhoff, P. & Bestor, V. (Eds.) (2003). Doing fieldwork in Japan. Honolulu, HI: 
University of Hawaii Press. 
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In order to minimize the influence of tape-recording, I explained the subject’s 
rights, which were outlined in a consent form, before starting the interview.  I 
also promised that their identities would be kept confidential by removing their 
names, project names, and geographical information when I quote their comments.  
No subject refused to have his or her responses tape-recorded.  Most interview 
subjects didn’t seem to care about the existence of a tape recorder.  Another 
scholar who has conducted in-person interviews extensively in Japan suggests that 
tape-recording in Japan actually influences a subject’s candor less than the 
presence of a research assistant228. 
Other sources of contextual information 
The purpose of the interview-based research was to discover elements that 
might affect the introduction of consensus building but that had never been 
explicitly expressed by Japanese practitioners of urban and regional planning.  
However, both parties to the interview had to possess some of the same basic 
information about the infrastructure planning context to establish a meaningful 
communication between them.  An example of such information is the 
configuration of government agencies and legislatures, readily gained from 
reference documents and websites. Anthropologists and negotiation researchers 
have found that communications in Japan are highly contextual—Japanese often 
                                                 
228 Krauss, E. (2003). Doing media research in Japan. In Bestor, T., Steinhoff, P. & Bestor, V. (Eds.) 
Doing fieldwork in Japan (pp. 176-192). Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. 
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talk without elaborating background assumptions229.  Therefore, the knowledge 
of basic information about public participation and infrastructure planning in 
Japan was crucial to the conduct of meaningful semi-structured interviews.   
In this chapter, I will also discuss these background contextual factors to 
familiarize readers with the Japanese context230.  Those who are not familiar 
with Japan should carefully pay attention to this auxiliary information. Without it, 
the stories in the following chapters might not make sense. 
Categorizing the information: four realms of analysis  
For this study, information from the interviews have been broken down into 
“vignettes” describing individual experiences or interactions in which the 
interviewees participated directly or as observers.  Most of the interview 
vignettes could be categorized into three realms of institutional attributes: 
organizational, normative, and regulative.  The idea of disaggregating such 
vignettes into three categories is drawn from the work of Richard Scott231.  
Based on a historical review of institutionalism, he suggests three “pillars” of 
institutions—regulative, normative, and cognitive.  The framework for my 
analysis of the interview vignettes from Japanese practitioners will draw on 
Scott’s framework. 
                                                 
229 Hall, E. and Hall M. (1987). Hidden differences: Doing business with the Japanese. New York, 
NY: Anchor Books 
230 See Appendix 4-C as well. 
231 Scott, R. (1995). Institutions and organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. pp. 33-47. 
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However, for the purposes of accurately describing the influences on and 
changes in institutional context when consensus building (or perhaps any new and 
unfamiliar system) is introduced, it is necessary to modify and add to Scott’s 
framework.  I suggest three changes.  First, this study will use the term 
“realms” instead of “pillars.”  Because I analyze the context by grouping the 
vignettes from the field, rather than from theory, the term “pillar,” which suggests 
the accumulation of scholarly discussions, simply does not fit my findings.  The 
term “realm” more adequately describes the pervasive quality of the attributes I 
describe. 
Second, this study substitutes the term “organizational” for Scott’s conception 
of the “cognitive.” The formal decision-making processes and structures 
characterizing the organizations involved in infrastructure planning in Japan (e.g., 
government agencies, consulting firms, and community groups) differ.  Vignettes 
addressing the nature of these groups fall into what I call the organizational realm.  
They suggest the involvement of a few important organizations and their 
attributes such as organizational structures, formal decision-making processes and 
what some scholars call organizational cultures232.  Because each group of 
organizations has its own distinct way of organizational management and 
decision-making, this dissertation summarizes those findings by each category of 
organizations. 
                                                 
232 Schein, E. (2004). Organizational culture and leadership (3rd Ed.). San Francisco, CA: 
Jossey-Bass. 
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Vignettes in the second category—normative realm—relate to how human 
interactions between the Japanese should be conducted in infrastructure planning.  
They indicate certain patterns of interaction that are commonly followed in those 
Realm Function Attribute 
Organization 
Hierarchy 
Aversion to info sharing and public involvement 
Coordination within an agency and between agencies 
Government 
Mochikaeri (to bring back) 
Organization 
Work involvement 
Disadvantage of small firms 
Idea generation 
Consultants 
Profitability 
Rural versus urban 
Community leaders 
Representation of communal interests 
Community 
orgs. 
Environmental groups 
Intervention by political actors 
Significance of political movements in rural areas 
Political orgs 
Local councils 
Organizational 
Academics Shingikai and iinkai (deliberative committees) 
Kao-mishiri (acquaintance) 
Seken-banashi (small talks) 
Interpersonal 
Age as an indicator of status 
Can’t speak out in the public Participation 
norms Free-wheelers 
Anger and peer mediation 
Nemawashi 
Group 
dynamics 
Sō-ron sansei, kakuron-hantai 
Kō-otsu relationship between government agencies and 
consultants 
Inter- 
organizational 
Municipal government as a mediator between project 
proponents and local communities 
Normative 
Substantive (egalitarianism) 
Urban Planning Act 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act 
Public laws 
River Act 
Guidelines Leadership endorsement 
Project deadline 
Regulative 
Fiscal year 
Personnel transfers 
Logistics Time and place of meetings 
Techniques Fourteen management techniques Settings 
Subject An overriding concern, in this set of interviews: 
compensation 
Figure 4-2: Four categories of contextual factors identified in  
interview vignettes 
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planning efforts.  Deviating from such patterns is considered inappropriate and 
can lead to disruptions in communication.   
Third, the regulative realm refers to various espoused rules (i.e., public laws 
and regulations) of government agencies for urban planning and infrastructure 
development.  Vignettes indicate certain effects of various laws and regulations 
in practice. 
A fourth “realm” amplifies the three realms of institutional function suggested 
by Scott.  Interview vignettes revealed another type of contextual element 
shaping infrastructure planning efforts in Japan—elements that may or may not be 
present in a specific planning process.  Compared to the elements of other three 
realms, however, these elements do not have restrictive character of institutions, 
which are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, … the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction.233”  For example, interviewees 
repeatedly referred to various meeting management techniques, such as 
facilitation, workshops, and open houses.  These techniques for public 
participation and involvement have been widely deployed in the last few years 
and are well known among practitioners.  They certainly functioned as part of 
the context for planners even though planning processes that do not involve such 
techniques were not necessarily inappropriate or illegitimate.  I classify these 
                                                 
233 North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. p. 3. 
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vignettes into a new category of “settings.”  While “settings” may or may not be 
operative in shaping an infrastructure planning process, analysts should be alert to 
their potential influence.  
Organizational realm 
In the organizational realm, eight organizational forms were identified in the 
interviewees’ stories: the government, consultants, community organizations, 
political organizations, academics, industrial organizations, the media, and 
not-for-profit organizations.  Those organizations often played important roles in 
participatory planning and dispute resolution efforts for infrastructure projects.  
In this section, details of the first five types of organizations will be explained 
because they were often the most important actors in the interviewees’ stories. 
The government 
The foremost important actors in the interviewees’ vignettes were government 
agencies, such as the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, prefectural 
governments, and municipal governments.  Sometimes they act as the proponent 
of the project; while in the other occasions they act as an agent for the interests 
they serve, such as local residents and environmental groups.  For example, 
municipal governments in rural areas often played the role of liaison between 
project proponents and local residents.   
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Organizations 
Japanese government has a three-tiered hierarchical structure: national, 
prefectural (to-dō-fu-ken)234, and municipal (si-chō-son)235.  There are 49 
prefectures and approximately 1,800 municipalities (see Figure 4-2)236.  
Prefectural and municipal governments are collectively called “local governments 
(chihō jichi-tai).”  Each prefecture oversees the administration of municipalities 
within its boundary.  Prefecture governors and municipality mayors are elected 
directly by their residents237.  Each prefecture and municipality has a general 
council as well.  Policing is the function of prefectural governments, not 
municipalities.  Each prefecture has a police department (kei-satsu). 
Most of major infrastructure facilities, including highways, dams, airports, are 
built and maintained by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 
(MLIT)—one of the 10 ministries of the national government.  The ministry 
itself has a three-tier hierarchical structure: the headquarters (hon-shō) in Tokyo, 
eight regional development bureaus (chihō-seibi-kyoku), and field offices 
                                                 
234 Most prefectures are called ken in Japanese.  Exceptions are: Tokyo-to, Hokkai-dō, Osaka-fu, and 
Kyoto-fu.  The difference in their denominations does not have any implication to their status. 
235 Municipal governments in Japan have three categories. si (city) is the highest.  To be designated 
as a city, a municipality must have the minimum of 50 thousands residents.  Fourteen cities are 
designated as “government-designated city (seirei-shitei toshi)” by the national government.  Those 
city governments have additional authorities.  chō (town) is the second, and mura (village) is the 
lowest.  Each prefecture has the authority to designate chō and mura within its jurisdiction. 
236 The number of municipalities in Japan is reducing rapidly from 3,232 in 1999 to 1,821 in 2006, 
following the national government’s initiative to consolidate small municipalities.  Source:  
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. (undated) gappei sōdan kōnā. [WWW Document] 
URL http://www.soumu.go.jp/gapei/ 
237 On the other hand, the Prime Minister is elected by the majority vote of Diet members, who are 
elected by Japanese citizens. 
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(jimusho).  The national headquarters are located in the Kasumigaseki complex 
in Tokyo where most of the national government’s functions are concentrated.  
The majority of officers working at the complex are the elites who passed the 1st 
class civil servant examination238.   
There are eight regional development bureaus for each region (see Figure 
4-3)239.  Each regional bureau oversees the Ministry’s activities in each region.  
For example, the Kita-josanjima experiment in Tokushima, which is discussed in 
                                                 
238 Civil servants hired by the national government are classified into three ranks: 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
classes.  To become a civil servant, everyone has to pass the civil servant examination.  Difficulty of 
the examination differs by the class one is applying for.  Each staff member’s positions and tasks are 
determined by his or her class and the years of experience.   
239 Infrastructure development in Hokkaido and Okinawa are under the jurisdiction of the Cabinet 
Office. 
Hokkaido
Aomori
IwateAkita
Miyagi
Yamagata
Fukushima
Niigata
Ibaraki
Chiba
TochigiGunma
Saitama
Tokyo
Kanagawa
Yamanashi
Nagano
ToyamaIshikawa
Gifu
Shizuoka
Fukui
Aichi
Wakayama
Nara
Kyoto
TottoriShimane
OkayamaHiroshima
Yamaguchi
Kochi
Ehime
Tokushima
KagawaFukuokaNagasaki
Kagoshima Miyazaki
Saga
Oita ShigaOsaka
Hyogo
Kumamoto Mie Okinawa
 
Figure 4-3: Forty-nine prefectures of Japan 
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the following chapters, was overseen by the Shikoku Regional Development 
Bureau located in Takamatsu.  The lowest tier of the hierarchy is the field office.  
There are currently 307 field offices across the nation (see Figure 4-3)240.  Each 
office undertakes the management of infrastructure development projects as well 
as the maintenance of national roads, major rivers, national parks, and other 
infrastructures.  For the Kita-josanjima experiment, Tokushima River and Road 
Office (kasen kokudō jimusho) took the convenor’s role. 
The national government controls most of public spending on infrastructure 
projects, especially after Tanaka Kakuei (1918-93) reformed public funding 
systems in the 1970s241.  For instance, sixty percent of the national infrastructure 
development budget (kōkyo-jigyō kankei hi) was distributed from the national 
government to prefectural and municipal governments in 2003 in various forms of 
subsidy242.  Current Koizumi administration is trying to minimize the 
involvement of the national government in infrastructure development through its 
structural reform efforts by scaling down the budget. 
Each project is managed by a handful of people: the section chief (kachō), the 
subsection chief (kakarichō), and their assistant staff.  The general manager 
(shochō) of each field office participates in meetings and events only at important 
                                                 
240 As of April 2006.  Based on the information on the web sites of the eight regional bureaus. 
241 Johnson, C. (1986). Tanaka Kakuei, structural corruption, and the advent of machine politics in 
Japan. Journal of Japanese Studies, 12 (1), 1-28. 
242 Board of Audit. (2004, November 9) heisei-15-nendo kessan kensa hōkoku no gaiyō. [WWW 
Document] URL http://www.jbaudit.go.jp/gaiyou15/ 200411/zaisei_04.htm 
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junctures.  The group of lower-tier officials enjoys a substantial level of 
autonomy in preparing for the project, even though they occasionally receive 
unilateral interventions from their supervisors.  The high level of autonomy 
found in the management of individual project is congruent with Shiroyama’s 
description of policy-making process at the Ministry’s headquarters243.   
Projects administered by local governments are managed in a similar way.  
The head of the project is usually, however, the division chief (buchō) of local 
governments’ headquarters.  In some instances, the head of the local government 
(i.e., governor or mayor) is involved in a few politically sensitive infrastructure 
projects, as discussed in the next section. 
Hierarchy 
Several attributes were found consistently among the stories relating to 
government agencies in Japan.  First of all, hierarchy seems to discipline the 
relationship between government officials in making decisions.  According to 
                                                 
243 Shiroyama, H., Suzuki, H. and Hosono, S. (1999). chūō shōchō no seisaku keisei katei: nihon 
kanryōsei no kaibō. Hachiōji, Japan: Chūō University Press. 
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Field Offices 
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Figure 4-4: Organizational structure of the MLIT 
Chapter 4  141 
the stories of seventeen interviewees, anyone in a higher rank or position often 
has a strong, sometimes decisive, influence on the course of action.  Their 
accounts of hierarchical relationship are congruent with Chie Nakane’s portrayal 
of Japan as a “vertical society244.”   
In the case of the MLIT, officers in regional development bureaus or the 
general manager of individual field offices are on the top of the hierarchical chain 
of command for each project.  In the case of prefectural and municipal 
governments, the governor, the mayor, or the deputy mayor (joyaku) have the 
final say in each project.  For example, a mayor’s decision was crucial in 
terminating a light rail transit project even though the city’s officials were trying 
to move forward with it.  A consultant recollects the experience as follows: 
Interviewee: I couldn’t understand what the mayor was seeking for.  The city’s 
officials were trying hard to implement the project, but the mayor 
took such an action (to stop it).  They couldn’t figure out what to do.  
I worked together (with the staff) for the project.  But finally, when 
the project went upward from the deputy mayor to the mayor, the 
proposal was always killed.  It was a deadlocked situation.   
 
Because governors and mayors are elected by citizens, infrastructure development 
projects can be seriously influenced by local elections.  In particular, Nagano 
prefecture’s governor Yasuo Tanaka, first elected to the position in 2000, had a 
substantial influence on various types of infrastructure projects in Nagano in the 
last few years.   
                                                 
244 Nakane, C. (1970).  
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The unilateral influence of the head figure is occasionally counterproductive to 
the work of lower-tier officials, such as the section chief and the subsection chief, 
as well as their consultants who concentrate their energy on individual projects.  
One private consultant told me the following story: 
Interviewee: Well, it is different among field offices.  In a nutshell, you know, 
everything often gets turned over when the issue went to the table of 
the supervisor of the person in charge.  Let’s say the person in 
charge is either the section chief (kakarichō) or the subsection chief 
(kachō).  But the strategy becomes completely different when things 
go up to the general manager (shochō). 
Interviewer: Does that often happen? 
Interviewee: Often?  Maybe.  The general manager of the field office is the key.  
Sometimes the manager has too much power in the field office.  But 
the manager doesn’t participate in our meetings.  We, and the staff 
on the other side, make plans through long discussions.  Then the 
manager, who doesn’t know anything about it, comes in and screws 
up everything according to his tastes.  That’s painful. 
Interviewer: You can’t push back? 
Interviewee: Well. Not if the staff in the field office can’t (laugh). 
 
Two other interviewees also referred to the strong influence of general managers.  
However, the unilateral influence of the head can be productive in changing the 
management of the organization.  One consultant reflects on his experience of 
working with a general manager who had been advocating for public 
involvement: 
Interviewee: The general manager, at that time, seemed to be actually leading the 
project.  That guy was a deputy manager of the X Field Office.  As 
you can guess, he had been attacked by local residents, and opposed 
by citizens.  He had been blamed even though he had a sincere 
intention to do good things for them (laugh).  He probably wanted 
to change the situation.  He had a quality or something that the 
Prime Minister Koizumi has.  He tried to do it even if his fellows 
tried to stop it.  
Later, a new system for public involvement was implemented by this general 
Chapter 4  143 
manager which gave him the hierarchical authority to manage the office in the 
way he wanted. 
Aversion to information sharing and public involvement 
Public officials are generally reluctant to disclose information to the public, 
especially when they are not ready for the public scrutiny.  A public official 
comments: 
Interviewee: In the past, when I was involved in some other projects, we didn’t 
provide information until the environmental assessment (is 
published) in order to forestall counterarguments.  That was the 
way.  Well, it wasn’t espoused (in the rule), but there was such an 
atmosphere.  So, we didn’t publish or disseminate the information 
to a wide range of people, other than to the local residents.  
A consultant, who designed a participatory process, reflected on his experience of 
being surprised by a “secret” plan: 
Interviewee: The mistake was that … the government tried to be a hero.  They 
could have told us everything at the outset, like “There is such and 
such plans for this watershed.  We have this idea.  We want your 
reactions by the next year.”  But they began by claiming that they 
wanted to reconsider the plan from the scratch by listening to 
everyone’s voice…. 
Interviewer: Did you know that there was a (secret) plan? 
Interviewee: Yes.  Consultants knew it.  Hmm… I felt, “Will that be 
acceptable?” at the outset...  Anyway, we weren’t informed about 
the plan.  They uttered something like, “We have to negotiate with 
the municipality on this matter.”  So, we had a hunch that they had 
something in their mind.  Anyway, public officials are reluctant to 
disclose information.  Well… 
Interviewer: So you weren’t informed much of it. 
Interviewee: You have to ask them.  We can’t know unless we ask. 
 
This does not suggest that the agencies are trying to “conceal” the information 
from the public.  None of the interviewees, including consultants and other 
planners, suggested any government intent to conceal wrongdoings.   
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The propensity to avoid sharing information seems to be changing in the recent 
years.  The Freedom of Information Act (jōhō kōkai hō), which was enacted in 
1999 and has been implemented since 2001, requires government agencies to 
disclose various types of information when they are requested to do so245.  A 
public official reflects on his long-term experience in watershed management 
projects as follows: 
Interviewee: Well.  In the past, we’re very reluctant (to talk with stakeholders).  
But in 1995, I think, in May 1995, the Nagara River Barrage started 
to operate.  Of course we knew that many things about the 
watershed management could be done in much better ways.  
Information disclosure was insufficient.  We were also not open to 
such negotiations (with stakeholders).  Negative reactions probably 
made the project much worse (than it could be).  Such reflections 
were shared by the entire organization. 
 
Public officials’ reluctance to share information has led to unwillingness to 
involve the public in planning processes.  According to interviewees’ 
commentaries, this characteristic is not necessarily true of all public officials.  
Port development projects in particular have lacked stakeholder involvement in 
the past. 
Interviewee: Mmm.  Those in the field of port development have a strong 
sentiment against outsiders stepping into their field.  In a nutshell, 
… special cargo equipments are moving around the port, and (the 
officials) are worried about possible accidents by letting people into 
the arena of port activities.  It is a matter of security.  They tried 
to shut everyone out of the area. … Because they have strong 
sentiment against letting people in, public participation was just 
unimaginable. 
Interviewer: You previously mentioned “waterfront (wōtā-furonto)” development 
projects that would allow the public to the port area.  Wasn’t there 
                                                 
245 The official title of the Act is “the Law on the Publication of Information Retained by Government 
Agencies (gyōsei-kikan-no hoyū-suru jōhō-no kōkai-ni kansuru hōritsu).” 
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any public involvement for those projects? 
Interviewee: There was no project that tried to listen to the voice of local 
residents.  Maybe there might be a case that involved opinion 
surveys that asked something like, “What kind of facilities do you 
prefer?”  But there was definitely no project involving workshop 
style meetings. 
 
Uncertainties and the lack of experience in experimenting with a new approach to 
public involvement constitute another possible factor that contributes to the public 
officials’ unwillingness to involve the public.  A consultant, who tried to 
introduce workshop techniques to a traditional singikai meeting246, was harshly 
opposed by public officials. 
Interviewee: In the past, most advisory committees were managed in a formal 
manner.  …  I suggested them to use the workshop format that 
would allow the exchange of candid thoughts.  But the national 
government reacted by saying something like, “We can’t ask the 
professors to do such things!  What the heck is the Post-it note!?  
No kidding.”  I clinched by saying, “Please let us do this once.  
Only once.  Please trust us.”  …   Then we did.  Once we 
introduced it, the discussion started to move forward!  Then, uh… 
The government could speak out frankly, and those professors could 
be relaxed and vent out their thoughts.  It went well.  After this, 
workshop meeting became possible in this field office. 
 
Another type of concern was related to the inflated expectation of citizens 
involved in planning processes.  Sometimes participants feel that they have the 
formal power to dictate the terms of an infrastructure project.  Three 
interviewees suggested such concerns: 
Interviewee: In a nutshell, if (the government) decides to listen to the voice of the 
citizens, the citizens will ask for anything they want.  (The mayor) 
was worried that the citizens would later complain that their 
requests (that they put forward in public forums) were not fully 
attended.  
 
                                                 
246 See p. 165. 
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For a variety of reasons, it is not easy for anyone to introduce public involvement 
and stakeholder dialogue into infrastructure planning in Japan.  It requires a 
sufficient level of support by a wide range of public officials. 
Coordination within an agency and between agencies 
Twelve interviewees touched on the subject of tatewari—lack of coordination 
between ministries and bureaus.  Because organizational management is highly 
hierarchical, horizontal coordination between ministries and bureaus, particularly 
at the lower-tier of the organization, is rare and difficult in formal settings.  Each 
public official is situated on a vertical line of command within each ministry or 
bureau.  The bureaucratic boundaries of turf become problematic when a public 
involvement effort is focused on a location, not on a particular function, of a 
project.  For instance, an advisory committee on the management of a dam 
prepared a comprehensive plan that proposed activities not administered by the 
MLIT.  A consultant says, 
Interviewee: If (the committee’s recommendations) were the matter of the MLIT, 
its officials would be happy to implement them.  On other kinds of 
recommendations, such as those administered by the town’s School 
Commission (kyōiku iinkai), (their plans) could not be elaborate. …  
[Reviewing the committee’s official report]  Uh…  Something like, 
“Developing a flower village” and “Eco-tourism.”  Those are in 
the field of education and environment. … and this “Culture 
Museum.”  How can the MLIT build a culture museum?  There’s 
no way of justifying such investments.  Of course the ministry can’t 
spend money on such projects.  
 
In the interview, the consultant regretted that the committee’s recommendations 
couldn’t be implemented because of the lack of coordination between 
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stakeholding organizations (i.e., other ministries). 
It seems, however, as though the difficulty of cross-sectional coordination is 
more problematic at the local level (i.e., prefectural and municipal governments) 
because their plans are often focused on certain geographical areas rather than on 
specific types of infrastructure.  Internal coordination between local government 
departments—each of which is focused on specific types of infrastructure—is 
difficult.  Coordination is a time-consuming task for officials working on urban 
planning and redevelopment issues because those projects require complex 
coordination between different departments.  At least three interviewees, who 
have worked with local governments, referred to this internal coordination as a 
difficult issue for managing participatory planning projects at the local 
government’s level.  For example, preparing a city’s master plan involves 
consensus building among multiple departments. For example, 
Interviewer: Between which departments did the internal coordination take 
place? 
Interviewee: It’s same for almost all municipalities.  In this case, the Urban 
Planning Department was managing the project.  But the scope of 
an urban master plan extends to different departments.  The land 
use pattern in the master plan might have been acceptable to the 
Urban Planning Department, but it has to be negotiated with the 
Land Readjustment Department (kukaku seiri ka), the Farm Policy 
Department (nōsei ka), and many other departments.  If the issue is 
politically sensitive, it has to be negotiated by department heads.  
This step is necessary at the end of the process. 
Implementation of public participation efforts was often delayed due to the time 
necessary for this kind of internal coordination.   
Interagency or intra-agency negotiations are usually conducted behind the 
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scenes and are not open to the public.  In fact, there is no accountability 
provision—such as sunshine laws or the Federal Advisory Committee Act in the 
US—that encourages the public to scrutinize meetings between public officials247.  
The newly enacted Freedom of Information Act (jōhō kōkai hō) primarily deals 
with requests by the public for such information248.  It is difficult for the public 
to know about the existence of internal staff meetings.  The consultant whose 
vignette is quoted above referred to this invisible negotiation process as a “black 
box.”   
Mochikaeri (to bring back) 
For public officials, particularly those in the lower tier of the hierarchy, it is 
crucial to develop a consensus within the agency before announcing anything to 
the public.  Therefore, in consultative meetings where lower-tier staff members 
participate as government representatives, issues on the table cannot be decided 
on the spot.  Controversial issues have to be brought back to the office and 
studied or negotiated behind closed doors within the agency or between relevant 
agencies.  The practice of bringing issues back to the office is known as 
mochikaeri in Japanese249.  A consultant gave his analysis of how this tendency 
to defer public decisions occurs: 
Interviewee: In the eyes of the public (simin)… They don’t know much about how 
                                                 
247 Uga, K. (2000). Amerika gyōseihō (2nd ed.). Tokyo, Japan: Kōbundō. pp. 44-48. 
248 Uga, K. (2002). Shin jōhō kōkaihō no chikujō kaisetsu: Gyōsei kikan jōhō kōkaihō dokuritsu 
gyōsei hōjin tō jōhō kōkaihō. Tokyo, Japan: Yūhikaku. 
249 Mochikaeri literally means “to bring back.” 
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the government works.  Government agencies have to follow 
certain processes such as council meetings and budget approvals.  
They are also concerned about the public nature of the project.  
They are operating under many constraints and no one can help it.  
But, maybe average citizens are too much ignorant of how the 
government works. …  From the perspective of the government, 
there are many areas where the project manager can’t make 
decisions on the spot.  It is just inevitable, I guess.  If those 
citizens do not know the systems of the government, I guess, they get 
irritated.  
 
Consultants 
Consultants also play important roles in various infrastructure projects in Japan.  
They are called konsarutanto in Japanese.   
Organization 
There are more than 500 construction (kensetsu) consulting companies in 
Japan; they employ more than 70,000 staff in total250.  Their services range from 
preparing engineering drawings to conducting social scientific policy analysis.  
They also assist public officials in designing and implementing public 
involvement programs.  In addition, think tank staff, independent consultants, 
and architects occasionally serve as consultants for government agencies.   
In some cases, different foundations (zaidan houjin), often abbreviated as 
zaidan, serve as the principal contractor, and subcontract a substantial part of the 
work to private consultants.  These foundations are established under the civil 
code of Japan to serve the public interests.  Government officials are often 
heavily involved in the management of these foundations.   Staff members are 
                                                 
250 Source: Japan Civil Engineering Consultants Association web site. http://www.jcca.or.jp/. 
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often seconded from supervising agencies.  Zaidans are sometimes confused 
with civil society organizations, but are in fact quite different in its nature from 
most not-for-profit organizations (NPOs) because the latter have little political 
influence and financial resources.    
Consultants usually work with lower-tier government staff, such as section and 
subsection chiefs, in developing site plans and public policy proposals.  They 
provide assistance based on service contracts. 
Work involvement 
The ways in which consultants obtain service contracts with government 
agencies are interesting: social networks have an important role in matching 
appropriate consultants with particular government officials at the right moment.  
The following are selected vignettes in which consultants explain how 
government officials asked for their assistance. 
Interviewee A: Our manager got acquainted with the official in a previous work.  
When the official was looking for a good consultant in order to 
launch this project, he happened to remember Mr. X, who is our 
manager.  So he called our manager.  
 
Interviewee B: The consulting company (principal contractor) got the contract, 
but the company was asked by the city government to seek help of 
the academic community.  Then the company asked Professor X. 
Interviewer: Why the company asked him? 
Interviewee B: Probably… there was a connection. (…)  A former student of 
Professor X was working for the company. 
 
These vignettes do not suggest that one must have a connection with public 
officials and other key organizations in order to get a contract.  Other consultants 
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suggested that they had won many contracts through competitive proposal 
processes.  These vignettes do suggest that being acquainted with government 
officials, particularly those having good reputations, can potentially lead to a 
contract.   
Disadvantage of small firms 
Independent consultants, who own small firms with a handful of staff or who 
operate independently, have greater difficulty in obtaining a direct contract with a 
government agency for various bureaucratic reasons.  At least three interviewees, 
who are independent consultants specializing in participatory planning, mentioned 
that they were subcontracted from other consulting firms, think tanks, or zaidans 
even though they had very important project roles.  One interviewee mentioned 
that this has been a difficult matter for him for the last two decades because he 
had to make appropriate arrangements with larger organizations in order to 
participate in projects: 
Interviewee: I have worked on a series of project, but I did not receive the 
contract as an individual.   
Interviewer: How about as an informal study group? 
Interviewee: Mmm.  The study group could receive only a few projects…  
Others were through the industry’s association.  In a nutshell, 
unincorporated organization (like his study group) couldn’t receive a 
contract no matter how much experience it may have.  It’s still 
difficult, isn’t it?  But public officials have their own rules.  …  
So, all of the past projects needed an intermediary (organization).  
We had to ask a zaidan to be the intermediary so that we could work 
on this project. 
Idea generation 
Consultants work with government officials to generate the best solutions for a 
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specific problem.  For dispute resolution and participatory processes, two 
patterns of idea creation were found in the interviewees’ vignettes.  The first 
pattern is policy transfer and lessons drawing251.  Consultants learned about new 
policy-making techniques and policy instruments that had been successful 
elsewhere, and applied the lessons to their own projects: 
Interviewee: In terms of organizations, we kind of created a citizen supporters’ 
organization.  There had already been several small groups, like a 
study group on the light rail transit in the local chamber and junior 
chamber.  We organized a citizen’s group by pulling them 
together… 
Interviewer: In organizing this supporter’s organization, did you draw on similar 
cases in other locations, like for trolleys? 
Interviewee: Yes.  There was a case that succeeded in saving a trolley line that 
was about to be abolished.  In that case, citizen’s groups did a 
fairly good job.  So we went to interview them as well.  Yes, we 
draw upon it. 
Interviewer: Did you go to the interview with the public official? 
Interviewee: Yes. 
 
In a similar vein, architects drew lessons from American urban planners (e.g., 
Henry Sanoff) and have experimented with their “workshop” techniques since the 
1980s252.  
Several “epistemic communities253” of government officials, consultants, and 
academics interested in participatory policy-making have facilitated the flow of 
                                                 
251 Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (1996). Who learns what from whom: A review of the policy transfer 
literature. Political Studies, XLIV, 343-357.; Dolowitz, D. (Eds.) (2000). Policy transfer and British 
social policy: Learning from the USA? Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press.; Rose, R. (1991). 
What is lesson-drawing? Journal of Public Policy, 11, 3-29.. : Rose, R. (1993). Lesson drawing in 
public policy. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House 
252 Ito, M. (2001). A study on workshops as the method to ensure resident participation in 
architectural and community development programs. (in Japanese). Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
Chiba University. 
253 Haas, P. (1992). Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination. 
International Organization, 46(1), 1-35. 
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information about policy-relevant innovations.  They are mediated by both 
formal consultative committees (shingikai) and informal study circles 
(benkyo-kai).  Those meetings are attended by (i) persons of learning and 
experience (gakushiki keiken-sha), (ii) public officials, and sometimes (iii) 
consultants who aid the officials.  They often learn from similar foreign 
experiences by sending delegates on short-term research trips foreign countries.   
The second pattern of idea creation arises from spontaneous problem solving.  
When the interview subjects were asked how they came up with new ideas for 
public participation and dispute resolution, some of them didn’t remember exactly 
“how.”  They claimed that the ideas were their own.  The ideas came out of 
staff meetings and their imaginations.  A consultant explained how his team 
developed an interesting technique: 
Interviewee: After examining meeting transcripts, we found that one participant 
was just extraordinarily (dominating the discussion).  We thought it 
would be better if we could show this information quantitatively.  
So, we created bar charts, showing that Mr. A spoke for this seconds, 
and Mr. B spoke for that seconds, something like that… 
Interviewer: How was the idea of creating bar charts conceived? 
Interviewee: We suggested that. 
Interviewer: How about the inspiration?  Did you see something similar before? 
Interviewee: No.  Nothing at all.  It was our original. 
Interviewer: Did they come out of discussions, or meetings at the company, 
spontaneously? 
Interviewee: We were at an impasse.  We had no other choice and tried it like 
“Let’s do it!”  Well, it turned out to be effective in the end. 
 
An interesting feature of idea generation through this kind of problem solving is 
the importance of “discussion (giron).”  Three out of four interviewees who 
suggested such spontaneous problem solving referred to “discussion” as the 
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source of idea.  None of them attributed these innovations to a specific person. 
Profitability 
All consultants who discussed the profitability of public involvement projects 
suggested that they do not generate much profit.  Services for local governments 
are much less profitable, even generating deficits, compared to those for the 
national government.  A consultant who has experience in managing public 
participation projects for both national and local governments explains the matter 
as follows: 
Interviewee: In a nutshell, it is all about which organization pays for the project.  
Projects are managed by the MLIT, prefectures, or municipalities.  
Well.  Based on my experience, the MLIT has been flexible in 
making adjustments to the design contract in the last few years 
(when there’s a need to expand the scope of work).  However, it’s 
difficult (to gain such concessions) from local governments.  
Therefore, public participation projects are not always unprofitable.  
It’s not a matter of project type, but more a matter of which 
organization pays for the project. 
Interviewer: You mean the difference between the national and local 
governments? 
Interviewee: Yes, indeed. 
 
At least two other consultants hinted at the lack of sufficient funding for public 
participation by the local government.  There is also a difference in the attitude 
toward public involvement projects between large consulting firms and small 
independent consultants.  For instance, a manager of a large consulting firm 
says, 
Interviewee: There are many tiny consulting firms that are enthusiastic about 
these projects.  …  Probably urban planners with architectural 
backgrounds.  They even spend the whole night to moderate a 
meeting discussion.  Those, mostly independent consultants, accept 
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those tasks for nominal fees.  There are many people who want to 
do those.  Compared to those, our firm sets a higher fee, and is also 
engaged in different kinds of projects.   
 
However, an independent consultant who advocates for participatory planning 
provides pro-bono work for a local government. 
Interviewee: I visit Mr. X’s house in order to discuss the plan.  Or, there are 
other new projects spinning out of the project.  I’m paid for the 
management of the meeting.  But after starting this job a new 
project for revitalizing the neighborhood emerged.  I’m writing 
proposals and newsletters.  
Interviewer: Those are your personal projects? 
Interviewee: Yes, they are my personal stuff (laugh).  
 
Interviewees were recruited from both large consulting firms and small 
independent ones.  At the time of the interview most of them were all entering 
relatively new field of public involvement and were experiencing different 
outcomes, resulting in mixed feelings about the profitability.  In the future, 
however, supply and demand for these services should come into balance. 
Community organizations 
In stories about infrastructure projects, community organizations and their 
leaders often appear as important stakeholders.  Their characteristics, however, 
are quite different depending on the geographical location of the project. 
Rural versus urban 
In rural areas, an informal group of 20 to 30 households comprise a ku, shūraku, 
or buraku.  These groups make decisions in yoriai, which is the general meeting 
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of all households in the community254.  Community organizations have a 
significant influence on the life of individuals particularly in the rural area.  The 
same set of local residents meet each other in various occasions—from the 
informal meeting of women’s self-help groups (fujin-kai) to the controversial 
discussion about the management of communal water resources.  In the past, 
those who did not follow communal rules were ostracized from the community 
and barred from the use of communal properties (e.g., junkyards and communal 
forests).  The practice of ostracizing non-abiding households is called 
mura-hachibu, and its occasional uses in very rural communities are still disputed 
in courts today255. 
Community groups are found in urbanized areas as well.  They are usually 
organized by the unit of neighborhood (chō)256.  The groups are called 
neighborhood groups (chōnai-kai) or self-governance groups (jichi-kai).  In a 
survey by the Japan Center for Cities, 75.2 per cent of municipalities responded 
that they have community groups in all parts of their cities257.  Those areas 
without community groups are concentrated in the neighborhoods occupied by 
condominiums and apartments.   
                                                 
254 Torigoe, H. (1985). Ie-to mura-no syakai-gaku. Tokyo, Japan: Sekai-Shisō. 
255 Mainichi Shinbun. (2006, April 7). sekikawa-mura numa-no mura-hachibu sosyō. Tokyo, Japan: 
Mainichi Shinbun. [WWW Document] URL. http://www.mainichi-msn.co.jp/chihou/niigata/news/ 
20060407ddlk15040113000c.html. 
256 Chō, in this context, is not an individual township but a subunit of a city.  Their boundaries are 
defined by the city government.  In addition to the function as the neighborhood boundary, chō is 
used for mailing addresses.  For example, the mailing address for the Prime Minister’s residence is 
“Nagata-Chō 1-6-1” which means the tract number 1-6-1 in the Nagata-Chō neighborhood. 
257 Japan Center for Cities (2001). kinrin jichi-to comyunitī. Tokyo, Japan. 
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Few of these community groups have any official status.  They are neither part 
of the government nor incorporated organizations258.  They are simply voluntary 
associations of individuals who live in the neighborhood259.  The ratio of those 
residents who join those neighborhood groups is, however, high: eighty percent of 
municipalities in Japan report participation of seventy percent of the population.  
In 2002 there were 296,770 community groups across the nation260.   
Community leaders  
Each community group has a head person.  They are usually referred to as 
group heads (kaichō) or neighborhood heads (kuchō).  In most communities that 
appeared in the interview vignettes the heads are elected or rotated every few 
years.  The head person is responsible for organizing communal events such as 
seasonal festivals (matsuri) and street cleaning.  In infrastructure planning efforts, 
they are usually asked to serve as representatives for the community.  Therefore, 
it is crucial for the project proponents to maintain good relationships with them.  
For example, it is a common practice for public officials to consult with local 
                                                 
258 In the modern Japan, community organizations were officially integrated into the government 
structure only between 1940 and 1947.  The occupation force considered that this system had helped 
the state control of individuals during the war.  In 1947, the national government ordered that 
municipalities disband those community organizations.  However, nearly 80% of those organizations 
revived as voluntary associations within three months after the order. See Takayose, S. (1979). 
Komyunitī-to jūmin soshiki. Tokyo, Japan: Rokusho Shobo Nakagawa, T. (1980). Chōnai-kai: 
nihon-jin-no jichi-kankaku. Tokyo: Chuko-Sinsho.).   
259 There was a lawsuit in which a community group sued a resident, who declined to join the group, 
for not paying the membership fee.  The community claimed that the participation was mandatory for 
all residents in the community.  On April 26, 2005, the Supreme Court issued a verdict that a 
community group could not force anyone to join it and pay membership fees. 
260 Cabinet Office. (2004). kokumin seikatsu hakusho. Tokyo, Japan: National Printing Bureau. p. 106. 
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community heads before holding public meetings.  The practice is known as 
nemawashi.   
Interviewer: Well, the community leaders are usually consulted by the 
municipality before consultative meetings.  I’m not sure if this 
really is a common practice.  But anyway, they inform the leaders 
that they will distribute this and that documents.  Sometimes we ask 
leaders to insert those informational brochures in the community’s 
circulation261.  
 
The head person is not necessarily the leader, however.  In rural areas, elders 
often hold the highest status as the community leader (no matter whether they are 
the official head or not) 262.  An elder may be called chō-rō (the leading elderly 
person) but may not necessarily be the official head of the neighborhood.   
Relatively junior members of the community, those in their 50s or 60s, may 
lead community protests against infrastructure projects.  In a story of local 
opposition against the construction of a drainage canal, an interviewee told how 
the leader for an opposition movement was chosen: 
Interviewer: How old was the leader? 
Interviewee: He was about 60… Well, the leader actually changed.  Initially, it 
was led by a person in the 90s.  Later, the person in the 60s took 
over.  But (in the final stage of the dispute,) he quit and the person 
in the 90s came back… 
Interviewer: What was the 90-ish guy like? 
Interviewee: He was the elder (chō-rō) of the local community… The change 
occurred when the opposition was the most intense.  Maybe it 
would be too difficult for the elderly person to manage the movement.  
I don’t know much, but maybe that’s why they changed their 
leadership.  Anyway, I don’t know the details. 
                                                 
261 “Kairan-ban” in Japanese.  Community organizations maintain a system of disseminating their 
information using a clipboard.  A clipboard with attached documents is passed around its members 
according to the sequence decided by the organization.   
262 Miyamoto, T. (1984). wasure-rareta nihon-jin. Tokyo, Japan: Iwanami 
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In another story offered by a different interviewee, a rural community chose a 
representative other than their elderly leader because the representative previously 
had experience negotiating with the government over the compensation for the 
loss of his family member in an accident.  According to those stories, 
community leaders against infrastructure projects are chosen not only their 
established status in the community but also for their qualifications as a 
representatives. 
Representation of communal interests 
Occasionally, community leaders do not fully represent the interests of local 
residents.  In urbanized areas, young families who have recently moved to a 
community sometimes decide not to join the local group.  In other instances, 
community leaders are just unable or unwilling to achieve a consensus within the 
community.  In such cases, another local resident may begin to act as the leader 
and form a new faction.  The community is then divided into multiple factions 
that may be pitted against each other. 
Interviewee: Well.  Each community has a district head.  But when the 
community is divided into two groups, and those groups are saying 
different things, we can’t ask the head to build a consensus of the 
community… 
Interviewer: Why (do they get divided?) 
Interviewee: Umm.  Probably the personal relationships between them.  
Factions are often formed and had been on bad terms.  And, the 
power dynamics within the community.  Someone might be trying to 
become the leader.  There is a head, aside from that leader, but the 
head changes every year. 
Interviewer: Aha. The head changes every year?  
Interviewee: In most cases, the head changes every year, or every two years.  
Each district has different rules.  Aside from the head, there always 
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is a local notable, someone who is vociferous...  The head is just for 
the convenience of the management.  He simply manages various 
communal events. 
 
In urbanized areas, the division between those who are active in the traditional 
chōnai-kai community organizations and those who do not participate seems to 
have led to a new ideology for public participation.  An academic, who also 
works as a consultant, referred to his public participation project as follows: 
Interview: Then we got involved.  We examined candidates for (a consultative 
committee’s) members (who had been suggested by the government).  
But the balance of the membership was just bad, in terms of age and 
sex.  So we decided to call for additional members through 
outreach263.  (…)  The interesting thing was that, usually, the 
participants were retired elderly men, or (…) active mothers with 
kids in some cases.  But in this case, a fair number of daddies in 
30s and 40s came.  I heard that our outreach event at the train 
station had a good effect.  They were actively involved and did 
good jobs in all subgroups. 
 
His effort to recruit “additional” members was based on the assumption that 
traditional community leaders do not necessarily represent the interests of new 
comers and relatively young residents.   
The focus on such nontraditional stakeholder representatives, however, 
occasionally backfires in participatory planning projects.  In a participatory 
workshop forum that tried to formulate a traffic-calming plan in a neighborhood, 
local community leaders did not participate in the first few meetings because they 
were not invited.  These meetings were dominated by activists and 
environmental advocates.  When the local leaders became aware that the forum 
                                                 
263 The interviewee said, “outreach” in English. 
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was about to introduce new traffic rules, which would make some streets one-way, 
they rushed into a meeting and tried to scrap the plan.   
At least seven other vignettes touch on similar instances in which community 
leaders and environmental groups tried to interrupt the discussion of participatory 
forum because their interests were not represented in it.  An interviewee 
mentioned that such “agitation” in the middle is quite common in a particular part 
of the country. 
Environmental groups 
In addition to community-based groups, ad-hoc civic associations that focus on 
particular issues exist across the country.  In stories about infrastructure disputes, 
environmental groups (kankyō dantai) are often the key stakeholders that protest 
against proposed projects.  They are different from the groups that had been 
formed to protest against particular projects or industrial pollutions in the 1970s.  
They are also different from powerful environmental lobbies in the US.   
Japanese environmental advocates are much less organized at the national 
level264.  Environmental groups in Japan engage in various grass-root activities 
for environmental conservation, such as educational outreach and clean up.  
They are similar to grass-root organizations in the US that focus on the 
conservation of a particular watershed or a park (e.g., “Friends of …”).  Many, 
                                                 
264 Pharr, S. (2003). Conclusion: Targeting by an activist state: Japan as a civil society model. In 
Schwartz, F. and Pharr, S. (Eds.) The state of civil society in Japan. (pp. 316-336). New York, NY: 
Cambridge.  
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not all, of them are officially incorporated as not-for-profit organizations, often 
abbreviated as NPOs. 
They form a loosely-knit coalition when there is a need to protest against the 
government; however, they are often on bad terms with each other.  An 
interviewee who was involved in a project that was faced with protests by local 
environmental groups described the relationship as follows: 
Interviewee: To be more exact, there were many different organizations.  They 
got together on the issue of wetland protection.  But they were 
normally on bad terms.  Not so good.  Mmm.  There were sects.  
I can’t elaborate much, but…  (There were) schoolteachers or 
left-wing activists affiliated with the Teacher’s Union (nikkyō-so).  
On the other hand, there were local intellectuals who were interested 
in culture, history, and nature.  There were many different 
organizations, and they got together when the issue of wetland came 
up.  When the project got cancelled (in order to protect the 
wetland), they gradually dissolved the relationship.  
 
Political organizations  
Compared to the aforementioned three types of organizations—the government, 
consultants, and community organizations—political groups have much less 
significance in the interviewees’ vignettes.   
Intervention by political actors 
Political parties and politicians can take advantage of political polarization in a 
community triggered by infrastructure disputes.  Four interviewees referred to 
various forms of intervention by political parties including the Japanese 
Communist Party (Nihon kyōsan tō) and the Japan Socialist Party (Nihon shakai 
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tō).  An interviewee suggested that his project could move forward with 
negotiations with local communities because he “could prevent such outsiders 
from coming into the community.”  Another interviewee, who observed an 
opposition movement against the construction of a waste management plant, 
explains his experience of having a party politician intervening into a 
community-based opposition group: 
Interviewee: A local councilman from the Communist Party came to the second 
meeting (of the opposition group).  He claimed that his visit was 
intended to provide more information.  Then he distributed flyers.  
He started to argue that the town manager should be recalled, and 
this movement be continued, and such and such (laugh).  The 
movement was gradually taken over by the party.  Meanwhile other 
community organizations in neighboring communities held their own 
meetings against the project.  These community groups used to 
collaborate with each other fairly well.  But they gradually became 
on bad terms.  Finally, the opposition movement was divided into 
two factions…  People knew that some groups were heavily 
influenced by the party.  Some people didn’t want to support the 
party no matter what it said.  So, they left the group and formed 
something like the second opposition group.  They were really 
pitted against each other.  Then they started to make arguments not 
to the town hall but to each other.  While they were quarreling, the 
project proceeded as scheduled. 
 
Stories of public disputes over the construction of a particular kind of 
infrastructure often involved political representatives at the national level265.  
The opponents used political channels to pressure the national government: 
Interviewer: Who were those Diet members? 
Interviewee: They were not the representatives for the local interests.  The same 
group (of Diet members) came to protest against different (projects). 
Interviewer: How many Diet members were involved? 
Interviewee: Mmm.  Representatives from the local district came once or twice, 
                                                 
265 The type of infrastructure cannot be revealed in order to protect interviewees’ identity.  Only a 
handful of public officials at the national headquarters in each division are involved in the negotiation 
with Diet members.   
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but there were four or five who always came.  …  But at that time, 
those affiliated with the opposition parties were not necessarily 
available in every district.  Opposition parties were weak in those 
rural districts, in particular where (projects) were being built.  
Maybe the condition is a little different now.  No one could 
represent for the local interest then.  So, those who were interested 
in those issues, not necessarily elected in those districts, came to us.  
They did not oppose to each ..  project.  They teamed up with the 
national coalition group. 
 
In general, however, political representatives do not appear in the vignettes of 
infrastructure development as important stakeholders.  They often appear as 
auxiliary players who provide political support and intervention in order to assist 
particular local stakeholders.   
Significance of political movements in rural areas 
In rural areas, debates over an infrastructure project can have an influence on 
local politics.  A rural community can be easily divided into polarized factions 
for or against an infrastructure project if the project provides benefits to some of 
its members while having unwanted impacts on the others.  Anyone seeking an 
elected position, such as the mayor and the townsman, must indicate whether he 
or she is for or against the proposal in order to score votes.  An interviewee 
reflects on his experience, in which interpersonal relationships in a rural 
community were disrupted because of such a political division: 
Interviewee: There were a few proponents in the community.  The community was 
sharply divided in two groups… 
Interviewer: Why did the proponents support the project? 
Interviewee: Well.  At the outset, everyone was against the project.  But some of 
them started to trust our explanations…  So, they left the protest 
group, and formed a new group…  
Interviewer: Did you see any confrontation between those groups? 
Interviewee: Well… Supporters and protesters lived in the same community.  So 
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they don’t speak to each other.  They spread bad rumors about the 
other side…  like “They turned into supporters because they were 
tricked by the Ministry.” …  The protesters group nominated a 
candidate for the town council.  But, the supporters group also 
nominated one.  …  I don’t know much about what’s happening in 
other countries, but at least in Japan, public projects create such 
problems to a greater or lesser degree.  But that divides rural 
communities severely.  Interpersonal relationships were 
jeopardized.  I wish we could care more about the interpersonal 
relationships between the people who have lived in the community 
for a long time. 
 
Local councils 
Local councils (gikai) seem to have a significant influence in infrastructure 
planning.  Each prefecture and municipality has its general council, whose 
members are elected by the vote of its residents.  If the local council makes an 
official resolution against a project, the project proponent has to do whatever it 
can to make the council withdraw the decision before the proponent can proceed.    
Even though local councils do not have the formal authority to veto any project 
undertaken by entities such as the national government, government officials are 
particularly sensitive to the reaction of local councils.  Two interviewees 
suggested that opposition by local councils were sometimes intended to draw 
more concessions from the project proponent. 
Interviewee: Anyway they closed a bargain.  At the outset, they claimed that the 
nature and the environment should be protected, and the airport 
shouldn’t be built.  But somewhere behind the door, sweet candies 
(laugh) were offered.  Like saying, “If there’s an airport, more and 
better employment opportunities will be available.”  Government 
agencies tried to rebut each argument (against the project).  Local 
councils, I mean, municipal councils decided formal resolutions 
against the project in the beginning.  But when (the compensatory 
schemes) came out, all councils reached resolutions to promote the 
project.  So, they closed the bargain when they got the candies 
(laugh).  Maybe they had no intention to protest.  They opposed as 
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a negotiation tactic.  
 
Academics 
In Japan, academic scholars have a fairly important status in a variety of 
policy-making efforts.  Most of them are faculty members of universities, and 
referred to as “persons of learning and experience (gakushiki keiken-sha).266” 
Shingikai and iinkai (deliberative committees) 
The prominence of academic scholars in policy-making efforts in Japan is 
supported by the importance of various consultative forums, known as 
deliberative committees (shingikais) and advisory committee (iinkais).  Creation 
of shingikais is regulated by Article 8 of the National Administrative Organization 
Act (kokka gyōsei soshiki hō): a shingikai must be established by a public law or a 
cabinet order.  Only a limited number of shingikais exist on the matter of 
infrastructure planning.  In addition, the Cabinet issued a plan to reduce the 
number of shingikais in 1999267.  The MLIT currently organizes thirteen 
shingikais, most of which address nationwide issues268.  In addition to the 
shingikais, government agencies often create iinkais269.  Those iinkais are ad-hoc 
                                                 
266 Schwarz, F. (1998). Advice and consent: The politics of consultation in Japan. New York, NY: 
Cambridge. p. 74-5. 
267 Cabinet Office. (1999, April 27). Shingikai-tō-no seiri-gōrika-ni-kansuru kihonteki-keikaku. 
Cabinet directive. [WWW Document] URL http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/ 
990524singikai.html. 
268 MLIT (undated). shingikai, iinkai, tō. [WWW Document] URL http://www.mlit.go.jp/singikai/ 
singikai.html 
269 They are also known as study circle (benkyō kai), research group (kenkyū kai), and study group 
(kentō kai).  There is no difference in the function between those informal groups.  
Chapter 4  167 
assemblies of academic scholars, researchers, consultants, and public officials.  
They are informally organized and not regulated by the National Administrative 
Organization Act270. 
Government agencies often enjoy autonomy in choosing members for a 
shingikai or an iinkai.  Even though they do not have complete freedom in 
choosing the shingikai members, they are generally careful to appoint only those 
who support government policies271.  As a result, those organizations are often 
criticized as “’kept body (goyō kikan)’ and ‘invisibility-working fairly cloak 
(kakuremino)’. 272”  It was in response to such criticisms that the Cabinet 
decided to reform the use of shingikais273. 
Vignettes of infrastructure disputes and public participation included various 
uses of iinkais that involved academic scholars.  First, iinkais were used to 
formulate policy guidelines pertaining to public participation and involvement.  
For example, the development of guidelines for public involvement in highway 
planning and airport planning involved several academic scholars through 
iinkais274.  Second, they are occasionally created to supervise various public 
                                                 
270 The Japanese government does NOT have provisions similar to the sunshine laws in the US.  
Therefore, the government agencies have the freedom of holding iinkais without publicizing them in 
advance. 
271 Schwarz, F. (1998). p. 62-4. 
272 Schwarz, F. (1998). p. 54. 
273 Cabinet Office. (1999, April 27). 
274 Togashi, A. (2002). “simin sankaku-gata dōro keikaku purosesu”no gaido-ra-in. Traffic 
Engineering, 6(37), 38-45.  MLIT (undated). ippan-kūkō-ni-okeru arata-na kūkō-seibi purosesu-no 
arikata-ni-tsuite. [WWW Document] URL http://www.mlit.go.jp/koku/04_outline/01_kuko/ 
04_process/index.html. 
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involvement activities.  The guidelines for public involvement in highway 
planning stipulate that third-party iinkais that involve “persons of learning and 
experience” should be created in order to monitor the transparency, objectivity, 
and fairness of public involvement processes275.  Third, iinkais are occasionally 
used as devices for public participation by involving a few additional local 
stakeholders.  Unlike stakeholder dialogue processes, those iinkais involve many 
academic scholars with technical expertise pertaining to a project.  
Normative realm 
Vignettes in the normative realm are subcategorized into the followings: (i) 
interpersonal norms, (ii) participation norms, (iii) group dynamics, (iv) 
inter-organizational relationships, and (v) substantive norms.  “Interpersonal 
norms” guide interactions between individuals.  “Participation norms” inform 
each meeting participant of appropriate behaviors in the meeting.  “Group 
dynamics” refer to commonly observed interactions between multiple individuals 
in a meeting.  “Inter-organizational relationships” are concerned with the 
organizations discussed in the previous section.  Vignettes in this category 
describe culturally accepted patterns of interaction between particular 
organizations.  Finally “substantive norms” relate to implicitly shared 
understanding about substantive issues (e.g., fair division).  Each of these five 
types of norms in Japanese infrastructure planning is explained below. 
                                                 
275 Togashi, A. (2002). 
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Interpersonal norms 
Kao-mishiri (acquaintance) 
Being “acquainted276” is one of the critical conditions for starting a constructive 
dialogue between the parties.  For instance, an interviewee (consultant) used a 
stage play to acquaint local residents with the functions of public officials..  He 
asked public officials to write a drama that recreated their daily jobs in the 
planning department: 
Interviewee: I was almost kicked out of the first meeting.  ….  Some 
participants (i.e., local residents) told us that they didn’t need us, I 
mean, the consultants.  Then we did (the stage play by public 
officials).  Well, I was worried that they would complain about us 
to the city hall.  But the audience applauded their theatrical 
performance!  Then (the performers) went to the table.  When they 
came, these old ladies sitting around the table seemed to be feeling 
some bonds with the officials.  Someone said, “Hey, the actors 
coming to us!”  There seemed to be the feeling of being connected.  
The meeting went well.  The workshop meeting went smoothly. 
At least five interviewees provided vignettes that indicate the development of 
acquaintanceship between stakeholders as a critical condition for constructive 
dialogues.  However, the sense of being acquainted is different from the 
Japanese sense of friendship (tomodachi)277.  A consultant who has observed 
meetings of a committee for three years told an illustrative story: 
Interviewee: The number of official meetings so far is 10 or so, but in addition to 
those we had approximately 10 subcommittee meetings.  So the 
total number (of the meetings) would be about 30. 
Interviewer: I guess that the stakeholder representatives were complete strangers 
                                                 
276 Kao-mishiri in Japanese.  Its literal translation is “knowing (someone’s) face.” 
277 John Forester suggests that public sector mediators have to be “critical friends” of the disputants 
(See Forester, J. (1999). The deliberative practitioner: Encouraging participatory planning processes. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT. pp. 155-197).  The acquaintanceship discussed here is probably similar to the 
concept of “critical friends.”   
 170  Chapter 4 
at the outset.  Did they gradually come close together? 
Interviewee: No.  But maybe, it’s better than it was before…  I think everyone 
now understands what the others are thinking, but they are not close 
together, something like that.  
 
At least three other interviewees suggested that the acquaintance relationship was 
different from a friendship.  Their vignettes suggest that the relationship, as 
operative in an infrastructure planning context, can be characterized as a weak 
tie278.  Stakeholders get together to resolve the conflict but do not meet each 
other frequently outside this arena.  They are not close friends279.  Stakeholders 
work together to resolve their differences so that they can find an arrangement 
that they can live with.  According to the interviewees’ stories, this level of 
interpersonal relationship (often characterized as kao-mishiri) is necessary to 
enable a constructive dialogue between stakeholders. 
Seken-banashi (small talk) 
In developing such an acquaintanceship, small talk, known as seken-banashi 
(small talk) in Japanese, seem to play an important role.  Even though such 
chitchat is not necessarily relevant to the project at all it encourages the sense of 
acquaintanceship.  A public official recalls the experience of negotiating with a 
landowner who wouldn’t sell his land:  
                                                 
278 Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 
1360-1380. 
279 The concept of friendship is different among the county, as Hall and Hall reports as follows: "In 
countries such as the United States, developing friendship is easy enough. ... However, a study on the 
subject, conducted by Edward T. Hall for the U.S. State Dept., revealed that a worldwide complaint 
about Americans was that they seemed capable of forming only one kind of friendship: the informal, 
superficial kind that does not involve an exchange of deep confidences." (Hall, E. and Hall M. (1987). 
Hidden differences: Doing business with the Japanese. New York, NY: Anchor Books. p. 7) 
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Interviewee: There was a thatched house, and the owner’s farmland was inside 
the project area (for a highway).  Except for that old buddy 
everyone had sold the land.  That guy was only the protester…  
He wouldn’t give up.  I was told by the staff in our Land Acquisition 
Department that he was the most difficult person.  I went to his 
home every week, every week in the morning, just to see him.  He 
was a farmer…  Well, I went there so often.  His wife kindly 
offered me a cup of tea.  The guy looked annoyed to see me coming 
again and again.  But as time went by, he started to talk about his 
family.  They told me that their son was working for the town hall.  
The wife talked about what she heard from her son about the 
difficulties of working for public agencies…  One day, she 
suggested to her husband, “Why don’t you give it a thought?  He 
comes to see us with so sincere intentions.”  Then, the guy 
reluctantly agreed to sign the contract…  Sometimes I went into his 
farm and praised his cucumber.  I didn’t ask for his land 
repeatedly…  Well, the guy actually didn’t like the negotiators from 
the Land Acquisition Department.  He said, “They always asked for 
the land whenever they came.  That was all.” 
 
Other interviewees, who have negotiated in rural areas with community leaders 
and persons adamant about their positions talked about similar experiences in 
which they gained people’s confidence through friendly discussion of topics 
completely unrelated to the infrastructure project.  One young public official said, 
“Well, after all, we are all human beings… So, seken-banashi and things like that 
are maybe important.”  
Age as an indicator of status 
Comparative studies of negotiation have found that Japanese are particularly 
concerned about “status.280”  Appropriate interactions between Japanese people 
                                                 
280 Hodgson, J., Sano, Y. and Graham, J. (2000). Doing business with the new Japan. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman &Littlefield. p. 35.; Influence of status difference on negotiation is often discussed under the 
heading of “power distance.”  See Brett, J., Adair, W., Lempereur, A., Okumura, T., Shikhirev, P., 
Tinsley, C. and Lytle, A. (1998). Culture and Joint Gains in Negotiation. Negotiation Journal, 14(1), 
61-86. 
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are guided by the difference or similarity in the relative status of the parties in 
dialogue.  Six interview vignettes revealed the influence of age as a determinant 
of status in the interaction between various types of individuals.  A junior 
consultant suggests the importance of age in managing public meetings: 
Interviewee: When we meet with local residents… Well, I’ve just become 31 years 
old.  Those residents won’t trust me, or listen to me, because I’m 
too young.  On the other hand, I’m more suitable for making them 
feel relaxed.  Anyway, when we have to discuss important issues, 
basically, these males in the 40s or over are better suited.  
Everyone calmly listens to these persons.  In such cases, I bring 
those persons out to the meeting.  …  Our five staff members, 
including my bosses, went to the first two or three meetings with the 
municipal government.  Once we develop a trust relationship (with 
the public officials), only I, and sometimes another staff member, 
went to the meeting.  
 
In terms of status, hierarchy and the kō-otsu relationship (discussed below) are 
also important factors shaping the interaction between various types of 
government officials and consultants.   
Participation norms 
Can’t speak out in the public 
Even though there are a few outspoken stakeholders in various venues for 
resolving infrastructure disputes, most participants are reluctant to speak out in 
public forums.  Vignettes related to public meetings that had no intervention 
mechanism to let each participant speak out (e.g., meeting facilitation), often 
included people who only participated by showing signs of agreement with 
particular speakers.  A public official told about organizing a meeting with local 
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farmers in a very rural area: 
Interviewee: Of course, we asked everyone to come to a meeting.  In addition, 
we conducted individual negotiation by visiting each household 
directly.  When everyone was there, different opinions wouldn’t 
come out.  But when we visited individual households, they have 
their own issues.  Among the 6 or 7 farmers, 4 or 5 of them had the 
intention to continue farming.  When everyone got together, 
everyone said that they wanted to continue farming.  But in 
individual negotiations, some revealed that they had problems in 
finding their successors, and were considering closing their farms.  
So, the number (of negotiating parties) reduced by 1 or 2.  
 
This issue of “can’t speak out” is related to the Japanese consciousness of omote 
(front) and ura (behind).  According to T.S. Lebra, interactions of Japanese in 
the omote arena, where they are exposed to public attention, tend to be 
ritualistic281.  In order to save face, they hide their true feelings to avoid taking 
actions that might offend bystanders.  Her portrayal of ritualistic interaction 
precisely fits with interviewees’ description of silent participants in large 
meetings.   
Free-wheelers 
Despite widespread sentiment against speaking out in public, there are a few 
“free-wheelers” who do not hesitate to offer their thoughts in the public.  They 
are often called “vociferous (koe-no ookii)” persons.  These people are often 
emboldened by their social status as community leaders.   
Interviewee: In such instances (of consultative meetings), the head of the 
community is usually the first person to raise a question.  Then the 
others follow.  That’s what usually happens.  When there is a 
momentum, everyone starts to speak out.  That’s the common 
                                                 
281 Lebra, T. S. (1976). Japanese patterns of behavior. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. 
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pattern.  
 
Such persons are, however, not always the leaders of local communities.  Many 
interview vignettes suggested that such vociferous persons did not have leader 
status among other participants.  In one consultative committee the vociferous 
person was a public official who did not have status superior to other members. 
Interviewee: The representative from the City of X always respond to the 
presentations by the project proponents, like “This document is 
faulty.” 
Interviewer: The first comment after the presentation by the proponent? 
Interviewee: Yes, yes, yes.  It always starts by the representative from X.  He 
says, “This statement is wrong,” “I didn’t agree with it,” and “It’s 
different from what we have agreed.”  And we think, “There he 
goes again!”  We always couldn’t discuss what we had planned.  
Many subcommittee meetings have been busted by him.  
 
Free-wheelers in public meetings were discussed unfavorably in the interview 
vignettes.  Organizers of public meetings, in particular consultants, regard them 
as an obstacle to managing these meetings effectively and tried to control their 
dominance. 
Group Dynamics 
Anger and peer mediation 
Many stories about public disputes touched on the moment in which one 
participant expressed his or her anger against other members and project 
proponents.  Stories about such angry participants are often related to the norms 
against speaking out in the public.  By appearing “angry”, these participants 
could break the norms for remaining silent, and speak out in public.  
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In five stories of infrastructure disputes, peer members appeased the angry 
person and tried to restore an atmosphere in which they could continue the 
dialogue.  The following is a story by an academic who served as the chairman 
for a participatory conference in a community: 
Interviewee: What did I say? ...  Maybe I rejected him by saying, “This is not a 
forum for talking about such an issue.”  Anyway, I was almost 
losing my temper.  Yes, myself.  Then, at last, the other average 
(futsuu-no) persons helped us.  Like appeasing him.  Yes.  Like 
saying, “There’s no point doing that, man.”  Then the man turned 
silent.  Soon he left the meeting.  
 
The same kind of interaction was found in another case, in which acrimonious 
verbal interactions between a public official and two academics were often 
moderated by an average citizen who participated in the meeting.  In other 
stories, however, participants did not necessary pay much attention to one 
person’s anger. The difference between these stories lay in the level of 
relationship developed between the participants.  When peer members tried to 
appease the angry person, there was a sense of acquaintanceship embedded in the 
triangular relationship among the angry person, the person whom he or she is 
angry with, and the peers.  Everyone knew who the others were.  This 
triangular relationship created an incentive for the peers to mediate the dispute in 
order to maintain the acquaintanceship on which the decision making process 
depended.  In other words, if the participants share a sense of acquaintanceship, 
one person’s anger and other emotional reactions can be appeased by peer 
members.  In stories in which angry persons were not appeased, peer members 
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did not know who the angry persons were or why they were angry. 
Nemawashi 
Literature on Japanese negotiation point to the importance of nemawashi: the 
practice of negotiating behind the scenes before holding formal meetings.  The 
term nemawashi comes from a traditional Japanese gardening technique: when a 
tree needs to be transplanted, a gardener usually cuts its main roots well before 
the transplantation so that it will grow thin roots that will absorb water very well. 
In the organizational realm of contextual issues affecting infrastructure disputes, 
community leaders are considered to be key stakeholders who should be 
consulted in advance through nemawashi.  In fact, nemawashi is not just a 
technique for consensus building.  It is a normative practice that must be 
followed.  An interviewee elaborates this point. 
Interviewee: Regarding the local business association, there won’t be any 
problem at all if we give a friendly notice to those local people.  
But if we don’t do that at all, we will encounter a harsh reaction.  
The project in the previous year was faced with such oppositions.  
In the next year we first consulted with local people (and they helped 
us).  …  I think, it is crucial that we first talk with them, and 
follow the ceremony of developing a formal acquaintance (jingi-wo 
kiru). 
 
Therefore, to regard nemawashi simply as a technique for consensus building 
negates its ritualistic meanings.  Such visits—in particular to local community 
leaders—behind the scenes must be made as a sign of respect.  
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Sō-ron sansei, kaku-ron hantai 
Two interviewees used the Japanese term sō-ron sansei, kaku-ron hantai in 
elaborating their experience with public participation.  It refers to the tendency 
of the public to agree with generalized goals but to disagree with particular plans.  
An interviewee explains his experience of preparing a neighborhood traffic 
regulation plan with local residents: 
Interviewee: Well, in a nutshell, it is a sō-ron sansei, kaku-ron hantai situation.  
We first organize a general committee for the whole area.  …  
Later we organize committees for each street by involving the 
residents on the street.  In the general committee, everyone agrees 
with the strategies for the whole area, such as “better traffic safety” 
and “exclusion of thru traffic.” … They agree with those sō-rons 
(general strategies).  But then we have to decide on the specific 
devices and regulations.  As you know, we build humps and 
chicanes.  But they don’t like to have the humps built in front of 
their houses (laugh).  They also disagree with the plan to introduce 
the one-way traffic regulation on their street.  But the community 
have to decide to which street they will introduce the one-way traffic 
regulation.  So, we have to explore those issues between sō-ron 
sansei and kakuron hantai. 
 
This might not necessarily be a dilemma that is culturally particular to Japan.  It 
is plausible that even in the US that stakeholders might agree with generalized 
goals but oppos particular plans.  Whether or not it is culturally unique, sō-ron 
sansei kakuron hantai is one of the contextual factors that Japanese planners must 
anticipate in organizing participatory planning efforts. 
Inter-organizational relationship 
Several relational patterns may be commonly observed between particular 
types of organization.  They inform each party of appropriate patterns of 
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interaction between the members of those organizations. 
Kō-otsu relationship between government agencies and consultants 
Japanese consultants are under the pressure of the kō-otsu relationship.  
kō-otsu means “the first party, the second party.”  Service contracts in Japan 
usually use the Chinese character of kō and otsu to represent a consignor and a 
consignee respectively.  The kō-otsu relationship is a jargon term used by 
government officials and consultants; it refers to the fact that the consultants are 
contractually bound to perform services to the government.  It also implies that 
the consultants are under the complete control of the government officials.  At 
the same time, the government is supposed to take full responsibility for the work 
that it commissioned from the consultant. 
Interviewee: … and the kō-otsu relationship with consultants.  If you see a 
report (for a project in a foreign country), the consultant’s name is 
indicated on the cover. …  It implies that this consultant is 
responsible for the numbers (that the consultant prepared for) the 
report.   
Interviewer: The same thing won’t happen in Japan? 
Interviewee: Probably never.   
 
For instance, Japanese consultants usually do not appear before the public in 
consultative meetings,unless they are hired as facilitators, because government 
officials are supposed to know everything about the work they commissioned.   
The relationship between government officials and consultants is similar to 
jouge-kankei—the vertical relationship—rather than a partnership282.  The 
                                                 
282 Nakane, C. (1970). 
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vertical nature is also reflected in the language.  Contractors are called 
“shita-uke” in Japanese; shita means “under” or “lower.”   
When a consultant was asked to act as a neutral assistant to a consultative 
committee convened by a prefecture, it encountered difficulties in working with 
municipal governments: 
Interviewee: Well, umm…  Municipalities assumed that we were a contractor 
hired by the prefecture. … They can’t imagine a neutral organization.  
It’s not commonsensical (to them) based on the experience of 
conventional iinkais in the past.  This was an exceptional case.  
So, we were simply the prefecture’s contractor.  As a result, well… 
It was not derogatory, but they told us something like, “What the 
heck are you doing?  If the prefecture wants to build the facility 
then you should prepare a report supporting it.” 
 
Municipal government as a mediator between project proponents and 
local communities 
Municipal governments often serve as mediators between the national 
government and local communities during the planning and the implementation of 
large-scale infrastructure projects.  For instance, the national government relies 
on municipal governments to relay project information to local communities.  
For large projects, such as the development of highways and high-speed railways, 
local governments establish a special section or designate a special officer in to 
deal with various issues throughout the planning and the construction of 
infrastructure.   
Interviewee : At the prefectural level, the Coordination Office (taisaku-shitsu) will 
be created first.  Below that, I mean the prefecture, there are cities.  
Each city usually establishes a Coordination Division (taisaku-ka) 
or something like that for the liaison purpose.  It is sometimes 
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established as a subsection of the Urban Planning Division… 
Interviewer: So, the liaison person at the municipality’s Urban Planning Division 
does what?  
Interviewee : Usually that person deals only with our project. 
Interviewer: Ah.  Only for the project.  
Interviewee : We ask them to do so.  That person works as a sort of the 
“connecting person (paipu-yaku)” between our project manager 
and local communities.  We ask the person to coordinate with local 
communities, including the task of scheduling community meetings.  
Well, it is not necessarily true for all of our projects. 
Interviewer: The municipal officer stands in the middle. 
Interviewee: Yes.  Someone like a “connecting person.” 
 
Sometimes, information goes in the opposite direction.  In a few railway 
construction projects mentioned by two interviewees, municipal government 
served as the primary contact for the local residents.  The following is a story 
from a very small village: 
Interviewer: Did the local residents make a phone call to your office? 
Interviewee: Well, the first contact was indeed to the village’s town hall (yakuba).  
Village managers were asked (by the local residents), “Water won’t 
come out anymore.  What’s going on?”  Then, they thought, “Well, 
there’s nothing going on around your places.  But if I have to 
identify something that’s currently going on, there’s a construction of 
a railway over there.”  So, the village’s town hall made an inquiry 
to us.  Our projects may have done something wrong.  But we 
didn’t hold a public meeting in the area, because it was outside the 
potentially impacted areas that we had projected.  
 
The role of the municipality as a mediator increases when the project must be 
registered as part of the municipality’s urban plans (toshi-keikaku).  This issue 
will be explored in the section on the regulative realm. 
Substantive norms 
Interviewees also touched on various normative issues unrelated to personal 
interactions and group dynamics.  The most commonly cited issue was the 
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egalitarian norm and its influence on the actual practice of planning.  There 
seems to be a mild consensus that every person is entitled to receive an equal 
amount of compensation and attention from the government.  A public official 
discussed the difficulty of making special arrangements in the context of 
developing sidewalks on a national route: 
Interviewee: Well, that’s because of the standards.  Of course we can’t apply our 
standards too strictly.  But if we give up too much, then they will 
say, “Why that person got a larger (entrance)?  Why I can’t?”  
That’s all.  We have to do things equally.  That’s the thing we take 
pains. 
Interviewer: If you sweeten up someone then you will be asked from others? 
Interviewee: Yes.  If one’s neighbor with the same condition has a wider 
entrance, he will get angry.  We can’t explain to him.  So, that’s 
what we cared the most. 
 
In infrastructure disputes, precedents are used as the reference points for argument, 
as in the story cited above.  If equality is an accepted norm of the society, anyone 
who is influenced by a project is likely to be entitled to as much compensation as 
others have received.  However, sometimes that is impossible, especially when 
the economy is in stagnation.  This issue is further discussed in the “settings” 
section as one of the subjects for dispute. 
Regulative realm 
Various regulations influence policy-making processes for infrastructure 
developments in Japan.  Infrastructure planning in Japan must comply with 
public laws, which are enacted by the Diet, as well as with informal guidelines, 
ordinances, and other regulations of the national and local governments. 
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Public laws 
Urban Planning Act 
Among various regulatory frameworks, such as environmental impact 
assessment and the project evaluation system, urban planning decisions 
(toshi-keikaku-kettei) based on the Urban Planning Act of 1968 (toshi-keikaku-hō) 
are the most important forinfrastructure planning in Japan.  Road, highway, and 
urban redevelopment projects must be registered in the prefecture’s urban plan 
(toshi-keikaku) before project proponents start land acquisition and construction.  
In most cases, project proponent and municipalities, under the direction by the 
corresponding prefecture, jointly hold several consultative meetings (setsumeikai) 
near the project site.  Each municipality prepares a draft urban plan with inputs 
from local residents, and the prefecture incorporates it into its final urban plan.  
Anyone can submit his or her written comments on the draft within two weeks 
following its publication.   
After reading those comments, as well as hearing the opinions of the 
prefecture’s City Planning Commission (toshi-keikaku shingikai), the governor 
makes a formal urban planning decision.  Within two years following the 
decision, the proposed project must be approved as an urban plan project 
(toshi-keikaku jigyō) by the governor.  When an area is designated for a project, 
all construction activities in the area, other than those for the approved project, are 
prohibited.  The project decision also grants the project proponent the power of 
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eminent domain. 
In Tokyo, a number of urban planning decisions, including one for the Gaikan 
highway, were made in the late 1960s.  Those were referred to as last-minute 
(kakekomi) decisions by the interviewees.  Project proponents submitted their 
proposals before the enactment of the new Urban Planning Act of 1968, which 
required government agencies to seek more inputs from local communities.   
However, many projects were suspended in the 1970s as described in Chapter 1.  
Suspension was not equal to the withdrawal of those decisions.  These planning 
decisions remained effective even though the government did not try very hard to 
implement them.  Because these plans remain inactive, those who have houses 
within the designated areas have not been able to renovate their homes nor sell 
their lands for 30 years.  This legacy of inaction is an important contextual 
element complicating the resolution of infrastructure disputes in Tokyo.  The 
issue was mentioned in almost all of the stories related to the Metropolitan Tokyo 
District.  In a recent project to widen a major street in Tokyo, residents of the 
abutting areas demanded that the project be implemented for their neighborhoods 
as well: 
Interviewee: There wasn’t much opposition (to the project).  But the biggest 
issue was that the urban planning decision was abandoned for 50 
years...  The current width of the road is 25m.  The plan is to 
widen it to 50m…  (The landowners’) opposition was intense.  
They demanded that the whole project be implemented instead of 
only a part of it.  The segment we were working on was 
approximately 2km.  The urban plan decision was made for a 4km 
segment.  It had long been unimplemented, and only 2km of it 
would be implemented.  The protest from the rest of the project site 
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was immense. 
Interviewer: Asking for the implementation in their area as well? 
Interviewee: Yes.  
 
In the same project, these landowners demanded compensation for the financial 
losses imposed by the building restriction.  The interviewee said that such 
compensation would not be legally permissible. 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act 
Another important law affecting Japanese infrastructure planning is the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Act (kankyō-eikyō hyōka hō).  It was 
enacted by the national Diet in 1997.  Before its enactment, a Cabinet Order 
required environmental impact assessments for all major infrastructure projects.  
In addition, all prefectures have their own EIA ordinances.  Unlike the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in the US, the EIA Act in Japan seems to be a 
relatively trivial issue in the infrastructure planning processes.  Approximately a 
quarter of interviewees (11) referred to various systems for EIA, but only three of 
them referred to it in the context of controversy.  Those EIA controversies were 
all related to the projects in the Tokyo suburbs. 
One possible reason for the relatively low importance of EIA in infrastructure 
disputes in Japan is the integration of EIAs into the formal urban planning 
processes described in the previous section.  Most public meetings and other 
venues for sharing public information for an EIA are combined with the public 
forums for urban planning decisions.  No additional forum for public 
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involvement was created for environmental impact statements (EIS: kankyō eikyō 
hyōka-syo), in addition to public meetings for the Urban Planning processes that 
had been in place since 1968283.  Another possible reason for the low 
prominence of EIA processes is the lack of the kind of political implications that 
an EIS has in the US.  Even though the Environment Ministry has the formal 
authority to suggest revisions to the draft EIS, it rarely does so.  A consultant 
suggested the scarcity of ministry interventions as follows: 
Interviewee: It was a project to reclaim a wetland.  The wetland was … 
considered to be very pristine as a location for bird migration.  
Environmental groups opposed to the project fiercely. …  In fact, 
there were substantial concerns about environmental impacts.  So, 
(the project proponent) agreed with the Environmental Agency, now 
the Ministry, to stop the project if there would be environmental 
impacts.  This was a very rare case at that time.  The project 
moved forward with a possible termination in the middle.  At that 
time, it was a very innovative project.  I heard (that it was 
innovative) from other people as well.  
 
Urban planning decisions have many more implications than does EIA for local 
neighborhood and property owners because they can impose serious restrictions.  
Formal urban planning processes also have a longer history in Japan compared to 
the EIA. 
River Law 
Almost all interviewee who discussed watershed management projects referred 
to the River Act (kasen hō) of 1997.  This new Act requires river maintenance 
                                                 
283 The EIA Act requires a public meeting in addition to the requirements by the Urban Planning Act; 
however, it is held in a very early stage of planning and does not often address infrastructure disputes 
or substantial issues in planning decisions. 
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authorities (in most cases the national government) to formulate a master plan for 
river environment management (kasen seibi keikaku) for every watershed.  
Article 16-2 of the law mandates the authority to solicit inputs from “persons of 
learning and experience” and the public into the master plan.  The law reads, 
Article 16-2. (3): In preparing a draft master plan for river environment 
management, the river management authority must listen to the opinions of the 
persons of learning and experience when the authority acknowledges that it is 
necessary. 
Article 16-2 (4): In (preparing a draft master plan for river environment 
management,) the river management authority must take necessary measures, 
such as public hearings, in order to reflect the opinions of the relevant residents 
when the authority acknowledges that it is necessary. 
Because of those provisions, a number of participatory forums have been created 
across the nation in preparing such master plans.  Before the River Law was 
amended in 1997, there was no legal mandate for government agencies to involve 
the public; the Urban Planning Act did not regulate the watershed management.  
Revisions of the law in 1997 had a significant impact on policy making in this 
field. 
Guidelines 
Aside from the Urban Planning Act and other major planning laws, the 
government occasionally issues formal regulations such as shō-rei (ministerial 
order) and tsū-tatsu (administrative guidance).  These seem to have a significant 
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influence in changing how public officials conduct their business.  For instance, 
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport issued a guideline for public 
involvement in 2003284.  This helped an interviewee, who is a private consultant 
working on public involvement projects, argue for more public involvement 
activities.  Previously, he had to overcome considerable resistance to such 
activities from skeptical staff in field offices.  Now, he doesn’t encounter harsh 
rejections because the Ministry issued the guideline.   
Another consultant was also helped by a city’s ordinance that required public 
participation.  His client, the city’s section chief, was reluctant to request the 
participation of other section chiefs in a participatory conference on Sundays 
because of possible negative reactions from them.  However, the ordinance 
explicitly stated that each section of the government would foster partnerships 
with civil society organizations.  The ordinance empowered him to request other 
sections to participate on Sundays without worrying about their angry reactions.   
Those stories suggest the power of formal guidelines in changing the conduct 
of government organizations.  The guidelines alone can’t change the way in 
which the government conducts its business.  Organizational theorists reject the 
idea that organizational change can be effected by the unilateral imposition of 
new guidelines285, a position underscored by the interviewees’ experiences.   
                                                 
284 MLIT. (2005, June 30). Kokudo-kōtsū-shō shokan-no kōkyō-jigyō-no kōsō-dankai-ni-okeru 
jūmin-sanka tetsuduki-gaidorain-no sakutei-ni-tsuite. Press Release. 
285 Beer, M., Eisenstat, R., & Spector, B. (1990). Why change programs don't produce change. 
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However, they were able to use the symbolic value of the guidelines to persuade 
reluctant officials to adopt participatory planning processes: This existence of the 
guidelines implied support from the top of the hierarchy.  Considering the 
strength of vertical relationship between government officials, directions from the 
top are likely to have a substantial effect in changing the conduct of those with 
lesser authority. 
Fiscal year 
Project deadline 
In Japan, service contracts with the government start and end within each fiscal 
year (April 1 - March 31).  Consultants must finish their project by the end of 
March, and wait until sometime in the next fiscal year for public officials to 
commission new contracts.  Sometimes, this time constraint overburdens 
Japanese consultants, because the deadlines for almost all of their commissioned 
works are set for March.  It is a ritual among consultants to complain about their 
busy schedule in March. 
This time lag is can pose a special problem for participatory planning projects.  
One of the interviewees, a private consultant, even volunteered to continue a 
participatory project in the early part of one fiscal year without being paid by the 
government because he had once lost the active participation of local residents 
                                                                                                                                                    
Harvard Business Review (Nov.-Dec.), 158-166.; Kohn, A. (1993). Why incentive plans cannot work. 
Harvard Business Review (Sept.), 54-63.; Carroll, J. S. & Hatakenaka, S. (2001). Driving 
organizational change in the midst of crisis. Sloan Management Review, 42, 70-79.  
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due to the time lag between contracts: 
Interviewee: I think the continuity of participation is important.  I became keenly 
aware of that.  On the government’s side, there are transitions 
between fiscal years.  But there’s nothing to do with that on the 
residents’ side.  When the project is put on hold, I felt something 
have to be done as an interlude. … (In another project,) the 
workshop meetings started in October or November 199X, and the 
last one was supposed to happen at the end of March, but it was 
actually delayed until April.  Then, the same thing happened like 
the other case.  What I did was to try a new participatory planning 
method…. I wanted to secure the continuity of participation.  It was 
an interlude.  So it was a pro bono project. 
Interviewer: There was no contract (between him and the government agency)? 
Interviewee: No 
. 
Personnel transfers 
Because almost all government agencies in Japan assume lifetime employment, 
each staff member is automatically promoted to a higher position even without 
applying for it.  For example, the MLIT suggests a model “career path (kyaria 
pasu)” for its staff members as follows: 
Year 1 to 3: After the employment, you will be assigned to policy-making and 
legal functions as the headquarters’ staff. 
Year 4 to 6: As a subsection chief of the headquarters, you will be assigned to 
policy-making and regulatory functions with more creativity.  You 
will have opportunities to expand your skill of civil service as a 
section chief of regional divisions or a seconded staff to other 
ministries.  You will have chances to study in domestic and foreign 
universities by applying for the Civil Servant Long-term Research 
Fellow systems. 
After Year 7: As a deputy section chief of the headquarters, you will assume the 
key policy-making functions of the MLIT.  After that, you will serve 
as the first-class secretary in foreign diplomatic missions, division 
or section chief of local governments, or division chief of regional 
divisions.  After those careers, you will be promoted to prominent 
positions, such as the section chief of the headquarters.286 
 
                                                 
286 MLIT (undated). saiyō-jōhō teikyō hōmu-pēji. [WWW Document] URL http://www.mlit.go.jp/ 
saiyojoho/categ01.html. 
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Promotions usually occur at the beginning of each fiscal year, the first weekday of 
April.  For employees of the national government, a new assignment can be 
located anywhere in Japan.  When an officer is appointed to a new position, he 
or she must learn how his or her predecessor has managed various projects.  This 
transition, known as hikitsugi, can have serious impacts on public participation 
projects.  In the interviews, four consultants suggested that the transition at the 
beginning of a fiscal year changed the course of projects in which they assisted. 
Interviewer: You mentioned that nothing has happened for one year.  Did the 
transfer influence the inaction (of the government agency)? 
Interviewee: Staff transfer is a huge issue.  This kind of consultative committee 
would take two and half years (to complete).  But the processes 
often stop in April because the assigned officers change.  If that 
was the case, let’s say if we planned to have the next meeting in May, 
but would be delayed until July or later because of the issues at the 
field office.  Well… Everything usually works fine if the newly 
assigned person agrees with us.  We explain how we managed (the 
committee).  But if the new person didn’t agree with us, everything 
would collapse.  I heard such stories from my bosses.  Fortunately 
I do not have such an experience in person.  
Settings 
Meeting logistics 
In Japan, official public meetings for local residents, such as consultative 
meetings, are held in the evening so that workers can participate.  The utility of 
this tradition is obvious to public officials that a few of the interviewees sounded 
surprised to be asked about the starting time for such meetings.  Meetings are 
usually held at community halls owned and managed by community organizations, 
or at elementary or junior high schools gymnasiums. 
Chapter 4  191 
Techniques 
Fourteen techniques for meeting management, public participation, and public 
involvement were identified in the interviews.  They are: 
− Open house (ōpun hausu) 
− Study forums (benkyō-kai) 
− Project Cycle Management (PCM) (pī-sī-emu) 
− Facilitation (fasiritēshon) 
− Workshop (wāku-shoppu) 
− Pattern language (patān rangēji) 
− Brainstorming (burēn-sutōmingu) 
− KJ method 
− Newsletters (nyūsu retā) 
− Public comment (paburikku komento) 
− Survey (ankēto) 
− Delphi (derufai) 
− Social experiment (shakai jikken) 
− Site visits (genchi-kengaku) 
Most of these techniques are adaptations of English words using Katakana 
characters in Japanese.  This suggests an influx of participatory planning 
techniques from abroad.  Indeed, the National Institute for Japanese Language 
included “public involvement (paburikku inborubument)” as one of the foreign 
words that should be translated into Japanese287.   
Subject 
Compensation for land and other assets is the subject that appeared most often 
                                                 
287 See the web site for the “Foreign Word” Committee of the National Institute for Japanese 
Language. http://www.kokken.go.jp/public/gairaigo/Teian3/index.html.  According to its survey, less 
than 25% of the public could not understand those words.  
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in the interviewee’s stories.  It seems that the land acquisition for infrastructure 
development has become more difficult in recent years.  An interviewee, who 
was a project manager for the Ministry in the 1980s, mentioned that landowners 
were actually better off selling their land to the government than to real estate 
developers.  In the late 1980s, the bubble economy had driven up land pricse and 
inflated landowners’ expectations.  Following the collapse of the bubble in 1992, 
land prices fell substantially.  According to three interviewees, landowners then 
became more reluctant to accept the offers from the government because they had 
received better offers in the late 1980s.   
The level of compensation is also different among the types of project.  
According to interviewees’ stories, airport projects seem to offer the largest 
amount of compensation, followed by highway projects.  Railway projects tend 
to offer the least amount because the private corporations that own the railways 
will pay property taxes to municipalities every year following completion of the 
project. (Infrastructure owned by government agencies is not taxed.)  These 
differences in the level of compensation complicate negotiation for land 
acquisitions.  A project manager in a railway project explained the difficulty of 
negotiating for land acquisition in a neighborhood where local residents had 
negotiated with highway authorities in the past; they expected as much 
compensation as they received from the highway project: 
Interviewee: I was working for a project to develop a railway in a rural region.  
In some parts of that region, the route of the railway is almost 
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aligned with an existing highway.  ….  In such areas, local 
residents were previously compensated by the Japan Highway Co 
(nihon dōro kōdan)288.  They argued, “Hey! Everything is so 
different!”  I responded, “Yes, because the system is completely 
different.”  When I explained such systematical differences, they 
understood.  But they often base their argument on the expectations 
that were developed through sweet deals with the Japan Highway.  
So, sometimes our negotiation got off the track.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter the context for Japanese infrastructure planning was reviewed 
using data from in-depth interviews with 40 Japanese practitioners.  Based on a 
qualitative analysis of the interview data, the context can be disaggregated into 
four realms: organizational, normative, regulative, and settings.  The attributes of 
the functions in the four realms together form the context in which practitioners 
must prepare infrastructure development proposals and resolve disputes with local 
residents.  
In order to fully explore all the material relevant to decision making that could 
be gleaned from the interviews, it was necessary to build on Scott’s analytic 
framework.  I substituted the term “realm” for Scott’s term “pillar”’ to suggest 
the potentially interactive quality of Scott’s groupings.  I recast the category of 
“cognition” to reflect the structural elements of organizations.  Finally, I added a 
realm, “settings”, to encompass a set of elements related to decision making that 
may be of critical importance in analyzing the impacts of the introduction of new 
designs.  In developing this approach, the objective is to build an analytic 
                                                 
288 A public authority that developed and managed most of the national highways in Japan.  It was 
privatized on October 1, 2005 and divided into three “Expressway Companies.” 
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framework that researchers can use to think about the addition of any new 
decision tools, not only consensus building, to a existing cultural mix.  
In Chapters 5 through 8, I will examine an experimental use of consensus 
building processes in Japan by focusing on the relationship between the 
experiment and the Japanese context.  Because the experiment was conducted in 
the Japanese context of infrastructure planning, “interactions” between the 
Japanese context and consensus building could be expected.  The contextual 
factors identified in this chapter influenced the way consensus building was 
performed for the first time in Japan.  At the same time, as the essential 
functions of consensus building were carried out, some of these contextual factors 
were transformed.  
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Chapter 5: The Site: Kita-josanjima Intersection 
The consensus-building experiment took place in Tokushima, Japan.  In order 
to fully understand what happened during the experiment, one has to understand 
the contextual background.  Important elements of the context in which public 
infrastructure disputes are resolved in Japan have been reviewed in the previous 
chapter.  This chapter provides an overview of the experimentation site, the 
community of Kita-josanjima in the City of Tokushima, Tokushima Prefecture, as 
well as problems associated with the previous configuration of the Kita-josanjima 
Intersection that led to the experimental introduction of consensus building. 
Issues with the Kita-josanjima Intersection 
The Kita-josanjima Intersection 
The Kita-josanjima Intersection is located on National Route 11 (NR 11: 
kokudō), half mile south of the Great Yoshino River Bridge (Yoshino-gawa 
ō-hashi) and a mile north of the Tokushima Prefecture Headquarters.  NR 11, 
Prefectural Route 39 (PR 39: kendō. also known as the “Tokushima-Naruto Line” 
and “Tamiya Route” by locals), and the city’s Josanjima-Okinosu Line intersect at 
the Kita-josanjima Intersection (see Figure 5-1).  
PR 39 and the city road are both one-lane (for each direction) roads.  Even 
though the prefectural route and the city road may appear to be a single street 
because of their alignment, they are owned by different entities.  PR 39 functions 
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as the key east-west axis for the northern part of Tokushima City.  The city road 
toward the east is one of the few routes to a coastal neighborhood known as 
Okinosu.  The city’s Central Food Market and an industrial complex are located 
in Okinosu.   
NR 11 widens from three lanes to four lanes (an additional lane for right turns 
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Figure 5-1: NR 11 Kita-josanjima Intersection 
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only) before entering the intersection 200m [220 yards] from the north and 100m 
[110 yards] from the south.   
The design of PR 39 to the west of the intersection is a little complex.  
Another signaled intersection is located only 50 yards away from the 
Kita-josanjima intersection.  From the intersection a one-lane (each direction) 
city road goes south in parallel with NR 11.  This city road used to be NR 11 
before the current one opened.  Locals call this the old road (kyū-dō).  Between 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2: NR 11 Kita-josanjima Intersection 
(Photo: Reproduced from TAT (2005, September 2). Kita-josanjima Kosaten no 
genjō to kōsaten-no kaizen jirei ((1), (3), (4)). Masahiro Matsuura (2)). 
(1) (2) 
(3) (4) 
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this intersection and Kita-josanjima, there are three lanes on PR 39: one 
westbound and two eastbound.  The middle one is restricted for right turns onto 
NR 11. 
Entrance from the other city road to the east of the Kita-josanjima intersection 
to the Kita-josanjima Intersection has three lanes as well: two westbound and one 
eastbound.  The middle one is restricted for right turns to the north. 
The intersection has a pedestrian overpass structure, which was initially built 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5-3: NR 11 Kita-josanjima Intersection (2) 
(Photo: Reproduced from TAT (2005, September 2). Kita-josanjima Kosaten no 
genjō to kōsaten-no kaizen jirei.) 
(5) (6) 
(7) 
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when NR 11 opened in 1973.  According to traffic rules, pedestrians should 
cross the street by walking over the overpass to avoid traffic accidents and to 
facilitate the flow of automobile traffic.  In order to accommodate bicycle traffic, 
however, Bicycle Crossing Zones (BCZ: jitensha-ōdantai) are drawn between 
corners (shown as dotted lines in Figure 5-1; see picture (5) and (6) in Figure 5-3).  
Even though only bicycles are supposed use the BCZ, the physical arrangement 
allows pedestrians to walk on the BCZ.   
The number of reported accidents at the intersection has been slightly 
decreasing since 1999 (see Figure 5-4).  Seven accidents were reported in 2003.  
Number of accidents by the parties involved 
 Pedestrian Bicycle Motorbike Automobile 
1997 1 3 0 7 
1998 0 0 0 8 
1999 0 3 0 8 
2000 0 1 1 6 
2001 0 0 2 5 
2002 0 2 0 3 
2003 0 2 0 5 
Total 1 (1.8%) 11 (19.3%) 3 (5.3%) 42 (73.7%) 
 
Types of accidents involving motorbikes and automobiles 
Rear-end 
collision 29 (64.4%)  Left-turn 2 (4.4%) 
Front-end 
collision 1 (2.2%)  Right-turn 6 (13.3%) 
Side-impact 
collision 5 (11.1%)  Other types 2 (4.4%) 
 
Figure 5-4: Number of traffic accidents at the Kita-josanjima Intersection 
Source: TAT (2005, September 2). Kita-josanjima kōsaten no genjō to kōsaten-no kaizen jirei.  
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Three quarters of the accidents between 1997 and 2003 involved automobiles.  
Two thirds of these automobile accidents were rear-end collisions.  
Approximately one fifth of all accidents between 1997 and 2003 involved 
bicycles.  Three quarters of those bicycle-related accidents occurred when 
automobiles were making left turns.   
Key issues for the convening agency 
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) is responsible for 
managing and improving physical arrangements of National Routes, including 
their intersections with crossing streets.  Its local field office staff—Tokushima 
River and Road Office—maintains the Kita-josanjima Intersection.  Due to the 
relatively large number of accidents, the Intersection was officially designated as 
one of the most dangerous points (jiko kiken-kasho) in Tokushima prefecture.  
Because of this designation, the field office had a mandate to improve the 
physical arrangement of the Intersection in order to reduce the number of 
accidents within a few years.   
The Intersection is heavily used by different kinds of traffic flowing in from all 
directions.  To make matters worse, because PR39 and the city road extending 
from the Intersection are among the most important streets for Tokushima City, 
many drivers make either left or right turns at this intersection.  These complex 
movements increase the risk of traffic accidents between automobiles, motorbikes, 
and bicycles.  
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Another key issue was the need to improve ways of handling pedestrian traffic.  
Even though pedestrians are supposed to walk on the overpass structure, it has 
been reported that pedestrians, especially elderly people who don’t have the 
strength to climb up the stairs, occasionally cross the street by walking in the 
Bicycle Crossing Zones.  The city’s main hospital is near the Intersection, and 
the lack of accessible facilities for physically-challenged people seemed to be a 
problem. 
Therefore, there was a clear need to improve the Intersection; however, finding 
a set of feasible improvement options could not be a simple task because any 
changes would affect a wide range of local residents and other stakeholders.  It 
was very possible that local stakeholders would try to forestall the implementation 
of a project that would negatively influence their lives.  
Need for consensus building  
Compared to other onerous public disputes discussed in Chapter 1, disputes 
over the new arrangement for the Kita-josanjima Intersection were not likely to be 
as intense because negative impacts from the improvement would be limited to 
local stakeholders.  Any protests would probably not involve supporters outside 
the immediate community.  
However, there was a clear potential for a local public dispute.  Business 
owners having parking lots adjacent to the Intersection would probably protest 
any proposal that would make their parking lots inaccessible from NR 11.  Local 
 202  Chapter 5 
residents would probably oppose to a project if it would increase road noise.  
Local schools and parents would protest if the agency removed the pedestrian 
overpass, which children had been using to walk to school.  Bicycle users would 
be angry if the project removed the BCZ and forced them to take detours.  
Drivers in Tokushima, who had been suffering from severe rush hour congestion, 
wouldn’t tolerate longer red lights which would make it much worse.   
Clearly, a wide range of stakeholders could be influenced by the 
reconfiguration of the Kita-josanjima Intersection; however, no one had a clear 
idea of who the important stakeholders were and what their interests might be.  
Therefore, the organizer of the experiment considered that consensus building 
would help stakeholders and the convenor (i.e., MLIT) to find feasible 
improvement options for the Intersection.  They assumed that consensus 
building through conflict assessment and facilitated dialogues between 
stakeholder representatives could effectively address these questions. 
In theory, the experimental application of consensus building could have 
demonstrated more social implications if it were used to resolve a more intensive 
dispute such as the one over the renovation of Daijū River Dam (see Appendix 
1-A).  In practice, it would have been extremely difficult to convince the 
leadership of the convening organization to experiment with consensus building, 
which had never been tried in Japan before, to such a high-profile case.   
The intensity of possible conflict over the Kita-josanjima project was, however, 
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very appropriate for the first experiment.  Because the problems with the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection could probably have been handled in other ways if the 
consensus building process produced no meaningful outcome, the project was an 
appropriate field for experimenting with consensus building, as practiced in the 
US, for the first time in Japan. 
The context for the Kita-josanjima Intersection 
Tokushima 
The experimentation site is located in the City of Tokushima in Tokushima 
Prefecture.  Tokushima Prefecture is located on the eastern end of Shikoku 
Island, one of the four major islands of Japan (see Figure 5-5).  Shikoku means 
“four states” in Japanese; the island was named after the four states—Awa, Sanuki, 
Iyo, and Tosa—that had been in place for more than thousand years.  Shikoku is 
connected to Honshū, the main island of Japan, by the Honshū-Shikoku 
Connection Bridges (Honshū-shikoku renraku kyō) most of which were opened to 
the traffic in the 1990s.   
Tokushima Prefecture has a population of 810 million and an area of 1,600 
square miles289.  Eighty percent of its land is mountain terrain290.  Most 
communities are aligned with the coast and Yoshino River Valley.  Akashi Strait 
                                                 
289 Statistics Bureau of Japan. (2005). heisei 17-nen kokusei chōsa  
290 Tokushima Prefecture. (undated). tokushima-ken ni tsuite. [WWW Document] URL 
http://www.pref.tokushima.jp/generaladmin.nsf/about?OpenPage&TableRow=2.2 
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Bridge (Akashi kaikyō ōhashi: the longest span bridge in the world) and Great 
Naruto Bridge (Ō-naruto bashi) connect Tokushima City and Kobe City via Awaji 
Island.  The prefecture’s main industry is paper and pulp production and 
chemical manufacturing291. 
This area was originally called the country of Awa—meaning millet—since the 
seventh century because millet production was abundant.  It was renamed 
Tokushima Domain (han) at the beginning of the Edo period when the Hachisuka 
family became the domain lords.  For the 250 years of the shogunate period, the 
                                                 
291 Tokushima Prefecture. (2000). heisei 12-nen sangyō renkan hyō kara mita ken keizai.  
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domain produced an abundance of indigo, salt, sugar, and cigarettes. 
Tokushima City became the domain’s capital in the 17th century at the 
beginning of the Edo period when the lord settled in Tokushima Castle.  It 
remains the prefecture’s capital.  The city is famous for its summer dance 
festival—Awa odori.  The festival lasts four days and attracts more than a 
million tourists from all over Japan.   
Tokushima City is located on the northeastern coast of Tokushima Prefecture 
(see Figure 5-5).  It is two and half hours from Osaka on highways and bridges.  
Intercity buses for Osaka and Kobe depart every half hour.  Japan Railway’s 
 
Figure 5-6: Tokushima in 1796 
Source: Tokushima Castle Museum. (2000). tokushima jōka e-zu.
Approximate location 
of the current Kita- 
josanjima Intersection 
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Kōtoku Line connects the city with Takamatsu City, another major city on 
Shikoku.  Express train Uzushio leaves for Takamatsu every hour.  Another 
regional line extends from Tokushima to the small village of Sukumo.  There is 
no direct train service to Osaka and Kobe.   
Tokushima has a civilian airport, sharing runways and other facilities with the 
Marine Self-defense Force.  The airport is located in the Town of Matsushige, 8 
miles north of downtown Tokushima.  Six daily flights to Tokyo and a few other 
regional flights are in service292.  Ferry services to Wakayama, on the south of 
Osaka, are available from Tokushima Port.  The port is located in the 
southeastern part of the city. 
The city’s population is approximately 110 thousand.  Commercial and office 
developments are concentrated in the area between the train station and the 
Tokushima Prefecture Headquarters. (See Figure 5-7.)  Major roads in the city 
include NR 11, NR 192, and NR 55.  Most streets other than those main routes 
are very narrow, often with only one lane for each direction, or even less.  
Drivers have to navigate through those narrow streets without hitting parked cars, 
bicycles, and pedestrians. 
In the northern area of the city runs Yoshino River.  It is the longest river in 
Shikoku with the total length of 120 miles.  Tokushima City was originally 
                                                 
292 As of July 2006. 
Chapter 5  207 
developed on the Yoshino River Delta.  There are currently four bridges across 
the river and two more are now being constructed.  Since the late 1990s, there 
has been a prolonged dispute over the construction of a dam upstream on Yoshino 
River, as discussed in Chapter 1.   
National Route 11  
NR 11 is the most important route for the city.  It runs from north to south on 
Downtown
City Hall
Prefecture HQ
Castle
Park
Sport s G round
t G
Airport
(5 mi.)
Takamatsu (40 mi.),
Kobe (70 mi.), 
Osaka (90 mi.)
Y o s h i n o  Ri v e r
Y o s h i n o  i v e
Station
Kita-
josanjima
Intersection
N R
 1
1
N R
 1
1
PR 3 93 9 C i ty r o ad
C i  r o d
NR 192
Tokushima-honcho
Intersection
Okinosu
(2 mi.)
G r
e a t
 Y o
s h
i n o
G
e a t
 Y o
s h
i n o
R i v
e r 
B ri
d g
e
R i v
e  
B i
d g
e
t Gt G
Y o s h i n o  i v e
Y o s h i n o  i v e
N R
 
N R
 
3 93 9 C i  r o d
C i  r o d
G
e a t
 Y o
s h
i n o
G
e a t
 Y o
s h
i n o
R i v
e  
B i
d g
e
R i v
e  
B i
d g
e
 
Figure 5-7: Location of the Kita-josanjima Intersection in Tokushima 
NR55 
 208  Chapter 5 
the eastern part.  All automobiles entering from the north of the city, including 
those from major cities such as Osaka, Kobe, and Takamatsu, take this route to the 
city.  Once they cross Yoshino River over Great Yoshino River Bridge, the traffic 
diffuses to different directions: to the downtown, to the seaport on the 
southeastern end of the city, and to the villages on the west.  NR 11 has three 
lanes for each direction south of Great Yoshino River Bridge, and four lanes on 
the north.   
There are two major intersections in the city: Kita-josanjima and 
Tokushima-honcho.  Tokushima-honcho is the crossing between NR 11 and NR 
192 that leads to the western villages.  This intersection also serves as the 
entrance to the downtown district.  Those two intersections, as well as another at 
the southern end of Great Yoshino River Bridge, are designated as the most 
dangerous intersections on NR 11 by the MLIT. 
Traffic congestion on NR 11 is a serious problem during rush hours.  The 
traffic volume on the route exceeds its capacity by the factor of 1.26 to 1.54 on 
the south of Yoshino River293.  In rush hours the average travel speed is only four 
miles per hour (7km/h).  MLIT estimates that annual economic losses from the 
congestion are 500 million yen (4.2 million U.S. dollar).  The area is currently 
faced with rapid motorization. The number of automobile registered in Tokushima 
                                                 
293 MLIT. (undated). dōro IR saito. [WWW Document] URL http://www.toku-mlit.go.jp/douro/ir/ 
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Prefecture has risen by 30 percent between 1990 and 2000 (see Figure 5-8)294.  
NR11 is also heavily used by trucks and intercity buses.  The ratio of oversized 
vehicles (e.g., buses and trailers) in the traffic is 10.5 percent on the north of the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection. 
NR 11 was constructed in the early 1970s.  In July 1972, the segment between 
Kita-josanjima Intersection and Great Yoshino River Bridge opened to traffic.  In 
November 1973, the construction of NR 11 between Kachidoki Bridge near the 
                                                 
294 MLIT. (2005). Shikoku un-yu kyoku gyōmu yōran. 
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Prefecture Headquarters and Kita-josanjima was completed295.  NR 11 took a 
different path before the development of the current road. NR 11. The previous 
route went through Yoshino River Bridge, which is located approximately a mile 
upstream from Great Yoshino River Bridge, followed the current PR 39, and 
turned south on immediately west of the current Kita-josanjima Intersection.  
The construction of this previous route (then called NR 21) was completed in 
October 1944.  These roads were transferred to the prefecture and the city when 
the current NR 11 opened. 
A bypass for NR 11—Tokushima Circumferential Highway East (higashi kanjō 
dōro)—is currently under construction by the prefecture on the eastern edge of the 
city.  The new two-lane (each direction) bypass will directly connect the 
northern and southern end of the city. 
Kita-josanjima neighborhood 
The intersection is located at the western edge of the Kita-josanjima Chō 
neighborhood296.  On the eastern side of the intersection lies the Suketō Bashi 
neighborhood.  Kōgenji River, a narrow stream, runs on the northern edge of 
Kita-josanjima and the eastern edge of Suketō Bashi.   
                                                 
295 Tokushima City Office of Historian. (1983). tokushima shi-shi. Vol. 3: sangyō, keizai, kōtsū, 
tsūshin.. p. 462 
296 Unlike in the US, neighborhoods are official subdivisions of each municipality whose boundaries 
are clearly demarcated by the municipality government.  Neighborhoods are used to designate a 
mailing address for each lot.  Each neighborhood has a “community group (chō-nai kai)” that 
organizes communal activities such as seasonal festivals.  Their boundaries are often based on the 
historical concept of mura (communities). 
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Kita-josanjima is one of three Josanjima neighborhoods.  Kita means “north” 
in Japanese.  Thus, Kita-josanjima can be translated as “Josanjima North” in 
English.  There are two other neighborhoods in Josanjima: Naka-josanjima 
(Josanjima Center) and Minami-josanjima (Josanjima South).  Josanjima was 
named after Josan Takeichi, a samurai who settled in this area in 1585297.  
Josanjima means “Josan’s Island.”  Because Tokushima City was developed on 
the Yoshino River Delta, Josan’s residence could have looked like an island when 
                                                 
297 Ishiyo, A. and Takahashi, K. (1992). furusato tokushima.  
 
Figure 5-9: Kita-josanjima in 1953 and the approximate location of the current 
Kita-josanjima Intersection 
Source: Nihon Seimitsu Chizu Shuppansha (1953). The Detailed Map of Tokushima: Tokushima in 1953. 
(tokushima seimitsu shigai chizu: 1953 nen-no tokushima)
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he settled there.   
In Meiji, the Josanjima neighborhoods were developed as a center for academic 
activities.  In 1899, Tokushima Normal School (shihan gakkō) was constructed 
in Minami-josanjima.  In 1923, the 15th Engineering High School (dai jūgo 
kōgyō kōtō gakkō) was established in the same neighborhood.  Currently, they 
together form the University of Tokushima’s Josanjima Campus. 
The Kita-josanjima intersection is surrounded by residential communities as 
well as some commercial outlets (see Figure 5-10).  On the northeastern corner, 
there is a clothing store called Aoyama (a national chain brand).  It has a parking 
lot with two entrances on NR 11 and a narrow street in the back.  Tokushima 
Citizen’s Hospital, run by the city, stands behind Aoyama.  One of the city’s 
largest general hospitals, it can accommodate 397 inpatients.  In order to 
alleviate the congestion of its parking lot, the hospital currently requires all 
patients to make an appointment before visiting the hospital.  Its building is 
currently under renovation and will include 155 parking spaces when it opens in 
2008.  On the northwestern corner is a white, two-story building housing a 
traditional Japanese-style bar (izakaya) on the first floor and apartments on the 
second floor.  A brown, 15-story building stands in the back of the white 
building.  The building houses a condominium complex called Frontage Suketō 
Bashi.  On the north of the Kita-josanjima Intersection along NR 11 are a few 
apartment buildings, stores, houses, and two car dealers. 
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On the southeastern corner, there is a sushi restaurant called Ginpachi.  It has 
a small parking lot with the entrance facing the intersection.  The southwestern 
corner of the intersection is a vacant lot owned by a car dealer who has an office  
north of the intersection.  The dealer parks his pre-owned cars for sale on the lot.  
South of the intersection along NR 11 are a few mixed-use buildings, a 
convenience store, a diner, a pachinko parlor, two banks, and two gas stations.  
University of Tokushima’s main campus is approximately a half mile to the south. 
The neighborhoods surrounding NR 11 are predominantly residential.  Most 
of the houses are two-story traditional Japanese style buildings.  Because of its 
proximity to the University of Tokushima, the area holds apartment buildings and 
small restaurants that provide basic amenities for its students.  At a glance, 
Kita-josanjima is a typical, traditional Japanese urban community crammed with 
tiny houses along narrow streets. 
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Figure 5-10: Major buildings and facilities in the Kita-josanjima neighborhood 
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Chapter 6: The Experiment: Committee for the 
Improvement of Kita-josanjima Intersection 
Introduction: site entry 
The author has been involved in this experimental consensus-building effort in 
Japan from its inception as an observer as well as an assistant who provided 
information about consensus building as practiced in the US.  The history of the 
project began in the summer of 2002 when I was first invited to give a lecture in 
the City of Takamatsu298.  The session was organized primarily by Professor 
Hideo Yamanaka of the University of Tokushima.  Affiliated with the 
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, he is a leading professor of 
transportation planning in the region.  Since 2000, he has been managing an 
ad-hoc research group of faculty members from several universities in the 
Shikoku region.  The group has been focusing on various issues on public 
participation and public disputes.  It was supported by the Shikoku Branch of the 
Japan Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE) both financially and organizationally.   
In July 2002, I gave a half-day lecture on consensus building processes and 
negotiation theories, as well as pedagogical tools for teaching those skills, such as 
negotiation simulations299.  The group invited other experts in “public 
                                                 
298 See Chapter 5 for the information about the Shikoku region’s geography. 
299 JSCE Shikoku (2003). doboku gijutsu-sya no tameno gōi-keisei gijutsu no kyōiku hōhō ni-kansuru 
kenkyū-kai heisei 14 nendo seika hōkokusho. Takamatsu, Japan. 
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involvement (paburikku inborubumento) techniques” and “participatory education 
(sanka-gata kyōiku)” in subsequent sessions.  Following the first encounter, I 
developed a working relationship further with Professor Yamanaka as well as 
other members of the group.  In the winter of 2003 I was invited to Takamatsu 
again to support Professor Yamanaka’s lecture for public officials on public 
participation processes.  I discussed the five-step consensus building process, 
which is outlined in Chapter 2, in a two-hour session. 
In 2004, I was given an opportunity to be a lecturer in a more intensive seminar 
on consensus building.  Professor Yamanaka’s group had decided to organize a 
seminar as a part of their experiments with teaching consensus building skills for 
practitioners and graduate students in the field of civil engineering.  In reaction 
to the proposal I suggested a weeklong seminar that would cover a wide range of 
issues in the efforts of consensus building.  I also encouraged them to consider 
institutionalizing consensus building processes after the seminar by conducting a 
few experiments in carefully selected settings, instead of organizing the seminar 
just as a one-time effort.  After a few exchanges of e-mails between Professor 
Yamanaka, Yusho Ishikawa (the chief director of the PI-Forum, a not-for-profit 
organization that assisted the seminar management and marketing), and me, it was 
decided that the seminar would take place in the summer of 2004 for three days.  
The organizers considered that a weeklong seminar would be too long for 
practitioners to stay away from their office.  
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The seminar was held in Takamatsu from August 26 to 28, 2004300.  Twenty 
practitioners and graduate students participated.  Professor Yamanaka and some 
of his colleagues at the University of Tokushima, who would eventually be 
involved in the experimental consensus building effort, participated in the seminar 
as well.  In fact, Professor Yamanaka and Dr. Toshikaki Sawada, a practitioner of 
participatory planning methods in Tokushima, were co-lecturers of the seminar.  
For instance, Sawada organized several “icebreaking (aisu burēku)” sessions 
during the seminar.  A few middle-rank officers from the MLIT, including 
Hajime Honda who would later take the convenor’s role in the experimental effort, 
participated in the seminar as students. 
Later in the year, Professor Yamanaka asked my academic advisor and me 
whether we were willing to assist in an experimental consensus building effort 
that would address possible improvements to the Kita-josanjima Intersection in 
Tokushima City.  MLIT’s Tokushima River and Road Office (Tokushima kasen 
kokudō jimusho) was to be the convening agency.  Hajime Honda, the director 
(kachō) of its Road Safety Division, would be the project manager on the 
Ministry’s side.  My academic advisor decided not to be involved in this 
experimental project.  I would serve as an advisor (adobaizā), providing 
information to the project managers about consensus-building processes as 
practiced in the US.  To preserve my objectivity as an observer, I intentionally 
                                                 
300 JSCE Shikoku (2005). doboku gijutsu-sya no tameno gōi-keisei gijutsu no kyōiku hōhō ni-kansuru 
kenkyū-kai heisei 16 nendo seika hōkokusho. Takamatsu, Japan. 
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avoided becoming a project manager myself301. 
Organizing the experiment 
The first task in setting up the experiment was team building.  In October 
2004 Professor Yamanaka informally negotiated with a local not-for-profit 
organization called Commons (komonzu) for its assistance.  Professor Yamanaka 
was one of its board directors.   
Commons was incorporated in April 2004 as a not-for-profit organization.  It 
is registered by Tokushima Prefecture as a legal entity under the NPO Law.  The 
group was initially organized by Yukiyoshi Sato, a local architect with over a 
decade of experience in participatory planning in Tokushima.  He worked with 
the City of Tokushima and the Tokushima Society of Architects in experimenting 
with participatory planning techniques—such as workshop techniques, 
pattern-language theory, and meeting facilitation—in designing street furniture 
and public parks302.  The current chief director is Junzo Kita, an architect who 
returned to his hometown after 25 years of experience as an architect in Tokyo.  
Both have their own architectural design offices in Tokushima. 
In recent years, the group has pioneered the introduction of “workshop 
(wāku-shoppu)” techniques to planning processes in Tokushima.  In Japan, 
                                                 
301 My role in the project might have exceeded what a typical participant observer does; however, I 
tried not to trigger organizational change myself as a change agent. 
302 Sato, Y. (1988, November). machizukuri no nettowāku wa hito-no nettowāku. Kenchiku Chishiki, 
91-93.; Sato,Y. (1997, July). suehiro kōen kaishū wākushoppu. Midori-no Dokuhon, 41, 61-69. 
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workshops have been widely adopted by planning practitioners, especially those 
who advocate for the recent machizukuri town-building movement303.  The 
machizukuri movement attempts to revitalize neighborhoods and public facilities 
by mobilizing local residents, volunteers, and supporters into participatory 
planning and community improvement activities.    
In 2004 Commons successfully organized seven workshop meetings in which 
local residents and environmentalists helped design the Tsukimigahama Seashore 
Public Park (kaihin kōen) near the airport304.  Since 2004, Commons members 
have offered a few short-term skill-building sessions for those who want to 
practice workshop-style participatory planning. 
Commons does not have a permanent staff, which is quite common among 
public interest entities in Japan305.  Core members own architecture studios, 
operate small consulting firms, or are faculty members in Department of Civil and 
Environmental Engineering at the University of Tokushima.    
Delegated by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE), a group of faculty 
members, graduate students, and undergraduates from the University staffed the 
experiment.  The JSCE had a prior relationship with the MLIT, having organized 
                                                 
303 Sorensen, A. (2002). The Making of Urban Japan. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 308-325. 
304 Kita, J. (2005). Tsukimi-gaoka Kaihin Kōen ni okeru shimin sanka. Presentation at Public 
Participation Techniques Exchange Forum in Tokushima on January 28, 2005. 
305 Pekkanen, R. (2003). Molding Japanese civil society: State-structured incentives and the 
patterning of civil society. In Schwartz, F. and Pharr, S. (Eds.) The State of Civil Society in Japan. 
New York, NY: Cambridge. p. 128. 
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an intensive seminar on consensus building processes the previous summer306.  
In addition, national universities, including the University of Tokushima, used to 
have strict rules discouraging faculty members from engaging in paid consulting 
jobs.  The restriction has been loosened only recently after they were separated 
from the national government system and incorporated as independent 
corporations in 2004307.  The university’s lack of experience in working with 
external funding sources could also have influenced the team members’ choice to 
work under the aegis of the JSCE. 
The alliance of the Commons and the JSCE comprised the “third-party 
organization (dai-sansya kikan)308” that would provide neutral assistance to the 
consensus-building effort.  The following individuals were involved in this first 
experimental effort at consensus building in Japan: 
• Japan Society of Civil Engineers (University of Tokushima, Department of 
Civil and Environmental Engineering) 
− Hideo Yamanaka (Professor), 
− Susumu Namerikawa (Lecturer), 
− Kana Murakami (Graduate Student), 
− Yuki Koori (Undergraduate Student), and 
− Several other undergraduate assistants who occasionally provided 
clerical assistance. 
                                                 
306 Personal communications with a staff member. 
307 Former national universities are now incorporated as national university corporations (kokuritsu 
daigaku hōjin). 
308 In Japanese, the term dai-sansya kikan is often used to refer to those organizations that do not have 
a stake in the subject matter.  Because the term does not necessarily guarantee the party’s neutrality, 
it was stressed at the meetings that they would act as a “neutral.” 
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• Commons309 
− Junzo Kita (Chief Director, Architect), 
− Yukiyoshi Sato (Director, Architect), 
− Toshiaki Sawada (Director, Civil engineer and Planner), 
− Yoshifumi Kasai (Director, Architect), 
− Yuji Kurahashi (Director, Industrial designer), and 
− Noriko Tanaka (Assistant to Sawada) 
• Tokushima River and Road Office, MLIT 
− Hajime Honda (Director, Road Safety Division310). 
Gaining legitimacy within the organization 
This was the MLIT’s first experience in requesting a nonpartisan neutral to 
conduct a conflict assessment.  Because of its “newness,” the staff had to acquire 
legitimacy within the Ministry to experiment with a new approach to consensus 
building. To legitimize the introduction of this organizational innovation, special 
arrangements had to be made.   
MLIT’s Shikoku Regional Bureau in Takamatsu created the Committee to 
Study Consensus-Building Techniques (gōi-keisei shuhō kentō iinkai), an informal 
study group to oversee the Kita-josanjima effort as well as a smaller consensus 
building experiment in Kochi311.  Members of the study group included 
                                                 
309 In the summer of 2005, Yukiyoshi Sato joined the team and Yuuji Kasai gradually left. 
310 He was transferred to the Planning Division II in April 2005. 
311 The scale and the scope of the other experiment in Kochi, another prefectural capital in Shikoku, 
were much smaller than the Kita-Josanjima experiment: a stakeholder committee was organized to 
discuss the design of the Sakaimachi Pedestrian Overpass in the downtown Kochi.  The ministry had 
already decided to build elevators for the pedestrian overpass and sought public inputs on their 
appearance (i.e., color and facade materials).  Stakeholder analysis was prepared in January 2005 by 
a construction consulting firm, with help of a local not-for-profit organization, to identify appropriate 
participants for the dialogue.  The stakeholder group was first convened February 2, 2005, with no 
third-party neutral involved.  The group reached a consensus about the design in their third meeting 
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Professor Yamanaka (chairman), Professor Shintaro Terabe of Kochi Institute of 
Technology, four senior public officials from the MLIT, and myself.  Each 
meeting was organized and managed by the Ministry’s staff.  Professor 
Yamanaka took the chairman’s role.  The group was set up in the typical 
shingikai format312.   
Meetings were held in Takamatsu on January 24 and March 18, 2005.  In the 
first meeting, I made a presentation on consensus-building processes as practiced 
in the US.  MLIT’s staff from Tokushima and Kochi reported the progress of 
their experimental efforts.  Other members of the study group asked for some 
clarifications, but no decisions were made during the discussion.  This type of 
purely consultative meeting is generally believed to lend credence to a plan, a 
relationship called osumitsuki in Japanese. 
Conflict assessment 
Preparation 
The team and the Ministry first met informally on November 25, 2004 at the 
Commons’ office to define the role of each individual.  JSCE members were 
designated to manage the consensus-building process and to act as a nonpartisan 
neutral.  For the fiscal year of 2004 (ending March 31, 2005) the JSCE was to 
produce a conflict assessment report and organize a convening meeting if possible.  
                                                                                                                                                    
on April 19.  Construction was completed in March 2006. 
312 See Chapter 4 (p. 166) for more information about shingikai in Japan. 
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Commons members were to assist the JSCE.  My role was to inform the 
participants about US consensus-building processes.   
Professor Yamanaka was to serve as a technical expert on transportation issues.  
To separate the technical advising function from the function of managing the 
deliberation process, he chose not to join the neutral managing group.  He was 
concerned that he would become an advocate, pushing innovative technologies 
for transportation safety because of his professional interest as a transportation 
engineer313. 
Hiroshi Tomiyasu of Oriental Consultants, one of the largest transportation 
consulting firm in Japan, participated in this meeting as well.  Oriental was to 
assist Professor Yamanaka in his technical analysis.  This group of personnel 
from the MLIT, the JSCE, the Oriental Consultants, and I comprised “the steering 
committee (un-ei iinkai).”   
By the time this experiment began, Professor Yanakana and Dr. Sawada, who 
had prior experiences with the PCM (Project Cycle Management) technique, had 
introduced the new term kankei-sha bunseki.  It refers to conflict assessment 
which had previously been called funsō asesumento in Japanese.  Kankei means 
relationship and sha means person.  Therefore, kankeisha can be translated as 
“relevant persons.”  Bunseki means “analysis”.  Previously in Japan, PCM 
stakeholder analysis not including stakeholder interviews had been called 
                                                 
313 Personal communication with Prof. Yamanaka on February 2, 2006. 
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kankei-sha bunseki.  However, Yamanaka and Sawada adopted this term for the 
newer process which did include solicitation of stakeholder opinion through 
interviews.  
The steering committee’s first meeting on December 14, 2004 was a discussion 
of strategy for conflict assessment.  Issues included possible stakeholders, ways 
of contacting the first group of stakeholders, and the interview protocol.  The 
Ministry provided a list of 17 possible stakeholder interviewees. I prepared two 
draft documents for the meeting: an interview protocol and a cover letter.  The 
interview protocol was modeled on a document prepared in 2003 by the 
Consensus Building Institute for the assessment of dispute over the development 
of Assembly Square in Massachusetts314.   
The steering committee decided that the MLIT’s Tokushima Office would send 
a letter to the initial round of interviewees before team members spoke to them. It 
was felt that an initial contact by the nonpartisan team would look suspicious. 
Team members needed the credibility lent by the MLIT; Commons was only a 
year old. In fact, the MLIT had already informally discussed the plan for the 
stakeholder analysis with other government agencies; some of them were 
reluctant to be interviewed by members of an unknown not-for-profit 
                                                 
314 Consensus Building Institute, (2003, August 25). Conflict assessment on the future of Assembly 
Square, Somerville, Massachusetts. Cambridge, MA. 
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organization315.  Later in an interview, a staff member reflects on the experience: 
Staff A: The MLIT prepared the list for initial round of interviews.  Then its 
staff contacted them, including those public officials.  I guess they 
went to government agencies.  Then, they were told, “We’d rather 
not work with NPOs…” 
Interviewer: It means they didn’t welcome? 
Staff A: Like, “We’d prefer not to be interviewed by NPOs…” 
Interviewer: For what reasons did they (react that way)? 
Staff A: I have some thoughts.  It’s just my ideas.  In general, public 
agencies in Japan are always being looked at with skeptical eyes.  
So, for those agencies, the term “neutral third-party” implies that it 
is in fact a citizens’ representative that won’t be aligned with 
governmental authorities.316  
As suggested in the interview quote, NPOs are still not fully trusted in Japan.  To 
overcome this obstacle, it was imperative that the MLIT endorse Commons as its 
partner. 
Announcements 
The start of the conflict assessment was announced to the public on January 31, 
2005.  MLIT’s Tokushima River and Road Office issued a press release on the 
same day.  It was distributed to a local Prefecture Administration Reporter’s 
Club (kensei kisha kurabu), an institution where local newspaper and TV 
reporters gather newsworthy information317.  The press release explicitly referred 
to the JSCE and Commons as a third-party (dai-sansya kikan) commissioned by 
the MLIT (see Appendix 6-A).   
                                                 
315 Steering committee members’ comments in the January 3, 2006 meeting. 
316 Personal communication with a staff member on February 3, 2006.  
317 For more information about reporter’s clubs (kisha kurabu) in Japan, see: Farley, M. (1996). 
Japan’s press and the politics of scandal. In. Pharr, S. and Krauss, E. (Eds.) Media and Politics in 
Japan. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press.  Freeman, L. (2000). Closing the shop: Information 
cartels and Japan's mass media. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
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To the surprise to the team, 
the announcement was covered 
by a local segment of the NHK 
news as well as by the 
Tokushima Shinbun newspaper 
(see Figure 6-1).  Even though 
the effect of those press 
coverage cannot be measured 
quantitatively, team members 
reported in a February meeting 
that the media coverage seemed 
to allay the suspicions of 
interviewees.  One team 
member said, “An interviewee 
told me, ‘Ah.  I saw this in the 
news program!’.318” 
Interviews 
Stakeholder interviews were conducted by eight team members organized as 
four groups of two individuals: one took the role of interviewer and the other took 
the role of recorder.  They together prepared a memo that captured their key 
                                                 
318 A comment by a staff member recorded in my field note. 
Figure 6-1: Newspaper coverage of the 
stakeholder analysis 
Source: Tokushima Shinbun. (February 3, 2005). “Ideas 
wanted for safety improvement”
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findings and shared them with other members by e-mail. 
E-mail exchanges between the team members were conducted through a 
web-based system called Hi-mail319 allowing only those with a valid ID and 
password to open encrypted messages. As this was most team members’ first 
experience as neutrals in a consensus building effort, they were particularly 
concerned about the protection of confidential information320. 
The first interview was conducted on January 21, 2005, even before the project 
was announced to the public.  In early February, the team started to interview 
                                                 
319 “Hi” means “secret” in Japanese.  [http://www.himail.jp/] 
320 In 2003, Law for the Protection of Personal Information was first enacted in Japan.  Readers 
should be aware that “privacy (puraibashī)” is of particular concern to the Japanese in the last few 
years. 
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Figure 6-2: Chronological progress of stakeholder interviews 
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additional interviewees suggested in the initial round321.  The final interview 
took place on February 15 (Figure 6-2). 
The initial list, suggested by the MLIT, included 20 individuals322 from various 
government agencies, local residents, and road users.  The team interviewed all 
of them, as well as 34 other individuals who were suggested by other interviewees 
as well as those who seemed to have some stake in the eyes of the team members.   
Preparing a draft report 
The team of neutrals met on February 13 to prepare a complex matrix mapping 
stakeholder interests and to discuss the structure of their draft report.  They 
debated how to summarized stakeholder comments.  One option was to 
categorize each by the location to which it referred, for example, “northeastern 
corner” or “along NR11 on the north.”  The second option was to categorize 
them by issue, such as  “accidents involving bicycles” and “mobility for 
handicapped people.”  A lively discussion ended in consensus to summarize the 
comments by issue.  
Susumu Namerikawa, a lecturer at the University of Tokushima, reviewed all 
the memos prepared by team members and teased out the following five 
categories:  
                                                 
321 A team member interviewed a package delivery driver on January 27 as an exceptional case.  
322 MLIT’s list included 17 individuals.  In an interview with an individual suggested by the MLIT, 
three other individuals from the same organization joined. 
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• Traffic on the north-south axis; 
• Traffic on the east-west axis; 
• Reduced visibility due to the pedestrian overpass; 
• Bicycle crossing zones; and 
• Others. 
 
All team members agreed with this construction which was presented in a staff 
meeting on February 22.  Another concern to be resolved was how to handle 
stakeholders’ “requests (yōbō)” for specific improvements to the Intersection 
aside from the “interests (rigai)”that defined them as stakeholders. Several 
interviewees proposed specific improvements to the intersection, such as the 
reconfiguration of signaling patterns and the pedestrian overpass.  Namerikawa 
prepared a list of such requests separate from the list of interests.  The team 
decided to attach the list of requests as an appendix to the stakeholder assessment 
report. 
Most parts of the draft report were prepared by Namerikawa.  He modeled the 
report on a stakeholder analysis for the Northern Oxford County Coalition 
Stakeholder Category Number of interviewees 
Drivers 11 
Local residents and schools 14 
Local businesses 20 
Government (Traffic, Road) 9 
Total 54 
Figure 6-3: Final number of interviewees by stakeholder categories 
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(NOCC) prepared by the Consensus Building Institute in 1995323.  In fact, CBI’s 
report for the NOCC had already been translated into Japanese; the translated 
version was used in the 2004 seminar as an example of stakeholder analysis as 
practiced in the US. 
Feedback to the draft 
The draft report was referred to as yobi hōkokusho (preparatory report) in 
Japanese.  Copies of the draft conflict assessment report were distributed to all 
interviewees on February 25, 2005.  The draft was accompanied by a letter that 
asked for their feedback and inquired about their willingness to have their names 
listed in the report.  The feedback form was to be returned before March 10 in a 
prepaid envelope attached to the letter. 
Eleven interviewees made suggestions about the draft.  One was particularly 
concerned about the stakeholder analysis.  He made a phone call to the team 
members who interviewed him, and asked the team to show a revised draft that 
incorporated his feedback.  He wanted to add several comments that would 
oppose the comments offered by other stakeholders.  The staff inferred that he 
was simply anxious about what would happen to the Intersection.  He seemed to 
have predicted a very large project involving land acquisitions.   
In fact, almost all of the Intersection’s abutters seemed to be worried about such 
                                                 
323 Personal communication with S. Namerikawa on February 3, 2006. 
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reconfiguration of the Intersection.  Staff members discussed the issue in the 
March 1 meeting as follows: 
Staff A: (A stakeholder) suspects that this would be an incredibly big project.  
National government, the “Evaluation Team”.  That’s obviously 
unusual!  Those implied that a whole rebuilding would occur at the 
intersection.  And they know that they their properties would stand 
in the project. 
Staff B: When I went to (a neighboring business) first time, he told me, 
“There’s no accident at this Intersection.”  But there were.  I 
guess he knew.  He probably didn’t want to admit that his 
customers were causing accidents.   
Staff C: That much newspaper coverage, and the “Evaluation Team” came 
to the households.  That meant too much of something. 
Staff A: No one has ever issued such a report.  I agree that anyone would 
feel that it would be a huge project. 324 
 
Because of the experimental arrangement, including media coverage and the 
preparation of an elaborate stakeholder assessment report, a few local 
stakeholders initially reacted as though the project itself was extraordinarily large.  
Confidentiality issue 
In the early phase of stakeholder analysis, there was a concern about how to 
select representatives for the committee from the large group of unidentified 
interviewees325.  I turned to an expert in the US, Professor Lawrence Susskind, 
for a clarification of this issue.  He pointed that a list of the interviewees in a US 
stakeholder analysis is always included in its report.  The Japanese team, myself 
included, was not aware that such list would typically be included simply because 
in the translated version of the NOCC report (which was used as a template) the 
                                                 
324 Team members’ comments in March 1, 2005 staff meeting. 
325 It was raised by a steering committee member in January 25, 2005 meeting. 
 232  Chapter 6 
list was simply omitted:326.  It was a failure—or what a policy transfer theorist 
might call “uninformed transfer327”—in transferring necessary knowledge from 
the US to Japan.  I am fully responsible for the mistake. 
Following e-mail conversations with Professor Susskind, I suggested to the 
team that a list of individuals be included in the stakeholder analysis report.  I 
argued that the listing would not violate their promise to respect each 
interviewee’s confidentiality because no individual would be associated with any 
specific stakeholder interests outlined in the report.   
However, staff members felt that having individual names listed in the report, 
whether or not they were associated with individual interests, constituted a breach 
of the confidentiality agreement.  In their view, the confidentiality agreement 
was a promise of complete anonymity in the report.  They worried that 
participation in the report could put some interviewees, particularly local 
community leaders, in an awkward position: they might be held responsible to 
their neighbors or organizations for any comments recorded in the report328.  The 
team compromised the need to follow US consensus-building processes and 
Japanese confidentiality concerns by deciding to publish the names of only those 
interviewees who agreed to be listed.   
                                                 
326 I downloaded a copy of the NOCC stakeholder analysis report from the CBI web site in the 
summer of 2004.  The copy did not include the list of interviewees. 
327 Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D. (2000). Learning from abroad: The role of policy transfer in 
contemporary policy-making. Governance 13(1), 5-24. 
328 Personal communication with a staff member. 
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In an attachment to the draft assessment report, the team asked each interviewee 
for permission to list his or her name.  As shown in Figure 6-4, stakeholder 
attitudes toward having their names listed in the report varied.  Most local 
residents and representatives from schools and local businesses declined.  
However, all interviewees from government agencies agreed to have their names 
listed.  This interesting contrast will be further discussed in Chapter 8 as a sign 
of contextual difference between the US and Japan. 
Publication of the final report 
The final conflict assessment report was prepared mainly by Junzo Kita with 
my assistance.  The bulk of work involved the preparation of recommendations 
for the stakeholder process.   
Kita initially drafted the recommendation and asked for my inputs on February 
26, 2005.  His draft included a diagram showing the relationship between 
stakeholders and committee members.  The diagram, in my opinion, seemed to 
trivialize the role of third party (see Figure 6-5).  After reviewing the draft, I 
 Agree Didn’t agree 
Drivers 8 3 
Local residents and schools 5 9 
Local businesses 8 12 
Government (traffic and road) 9 0 
 
Figure 6-4: Number of interviewees who agreed to have their names listed. 
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suggested that he modify the diagram so that the role of the neutral team would 
appear more important (see Figure 6-6).   
I prepared draft ground rules for the process based on those for the Delaware 
Coastal Zone Act Regulatory Advisory Committee, as included in the Consensus 
Advice, Suggest a 
Plan
Manage
ParticipateRequest
Manager: The Third-
Party Team
Committee
=>
Special 
Subcommitee
Hardware and 
Software
Intersection 
Stakeholder
Intersection 
UserMLIT Tokushima River Road Office
Experts in 
Transportation
Advisor: Experts in 
Transportation
Recommendations 
for Improvements to 
the Intersection
Commission
Commission
Request
Request
Participate
Participate
Commission
 
Figure 6-5: Diagram showing the relationship between stakeholders and other 
components of the committee (prepared by Kita) 
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Figure 6-6: Diagram showing the relationship between stakeholders and other 
components of the committee (final) 
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Building Handbook329.  In the March 1 staff meeting several team members 
voiced concerns about these rules.  First, they thought that asking each 
participant to sign the ground rules would scare some neighborhood participants.  
They decided not to ask each member to sign the agreement.  Second, the draft 
stated that each party would be “responsible for (sekimu wo ou)” specific 
consensus-building tasks.  In the eyes of team members this wording might also 
have been too demanding for the participants.  One team member said: 
I have a comment on the phrase “Be responsible for” in the “Role of committee 
members” section.  Can this expression be replaced with a milder (yawarakai) 
one because the participants are local moms and pops330. 
The group decided to replace “responsible for (sekimu wo ou)” with “will take the 
role of (yakuwari wo ninau).”  In general, the draft was considered too formal.  
In a March 7 meeting, the group decided to modify it further by adopting a 
bulleted list format. 
The final report recommended that a committee for the improvements to the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection be organized in the following manner: 
Based on this stakeholder analysis, even though there are a few conflicting 
interests, we assess that an improvement plan, which might be small scale but 
everyone can live with, can be discovered by organizing a public participation 
                                                 
329 Susskind, L. and Thomas-Larmar, J. (1999). Conducting a conflict assessment. In Susskind, L., 
McKearnan, S., and Thomas-Larmer, J. (Eds.) The Consensus Building Handbook: a comprehensive 
guide to reaching agreement (pp. 99-136). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. pp. 124-7. 
330 A team member’s comment on March 1, 2005 staff meeting. 
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committee.  We expect that the committee be an exemplary case for a 
participatory committee that is based on a stakeholder analysis and managed by a 
third-party.331 
The report suggested a seven-step process consisting of: 
• Jointly understanding the role of the committee; 
• Jointly understanding the various conditions and technical constraints for 
implementing a project; 
• Creating a list of issues to be resolved; 
• Experts suggesting improvement plans; 
• Examining the suggested plans; 
• Adjusting the suggested plans; and 
• Making recommendation for the improvement.332 
 
The final report was published on March 17 on the Commons’ web site.  The 
publication was also announced by a joint press release by the JSCE, Commons, 
and the MLIT on the same day (see Appendix 6-B).  Actual handling of the press 
release was managed by the MLIT staff which has access to the reporter’s club.  
Unfortunately, the release of the stakeholder analysis report was not covered by 
the news media.  
 
                                                 
331 Stakeholder Assessment Team (JSCE Shikoku Branch and Commons). (2005). Kita-jōsanjima-chō 
kōsaten kōtsu-anzen hōsaku-kentō-no-tameno kankeisya bunseki chōsa (saishū hōkoku-sho). p.17. 
332 Stakeholder Assessment Team (2005). p. 20. 
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Classification 
Date Event 
Conflict Assessment 
Stakeholder Meetings 
Steering Committee 
Announcements 
Miscellaneous 
2002/8/1 First lecture on consensus building in Shikoku     * 
2004/8/26-28 Three-day seminar on consensus building processes     * 
2004/10 Discussions for the experimentation begin     * 
2004/10 Commons become involved     * 
2004/12/14 Steering Committee’s 1st meeting   *   
2005/1/24 Committee for Consensus Building Processes 1st 
Meeting (Takamatsu, Shikoku Regional Bureau)  
   * 
2005/1/25 Stakeholder interviews start *     
2005/1/31 MLIT issues a press release about the start of conflict 
assessment 
   *  
2005/2/1 Flyers are distributed to local residents *     
2005/2/15 Last stakeholder interview *     
2005/2/25 Draft report distributed for interviewees’ feedbacks *     
2005/3/10 Feedback period ends *     
2005/3/17 Final conflict assessment report is published *     
2005/3/17 JSCE/Commons/MLIT issues a joint press release on 
the conflict assessment report 
   *  
2005/3/18 Committee for Consensus Building Processes 2nd 
Meeting (Takamatsu, Shikoku Regional Bureau) 
    * 
 
Figure 6-7: Major events before March 2005. 
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Stakeholder dialogue 
Convening 
Even though the final conflict assessment report proposed that the MLIT should 
begin convening the stakeholder group in April, the project was suspended for 
almost two months.  Several factors contributed to the delay.  First, Hajime 
Honda, the lead staff member on the MLIT’s side, was reassigned from the Traffic 
Safety Division to the Planning Division II in the MLIT’s Tokushima Office at the 
beginning of April.  The rigors of adjustment to his new assignments, as well as 
other pressing demands in April prevented him from working on the convening 
process for the Kita-josanjima project333.   
Second, the budget for the Kita-josanjima project had to be reauthorized by the 
MLIT because a new fiscal year started in April.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
almost all projects by the MLIT have to start and finish within a fiscal year.  A 
time lag following the beginning of the fiscal year is quite common among 
participatory planning projects in Japan334.  In fact, this experimental project was 
somewhat fortunate--similar projects were occasionally discontinued after the end 
of the fiscal year, as seen in Chapter 4. 
The steering committee had its second meeting on May 31, 2005.  Staff from 
the MLIT and Commons gathered at the University of Tokushima to discuss 
                                                 
333 Personal communications with H. Honda and other staff members. 
334 See Chapter 4 (p. 188) 
Chapter 6  239 
strategies for organizing the stakeholder process.  Two key issues were the 
membership and time frame for organizing the stakeholder committee. On the 
first issue, based on its conflict assessment experience Commons suggested a list 
of committee members to the MLIT.  The MLIT responded by suggesting that 
the number of representatives from the Police Department be increased to two.   
The time frame issue was more difficult.  In the conflict assessment, seven 
committee meetings between May and November were proposed.  Because the 
1st M ee tin g: G e t acqua in ted , U nderstand  
th e  pu rpose  and  managemen t p rocesses
2nd  M ee tin g: U nderstand  assumption s, 
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options
3rd  M ee tin g: Understand  and  
d iscuss improvemen t op tion s
Redesign 
improvement 
options
4 th  M ee tin g: Ad ju stmen ts to  
improvemen t op tion s, decide  th e  
framework o f m id -te rm  
recommenda tion s
Su rvey  on  
im provemen t op tion s
N th  M ee tin g
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Ju ly 2005
August
Septem ber
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Novem ber
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Figure 6-8: Initial work plan 
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project had been delayed for two months, the number of meetings had to be 
reduced in order to conclude the process by the end of October.  The MLIT 
needed to receive recommendations by this date in order to have them 
implemented in the next fiscal year. 
An alternative meeting schedule was prepared by the members of Commons in 
the meeting on June 3 and presented to other members by e-mail on June 10.  
The new plan called for four meetings between July and November (see Figure 
6-7).  It also curtailed subcommittee meetings. 
The steering committee met for the third time on June 14, 2005.  All members 
agreed on the alternative work plan suggested by Commons.  They decided to 
contact each candidate for the committee immediately to confirm willingness to 
participate as a representative.  Six prospective members from government 
agencies would be initially contacted by the MLIT, considering the negative 
reactions that some had shown toward Commons during the stakeholder 
assessment.  Other candidates would be contacted by Commons and JSCE 
members who had achieved a certain level of rapport with them during 
stakeholder interviews.   
The team of neutrals met separately after the steering committee meeting to 
plan for convening the representatives.  Sawada prepared a two-page memo—a 
short summary of the recommended work plan for the committee—to be handed 
out to prospective representatives.  Each member was asked to meet a few 
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stakeholders and ask for their participation.   
The fourth, and the final, steering committee meeting was held on July 6.  The 
group decided to hold the first stakeholder meeting in the afternoon of July 22 to 
accommodate the largest possible number of committee members.  Three 
candidates responded that they would not join the committee for various reasons.  
All of them were stakeholders who operated businesses in the neighborhood.  
The steering committee agreed that their absence would not be a serious threat to 
the implementation of the committee’s recommendations.  Several other 
representatives from local businesses could serve adequately as proxy for the 
interests of those who refrained from participating.  There would be 21 members 
representing local neighborhoods, local businesses, stakeholding organizations, 
and government agencies (see Appendix 6-J).  Steering committee members also 
discussed the agenda for the first committee meeting.  Commons suggested a 
draft agenda and everyone in the meeting agreed with the proposal. 
On the next day, a packet was mailed to all committee members.  It announced 
that the first meeting would be held at Tokushima Educator’s Building (kyōiku 
kaikan) on July 22 from 3PM to 5PM.  The team also asked each committee 
representative to return an attached postcard indicating his or her intention to 
attend and his or her availability in the last week of August so that the neutral 
team could suggest a date for the second meeting. 
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First meeting: July 22, 2005 
On July 19, the Kita-josanjima consensus-building effort was officially 
announced by the MLIT.  A press release was distributed by the MLIT to the 
Kensei Reporter’s Club as well as published on its web site (Appendix 6-C).  
The statement included phone numbers for the JSCE and Commons as the 
organizations that had prepared the stakeholder analysis.  The press release 
explicitly stated that this committee would be organized to approximate 
consensus-building processes as practiced in the US.  It reads, “In seeking an 
agreement between committee members, we will experiment with the ‘CB 
(Consensus Building) Processes,’ which has been used mainly in the United States.  
This will be its first experiment in Tokushima.335.”  
The first meeting was held on July 22, from 2PM to 5PM, in a small conference 
room at the Tokushima Educators’ Building in the Kita-tamiya neighborhood, 
about10 minutes from Kita-josanjima by car.  The first meeting was attended by 
18 members (3 members were absent).  They were seated in a roundtable format.  
In the middle, a scale model of the Kita-josanjima Intersection was situated.  
Seats for observers were located in the back of the room (see Figure 6-8). 
A TV crew from a local branch office of NHK, the national broadcasting 
company, came to record the scene336.  A total of 11 observers, including the 
                                                 
335 MLIT Tokushima River Road Office. (2005, July 19). daisansya-kikan ni-yoru jūmin-sanka-gata 
no iinkai-ni-oite kokudō kōsaten no kaizen-hōsaku wo kentō shimasu. Press Release. 
336 NHK stands for nihon hōsō kyōkai.  It literally means “the Japan Broadcasting Association.”  
For more information about NHK, see: Pharr, S. and Krauss, E. (Eds.) (1996). Media and Politics in 
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crew members, were present, all seated in the back of this small conference room.   
At 2PM, Hajime Honda of the MLIT broke the silence.  After a very short 
self-introduction, he asked committee members if they would allow the media to 
record the meeting.  No one responded.  He seemed to have recognized the lack 
of reaction as the sign of agreement, and continued to explain the purpose of 
organizing this committee as a convenor.  After Honda’s opening statement, 
Susumu Namerikawa, as a neutral facilitator of the JSCE, presided over the 
meeting.  He asked each member to examine the handouts and explained the 
day’s agenda.   
                                                                                                                                                    
Japan. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press. 
 
Roundtable format 
 
TV crew behind observers 
 
Kita explains the process 
 
Sato (left) and Kita (right) 
Figure 6-9: The first meeting 
(Photo: Yuuji Kurahashi) 
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The next agenda item was self-introduction (see Appendix 6-E) by each 
member, including a reference to his or her relationship to the Kita-josanjima 
Intersection.  This round of self-introduction revealed a clear polarity between 
government officials and others.  All government officials, except for one, 
mentioned their intention to “listen to your ideas (goiken-wo oukagai-suru).” 
Representatives from local communities, however, “asked for” various 
improvements to the Intersection.  Representatives from government agencies 
and local communities seemed to assume different kinds of responsibilities in the 
committee. 
The third agenda item addressed the structure and the goal of the committee.  
Honda explained current problems associated with the Intersection as well as how 
the MLIT, as a convenor, expected the committee to address those issues.   
The fourth agenda item—reaching agreement on a method of managing the 
committee—was the most important one for the first meeting.  Namerikawa, as a 
facilitator from the JSCE, introduced Commons as a candidate for the neutral 
party to assist the committee.  Technically speaking, this meeting was a 
convening meeting organized by the MLIT with help of the JSCE: the outsourcing 
contract by the MLIT was made to the JSCE.  Even though there was virtually 
no other organization in Tokushima able to assist the committee, Commons still 
had to be appointed by committee consensus. 
Namerikawa, as a representative of the JSCE, stated that he was recommending 
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Commons as the neutral party because it was the only not-for-profit organization 
in Tokushima Prefecture that explicitly advocated for “consensus building (gōi 
keisei)337” in its bylaws.  The NPO Law requires each organization to submit its 
bylaws to a prefecture government or the Cabinet Office; they are available on the 
web sites.   
Sato and Kita, as the representatives of Commons, walked up to the front stage.  
Sato distributed one-page organizational brochures to the audience, and provided 
a short presentation about the organization.  Kita followed it by proposing a 
work plan, ground rules, organizational structure, and meeting agenda for the 
upcoming committee meetings.  He proposed a work plan involving four 
meetings between July and November (see Figure 6-7).  Regarding the 
organizational structure, he suggested the involvement of a “Technical Assistant 
Team (TAT)” comprised of Professor Yamanaka and the Oriental Consultants Co.   
After those presentations, Namerikawa asked if anyone had questions or 
comments.  Honda asked how information would be shared on the Internet.  
Kita suggested that handouts distributed in each meeting as well as meeting 
minutes (without attribution of comments), could be published on the Internet.  
A local business owner asked for the number of accidents at the Intersection in the 
past and suggested that the number might be decreasing.  Kita referred to a 
                                                 
337 Note that Commons provides support for not only “consensus building processes” that we 
experimented but also other kinds of processes for public participation. 
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number included in one handout that indicated such a decrease. No one 
volunteered any other comment.   
Namerikawa then asked for any objections to the proposed work plan, ground 
rules, and most importantly, the appointment of Commons as a third-party 
assistant to the committee.  There was a moment of silence.  After looking 
around, Namerikawa said, “Ok.  Does everyone agree with it?  ...  Good.  
Thank you.”  Sato and Kita stood up and bowed to the members.  
Namerikawa’s role as the meeting facilitator ended here, and Commons was asked 
to facilitate the meeting. 
With apparent signs of relief, Sato gave a short speech on his enthusiasm for 
the committee.  Finally, he suggested that the next meeting be held on September 
2 from 2PM to 5PM in a larger conference room in the same building.  Everyone 
agreed and the meeting was adjourned. 
Later in the evening, the team members gathered in a conference room at the 
University of Tokushima to reflect on the first meeting.  There was a mild 
consensus among the team members that the meeting was structured too formally, 
discouraging lively discussion between stakeholder representatives.  In addition, 
some thought that the seating arrangement was problematic: representatives from 
government agencies and civil society organizations were seated on opposite sides 
of the roundtable, an arrangement with the potential to trigger a “petitioning” 
mode of discourse from the civil society representatives. 
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Tokushima Shinbun, a local newspaper, 
reported the first meeting of the 
Kita-josanjima Committee on the next day 
(see Figure 6-10).  The article states that 
the committee would produce 
recommendations for the improvement by 
November.  It also reports that Commons 
would manage the process as a third-party 
organization. 
Second meeting: September 2, 2005 
Because early to mid-August is the 
Japanese holiday season of obon, the 
preparation for the second meeting did not 
start until August 12.  At the end of the 
five-hour meeting, a few team members 
discussed the arrangement for the second 
meeting.  They decided to divide the 
negotiation group into two subgroups to 
make sure everyone had an opportunity to speak out in a relaxed atmosphere338.  
Because the team members had experiences in managing “workshop” style 
                                                 
338 Team members’ comments in the August 12, 2005 staff meeting. 
 
Figure 6-10: Newspaper 
coverage of the first meeting 
Source: Tokushima Shinbun. (July 23, 
2005). “Recommendations Expected in 
November”
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meetings, they thought that a small group format using Post-it notes would 
provide a more appropriate environment for the purpose of the second meeting, 
which was to cultivate each member’s understanding of the current conditions of 
the Kita-josanjima Intersection. 
Team members decided to meet those who were absent from the first meeting.  
This was repeated after the following meetings as well.  They brought handouts 
and made sure that the representatives were fully informed about the progress of 
each meeting.  
The second meeting was held on September 22 in the Small Conference Hall 
(shō-kaigi-shitsu) at Tokushima Educator’s Hall from 2PM to 5PM.  This room 
was much bigger than the room for the first meeting.  Two islands of tables, 
surrounded by approximately 10 seats, were set up in the middle of the room (see 
Figure 6-11).  The team also brought its own exhibition panels and arranged 
them around those islands. 
Sato moderated the meeting, beginning with reflections on the first meeting.  
During the introduction, he referred to the new seating arrangement: 
Today, we will use a different seat arrangement.  The room is slightly larger 
than the one we used last time.  We have more space.  The last meeting was 
structured somewhat formally, probably because it was the first one.  Today, I 
want each of you to recognize others’ faces, and start with an informal 
atmosphere.  
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Sato then asked each member to stand up and say his or her name so that others 
would recognize him or her.  Then he asked members to review the handouts and 
make sure no material was missing.  Finally, he asked for agreement on the 
proposed minutes for the first meeting.  No one responded. 
The second meeting was intended to identify the problems at the Intersection 
for the committee would address in its recommendations.  A representative of 
the technical assistant team (TAT), Akinobu Kanetsuki, an engineer of the 
Oriental Consultants, explained how major accidents had occurred at the 
Intersection in recent years.  In response to a request by Sato, Masaaki Ushiro, 
 
Two-island format 
 
TAT’s presentation on current issues at 
the Intersection 
 
Each member writes his/her comment on 
Post-it notes 
 
A member elaborates on his  
comment on the wall 
Figure 6-11: The second meeting 
(Photo: Yuuji Kurahashi) 
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an alternate representative from the Police Department, provided an analysis of 
car accidents between 1978 and 2004.  Because detailed data on traffic accidents 
are not publicly accessible in Japan, the presentation by the police department had 
to be arranged in advance.  Kanetsuki also suggested 10 standard measures to 
reduce car accidents.  After Kanetsuki’s presentation, Kita explained his findings 
from the stakeholder analysis.  He identified eight safety issues and six usability 
issues at the Intersection:   
• Safety 
− Safety for pedestrians  
− Safety for bicycle riders 
− Safety around the southern entrance to the Intersection 
− Safety around the northern entrance to the Intersection 
− Safety around the western entrance to the Intersection 
− Safety around the eastern entrance to the Intersection 
− Safety for right-turning vehicles (from NR north to PR west)339 
− Safety for right-turning vehicles (from NR south to City Road east) 
• Usability 
− Shape of the Intersection, Signals 
− Pedestrian usage 
− Lighting  
− Entrance to/Exit from neighboring parking lots 
− Other issues with automobiles 
− Concerns about changing the status quo 
 
Members listened patiently to Kanetsuki and Kita’s presentations which together 
                                                 
339 Readers should be reminded that cars drive on the left side of the road in Japan; right turn 
intercepts the opposing traffic. 
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took approximately one hour. 
Committee members were then asked to comment on these 14 categories 
problem areas. Kita and Sawada each joined one of the islands of tables where a 
couple of student assistants were also stationed to assist the members.  First,  
each member wrote down suggestions and comments on large Post-it notes340.  
Second, each member handed his or her notes to one of the assistants who then 
categorized the comments.  Third, the assistants attached the Post-its to one of 
14 large sheets of paper, each devoted to a problem category, hung on the walls 
and panels (See Figure 6-11).   
After a ten-minute break, Sato reviewed the14 collections of Post-it notes. 
During the review, he spontaneously mentioned that this way of managing the 
discussion is quite common in “workshop” meetings.  Beginning with the 
category that had drawn the least attention, Sato went around the room to cover 
all of 14 categories of issues.  For each category, he asked one or two committee 
members to elaborate on his or her comments.  When all categories were 
reviewed, each member was asked to speak out at least once.  Sato says, 
I thought that the second committee meeting would be the first forum for 
deliberation and information exchange.  Therefore, I thought it would be crucial 
for us to offer each member an opportunity to express his or her ideas with his or 
her own voices (…) in order to understand the character and the ideas each 
                                                 
340 Commons and the University of Tokushima had a large stock of specially designed (3’’x8.5’’) 
Post-it notes for their workshop meetings. 
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member had341. 
Even though this meeting was intended for the clarification of current issues and 
problems, not for the discussion of specific improvement measures, several 
members suggested specific improvements to the Intersection.   
It was only a few minutes before 5PM when the committee finished reviewing 
those comments.  The committee moved to the final agenda item, which was to 
limit the categories of issues that the committee would address.  A straw poll 
was conducted by, again, using Post-it notes.  Sato reviewed the results, and 
quickly moved on, suggesting that the committee would address all issue 
categories and ask the TAT to formulate options for improvement.  No member 
disagreed.  Sato became noticeably worried about the time: it was a few minutes 
before 5PM and he repeatedly said, “I’m sorry for the delay.”  He suggested that 
the next meeting would be held on October 6 at the same place.  No one 
disagreed, and the meeting was adjourned a few minutes after 5PM.  
Third meeting: October 6, 2005. 
The most important agenda for the third meeting—from the standpoint of the 
neutral team—was to suggest an additional fifth meeting. At the September 27 
steering committee meeting, everyone, including the convenor, recognized that an 
additional meeting would be necessary for the committee to explore the areas of 
                                                 
341 Personal communication with Y. Sato (via E-mail) on April 2, 2006. 
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agreement so that the TAT would be able conduct adequate technical studies and 
the neutral team could prepare a single text.  The fifth meeting was to be held 
sometime before the mid-December in order to meet the expectations of the 
convenor (i.e., the MLIT). 
For the third meeting, the TAT prepared a report explaining all possible options 
for the improvement of the Intersection.  The report included 47 options (see 
Appendix 6-K).  Among those, nine (from #39 to #47) were considered 
infeasible within the time frame set by the MLIT; the committee was supposed to 
propose measures that could be implemented within the next fiscal year.  The 
goal of the third meeting was to narrow the focus of technical study to no more 
than 38 options by removing those 9 options as well as some others. 
The setting for the third meeting was again organized in the “workshop” 
format: three islands were set up in the meeting hall and committee members 
were divided into three groups.  An engineer from the TAT and a facilitator from 
Commons were stationed at each island.   
The meeting started with the regular routine: Sato offered an opening statement 
and asked members to confirm the minutes and review other handouts quickly.  
One member asked for a minor correction to the minutes.   
After a round of short self-introductions, Kita was brought to the front to 
propose an additional meeting.  He first explained a suggested procedure for 
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choosing appropriate options at length.  Then he asked for the extension as 
follows: 
Well, many issues have been raised.  The Technical Assistant Team examined 
those issues and identified as many as 47 possible options.  Team members will 
explain them later.  How should we manage this committee from now on?  Well, 
let me repeat my proposal.  We want you to fully understand those improvement 
options, check the compatibility between each option and the purpose of our 
deliberation, and evaluate the impact of each option.  In order to complete those 
tasks, I think, we need to spend some time for understanding those possible 
options.  We need to attend to all of your questions.  We plan to allocate most of 
our time for that discussion.  To do so, we need to modify the work plan for the 
rest of committee meetings a little bit.  Four meetings were planned for the 
 
Three-island format 
 
TAT’s engineering consultant explains 
each option to the group 
 
Post-it notes are used to suggest 
questions and comments on each option 
 
Facilitator recaps the discussion in each 
group 
Figure 6-12: The third meeting 
(Photo: Yuuji Kurahashi) 
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committee, but I would like to ask you to have an additional meeting, and to 
produce our recommendations in total of five meetings.  That’s what I propose. 
Kita continued explaining his proposal for an additional meeting, and gave the 
microphone back to Sato.  Sato asked if there was any disagreement.  No one 
volunteered and the proposal was approved by the committee. 
The team programmed the third meeting to familiarize each committee member 
with the 47 options suggested by the TAT.  Kanetsuki of the Oriental Consultants 
first explained how the TAT had conceived those 47 options.  He explained the 
relationship between those options and the 14 issues identified in the previous 
meeting. 
After a short break, each group, led by a facilitator, started to discuss each 
option.  All groups followed the same basic procedure.  First, a representative 
from the TAT offered a technical explanation of one of 47 options.  Second, the 
facilitator asked committee members around the table if they had any questions 
regarding that option.  If someone offered a comment, an assistant recorded it on 
a Post-it note and pasted it on the wall.  As they did in the second meeting, the 
neutral team brought in sheets of oversized paper on which 47 options were 
drawn, and hung them around the room (see Figure 6-12).  The assistant pasted 
each Post-it to the appropriate section on the wall.  Each group repeated this 
procedure for 47 options.  Finally, the facilitator for each group asked its 
members if they would agree to limit their focus to the 38 options that seemed to 
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be feasible within the next fiscal year. 
Several noncontroversial issues were identified during the group discussion.  
First, the goal of this committee—which was to discuss measures that could be 
implemented in the next fiscal year—was repeatedly criticized by at least one 
member.  This member, in fact, argued consistently for measures that would 
allow elders and handicapped persons to cross the intersection.  He said, 
Member: Short-term programs?  Well, do just cosmetic changes.  
Superficial changes are enough, but don’t spend big money on them.  
We need complete reforms!  Maybe, why not building underground 
paths for pedestrians?  That’s nice.   
 
Second, some others were frustrated by the agenda for the third meeting.  In one 
of the three groups, the facilitator tried to suppress commentaries on benefits and 
impacts from each option because the purpose of the discussion was to 
“understand” each option.  Only questions for the TAT were allowed.  Later in 
the meeting a member of the group vented his frustration as follows: 
Member: It’s better to discuss substantial issues, such as whether each option 
has negative impacts or not.  Each option has those, right? 
Facilitator: Yes.  I think each has. 
Member: Those issues must be discussed, at least, before the next meeting.  
Like it was suggested…  Four meetings were initially proposed, but 
extended to five meetings.  In a nutshell, it will be extended forever!  
Today’s meeting is the same. … Like Mr. (name of a member) 
mentioned previously, we should consider the kinds of impact each 
option has.  Those options won’t offer an effective solution to the 
issues.  Like this one, we need to consider the traffic in the 
Tokushima-honchō areas as a whole, like the control of traffic 
signals.  If we don’t consider those, we won’t be able to produce 
our recommendation.  
 
Representatives from government agencies were particularly critical of the slow 
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progress and lack of detailed technical investigation.  Several of them tried to 
make sure that none of the options would be implemented without further 
technical investigation. 
After the group discussion, Sato asked each facilitator to summarize the 
discussion at each table.  All groups agreed with the idea for limiting the 
discussion to 38 options.  Sato proposed to limit the focus to 38 options for 
further investigation, while admitting that long-term plans would also be 
important.  No one dissented, and the meeting was adjourned. 
Option survey 
After the third meeting, team members had a staff meeting at the University of 
Tokushima in order to reflect on it.  The discussion was relatively intense 
compared to other staff meetings.  According to the revised work plan proposed 
in the third meeting, 38 options would be discussed in the fourth meeting in order 
to formulate a rough draft of the final recommendation.  Professor Yamanaka, a 
member of the TAT, stressed that the 38 options must be narrowed down as soon 
as possible in order to advance TAT’s technical studies.  He stressed the 
importance of preparing a “single text (shinguru tekisuto)” that would be 
acceptable to all committee members as their consensus recommendation.  I 
agreed with him because this is how an agreement is crafted in the course of 
consensus-building processes in the US.  I also pointed out, based on my 
observation of the meeting, that at least one member seemed to be frustrated by 
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the slow progress, as described above. 
Everyone in the team quickly agreed with Yamanaka’s proposal and started to 
discuss survey questions.  Because the committee would seek a consensus of all 
stakeholders, the team assumed that any option that would have serious negative 
impacts on any stakeholders would not be included in the final agreement.  
Therefore, the survey would ask each member what the negative impacts of each 
option would be.  
The survey was dispatched by mail on October 20, 2005.  Between November 
1 and 10, team members visited each member’s office or household to collect his 
or her responses.  A couple of members expressed strong reservations about 
responding to the survey because they considered the technical analysis for every 
option to be inadequate.  These stakeholders were extremely concerned about the 
feasibility of the options.  It became evident that the details of each option 
needed much further technical analysis than had been anticipated. 
Responses were summarized for each option.  Fifteen members expressed 
their concerns about the removal of the pedestrian overpass (option #1).  No one 
expressed a concern about marking the sidewalk at the entrance to the 
condominium (Option #34).   
Fourth meeting: November 18, 2005. 
When the team was organizing for the fourth meeting, members recognized the 
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difficulty of formulating a draft recommendation; their experience in the option 
survey had sensitized them to it.  In particular, the final proposal had to be 
endorsed by the Prefectural Police Department because it had the regulatory 
power to veto the MLIT’s decision. (See the next section for details.)  I 
suggested that the team members could use “caucuses (kōkasu)” between the 
MLIT and the Police Department; this technique was used in the US to resolve 
differences between particular stakeholders.  The team members, as well as the 
MLIT, decided to pursue the caucus option.   
For this reason, the fifth meeting had to be delayed for several months so that 
the MLIT and the Police Department could have enough time to negotiate on the 
final draft agreement separately from the whole group.  In a November 10 
meeting, the MLIT, as a convenor, agreed to accept the committee’s delayed 
recommendations even though they would be several months after the initial goal 
of the committee, which was November 2005. 
The fourth meeting was held on November 18 in the Small Conference Hall at 
the Educator’s Building as usual.  Sato, as the moderator, started the meeting at 
2PM, and asked Kita to explain the proposal to revise the process.  Kita 
explained the need for negotiation between regulatory authorities on drafting the 
final agreement as follows: 
Well, in this committee, we will share our concerns and discuss possible ways of 
resolving them.  Based on our discussions, the Technical Assistant Team will 
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prepare an implementable plan, not just options.  Based on a thorough analysis 
of the current configuration of the Intersection, and its signaling patterns, they 
will formulate an implementable plan, in terms of both hardware and software.  
In this planning process, they have to consult with relevant organizations, on 
regulatory issues and rules.  So, the TAT will negotiate with relevant 
organizations and improve the plan into a more realistic one.  Then we will 
promulgate it into a draft recommendation for road safety improvements.  With 
that draft in hand, we plan to hold the fifth meeting in January next year, as we 
will announce later.  We want you to discuss the draft, and revise it in various 
ways if necessary, and achieve the final goal of this committee, which is to 
produce recommendations for the road safety improvement.  
No one disagreed with Kita’s proposal.  He went on to explain the results from 
the opinion survey.  Then Kanetsuki outlined the TAT’s findings from its detailed 
analysis of the 38 options.  TAT concluded that most of the 38 options had some 
negative impacts for traffic.  The team conducted a traffic projection analysis in 
order to measure the impact of changing the signaling patterns.  It revealed that 
traffic congestion around the Intersection would be made worse: the length of the 
traffic jam would be longer by somewhere between 200 yards and a mile, 
depending on the choice of option and the time of a day.  He also pointed out 
several technical concerns to be considered—such as reduction in driver attention 
to traffic as he or she is distracted by reading additional signboards—before 
implementing other options. 
After a short break, the session was divided into two groups.  One group was 
to discuss options for reducing the following types of accidents: pedestrians and  
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automobiles, bicycles and automobiles, and rear-end collisions.  The other group 
was to discuss options for reducing accidents during right-turns and involving 
motorcycles during left-turns.  The assignment to each group was involuntary: 
each member was assigned a seat at the beginning and members were not offered 
a chance to move to the other group.  Sato was concerned about the mix of 
Propose Interim Options for Improvements  (Short-term and Long-term 
solutions, Impact Assessment)
Discussion in the 2nd Meeting + 
Stakeholder Interviews
Long-term Options
Short-term Options
Option Survey
Concerns about the Proposed Options
Confirm Safety-related Issues at the 
Intersection
Craft All Possible Options
3rd Meeting
4th Meeting
Check/Share Concerns about the Proposed Options
Consider Ways to Attend Concerns about the 
Proposed Options
Craft Options with High Implementability
Prepare a Draft Recommendation for Improved Safety
Negotiations with Relevant Organizations
5th Meeting (Discuss the Draft Recommendation)
Agree the Following Procedures
Design Improvement Measures to the Intersection, Based on the 
Recommendation (Relevant Organizations)
Implement the Improvement Measures
Inform Stakeholders
Recommendation for the Safety Improvement Measures by the Committee
 
Figure 6-13: New work plan suggested in the fourth meeting 
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representatives from government agencies and others in each group342.  After 
discussing different options the groups reached the following conclusions: 
Group A: 
1. Options for reducing accidents between pedestrians and automobiles cannot 
be implemented in a short term. 
2. Reducing accidents between bicycles and automobiles might be possible if 
authorities were to: 
Option #2. Move the bicycle crossing zones (BCZs) toward the center (if 
technically feasible); 
Option #3. Paint the BCZs (if the color is the same with other intersections 
in Tokushima); 
Option #9.      Reduce the corner radius; 
Option #12. Install night lighting equipments (if technically feasible); 
Option #26. Install electronic signboards showing the time remaining for 
green lights for bicycles; or 
Option #34. Draw lines between the road and the sidewalk at the condo 
entrance. 
3. Reducing rear-end collisions might be possible if authorities were to: 
Option #5. Draw road markings for speed reduction (for the downhill 
segment nearby the Great Yoshino River Bridge); or 
Option #19. Add a “Time-lagged signal” signboard. 
 
 
Group B: 
4. Reducing accidents during right-turns might be possible if the authorities 
were to: 
Option #4. Draw guidance lines for the right turn traffic (for traffic turning 
right from NR11) with repainting the arrows on the road for the 
east-west axis. 
5. Options for reducing accidents involving motorcycles during left-turns 
cannot be implemented in the short term. 
                                                 
342 Personal communication with Y. Sato (via E-mail) on April 2, 2006. 
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The group discussion took more time than was originally planned.  When Group 
A completed its discussion, it was past the scheduled closing time of 5PM.  Sato 
first apologized to the members for the delay, and skipped presentations by the 
facilitator for each group.  Sato quickly reviewed the agreements in each group, 
and asked if the members would agree to let the TAT negotiate with relevant 
regulatory authorities and prepare a draft agreement.  No one dissented.  The 
meeting was adjourned at 5:15PM. 
Caucus between the Ministry and the Police Department 
It was evident to the team members that the final agreement had to be packaged 
 
Two-island format 
 
TAT’s engineering consultant explains 
the result of detailed analysis 
 
Discussions in the Group B 
 
Figure 6-14: The fourth meeting 
(Photo: Yuuji Kurahashi) 
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into a detailed plan that would be acceptable to both the MLIT and the Police 
Department343.  Theoretically, such negotiations between those two agencies 
could have taken place during committee meetings.  However, decisions had to 
be made using a traditional arrangement. 
The traditional system for reaching an interagency agreement between the 
MLIT and the Prefectural Police Department was institutionalized by the Road 
Law (dōro hō) and the Road Traffic Law (dōro kōtsū hō).  Article 95-2 of the 
Road Law requires the owner of the road (i.e., the MLIT) to solicit an opinion 
from the regulator of the road (i.e., the Police Department) when the former 
intends to draw lines on a road surface or construct a pedestrian overpass.  
However, Article 110-2 of the Road Traffic Law requires the regulator to solicit 
an opinion from the owner when it intends to issue new traffic regulations, 
including the reconfiguration of zebra crossings and bicycle crossing zones.  
Therefore, the Japanese legal system mutually binds the MLIT and the Police 
Department to reach an agreement before making improvements to the road. 
In addition, the MLIT had no jurisdiction over the management of traffic 
signals.  In fact, changing the patterns of traffic signals in the third meeting 
would have required an invasion into the bureaucratic turf of the Police 
Department.  The neutral team, however, didn’t recognize the need to give 
                                                 
343 Technically speaking, the Public Safety Commission (kōan-iinkai) has the authority of regulating 
the traffic.  In reality, the Police Department undertakes the actual work for the commission. 
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special attention to the Police Department when the committee was convened 
because the stakeholder assessment did not reveal the importance of reaching an 
interagency agreement between those agencies344.  Several team members now 
think that they should have tried to work more closely with the Police Department 
using informal caucuses at the beginning of the process. 
The negotiation, in the traditional format with a twist, took place after the 
fourth meeting.  The TAT prepared a draft plan for the MLIT incorporating 
commentary from the fourth meeting.  With the plan in hand, MLIT officially 
asked the Police Department for its opinions.  The negotiation between those 
parties took place in the mid-January.  The neutral team was in fact banned from 
the negotiation table.  Unfortunately, details of the negotiation between those 
agencies cannot be analyzed because it was conducted in the traditional way 
without involving the neutral team.  Unlike in the U.S., such internal meetings 
are not open to public scrutiny. 
Preparing for the final agreement 
On January 20, the neutral team received a finalized plan from the Technical 
Advisory Team.  It was based on the outcome of the bilateral negotiation 
between the MLIT and the Police Department.  The draft plan included the 
following eight schemes (see Appendix 6-L). 
• Reducing the corner radius and moving the bicycle crossing zone to the 
                                                 
344 Personal communications with several team members. 
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center of the intersection; 
• Installing night lighting equipment; 
• Drawing the border between the road and the sidewalk (condo entrance); 
• Adding a sign “Time-Lagged Signal (jisa-shiki shingo)” next to the signal 
(from the west); 
• Installing a signboard to warn drivers of crossing bicycles; 
• Drawing road markings to reduce the speed; 
• Drawing guidance lines (for right turns) from the north; and 
• Adding a digital signboard for bicycles showing the remaining time for the 
green signal. 
 
In fact, almost all schemes suggested in the fourth meeting were included in the 
final plan.  The only exception was the option to paint the BCZs and the condo 
entrance.  Presumably, it was determined during the negotiation that the color for 
painting those areas could not be decided.  Kita incorporated the eight accepted 
schemes into the draft consensus agreement of the committee, which included the 
following chapters. 
• Chapter 1: Introduction 
• Chapter 2: Work of the Committee 
• Chapter 3: Recommendations 
• Chapter 4: Issues to be Resolved in the Future 
• Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The neutral team forwarded the draft to the MLIT for its approval. MLIT 
informally accepted it with a few minor changes to the draft, including the 
sequence of the eight schemes presented in the report.  The draft was distributed 
to all members on February 1, 2006 with a letter asking each representative to 
read through it and submit a comment to the team if he or she found something in 
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the draft that would have negative impacts on any of stakeholders.  The deadline 
for the comment was set for February 7.  No one responded to the request.  The 
final meeting was expected to be ceremonial, with no discussion of substantial 
issues. 
Fifth meeting: February 10, 2006 
The fifth and final meeting took place at Hotel Senshū Kaku located next to the 
Tokushima City Hall in the Saiwaichō neighborhood.  The team could not 
reserve a room at the Educators’ Building because the meeting date was on such 
short notice.  The team scheduled the meeting between 2PM and 4:30PM, 30 
minutes shorter than the regular meeting, in anticipation that the members would 
have few issues to discuss.  This assumption was based on the reactions team 
members received during their follow-up visits and phone calls with committee 
members who were absent from the fourth meeting. 
The MLIT issued a press release for the final committee as usual (see Appendix 
6-D).  In the press release, however, it was noted that this meeting would be the 
last if members reached an agreement.  In response to the press release, a 
reporter and camera crew from the local NHK branch and a reporter from a local 
newspaper came to observe the meeting. 
For this meeting, the table arrangement was similar to that of used the first 
meeting (i.e., the U shape).  Team members and student assistants gathered at the 
meeting hall a few minutes after 1PM.  Sato put the name plates around the table.  
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As discussed in the previous team meeting, seats for the MLIT representatives  
were reserved at a separate table where Namerikawa and Professor Yamanaka 
could work on a computer and a printer.  The seating arrangement for the other 
representatives was also quite similar to the first meeting; representatives from 
government agencies were seated on one side and others across from them.  
At 2PM, Sato opened the meeting by asking representatives whether they 
agreed to have the TV crew record the meeting.  No one disagreed.  Then, the 
camera crew set up a professional VCR on a tripod and started recording.  Sato 
 
 Committee used an overhead projector 
to discuss the amendments to the draft. 
 
Kita (right) handed in the final agreement to 
Honda (convenor: left) 
 
Honda expressing his gratitude to 
committee members 
 
Kita wrapping up the discussion 
 
Figure 6-15: The fifth meeting 
(Photo: Yuuji Kurahashi) 
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continued the meeting by reviewing the handouts distributed to each 
representative and the meeting minutes for the fourth meeting.   
At that point, a representative from the Handicapped Persons’ Association 
(HPA: shōgaisha kyōkai) raised his hand and suggested that the proposal was not 
acceptable.  Sato suggested that they would discuss any objections following 
presentation of the draft agreement.  The representative agreed.  Then, Kita was 
brought in to provide a review of the draft agreement.  Kita used PowerPoint 
slides to explain key issues in the draft, in particular the eight suggested 
improvements to the Kita-josanjima intersection. 
Sato opened a discussion by bringing the draft to the floor.  He asked if 
anyone had objections to Chapters 1 and 2 of the draft.  Everyone agreed.  Then, 
he asked if anyone objected to Chapter 3, which described eight schemes to be 
implemented in the next fiscal year.  The representative from the HPA, raised his 
hand again.  He harshly and critically observed that the eight proposals did not 
include any scheme for handicapped persons, and demanded that elevators for the 
existing pedestrian overpass or an underground pedestrian path be built.  He also 
raised the issue of compliance with the Barrier-Free Transportation Act of 2000 
(kōtsū baria-furī hō) that required all transit facilities and streets to be accessible 
to disabled and elderly people.   
A representative from the MLIT responded by suggesting that the Law was 
only applicable to certain designated areas in downtown Tokushima and the 
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Intersection was outside this area.  He also suggested that the resources available 
for the Ministry might not allow such projects.  The representative from the HPA 
argued that the Law must be applied more flexibly and the fact that the 
Intersection was out of the designated area did not legitimize the lack of facilities 
for elderly and handicapped persons.  The tone of his speech was a little 
high-pitched and a little angry. 
Following this interaction, a tense atmosphere filled the room. Then, another 
representative from the HPA, raised his hand.  In a subdued voice, he suggested 
that the paragraphs in Chapter 4, which included future actions, were not 
elaborate enough.  He explained that the committee had discussed those options 
including the construction of elevators and determined that those options would 
not be feasible in the short term.  He also stressed the importance of planning 
those facilities without making hasty decisions.   
Sato then suggested that revisions could probably be made to the paragraphs in 
Chapter 4 of the recommendation.  Several others volunteered commented on the 
relative merits of elevators and underground paths.  Sato asked representatives of 
local residents for their thoughts.  Two of them suggested that the 
implementation of either of those options would take too long.   
After those interactions, the representative who initially raised the issue seemed 
to agree grudgingly with the idea of editing Chapter 4 to incorporate his argument.  
He demanded a few specific sentences be inserted in Chapter 4 of the final 
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agreement.  Sato summarized his comment, and asked the representative of the 
MLIT if he had something to say.  MLIT’s representative acknowledged the 
importance of improving accessibility while stressing the cost effectiveness with 
regard to other projects in Tokushima.  Other representatives offered no further 
comments.   
Sato suggested that they take a 10-minute break.  Susumu Namerikawa and 
Professor Yamanaka scrambled to prepare revisions to the paragraphs in Chapter 4.  
They printed out the revised draft, discussed it with the representative from the 
MLIT, then returned to their laptop computer to work and on further revision. 
After the break, the overhead projector was turned on again.  The revised 
paragraph in Chapter 4 was shown in red on the screen.  Sato read through the 
revised paragraph.  The last paragraph, in its original and revised forms, was as 
follows: 
Before: We hope that there will be continued discussions about “the measures 
for developing the safe walking environment and crossing access for pedestrians.” 
After: There is a need for continued discussions about “the measures for 
developing the safe walking environment to cross the road for pedestrians.”  In 
particular, it is important that the design and the cost-effectiveness of the facilities 
for Barrier-Free crossing access (such as elevators, slopes, underground paths, 
and etc.) are studied in a timely manner. 
The HPA representative argued that the final paragraph should explicitly support 
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implementation and that inclusion of the word “cost-effectiveness” was not 
necessary.  The representative from the MLIT questioned the latter proposal, 
saying that public spending could not be approved without considering 
cost-effectiveness.  Finally, Sato suggested that “and implemented” would be 
inserted in the last sentence before “in a timely manner.”  Kita typed the phrase 
on a laptop, and the revised paragraphs were displayed immediately on the screen 
(see Figure 6-15).  Sato asked if anyone had comments on the revision.  There 
was a moment of silence for a few seconds.  Sato reaffirmed that there was no 
predetermined scenario for the meeting and encouraged others to raise hands if 
anyone disagreed with the revised draft. 
It was a moment of relief.  Sato said, “Thank you.” and invited Kita and 
Honda—who took the convenor’s role—to the front stage.  TV crew and 
newspaper reporters also approached the front.  Kita said that he would hand in 
the recommendations as a representative of the stakeholder committee.  Kita 
inserted the print-out of the revised paragraph in the original draft, and solemnly 
handed it to the MLIT representative.  Everyone at the table spontaneously 
applauded. 
Draft minutes for this meeting were prepared simultaneously during the 
meeting.  Because printing out copies of the draft on the team’s slow ink-jet 
printer would take several minutes, Sato took the opportunity to ask a few 
participants to reflect on the progress of the committee.   
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A copy of the draft minutes was distributed to each participant.  The contents 
were immediately accepted by all participants.  Sato thanked all for their 
participation in the committee.  He also stressed that each representative should 
take the agreement back to the organizations he or she had represented.  He 
concluded the meeting around 4:10PM by saying, “arigatō gozaimasu (thank 
you!)”. 
While everyone was leaving the room, a reporter from the local NHK-TV 
station asked several representatives as well as Kita for their commentaries.  
While staff members were cleaning up the room, I had a chance to talk with 
Hajime Honda, the representative from the MLIT.  He spontaneously said to me, 
“This was difficult.  In the U.S. everyone make changes to the draft during the 
meeting, right?  We did, but that was tough.”  Everyone left the room around 
5PM. 
At 6:17PM, a news program covered the story of the Kita-josanjima 
Intersection for several minutes.  The reporter first outlined the current problems 
with the Kita-josanjima Intersection.  Then, he briefly discussed how the 
committee was organized and what recommendations it produced.  Kita’s brief 
comment on the role of the third-party neutral was aired.  Unfortunately, the 
report did not mention that it was structured around “consensus-building” 
processes as practiced in the US.  Then, the report moved on to the details of the 
committee’s recommendations.  In particular the reporter discussed the 
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effectiveness of reducing the corner radius and moving the bicycle crossing zone 
to the center of the intersection.  A reporter interviewed a middle-aged person 
who happened to ride a bicycle through the Intersection.  He said, “Well, it’s 
good if the intersection becomes safer.”   
Distribution of the final agreement 
Because the agreement was revised in the last meeting, the team had to 
distribute the final draft to all committee members including those who were 
absent.  Copies of the final agreement were mailed on February 16 by a student 
assistant.  The highlights of the document—the eight schemes for improving the 
safety and the usability of the Intersection that could be implemented in the short 
term—is included in this dissertation’s Appendix 6-L.  For the purpose of this 
research, a survey form was enclosed in the packet.  The responses from the 
stakeholder representatives will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Classification 
Date Event 
Stakeholder Meetings 
Steering Committee 
Announcements 
Miscellaneous 
2005/5/31 Steering Committee Meeting  *   
2005/6/14 Steering Committee Meeting  *   
2005/6/15 Neutral team begins to contact prospective 
stakeholder representatives 
   * 
2005/7/6 Steering Committee Meeting  *   
2005/7/7 The first stakeholder meeting announced to members   *  
2005/7/19 MLIT issues press release on the first committee 
meeting 
  *  
2005/7/22 Kita-josanjima Intersection Committee 1st meeting *    
2005/8/26 Steering Committee Meeting  *   
2005/9/3 Kita-josanjima Intersection Committee 2nd meeting *    
2005/9/27 Steering Committee Meeting  *   
2005/10/6 Kita-josanjima Intersection Committee 3rd meeting *    
2005/11/15 Steering Committee Meeting  *   
2005/11/20 Kita-josanjima Intersection Committee 4th meeting *    
2006/2/7 Steering Committee Meeting  *   
2006/2/10 Kita-josanjima Intersection Committee 5th meeting *    
 
Figure 6-16: Major events after April 2005 
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Chapter 7: Stakeholder Reactions 
Getting feedback from the committee members 
Purpose 
To measure the effectiveness of this experimental consensus-building I needed 
to gauge the reactions of the members of the Committee for the Improvements to 
the Kita-josanjima Intersection.  The main focus of this dissertation, however, is 
not the analysis of this particular consensus-building effort; it is an evaluation of 
adaptation and organizational change through the introduction of consensus 
building processes to Japan.  Reactions from the stakeholder representatives 
were sought to make sure that this experiment achieved certain outcomes—fair, 
efficient, wise, and stable solutions345—that are envisaged in the theory of 
consensus building in the US.  In other words, participant feedback is helpful in 
confirming that the process adaptation and organizational change required by the 
Japanese context did not cause the experiment to “fail”. 
Method 
A paper survey was used to gather feedback from the 21 stakeholder 
representatives.  It was distributed by a student assistant at the University of 
Tokushima on February 16, 2006 (i.e., immediately after the final meeting) to all 
                                                 
345 Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J., (1988). Breaking the impasse: Consensual approaches to 
resolving public disputes. New York, NY: Basic Books. pp. 21-33. 
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committee members as an insert in the final recommendation report.  They were 
asked to respond to the survey before February 24 by mailing completed forms in 
an attached pre-paid envelope.  The survey was conducted as a research project 
of the JSCE’s Shikoku Branch.  Postcards were mailed to everyone on February 
24 to encourage responses from those who had not responded yet.   
The survey form included 27 multiple-choice questions (see Appendix 7-A).  
It was designed to capture participants’ evaluation of the Kita-josanjima 
experimental process from a wide variety of perspectives.  To elicit their candid 
reactions, the survey did not ask their names and any other background 
information that would possibly suggest their identity.  The survey also promised 
that the data would be statistically processed in order to insure the confidentiality 
of individual responses. 
The survey questions were based on various factors for evaluating consensus 
building processes outlined in the Consensus Building Handbook346.  Those 
criteria are also summarized in the last section of Chapter 2.  The first part of the 
survey (Questions 1-10) asked each stakeholder to evaluate the procedural aspects 
of the experiment.  The latter part of the survey (Questions 11-26) was related to 
the final agreement and other outcomes.  Seventeen out of 21 committee 
members (81%) responded to the request.   
                                                 
346 Innes, J. (1999). Evaluating consensus building. In Susskind, L., McKearnan, S. and 
Thomas-Larmar, J. (Eds.). Consensus building handbook. (pp. 631-675). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
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Feedback 
Procedural aspects 
Satisfaction with the given goal (Q1) 
The first survey asked each 
committee member how satisfied he or 
she was with the goal given to the 
committee, which was to formulate a 
short-term plan to improve the safety 
and usability of the Kita-josanjima 
Intersection.  The majority of the 
respondents answered that they were 
very satisfied (24%) or mostly satisfied (41%).  However, six members (35%) 
were mildly unsatisfied with the goal of the committee, even though it was 
articulated by a representative of the MLIT and unanimously endorsed by 
committee members at the first meeting.  Those unsatisfied representatives did 
not boycott the meetings; three of them participated in all five meetings and two 
others participated in four.   
Incorporating stakeholder interests (Q2) 
The second question was how satisfied the respondents were to how well 
stakeholder interests were reflected in the processes.  Responses to this question 
correlated closely with responses to the first question.  Respondents who were 
Are you satisfied with the goal given to the
committee?
1. Very
satisfied
24%
2. Mostly
satisfied
41%
3. Not much
satisfied
35%
4. Unsatisfied
at all
0%
 
Figure 7-1: Satisfaction with the 
committee’s goal 
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satisfied with the committee’s goal 
felt that “Almost everyone’s opinions 
were reflected.”  The five 
respondents who thought that “Only 
a portion of people’s opinions were 
reflected” were asked which 
opinions were disregarded. Two of 
them pointed to 
physically-challenged people (kō-tsu jakusha); two mentioned various types of 
automobile drivers; and one specified neighboring businesses.   
Ownership of the processes (Q3) 
Various theories of consensus building in the US suggest that stakeholders 
should experience “ownership” of the processes in which they participate347.  In 
order to measure the sense of 
“ownership” among these participants, 
the survey asked each member if he or 
she had been given the opportunity to 
comment on how the committee would 
be managed.  Positive responses 
would indicate that participants’ sense 
                                                 
347 Innes, J. (1999). p. 648 
Do you think the opinions of everyone who has a
stake in the Kita-josanjima Intersection were
reflected in the process through the stakeholder
analysis (interviews) and the committee?
2. Almost
everyone's
opinions were
reflected.
65%
3. Only a
portion of
people's
opinions were
reflected
29%
No answer
6% 1. Everyone'sopinions were
reflected.
0%
4. No one's
opinions were
reflected
0%
 
Figure 7-2: Incorporating stakeholder 
interests 
Do you think that you were given
opportunities to express your opinions about
the processes and the management of the
committee?
2. Adequate
opportunities
were given
59%
3. Not much
opportunities
were given
0%
4. No
opportunities
were given at
all
0%
1. Sufficient
opportunities
were given
41%
 
Figure 7-3: Process ownership 
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of “owning” the process is likely to be high.  All respondents answered 
positively to the question: 41% thought that sufficient opportunities had been 
given, and the rest (59%) believed that they had been given at least some 
opportunities to provide inputs on how the committee would be managed.   
Contribution of the third-party neutral and the technical assistant team to the 
process (Q4 and Q5) 
Seventy percent of the respondents 
thought that the neutral assistance (i.e., 
Commons) was crucial (24%) or 
important (46%) in the management of 
the committee.  Only one respondent 
was critical of the contribution of the 
neutral team.  Compared to a similar 
survey conducted in the US, the 
evaluation of the neutral team for this 
experiment was somewhat low; in a 100-case study conducted by the Consensus 
Building Institute, 85% of the respondents thought the mediator was crucial 
(60%) or important (25%) in achieving agreement348.  The U.S. survey, however, 
focused on complex public disputes, while the Kita-josanjima experiment did not 
involve controversial issues.  The stakeholders’ evaluation of the neutral 
                                                 
348 Susskind, L., Amundsen, O. and Matsuura, M. (1999). Using assisted negotiation to settle land use 
disputes. Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy. p. 21. 
How important was the third-party neutral
team
2 Important
46%
1. Crucial
24%
4. Not
important
6%
3. Somewhat
important
24%
Figure 7-4: Contribution of the 
neutral 
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facilitators in this effort was slightly 
worse probably because the lack of 
controversy made neutral assistance less 
crucial in achieving an agreement. 
Respondents valued the technical 
assistant team (TAT) differently.  
Compared to the evaluation of the neutral 
team, more respondents evaluated the 
TAT positively (i.e., crucial [6%] or important [76%]).  On the other hand, two 
respondents (12%), who considered the neutral was “somewhat important,” 
answered that the TAT was not important.   
Neutrality of the third-party team and the TAT (Q6 and Q7) 
The survey asked how the 
representatives to evaluate the 
neutrality of the facilitator team and 
the TAT.  If most representatives 
thought that those teams favored 
particular interests, the teams didn’t 
provide good facilitation services 
and technical advising.  The survey 
asked if the facilitators and TAT 
How important was the technical assistant
team?
2 Important
76%
1. Crucial
6%
4. Not
important
12%
3. Somewhat
important
6%
Figure 7-5: Contribution of the TAT 
Do you think the third-party team was
assisting from an independent standpoint?
2. Adequately
independent
70%
1. Very
independent
12%
4. Not
independent
at all
12%3. Not much
independent
6%
 
Figure 7-6: Neutrality of the neutral 
facilitation team (Commons) 
Chapter 7  283 
appeared to be independent from the 
influence of the convenor (i.e., the 
MLIT).  More than three quarters of 
the respondents said that the neutral 
team was very independent (12%) or 
adequately independent (70%).  
The two respondents who had 
criticized the agreement for failing to 
incorporate the interests of physically-challenged people thought that the 
third-party team wasn’t independent at all.  The evaluation of the independence 
of the TAT was more favorable.  Only two respondents (12%) were mildly 
concerned about the independence of the TAT. 
Satisfaction with the process (Q8) 
Seventy percent of the respondents evaluated the process favorably, and three 
(18%)  unfavorably.  The survey also 
asked committee members to provide 
written comments on the process.  Out of 
the 17 respondents, 14 wrote evaluations. 
Eight of these pointed out a few elements 
that should be improved in future 
consensus-building efforts.  Their 
How do you evaluate the process?
3.
Unfavorable
18%
4. Very
unfavorable
0%
1. Very
favorable
24%
No answer
12%
2. Favorable
46%
Figure 7-8 Satisfaction with the 
process 
Do you think the technical assistant team was
assisting from an independent standpoint?
3. Not much
independent
12%
4. Not
independent
at all
0%
1. Very
independent
12%
2. Adequately
independent
76%
 
Figure 7-7 Neutrality of the TAT 
 284  Chapter 7 
complaints addressed the role of government agencies in the process, inefficient 
management of the process, the lack of detailed analyses of accident records, and 
insufficient attention to particular stakeholders.   
Recognition by the local communities (Q9 and Q10) 
The majority of respondents 
thought that the process and the 
substance of the committee’s 
discussions were not greatly 
recognized by the local community.  
The majority (58%) responded that 
few local residents were aware that 
the committee existed; 64% 
answered that many local residents 
didn’t know what the committee had 
discussed in the committee.  Even 
though this survey did assess the 
actual awareness of local residents, 
the committee members’ opinions 
suggest insufficient community 
outreach efforts in this experiment.  The neutral facilitator team tried to inform 
the community by inserting newsletters (iinkai-dayori) into the Tokushima 
Do you think the users and the neighbors of
the Kita-josanjima Intersection know the
existence of the committee?
2. Some
people know
24%
5. Don't know
12%
1. Almost
everyone
knows it.
6%4. No one
knows about
it.
0%
3. Not many
people know
it.
58%  
Figure 7-9: Recognition of the process 
Do you think the users and the neighbors of
the Kita-josanjima Intersection know what the
committee has discussed?
2. Some
people know
12%
5. Don't know
18%
1. Almost
everyone
knows it.
6%
4. No one
knows about
it.
0%
3. Not many
people know
it.
64%
 
Figure 7-10: Recognition of the discussion 
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Shinbun newspaper.  The neutral team could have solicited the help of 
representatives from the local communities and improved the community’s 
awareness by using different approaches to public involvement.  In addition, the 
team could have coached the community representatives, enabling them to 
publicize the committee’s progress more effectively (e.g., by asking them to post 
newsletters on community bulletin boards). 
Substantial issues 
Comprehension of the issues discussed in the committee (Q11) 
This question was designed to elicit 
participants’ evaluation of the quality of 
communication between committee 
members during the meetings.  If they 
couldn’t understand what the other 
members were talking about, the 
dialogue among them was not 
communicating any message.  On the 
contrary, almost everyone (93%) answered they understood most of what others 
were saying in the committee.  No one answered that they couldn’t understand 
much.  Based on those responses, we can conclude that the quality of 
communication between committee members was adequately high. 
 
Could you fully understand what other
members of the committee were saying (were
intended)?
2. Mostly
understood.
93%
1. Fully
understood
7%
4. Not at all
0%3. Couldn'tunderstand
much
0%
 
Figure 7-11: Quality of 
communication 
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Interest in the issues discussed in the committee (and how it changed) 
(Q12 and Q13) 
All respondents answered that the 
subjects discussed in the committee 
meetings were interesting.  
Twenty-nine percent answered that 
everything was interesting, and 71% 
answered that most of the subjects were.  
The survey also asked how each 
committee member’s level of interest 
had changed.  I assumed that some 
might have lost interest in the 
discussion after finding out that the 
final agreement was unlikely to have 
negative impacts on them.  
Approximately half of the 
respondents answered that their level 
of interest remained high throughout the process.  Five respondents (29%) 
answered that they lost interest.  Two out of those five respondents offered 
critical commentaries in their written responses to Question 8 about how the 
committee was managed. 
Did the level of your interest in the subjects
discussed in the committee change?
3. Grew
interest during
the committee
18%
4. Not
interested
from the
beginning to
the end
0%
1. Interested
from the
beginning to
the end
53%
2. Lost
interest during
the committee
29%
 
Figure 7-13: Change in the level of 
interest 
Were the subjects discussed in the committee
interesting to you?
3. Not much
interesting
0%
4. Not
interesting at
all
0% 1. Everything
was
interesting
29%
2. Mostly
interesting
71%
 
Figure 7-12: Interest in the subject 
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Representation and the liaison with constituents (Q14) 
Consensus building processes are 
based on dialogue among 
stakeholder representatives.  
Therefore, it was crucial for 
representatives to keep their 
constituents abreast of the 
committee’s discussions if the final 
agreement is to be supported by all 
stakeholders.  Twelve respondents (70%) answered that they kept their 
constituents informed about the progress of the committee.  The committee 
ground rules required them to do so. However, four (24%) answered that they had 
Did you report back to your constituents
about the progress of committee meetings?
2. Yes
70%
1. No
24%
No answer
6%
 
Figure 7-14A: Liaison with the 
constituents 
ID 
Before the 
1st meeting 
Between the 
1st and the 
2nd meetings 
Between the 
2nd and the 
3rd meetings 
Between the 
3rd and the 
4th meetings 
Between the 
4th and the 
5th meetings 
After the 5th 
meeting total 
1   X X X X 4 
2 X X X X X X 6 
3       0 
4       0 
5 X X X X X X 6 
6 X     X 2 
7     X  1 
8 X     X 2 
9       0 
10    X   1 
11 X X X X X X 6 
12       0 
13 X X     2 
14  X X    2 
15       0 
16 X X X X X X 6 
17      X 1 
total 7 6 6 6 6 8  
Figure 7-14B: Occasions of liaisons with constituents 
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not kept their constituents informed.  The survey also asked the 12 respondents 
who answered yes when correspondence with their constituents occurred. (See 
Figure 7-14B.)  In general, approximately half of them did so once or twice 
during the committee process.  Four of them answered that they reported back to 
their organizations before and after every committee meeting. 
Representation of one’s interest in the committee (Q15) 
The overwhelming majority of the 
respondents (86%) answered that they 
could say what they wanted to in the 
committee meeting.  The respondent 
who answered “I couldn’t say at all” 
participated in only one committee 
meeting.  It is likely that 
nonparticipation in the committee 
meetings led him or her to choose that option.  In general, respondents were 
adequately satisfied with the opportunities for them to speak out in the committee 
meetings.   
Knowledge creation by participating in the process (Q16) 
The survey asked this question to evaluate the learning effect of participating in 
stakeholder dialogue.  Eighty-eight percent of the respondents answered that 
they learned at least a few things about the Intersection and the neighborhood by 
Could you say what you had intended to say
in the meeting?
3. I cound't
say much
12%
4. I couldn't
say at all
6%
1. I could say
everything
6%
2. I could say
most of them
76%
 
Figure 7-15: Representation in the 
committee 
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participating in the committee.   
Innovations in the recommendation (Q17) 
The majority of respondents (53%) answered that the committee did not discuss 
many innovative ideas; not much knowledge was created. Several possible factors 
may have contributed to the lack of innovative schemes in the final agreement.  
First, the committee’s goal, as laid down by the MLIT, was too narrowly defined 
to accommodate innovative schemes. To be included in the recommendations, any 
scheme had to be implemented in the short term. Ambitious schemes which could 
take several years to implement (e.g., construction of an underpass) were 
excluded in the middle of the process because they could never be built within the 
designated time frame.  Second, the technical assistant team might not have been 
able to suggest innovative schemes.  This hypothesis is further addressed by the 
next question. 
Could you learn something new about the
function of the Kita-josanjima Intersection
and its neighborhood by participating in the
committee?
2. Could learn
a few things
59%
1. Could learn
many things
29%
4. Nothing
new at all
0%3. Almostnothing new
12%
 
Figure 7-16: Learning by participation 
Do you think the committee discussed
innovative solutions and new ideas?
2. Discussed
a few
innovative
ideas
35%
1. Discsussed
many
innovative
ideas
6%
4. No
innovative
ideas at all
6%
3. Not many
innovative
ideas.
53%
 
Figure 7-17: Innovations in the 
committee 
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Contribution of the technical assistant team to the substance (Q18) 
The survey asked “what if” the 
TAT had not been available to assist 
the committee. The response is 
somewhat mixed. Slightly less than 
the majority of respondents (42%) 
answered that the final 
recommendations would have been 
worse if the TAT had not been 
involved.  However, 34% answered that the final recommendations would have 
been the same even if the TAT were not involved.  Two respondents (13%) even 
answered that the plan would be better if it were not for the TAT.     
Why did 46% of the respondents think that the TAT’s involvement made no 
contributions to the final agreement?  Was the TAT unable to suggest innovative 
ideas to the committee?  Or was it unable to provide a sufficient analysis of the 
past accidents and other issues around the Intersection?  A cross tabulation of the 
If the committee discussed the plan without help
of the technical assistant team, how do you think
the plan would be compared to the actual plan?
No answer
12% 2. Would be alittle better
plan.
6%
5. Really bad
plan
18%
1. Would be a
much better
plan
6%
4. A little
worse plan
24%
3. The same
plan
34%
 
Figure 7-18A: Contribution of the TAT 
Q18 Q18  1~3 4, 5   1~3 4, 5 
1, 2 4 (57%) 3 (43%)  1 2 (29%) 1 (14%) 
Q1 7
 
3, 4 3 (43%) 4 (57%)  2 3 (43%) 6 (86%) 
Total 7 (100%) 7 (100%)  Q
19
 
3 2 (29%) 0 (0%) 
    Total 7 (100%) 7 (100%) 
Figure 7-18B: Cross tabulation for Q17, 18, and 19. 
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answers to Questions 17, 18, and 19 indicates that the latter is the case. (See 
Figure 7-18B.)  Those who did not value the TAT’s contribution (i.e., those who 
chose options 1~3 to Q18) were more critical of the committee’s recognition of 
the current issues than they were about the absence of innovative ideas.  The 
respondent’s frustration with the TAT is more related to the lack of the analysis of 
present conditions than to the lack of innovative proposals. 
Recognition of current issues (Q19) 
If the recommendations were based on 
inaccurate recognition of the current 
issues surrounding the Kita-josanjima 
Intersection, they would be less effective 
in addressing its traffic safety issues.  
Seventy percent of the respondents, 
however, answered that the committee 
recognized those issues correctly.  
Compared to the evaluation of technical innovation in the committee’s discussions, 
this result is substantially favorable.  In the eyes of the committee members, the 
group paid adequate attention to the current issues around the intersection, even if 
its recommendations were not innovative enough. 
 
 
Do you think the committee explored options
after recognizing all issues of the Kita-
josanjima Intersection correctly?
2. To some
extent
52%
No answer
6% 1. Very much
18%
4. Not at all
0%
3. Not much
24%
Figure 7-19: Recognition of the 
issues 
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Satisfaction with the final agreement (Q20) 
This question was intended to capture 
participant’s overall satisfaction with the 
final agreement.  No one answered that 
he or she was “fully satisfied” with the 
final agreement.  Almost three quarters 
of the respondents (71%) answered that 
they were mostly satisfied with the 
agreement.  Five (29%) were not much 
How satisfied are you with the contents of the
recommendations?
2. Mostly
satisfied
71%
1. Fully
satisfied
0%
4. Not
satisfied at all
0%
3. Not much
satisfied
29%
 
Figure 7-20A: Satisfaction with the 
final agreement 
 
Figure 7-20B: Comparison between “satisfied” and “unsatisfied” members 
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satisfied with the agreement.   
To understand why those five respondents were unsatisfied with the final 
recommendations, their responses to other questions were analyzed.  Their 
responses to Questions 1, 13, 17, 19, 22, and 23 were strikingly different from 
those of the other respondents. (See Figure 7-20B.)  Generally speaking, they 
thought that the committee neither recognized issues correctly (Q19) nor 
discussed innovative solutions (Q17). Furthermore, they lost interest in the 
discussion in the middle of the process (Q13).  They were also unsatisfied with 
the objectives that the MLIT had articulated (Q1).   
Based on these reactions, it appears that these members were unsatisfied with 
the final agreement because an issue important to them was neither fully 
recognized by the committee nor addressed by innovative solutions because of the 
limited range of objectives the committee was allowed to consider.   
Implementability of the final 
agreement (Q21) 
The survey asked each member’s 
assessment of the implementability of 
the recommendations.  The 
overwhelming majority of the 
respondents answered that everything 
would be implemented (18%) or that 
Do you think the recommendations will be
really implemented?
2. Mostly
implemented
70%
5. Don't know
6%
1. Everything
will be
implemented
18%
4. Not
implemented
at all
0%
3. Not much
implemented
6%
 
Figure 7-21: Implementability 
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most of them would be implemented (70%).  The result is among the most 
favorable reactions to the survey of the committee members.  Only one 
respondent answered that not many of the recommendations would be 
implemented.  Interestingly enough, the five respondents who reported a low 
level of satisfaction with the recommendations nevertheless believed that most of 
them would be implemented.   
Effectiveness of the final agreement (Q22) 
The survey also asked committee 
members to assess the effectiveness of 
various proposals included in the final 
agreement.  More than three quarters 
of the respondents (82%) answered that 
the recommendations would contribute 
to the reduction of accidents and the 
improvement of usability at the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection.   
Social desirability of the final agreement (Q23) 
The question was designed to evaluate members’ opinions of whether the 
recommendations were appropriate for society as a whole. Because of the public 
nature of the stakeholder dialogue, the final agreement should have been 
acceptable to the public, including those who were not stakeholders in any issue 
Do you think the recommendations will
contribute to the reduction of accidents and
the improvement of usability at the Kita-
josanjima Intersection?
2. Will
contribute at
least a little
82%
5. Very
negative
impacts
0%
1. Will
contribute
very much
0%4. A littlenegative
impacts
6%
3. Not much
changes
12%
 
Figure 7-22: Effectiveness 
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affecting the Kita-josanjima Intersection.  The overwhelming majority (82%) of 
the respondents was positive about the recommendation from this perspective as 
well. 
Possible negative effect of the final agreement (Q24) 
The majority of the respondents (53%) answered that the recommendations 
would not have significant negative impacts on those who use the Kita-josanjima 
Intersection.  However, 41% answered that a few people would be negatively 
affected.   
The survey did not ask who would be negatively influenced by the 
recommendations.  However, based on the responses to Question 2 and my 
observations of discussions in the committee meetings, those people are likely to 
be the automobile drivers who drive through, or turn around at, the Intersection.  
Eight schemes included in the final agreement entail no negative impact on 
Do you think the recommendation is a
"desirable" for the City of Tokushima as a
whole?
2. Desirable
to some
exitent
70%
5. Don't know
0% 1. Very
desirable
12%
4.
Undesirable
at all
6%
3. Not much
desirable
12%
Figure 7-23: Social desirability 
Do you think there are users who will be
negatively impacted by the recommendations
if they are implemented?
2. Not many
41%
5. Don't know
0% 1. Not at all
12%
4. Many
6%
3. A little
41%
 
Figure 7-24: Negative effects 
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pedestrians, bicycle riders, and neighbors, even though they might have no benefit 
to those who wanted improvements (i.e., physically challenged people).  Some 
of those schemes, however, were intended to reduce the speed of automobile 
traffic in the Intersection.  They would not worsen the already terrible traffic 
jams in the morning, but they were certainly intended to regulate the road traffic.  
Several safety improvements would inevitably cause such “negative” side-effects. 
Social network creation by participating in the committee  
(Q25 and Q26) 
These questions were designed to capture the social network creation effect of 
consensus-building efforts; Innes stresses this important evaluation criterion349.  
Fifty-nine percent of the respondents answered that they had become acquainted 
                                                 
349 Innes, J. (1999). pp. 652-3. 
Do you think you could get acqainted wihth
those who weren't before?
2. No
41%
1. Yes
59%
 
Figure 7-25: Acquaintance 
Were there any occaions other than the Kita-
josanjima Committee where you worked or
discussed with the members?
2. No
59%
1. Yes
41%
 
Figure 7-26: Working together in other 
occasions 
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(kao-mishiri) with other participants.  Considering the number of meetings (five 
meetings spread across the year) and the settings (meetings of 21 representatives 
without involving after-hours party and other highly informal venues), the result 
seems to be fairly high.  Even though it is impossible to determine whether 59% 
meets the threshold of adequacy or not, the feeling of acquaintance could have 
encouraged committee participants to speak out in the meetings, as revealed in the 
responses to Q15350.  Finally, 41% of the respondents reported the opportunity to 
work with other committee members on different occasions.    
Analyzing the feedback 
In this section, the Kita-josanjima experiment with consensus building will be 
evaluated by applying the “four good outcomes of negotiated settlements,” 
suggested by Susskind and Cruikshank, as the key criteria for evaluation351.  A 
major concern, however, is the tradeoffs among these criteria.  The process’s 
fairness and wisdom may be slightly compromised in favor of better efficiency 
and stability.  These points are discussed further below. 
Fairness 
In general, the Kita-josanjima experimental consensus building process seems 
to have been seen as fair.  The whole two hours of the first meeting were 
dedicated to a discussion about how the committee would be managed.  When 
                                                 
350 The importance of kao-mishiri in resolving infrastructure disputes in Japan is discussed in Chapter 
4 of this dissertation. 
351 Susskind, L. and Cruikshank, J. (1988). pp. 21-33. 
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the facilitation team determined that an additional meeting was necessary, the 
team asked all committee members whether they would agree to have an 
additional meeting or not.  As their responses to Question 3 reveal, members of 
the committee were given adequate opportunity to provide input.   
There were concerns, however, about the range of stakeholders involved the 
committee’s discussion.  In response to Question 2, which asked about 
representation of stakeholders on the committee, 29% of the respondents choose 
“Only a portion of people’s opinions were reflected.”  Responses to Questions 9 
and 10 suggest that most of the local residents in the Kita-josanjima 
neighborhoods were probably not very aware of the committee’s discussions.   
These reactions suggest insufficient representation of particular interests, even 
though a full conflict assessment was conducted before convening the committee.  
Who are the underrepresented groups?  According to the written comments to 
Question 2, they are physically-challenged people, various types of automobile 
drivers, and neighborhood businesses.  Based on reactions to Question 24 and 
other responses to Question 8, drivers are likely to be the most underrepresented 
group.  There was no organized group that could represent the interests of 
drivers who simply move through the Intersection.  The lack of their direct 
involvement, however, does not necessarily mean their interests were completely 
ignored.  In fact, many members occasionally spoke about the interest of drivers.  
For example, options that would negatively influence traffic flow, such as the 
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reconfiguration of signaling patterns, were abandoned in the fourth meeting.  It 
was quite obvious to everyone in the meeting that government agencies, including 
the police department, would never support any scheme that would worsen the 
rush-hour traffic jams, already a serious problem around the Intersection.  
Therefore, the final agreement is unlikely to impose “unfair” impacts on those 
drivers.  Instead, the neutral team and the committee could have tried to involve 
those unorganized users of the Intersection directly by implementing more 
proactive outreach efforts, such as advertisements and site visits.  Such outreach 
efforts might have improved the perception of “fairness” by increasing the 
presence of unorganized interests on the committee (even though the final 
recommendations would probably be the same).  Because this experiment was 
focused on the use of consensus building as practiced in the US, the team and the 
convenor might have paid less attention to such public involvement activities than 
they could have.   
There were two complaints about the representation of physically-challenged 
people in the answers to the Question 2.  The issue of disability access is, 
however, separate from the lack of representation because they were in fact 
represented by two committee members.  It is more related to the goal of the 
committee and the substance of the final recommendations.  Schemes for 
improving disability access would have significantly worsened the already serious 
traffic jam and would have required many years for land acquisition and budget 
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approval.  Because the committee was convened to produce consensus 
recommendations that the MLIT could implement in a few years, no strategies for 
improving disability access were included in the final agreement.  The lack of a 
plan for improving disability access may seem “unfair,” considering that the city’s 
main hospital is located next to the Intersection.  In order to make the final 
agreement “fair” from this perspective, the goal of the committee, which was 
given by the convenor, would have to have been reconfigured.  Doing so would 
have negatively influenced the other aspects—in particular the efficiency and the 
stability—of the process.  The work plan would have to have been reconfigured 
and the convenor would not have been able to guarantee implementation of the 
committee’s recommendations.   
Efficiency 
Generally speaking, the committee was managed efficiently.  In the answers to 
Question 4, many respondents considered that the facilitation were crucial (24%) 
or important (46%).  Only one respondent was highly critical about the 
management by Commons.  In a written comment to the Question 8, he or she 
stated, “There were too many committee meetings.  It could have been prepared 
in a shorter period.  Correspondence was always late.” 
Good communication between committee members in the meeting is an 
important factor that influences the overall efficiency of committee management.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, similar kinds of public meetings in Japan are often 
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dominated by “vociferous” people and many other participants remain silent even 
if they do not agree with the outspoken individuals352.  Their candid thoughts are 
usually sought through additional in-person conversations.  In the Kita-josanjima 
experiment, respondents were generally satisfied with the opportunities for 
communication in the meetings.  In response to Question 11, all respondents 
answered that they could fully understand what others were saying (7%) or most 
of it (93%).  An overwhelming majority of respondent (82%) answered to 
Question 15 that they could say what they had intended to say in the committee 
meetings.   In general, stakeholders’ reactions indicate that the communications 
in the committee were efficient and open to every participant.   
In addition to these evaluations, the survey asked whether the respondents had 
adequate chances to get acquainted with other members.  More than half (59%) 
answered that they could, notwithstanding the semi-formal environment at the 
meetings (i.e., in a conference room crowded with approximately 10 to 20 
representatives as well as almost the same number of staff).  As discussed in 
Chapter 4, being acquainted (kao-mishiri) is an important precondition for 
successful communication in Japan.  Therefore, communications in the meetings 
were more likely to be effective than would have been without any special effort 
to get acquainted.  The neutral team, Commons, seems to have had a positive 
effect in this regard.  Its experience of managing “workshop” meetings—focused 
                                                 
352 See Chapter 4 (p. 174). 
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on the creation of an environment in which every participant could speak 
out—helped create an informal feeling among each members.  For example, the 
facilitator at the second meeting asked each committee member to stand up and 
say their name so that “others can call you by the name.” 
The committee’s recommendations might be considered efficient because they 
contributed to the improvement of safety and usability at the Kita-josanjima 
Intersection.  Question 22 asked about the effectiveness of the recommendations, 
and 82% of the respondents answered that they would “contribute at least a little.”  
The actual effectiveness of the recommendations, however, cannot be measured 
until several years after they are implemented.  This latency period is the main 
difficulty of measuring the real effectiveness of consensus building processes.  
Even though I plan to observe how the Kita-josanjima Intersection will be 
improved and how the number of accidents will be reduced (or increased), the 
evaluation result is unlikely to surface in less than five years. 
Wisdom 
This experimental process had positive learning effects on the participants.  In 
response to Question 16 many respondents answered that they could learn many 
things (59%) or at least a few things (12%) about the Intersection and the 
neighborhood by participating.   
There seems to be, however, a few problems related to the lack of wisdom that 
could be embedded in the final agreement.  First, the responses to Question 17 
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indicate the lack of innovative ideas in the final agreement; 53% of the 
respondents answered that “not many innovative ideas” were discussed by the 
committee.  This is relevant to fairness; the goal substantially limited the scope 
of schemes that could be included in the final agreement.  Therefore, many 
schemes that might be considered “innovative” were excluded.  If the committee 
had discussed those schemes in detail, however, the efficiency would have been 
compromised because the discussion would have required additional meetings 
and analysis.  Recommendations would have been less stable (i.e., 
implementable) if the committee had not been able to produce them within the 
fiscal year of 2005. 
Another problem, although less noticeable than that of the lack of innovative 
ideas, is the recognition of the issues surrounding the Kita-jonsajima Intersection.  
Seventy percent of the respondents answered that the committee correctly 
recognized these issues (Very much: 18%: To some extent: 52%).  On the other 
hand, 24% answered “Not much” to the same question, and a cross tabulation 
with their evaluations of the technical assistant team’s contributions revealed that 
the TAT might have been less effective in integrating the analysis of past accidents 
and current conditions.  Several commentaries in the answers to Question 8 also 
suggest that the respondents wanted to learn more about how accidents had 
occurred at the Intersection.  There were, however, discussions in the committee 
meetings about past accidents and other conditions at the Intersection.  For 
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instance, the TAT presented their detailed analysis of past automobile accidents in 
the second meeting.  A TAT representative provided an eleven-page document 
loaded with many graphics, and spent twelve minutes explaining it.  It seems 
that the amount of information provided by the TAT to the committee was 
sufficient.  Instead, the real problem was the lack of participation in the 
formulation of those analyses.  Even though the facilitation team was aware of 
the importance of joint fact-finding, there weren’t lively discussions on the kinds 
of data and analysis that would be gathered and conducted by the TAT.  They 
received the information, but they did not feel they “owned it” because they did 
not participate in the formulation of these analyses. 
Stability 
The Kita-josanjima experiment is most highly rated in this regard.  First of all, 
most of the respondents (88%) considered that all (18%) or most (70%) of the 
recommendations would be implemented.  Considering that no one was fully 
satisfied, and only 71% were mostly satisfied with the agreement, their estimate 
of implementability is quite high.  This contrast suggests that the 
Kita-jonsanjima experiment could produce an agreement that everyone was 
willing to “live with353” even though it might not be ideal for each stakeholder.   
Implementation not only suggests a high level of stability, but also a high level 
                                                 
353 Susskind, L. (1999). An alternative to Robert’s rules of order for groups, organizations, and ad hoc 
assemblies that want to operate by consensus. In Susskind, L., McKearnan, S., and Thomas-Larmer, J. 
(Eds.) The consensus building handbook. (pp. 3-57). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. p. 6. 
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of efficiency of the planning processes as a whole.  On the other hand, if the 
recommendations are not implemented at all, the process is inefficient because the 
resources put in to produce the recommendations could not be turned into 
practical solutions in the field354.  In any case, the Kita-jonsajima effort has been 
so far highly stable.  The final judgment, however, cannot be made until the end 
of fiscal year 2006 (i.e., March 2007) by which time the recommendations are 
supposed to be implemented by the MLIT 
The stability of the agreement can also be measured by how benefitial it is for 
the society as a whole.  If those who did not participate in the process regard the 
final agreement as socially unacceptable, the agreement is unstable because it 
probably won’t be implemented.  There are many venues, such as budget 
approvals, in which external parties can influence implementation.  In the survey, 
82% of the respondents evaluated the recommendations as very desirable (12%) 
or somewhat desirable (70%) for the City of Tokushima.  This evaluation was 
supported by the news coverage by the NHK on the day the committee agreed to 
its recommendations: the reporter discussed the proposed schemes very favorably.   
                                                 
354 Many authors argue for various good side effects of stakeholder dialogues (e.g., improved 
relationships) even if their agreements were not implemented. For example, Susskind, L., van der 
Wansem, M., and Ciccarelli, A. (2000). Mediating land use disputes: Pros and cons. Cambridge, MA: 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. p. 17 and Bush, R. and Folger, J. (1994). The promise of mediation: 
Responding to conflict through empowerment and recognition. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
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Chapter 8: Evaluation of Adaptation and 
Organizational Change 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the focus of this dissertation is process adaptation 
and organizational change in response to the introduction of consensus building in 
Japan.  This chapter first summarizes actual instances of adaptation and 
organizational change identified through close observation of the Kita-josanjima 
experimental effort, which has been described in detail from Chapter 5 to Chapter 
7.  The neutral team, the convenor, and stakeholder representatives adapted 
consensus building both consciously and unconsciously to fit the Japanese context.  
These adaptations were driven by their aspiration to make this experiment a 
success.  Some were added at the beginning of the experiment, while others were 
introduced in response to unexpected situations emerged during the process.   
In order to insure that the adaptations observed in the experiment were still 
acceptable to consensus building practitioners based in the US, feedback on the 
appropriateness of these adaptations were sought from four leading 
practitioners355.  They were provided with a brief summary of process 
adaptations observed in the Kita-josanjima experiment (see Appendix 8-A).  
                                                 
355 Dale Keyes (Senior Program Manager, US Institute for Environmental Conflict Resolution), David 
Fairman (Managing Director, Consensus Building Institute), Scott McCreary (Principal-In-Charge, 
CONCUR, Inc.), and Jonathan Raab (President, Raab Associates). 
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Their comments on each category of adaptation in Japan are quoted as footnotes 
in this chapter. 
A wide range of parties involved in the experiment also noted certain kinds of 
organizational change during the Kita-josanjima process.  Although the signs of 
such changes were less clear—compared to the instances of 
adaptation—organizational changes had greater impact in the agreement among 
stakeholder representatives.  Without such transformations in the way 
stakeholders negotiated and developed recommendations, the experiment would 
have failed and the convenor would not have been willing to carry them out.  In 
addition, organizational changes seemed to be a demanding experience for those 
individuals who went though such changes because they had to abandon their 
familiar routines and explore new ways of “doing businesses.”  The change was 
Involving academics 
Choosing the lead facilitator based on age 
Involving community leaders 
Choosing the right 
participants based on the 
Japanese context 
Keeping conflict assessment interviewees 
anonymous and the Japanese concept of 
puraibashī 
Using the shingikai system 
Incorporating traditional ways of interagency 
negotiation 
Adapting processes to 
accommodate the needs 
of government agencies 
Developing the work plan to fit with the fiscal 
year 
Integrating workshop techniques 
Process 
Adaptations 
Adapting the processes to 
maximize their 
effectiveness 
Meeting each member in the nemawashi 
fashion 
Relationship between government agencies and consultants 
Representation of stakeholding interests in public forums and mochikaeri 
Organizational 
changes 
NPO as a process manager 
 
Figure 8-1: Process Adaptations and Organizational Changes observed in the 
Kita-josanjima experiment. 
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particularly difficult since it needed to be implemented through collaboration 
among different organizations356. 
In order to identify the need for adaptation and organizational change, this 
chapter also discusses other instances in which new approaches to public 
participation and consensus building in infrastructure planning were introduced in 
Japan.  In those cases failures to adapt or change have led to different kinds of 
failure.  By comparing them with the Kita-josanjima experiment, I argue that 
adaptation and organizational change—in particular, organizational change—were 
indeed required to introduce consensus building in Japan357. 
Process adaptations observed in the experiment 
Choosing the right participants based on the Japanese context 
Involving academics 
The experiment was initially promoted by Professor Hideo Yamanaka of the 
University of Tokushima.  Considering the prominence of academics in 
                                                 
356 For example, the formalized system for negotiations between the MLIT and the police department 
could not be changed because (i) the system was highly institutionalized by several legislations, (ii) 
the interagency negotiation involved a number of individuals in two different organizations, and (iii) 
the organizations were laden with the hierarchical organizational culture. 
357 J. Raab’s comment: “My overall comment is that this is still a very evolving field of theory and 
practice, and there’s clearly no perfect way to do these complex negotiations.  Moreover, we always 
preach doing assessments first to the extent practicable, and in any case customizing the process to the 
problem, place, people etc.  Overall, I see the adaptations that were made to fit the process as unique 
customizations for the Japanese audience.  It may be that some of the adaptations can be changed 
over time as people gain more experience and comfort with the process. …Ultimately what’s critical is 
that you create an approach that works in Japan and people see as better than the status quo.” 
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policy-making functions in Japan, his involvement was crucial to organizing the 
experiment.  In fact, the level of his involvement was beyond the scope of 
traditional academic engagement in the field of policy-making in Japan (i.e., 
participation in the shingikai as a person of learning and experience).  For 
instance, he was instrumental in organizing the team of neutral facilitators.  
Considering the hierarchical culture of government agencies and the significance 
of “status” in Japanese society, his involvement on the neutral side was crucial to 
managing the relationship between the convenor (i.e., the MLIT) and the neutral 
parties involved (i.e., Commons and Oriental Consultant)358,359.  His status as a 
prominent academic in Shikoku, his ongoing experience with the MLIT, and his 
proactive involvement on the neutral’s side allowed those neutral parties to 
function as real independent assistants to the committee, not as a typical 
consultant that would follow the contracting agency’s directions under the 
pressure of the kō-otsu relationship360. 
Choosing the lead facilitator based on age 
Most of the committee meetings were moderated by Yukiyoshi Sato, who had a 
decade of experience managing public participatory meetings using workshop 
techniques.  As evaluated in Chapter 7, the communication between each 
                                                 
358 D. Keyes’s Comment: “If the advice helped the neutrals persuade the MILT field office to use a 
collaborative approach to help solve the transportation problem, then I would conclude the advisor 
contributed to the success of the process.” 
359 D. Fairman’s Comment: “Good point. University professors also have status and standing in some 
communities in the US, but not always.” 
360 See Chapter 7 (p. 282) for the stakeholders’ evaluation of their neutrality. 
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representative in the committee meetings, which was facilitated by Sato, was very 
efficient361.  The communication would have been less effective if he hadn’t 
facilitated the meetings effectively.  The Commons’ choice of him as the lead 
facilitator could have been based on his experience, but his age was another factor 
that contributed to their choice362.  For instance, Susumu Namerikawa363, who 
moderated an early part of the first meeting as a representative of the JSCE, once 
humbled himself by saying, “This kind of meeting is usually moderated not by 
such a wakazō (youngster), but by an authoritative professor in the field.364”  
Considering the findings from interview vignettes, as well as literatures on the 
Japanese ways of interaction (i.e., its vertical nature), age could certainly be one 
of the factors that determine one’s capability as a meeting facilitator or moderator 
in Japan365,366.  The choice of Sato as the lead facilitator was in fact a kind of 
adaptation to the Japanese context. 
Involving community leaders 
As is common with the other public participation efforts, community leaders of 
the Kita-josanjima neighborhoods were invited to the dialogue as the 
                                                 
361 See Chapter 7 (p. 285). 
362 Sato was born in 1952. 
363 Namerikawa was born in 1971. 
364 Namerikawa’s comment in the first committee meeting, July 22, 2005. 
365 D. Fairman’s comment: “Yes, age is probably more significant in Japan.” 
366 J. Raab’s comment: “Seniority seems important in every culture and is usually but no always 
heavily correlated with age.  But I wonder whether the parties in the Japanese case then defer to the 
facilitator more for solution advice in Japan than in the US.  If so, the facilitator would need to be 
extra careful about still being perceived as non-partisan (not favoring any one side over the other) as 
this can compromise their neutrality and the process.” 
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representatives of local interests367.  They nourished the discussion by tapping in 
their local knowledge regarding the Intersection.  One of these leaders, who had 
lived near the Intersection for many years, provided invaluable information about 
traffic patterns, regulations, and properties around the Intersection368,369.  
However, they could not represent all residents living in local neighborhoods.  In 
this consensus building effort, the team used the conflict assessment to identify 
additional stakeholders in the same neighborhood and invited them to the meeting 
(e.g., a representatives of the condominium).  The neutral facilitation team 
developed a hybrid model of representation—inviting community leaders as well 
as other members of the public who were not the leaders but had high stakes in 
the project—by adapting consensus building processes to the Japanese context. 
Keeping conflict assessment interviewees anonymous and the Japanese 
concept of puraibashī 
Listing the names of interviewees in the conflict assessment report turned out to 
be problematic.  Many team members thought that listing those names, even 
without attributing specific comments to each of them, would be a breach of the 
                                                 
367 D. Fairman’s comment: “I don't think this is significantly different from US, except that not all US 
neighborhoods have such associations. Wherever one existed, it would be good practice to involve it 
on an issue like this.” 
368 D. Keyes’s comment: “Did they dominate the negotiations?  Did other stakeholders differ to 
them?  Did they try to represent everyone's interests?  If so, they could have been a negative 
influence by hindering a free and open exchange of ideas.” 
369 J. Raab’s comment: “Do the leaders get deferred to by other stakeholders, thus somehow making 
them superstakeholders?  This type of leadership could be good, but could also make other 
stakeholders not feel heard, and solutions not implemented.” 
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confidentiality agreement they had made with the interviewees370.  As a 
compromise, they decided to include the names of those interviewees who agreed 
to have their names included371.  All interviewees in the category of 
“government agencies” agreed, while the majority of local businesses and 
residents declined372.  The total number of interviewees for each stakeholder 
category was also included in the report in order to demonstrate the range of 
interviewees373.  
This adaptation was made to accommodate the Japanese sense of privacy 
(puraibashī in Japanese).  As discovered in Chapter 4, most Japanese individuals 
are reluctant to express their concerns in public forums.  One might still assume 
that their privacy would be protected by not identifying them with particular 
comments—especially those interests secretly revealed in assessment 
interviews—even if their names were published in a separate list; however, the 
fact that they participated in stakeholder interviews was a matter of privacy that 
had to be protected.  A staff member once mentioned in an interview that being 
                                                 
370 S. McCreary’s comment: “This is a definite and noteworthy departure from accepted practice in a 
US context.  Also, it presents a kind of logical conundrum: if the working assumption is that 
assessment precedes negotiation, then it would be reasonable to deduce that the negotiation 
participants had been interviewed.  This might be an example of a norm or adaptation that would 
evolve over time.” 
371 D. Keyes’s comment: “We typically list those who have been interviewed in an assessment, but 
not if they object.  I don't see any problem with not listing specific people.  It's more important to 
establish that representatives of different groups or interests were interviewed.” 
372 See Chapter 6 (p. 231). 
373 J. Raab’s comment: “We generally will quote folks and list their broad stakeholder affiliation to 
protect anonymity or have them review the quote.  But it is rare that we wouldn’t list everyone we 
talked to at the end of the report.  I guess another way to do it would be to just describe by 
categories.” 
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listed would be “koppazukasii (extremely embarrassing)374” for him if he were an 
interviewee.  That is the Japanese conception of puraibashī regarding the listing 
of people interviewed in a conflict assessment. 
Japanese have their own conception of privacy375, albeit Ruth Benedict once 
mentioned in the Chrysanthemum and the Sword, “Because there is little privacy 
in a Japanese community, it is no fantasy that ‘the world’ knows practically 
everything he does…376.”  The subtle difference in the conception of privacy 
between the US and Japan required an adaptation to the way the conflict 
assessment was presented. 
Adapting processes to accommodate the needs of government agencies 
Using the shingikai system 
The MLIT organized an iinkai—a kind of shingikai—at the Shikoku Regional 
Bureau’s headquarters for evaluating the uses of consensus building processes377.  
Even though the discussions in those iinkai meetings did not necessarily have 
specific implications for how the experiment in the Shikoku region would be 
                                                 
374 Personal communication: an interview with a staff member. 
375 Mizutani, M., Dorsey, J. and Moor, J. (2004). The internet and Japanese conception of privacy. 
Ethics and Information Technology, 6, 126-128.  There are many areas in which Japan and the US 
adopt different conceptions of privacy.  For example, the disclosure of lottery winners’ name to the 
public is just inconceivable in Japan.  On the other hand, the Japanese tax authority used to release a 
list of top 100 taxpayers (those individuals who paid most personal income taxes) every year until 
2005. 
376 Benedict, R. (1946). Chrysanthemum and the sword. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. p. 288. 
377 See Chapter 4 (p. 166) for more information about shingikai in Japan. 
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managed378, it was an important step, or ceremony, for the MLIT staff in 
introducing the new process to the organization.  By involving high rank 
officials and academics in the iinkai, lower-rank officials orchestrated the 
agreement, or the absence of disagreement, among top decision-makers regarding 
the experimental project.  Even though the iinkai had no formal authority, it in 
fact gave the green light for moving forward with the experiment379.   
As discussed in Chapter 4, highly skilled bureaucrats in Japan, like the one who 
served as the convenor, are adept at crafting a consensus within the agency by 
organizing a shingikai or an iinkai.  For example, public involvement efforts for 
the Gaikan highway project in Tokyo—one of the most controversial projects in 
Japan—involved many different iinkais in order to apply public involvement 
techniques, which were imported from the West, to the Ministry’s effort to resolve 
the controversy380.  The Kita-josanjima experiment followed this customary 
routine as well.  The iinkai functioned as a buffer between high ranking officials 
and team members.  It was a kind of “catch basin” for possible interventions 
from the top.  Otherwise, the experiment could have been manipulated by 
uninformed interventions by senior officials like other public participation 
                                                 
378 There was another mini-experiment of consensus building processes in Kochi. See Chapter 6 (p. 
221). 
379 S. McCreary’s comment: “I would think it would be quite analogous to similar approaches used in 
the US setting.  In the early days of ADR practice here, especially, there were steps taken to win such 
approvals.” 
380 See Appendix 1-A. 
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projects in Japan sometimes are381.  The presence of academics in the iinkai 
meetings also helped to deflect uninformed interventions.. 
Incorporating traditional ways of interagency negotiation 
As discussed in Chapter 4, government agencies are generally reluctant to 
disclose information to the public.  In this experiment, the convening agency was 
probably well prepared for information disclosure and open debates in the public 
arena; however, other participating agencies were not necessarily on the same 
page.  For instance, the work plan had to be adjusted in the middle of the process 
in order to integrate the formalized interagency negotiation processes for the 
MLIT and the police department.  They chose to negotiate behind closed doors 
as they had in the past382.  The introduction of the closed-door negotiation, 
however, was not necessarily driven by a desire to hide information from public 
eyes.  The neutral facilitator team explained in the fourth meeting that such 
separate negotiation between relevant authorities was necessary because a high 
level of technical expertise was required to finalize the plan.  If the team of 
neutrals had been able to understand such requirements in the early stage of the 
conflict assessment, it could have designed a process that would allow technical 
discussions involving police representatives in a public forum.  The other 
possible reason for introducing the private negotiation was the need to follow the 
                                                 
381 See Chapter 4 (p. 140) for negative influences of interventions from the top. 
382 D. Fairman’s comment: “Not so different from US--side agreements/MOUs between agencies are 
common, and don't always get reviewed by other stakeholders.  It's common for agencies to inform 
other stakeholders of key points.” 
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formal procedure outlined in the Road Law and Road Traffic Law383.  In any 
case, the consensus building process was adapted to reflect the Japanese context. 
Developing the work plan to fit with the fiscal year 
The experiment was designed in two distinct segments—the conflict 
assessment and the actual stakeholder dialogue—because the experiment was 
likely to extend over two fiscal years.  The conflict assessment was completed in 
fiscal year 2005 and the actual stakeholder dialogue was organized in fiscal year 
2006.  The end of each fiscal year is an important juncture for any participatory 
planning effort in Japan, and the same was true for the Kita-josanjima 
experiment384.   
The division of the process into two parts turned out to be quite effective in 
dealing with the widespread problem created by the inflexible fiscal year system.  
Citizen participation programs across the nation are occasionally suspended for 
several months, or even terminated, each new fiscal year because of budget 
constraints and staff reassignments.  In this experiment, even though the first 
convening meeting was slightly delayed, it did not frustrate the participating 
stakeholders.  The existence of the neutral facilitator team was effective in 
encouraging the MLIT to start the convening process early in the new fiscal year. 
Anyone who designs participatory planning processes in Japan must pay close 
                                                 
383 See Chapter 6. (p. 264) 
384 S. McCreary’s comment: “Fiscal year considerations are very real in the US, too.  This seems like 
a very practical adaptation.” 
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attention to the end of each fiscal year as an crucial breakpoint.  In this 
experiment, the interval between the conflict assessment and the stakeholder 
process coincided with the end of the fiscal year. 
Adapting the processes to maximize their effectiveness 
Integrating workshop techniques 
Members of Commons had experience managing “workshop” meetings.  In 
order to maximize the effectiveness of each committee meeting, they applied their 
skills to this consensus building experiment.  For instance, they divided the 
whole committee into several subgroups and urged each member to speak out in 
the subgroups.  They also used extra large Post-it notes specially designed for 
them in order to elicit ideas from those who were reluctant to raise their hands or 
speak out at meeting385.  By infusing their workshop management skills into the 
management of the Committee for the Improvement to the Kita-josanjima 
Intersection, they succeeded in facilitating communication among the members.  
For instance, 82% of the respondents to the post-committee survey were satisfied 
that they could say what they had intended to say at the meetings386.  
Considering the Japanese norms of “not speaking out in the public places387,” the 
survey result was remarkable.   
                                                 
385 S. McCreary’s comment: “I have seen this post it note system used very effectively in a meeting 
on the future of the Sanbanze wetlands (in Chiba, Japan) where I was the lead off speaker.  I thought 
it was a clever adaptation.” 
386 See Chapter 7 (p. 288) 
387 See Chapter 4 (p. 172). 
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Integration of workshop techniques into consensus building was not a reaction 
to incompatibility between the context and the imported process.  Even though 
workshop techniques are now gaining popularity in Japan, they do not necessarily 
define the context to which consensus building must adapt.  The context in 
which this particular experiment was embedded (i.e., an experiment involving 
practitioners skilled in workshop techniques) enabled the blending of workshop 
techniques, as practiced in Japan, the consensus building as practiced in the US.  
This led to the emergence of a new version of consensus building processes 
infused with the features of workshop management techniques.   
Meeting each member in the nemawashi fashion 
The neutral facilitator team always had five to ten staff members available to 
work on the experiment.  They divided various tasks among them.  One of the 
interesting features of their division of labor was the focus on each stakeholder 
representative: at the beginning of the stakeholder dialogue process, each senior 
staff member was assigned to a few representatives whom he had interviewed 
during the conflict assessment.  When there was a need for the team to 
communicate with a particular representative, the assigned staff member was 
asked to contact that person.  When a representative was absent from a meeting, 
the assigned staff member went to his or her office or home in order to update him 
or her on the progress in the meetings.  After distributing the survey on 47 
options, staff members went to see each representative in order to collect 
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completed forms in person.  Team members consider this one-stop liaison 
system effective in developing a trusting relationship between each representative 
and the team388.   
The system, from my perspective, has a striking similarity to the practice of 
nemawashi, which was discussed in Chapter 4 as a critical element in developing 
a local consensus for a development project389.  Those who work for consensus 
building in Japan are supposed to make periodic visits to each stakeholder for 
nemawashi in order to update them, rather than to wait for them to come and ask 
for more information390.  This one-stop system also addresses the importance of 
kaomishiri (i.e., being acquainted) in effective communication between 
Japanese391.  In order for staff members to be adequately acquainted with 
stakeholder representatives, it was important that each representative was 
approached by a particular staff member so that the representative would 
recognize at least one members’ face (kao).   
Staff members, however, now say that this liaison task was particularly 
burdensome392.  No matter how demanding this one-stop liaison system might 
                                                 
388 Personal communication with a staff member on February 7, 2006. 
389 See Chapter 4 (p. 176) 
390 D. Keyes’s comment: “This sounds somewhat like what we would call "shuttle diplomacy" - 
where the mediator works separately with groups to see if he or she can narrow differences.  This 
provides an opportunity to have more candid discussions than is possible when everyone is present.  
Often these are confidential discussions and are helpful in getting resistant stakeholders to modify 
their position.” 
391 See Chapter 4 (p. 169) 
392 Yamanaka, H. and Namerikawa, S. (2006). Wagakuni-ni okeru konsensasu-birudingu shuhō-no 
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have been for, however, it was indeed an appropriate adaptation of consensus 
building to the Japanese context. 
Organizational changes observed in the experiment 
Relationship between government agencies and consultants 
My analysis of the Japanese context pointed out a common relationship 
between government agencies and consultants, which is often characterized as the 
kō-otsu relationship393.  Under the influence of this relationship, consultants are 
supposed to follow the contracting agencies’ directions obediently.  In return, 
government agencies take full responsibility for the analysis produced by the 
consultants.  This kind of vertical relationship between public agencies and 
consultants was unacceptable to the Kita-josanjima consensus building processes 
in which technical consultants are supposed to help stakeholders employ joint 
fact-finding.  The consultant had to be responsive to the whole committee, not 
just to the convenor or a particular stakeholder. 
In this experiment, Oriental Consultants Co. and Professor Yamanaka were 
involved in the stakeholder dialogue as the technical assistant team (TAT).  Their 
job was to provide “information and its analysis from a third-party standpoint 
without supporting particular stakeholders.394”  In conventional planning efforts, 
                                                                                                                                                    
tekiyō-jirei to hyōka. PRI Review, 20. 26-35. 
393 See Chapter 4 (p. 178). 
394 MLIT Kita-josanjima Intersection Road Safety Improvement Committee. (undated). Kiyaku 
(Ground rules). §4. 
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Oriental Consultants are influenced by the kō-otsu relationship.  In this 
experiment, however, the relationship between the MLIT and the consultant was 
reworked; the consultant, with help of Professor Yamanaka, acted as a neutral 
assistant to the whole committee and provided consulting services in a new 
manner. 
For example, the TAT produced a list of 47 possible schemes for improving the 
safety and the usability of the Kita-josanjima Intersection (see Appendix 6-K).  
Producing this list was an additional task for the consultant, compared to 
traditional consulting services. 
Consultant: In typical safety improvement projects, we explore options by 
focusing on particular aspects by narrowing the range of options.  
Like, “This won’t be possible at all.”  In this case, we were asked 
to list all conceivable options.  This step was additional (in this 
case).  This was different from typical projects395. 
 
As a result, its analysis of each option was less detailed than usual because of the 
large number of listed options.  This could have led to a few stakeholders’ 
criticism on the lack of sufficient analysis of the conditions surrounding the 
Intersection396.  In addition, one of the consultants felt that the convenor gave 
much less instruction about their analysis as compared to what government 
agencies usually do397.   
The neutral facilitator team (i.e., Commons) managed the committee without 
                                                 
395 Personal communication with a consultant in February 2006. 
396 See Chapter 7 (pp. 290). 
397 Personal communication with a consultant in February 2006. 
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favoring the convenor’s interests.  Commons, however, might not be influenced 
by the kō-otsu relationship anyway, as much as Oriental Consultants are in other 
projects.  It was incorporated as a not-for-profit organization only recently (in 
2004) with the goal of providing “support for public participation and consensus 
building as a third-party organization.398”  The introduction of Commons, a 
not-for-profit organization, in this experiment will be discussed further in a latter 
section as a different kind of organizational change. 
Based on my observations of the steering committee meetings and other staff 
meetings, the convenor tried to limit its intervention.  For example, the MLIT’s 
staff occasionally suggested improvements to proposed agendas for upcoming 
meetings; however, they did not give directions to Commons about what it should 
do at the meetings. 
Generally speaking, the kō-otsu relationship between government agencies and 
consultants was temporarily lifted during this experiment.  Unlike other projects, 
the MLIT did not give specific directions about committee management, and the 
neutral facilitator team and the TAT could function as a “partner” not as a 
“retainer.”  
Representation of stakeholding interests in public forums and “mochikaeri” 
Representation is often problematic in forums for public participation in Japan.  
                                                 
398 Commons. Organization Charter. URL [http://www.pref.tokushima.jp/ generaladmin.nsf/ topics/ 
4E94D23A7987208549256D57001A6B85? opendocument] 
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As revealed in the analysis of interview vignettes in Chapter 4, many such forums 
often do not proceed as they were planned because a sufficient range of 
stakeholders is not present399.  In the Kita-josanjima process, however, 
everything proceeded as planned, except that the final meeting had to be delayed 
in order to accommodate formal negotiation between public agencies. 
Representation by each stakeholder representative was sufficiently backed up 
by an adequate level of contact with his or her constituents.  Almost three 
quarters of the survey respondents (70%) answered that they reported back to 
their constituents periodically in order to keep them abreast of the committee’s 
progress400.  In fact, I happened to observe one such instance on October 6, 2005, 
on the day of the third committee meeting. 
Around 9:00AM, after a morning walk around the Kita-josanjima neighborhood 
in order to familiarize myself with the environment, I was having my bacon and 
egg breakfast at a diner called Gasuto nearby the Intersection.  The diner was 
almost empty.  There was another customer who was eating her breakfast, and a 
disinterested waitress who mechanically took my order, the practice of which is 
very common in Japan where tipping is virtually nonexistent.  Then, a group of 
five persons came in.  I didn’t pay much attention to them, but suddenly I 
recognized a familiar voice of a committee representative.  I ducked my head 
behind the booth.  Fortunately, they were seated in an area where I can vaguely 
hear their conversations but could not be seen by them.  They started to discuss 
local issues that were not relevant to the Intersection.  When I almost started to 
lose my attention to their conversation, I heard the representative talking about 
                                                 
399 See Chapter 4 (p. 159). 
400 See Chapter 7 (p. 287). 
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one of the schemes that would be proposed in the third meeting.  I couldn’t hear 
their conversations well, but the representative was definitely explaining the 
proposed schemes to his or her fellows using a handout that would be used in the 
committee meeting later that day.   
This is just an anecdote, but it was nonetheless a rare occasion to manifest such 
liaisons between stakeholder representatives and other stakeholders.  Unlike 
other public involvement efforts in Japan that invite stakeholders without specific 
responsibilities, the Kita-josanjima effort functioned at the center of all 
stakeholders by inviting in stakeholder representatives with a mandate to be 
responsible for their constituent (which was stipulated in the committee’s ground 
rules).   
The issue of representation seemed to be problematic, however, for the 
representatives of the government agencies other than those of the MLIT.  In the 
committee meetings, they had difficulties speaking for their organizations.  They 
occasionally provided their thoughts based on their personal experiences with the 
Intersection by interjecting a phrase, “I personally think…”  But none of them 
could elaborate on their organization’s interest in the Intersection particularly in 
impromptu responses.  The mochikaeri syndrome—the tendency to avoid 
commitments in a meeting and bring issues back to the office—prevailed.  In the 
end, the process had to accommodate the formal negotiation system between the 
MLIT and the police department.  Glitches associated with the mochikaeri 
syndrome, however, should never be ascribed to each representative from 
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different government agencies.  Under the current conditions, almost anyone 
sent to a committee from a government agency won’t be able make any 
commitment during public meetings without consulting with their bosses and 
colleagues.  Those who speak for the organization without consulting with their 
colleagues are more troublesome because their promises in the meetings are likely 
to be dismissed. 
The representative from the convening agency (i.e., the MLIT), however, 
seemed to have been more prepared.  In the last meeting, representatives from a 
handicapped people’s association demanded revisions to the draft final agreement.  
The representative requested that the agreement ask the MLIT to continue the 
dialogue for improving access for the disabled at the Intersection.  The final 
agreement, with the consent of the MLIT’s representative, included a revised 
phase that the dialogue would be continued in order to discuss the 
cost-effectiveness of those schemes for an improved disability access as well401.  
One of the representatives from the handicapped people’s association wanted to 
have the word “cost-effectiveness” removed from the paragraph, while the 
MLIT’s representative insisted that it was indispensable.  The interaction was a 
real negotiation of the final agreement, and it took place in the public arena.  
This was a substantial deviation from the common practice of mochikaeri and 
backdoor negotiations.  That was probably why the representative from the 
                                                 
401 See Chapter 6 (p. 269). 
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MLIT felt that the interaction was very difficult402.  Although the organizational 
change in this aspect was quite limited (i.e., representatives from other 
government agencies were still bound by the conventional norms of mochikaeri), 
there was certainly a moment in which the traditional pattern was broken. 
NPO as a process manager 
The involvement of Commons, a not-for-profit organization (NPO), as a 
third-party neutral in a infrastructure planning effort was certainly an experiment.  
Even though a few NPOs, such as the Tokyo LA-NPO and the Nerima 
Machizukuri Association, have been working with government agencies as an 
agent for public participation, almost none of stories from my interviews with 40 
Japanese practitioners involved NPOs taking such roles in the planning processes.  
Instead, NPOs are often characterized as one of the stakeholders who occasionally 
protest against proposed projects. 
The introduction of Commons as a third-party process manager was in fact a 
kind of organizational change (i.e., deviation from the standard practice).  The 
choice of Commons as a neutral assistant to the consensus building processes was 
probably the “right” solution for three reasons.  First, Commons was not 
influenced by the kō-otsu relationship as a consulting firm.  Most of its members 
were independent architects and faculty members of the University of Tokushima 
who were not influenced by the kō-otsu relationship through other contracts with 
                                                 
402 See Chapter 6 (p. 273). 
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the MLIT and other government agencies.  Second, to hire the members of 
Commons, most of whom live in Tokushima and were skilled in meeting 
facilitation, was probably much more cost-effective than to retain a large 
consulting firm.  Third, the Kita-josanjima effort was highly experimental: it was 
the first of its kind in Japan.  Therefore, it required flexible adjustments to the 
process as it moved forward.  The members of Commons were effective in 
attending to such adjustments because they were based in Tokushima and highly 
motivated by their aspiration to improve urban planning processes. 
The Kita-josanjima experiment embodied a new form of organizing for 
effective infrastructure planning.  It introduced a NPO as a process manager, not 
as a stakeholder representative, into the framework, which was previously 
dominated by government agencies and consulting firms.  Such a change could 
not be implemented without overcoming institutional barriers.  First of all, 
Commons had to overcome the disadvantage of small firms discussed in Chapter 
4403.  In the experiment Commons could overcome the hurdle because it was 
only the organization that was explicitly advocating for the improvement of 
participatory planning processes and had successful records of managing 
workshop meetings.  Moreover, government agencies must be willing to 
collaborate with NPOs as professional partners.  Consider that a government 
agency was actually reluctant to be interviewed by Commons during the conflict 
                                                 
403 See Chapter 4 (p. 151). 
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assessment simply because it was a NPO404.  As revealed in Chapter 4, NPOs in 
the stories of infrastructure disputes are often an agent for various social 
movements against government agencies.  Therefore, in order to involve NPOs 
as process managers, the relationship between government agencies and those 
NPOs that are willing to serve as neutral process manager has to change.   
The Kita-josanjima experiment was a demonstration of a new form of 
infrastructure planning: a government agency as the convenor of a process, a NPO 
as an independent process manager, and a technical consultant as a neutral 
assistant to the stakeholders.  Such an arrangement was possible because those 
organizations had the necessary skills as well as the courage to experiment with 
the new system. 
Comparison with other Japanese cases 
Introduction 
Purpose 
The yearlong observation of the Kita-josanjima experiment and the stories from 
the fields of infrastructure planning in Japan provide concrete evidence that 
process adaptation and organizational change are crucial to introducing consensus 
building to Japan in a way that will produce agreements among stakeholders with 
a good chance of implementation.  To substantiate this hypothesis it is necessary 
                                                 
404 See Chapter 6 (p. 224). 
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to demonstrate that imported approaches to public decision-making will not 
achieve their goals without adaptation or organizational change.  This section 
reviews various stories of “failures” of new approaches, such as “public 
involvement” and “workshop” techniques, introduced into Japanese infrastructure 
planning processes.  These failures were clearly triggered by a lack of adaptation 
or organizational change. 
Data source 
For this analysis I will revisit the interview vignettes used for the analysis in 
Chapter 4.  Some of the 79 projects explained by 40 interviewees included 
failures to successfully introduce a new approach to planning or to produce 
consequential outcomes.  The failures were of different types.  
In addition to the interview vignettes, I conducted an on-line survey precisely 
for the purpose of collecting more stories of “failures” of this sort.  The survey 
was made available on the Internet between January 15 and February 4, 2006 at 
http://mmatsuura.acbj.org/jsurvey/.  The web site was accessible to anyone who 
was willing to participate in the survey.  It was initially advertised by e-mails to 
the 40 interviewees recruited for this dissertation research as well as other 
Japanese practitioners whom I had met before and who had experience in 
participatory planning.  
 I asked these groups to forward the advertisement to anyone who had 
experience in participatory planning.  To stimulate participation among a diverse 
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range of practitioners, anyone who responded to the study had a chance to win an 
MIT or Harvard T-shirt.  To encourage candid reactions, the survey did not ask 
for any background information (e.g., name, age, occupation).  Two separate 
databases were constructed: one for the responses and one for the respondents 
who entered the T-shirt lottery; they were not linked to each other. 
The survey included two groups of questions (see Appendix 8-B).  The first 
group asked the respondent to describe an unsuccessful attempt (e.g., proposal 
was rejected by the government) to introduce a particular public participation or 
involvement technique.  The questions were:  
• What did you propose?; 
• What were the immediate reasons for the failure?; and 
• What were the contextual reasons behind the immediate reason you 
mentioned above? 
 
The second group of questions was related to respondents’ experience of failures 
or disappointments after implementing a particular public participation or 
involvement technique (e.g., meeting was disrupted by a few participants).  The 
questions were: 
• What did you introduce?; 
• What were the failures?  What went wrong?  What disappointed you?; 
and 
• Why didn’t it go well?  What else could you have done to avoid them? 
 
To insure respondent confidentiality, the survey promised that any proper nouns 
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(e.g., names of persons, places, projects, companies, and organizations) and any 
other information that would lead to the identification of a particular project 
would not be quoted elsewhere. 
The 24 valid entries to the survey were combined with the interview database 
and analyzed together.  There were 19 entries for the T-shirts lottery.  Only six 
of these had been previously interviewed for this dissertation research. 
Approximately one-third of the entries came from individuals I have never met. 
Analysis 
Sixteen projects in the interview vignettes involved a failure or difficulty in 
reaching an agreement among stakeholders or in introducing a new approach to 
participatory infrastructure planning.  The 24 responses to the on-line survey add 
to the rich account of such failures.  In this section, these instances are analyzed 
in relation to particular contextual factors discussed in Chapter 4.  The objective 
is to identify the relationship between the context and the failure or difficulty.  
Failures trigged by the Japanese context in the organizational realm 
Government agencies 
Hierarchy: Four interview vignettes and two survey entries implicated top 
management in a failure or difficulty in reaching a meaningful agreement.  The 
decision makers in these stories were, in fact, governors or mayors. (None were 
MLIT officials.).  In four stories, a governor or a mayor did not accept 
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recommendations from stakeholders or their own support staff for political 
reasons.  In two stories, negotiations with a municipal government were 
extremely difficult because the mayor was elected on the basis of his political 
position against the project.  However, in the four interview vignettes related to 
the MLIT, the hierarchical influence facilitated the introduction of new 
approaches; the office manager (shōchō) introduced them using his power as a 
sort of “commander in chief.”  Therefore, hierarchy, as a property of government 
agencies, cuts both ways.  It can restrict the implementation of stakeholder 
recommendations but may be deliberately used to introduce new approaches. 
Aversion to information sharing and public involvement: Three interview 
vignettes and seven on-line survey responses recounted a government agency’s 
propensity to limit information disclosure and public involvement.  In five of 
these cases, public officials appeared to be worried about losing control of 
planning processes.  For example, a committee of government officials and a 
few NGO representatives kept their negotiations behind closed doors; this strategy 
backfired when it released a draft plan: 
Respondent #7: In preparing the draft master plan, the committee member did not 
disclose the information to the public.  They worried that 
stakeholders, in particular environmental organizations, would be 
mobilized against the project if the information were released. … 
Local communities were fed up with such a unilateral approach, and 
produced a statement for the committee in order to make specific 
requests. 
 
The committee produced recommendations for a community, but its residents 
resented the committee’s attitudes and unwanted intervention. 
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Motivation for changing practices: Although this context was not identified in 
the interview vignettes, seven on-line survey entries ascribed failures to the public 
officials’ lack of motivation to adopt a new approach to policy making.  Three of 
them mentioned that the introduction of public involvement was “katachi-dake” 
(just on the surface).  A superficial adoption of public involvement processes 
triggered confusion among participating stakeholders and blocked any agreement.  
Public officials were fundamentally unable or reluctant to change their old ways 
of doing businesses.  This description nicely fits with Meyer and Rowan’s model 
of decoupling an organization and its environment405. 
Consultants 
Kō-otsu relationship: Only one on-line survey entry identified the kō-otsu 
relationship between government agencies and consultants as one reason that an 
attempt to introduce a consultant to assist a citizens’ committee failed.   The 
respondent said, 
Respondent #18: I can’t deny that some people thought that the role of a 
consultant should be limited to the support for those who paid for 
the service. 
 
The absence of such accounts, however, does not necessarily mean that the 
kō-otsu relationship is a marginal issue in introducing new approaches to 
infrastructure planning.  Considering its significance in the interview vignettes, it 
is more likely that adaptation or organizational change to allow for the kō-otsu 
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relationship almost always occurred.  Because this transformation was so 
pervasive, very few failures are attributable to failure to adapt.  Furthermore, the 
kō-otsu relationship may have not been an issue in some cases;  for example, a 
new approach may not have required process managers to be independent from 
the influence of government agencies. 
Context in the normative realm 
Participation norms 
Can’t speak out in the public: Local residents who were not heard in public 
meetings did not appear in the “failure” stories, for the obvious reason that they 
were not present for any proceedings.  Their reluctance to speak out was more 
powerful than any motives they might have had to become involved.  However, 
their absence from various venues for public involvement was problematic. One 
vignette and five survey entries discussed such failures.  In those accounts only a 
particular segment of stakeholders was involved in the public discussion at the 
outset.  However, some of those who were reluctant to speak or even attend the 
meetings were dissatisfied with the result.  In some cases, those who had not 
been heard—even of their own volition—stormed into the meeting to protest 
elements of an agreement.  In other cases, practical recommendations could not 
be created because of the lack of coordination with these “silent stakeholders”.  
Free-wheelers: Sometimes the involvement of a few vociferous persons in the 
meeting without an intervention mechanism, such as meeting facilitation, led to 
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failures in managing meetings as efficiently.  Three interview vignettes and three 
on-line survey entries touched on such instances.  For example, an interviewee 
talked about an extraordinary experience in a rural village: 
Interviewee: Well, I knew there were protesters.  But I didn’t know he had that 
much (influence).  Later, I heard that once he starts to mumble 
gocha gocha (moans)…  Do you understand what I mean? (laugh). 
… If you dare challenge the guy after he starts to mumble moans, he 
will surely harass you.  Everyone tried to stay away from him. … 
Everyone knew that nothing could be done in the community if he 
said “No.”  …  Well, it is a story from a rural village where such 
a person might be living. 
 
In this case, constructive dialogue was simply impossible and no agreement was 
reached.   
Group dynamics 
Nemawashi: Two interview vignettes were related to the failure to conduct 
nemawashi well to the local community leaders.  In the first case, a local 
business association was offended by the lack of nemawashi before starting a 
social experiment and would not support it.  The planning department learned a 
lesson and carried out the nemawashi in the next year.  Afterwards, local 
communities fully cooperated with the department in preparing a neighborhood 
revitalization plan.  In the second case, local business owners did not participate 
in a series of workshops for neighborhood street design because they had not been 
informed about the meetings through adequate nemawashi.  As a result, they 
stormed into the final workshop meeting and nullified the effort. 
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Context in the regulative realm 
Personnel transfers 
Two interview vignettes and two survey entries attributed failures of public 
involvement efforts to personnel transfers.  In one case, transfer of an office 
manager who introduced an innovative framework for stakeholder dialogue took 
its toll on a participatory process.  He promised stakeholders that an agency 
would follow their recommendations.  However, after he was transferred, the 
agency decided not to incorporate some of stakeholder recommendations.  
Context in the settings (for public involvement) 
Slow pace 
Even though the analysis in Chapter 4 did not reveal its importance in the 
Japanese context, insufficient time to organize and complete public discussions 
was a factor contributing to some failures in public participation.  A re-reading 
of one interview vignette and three survey entries revealed that when the extended 
time necessary for thorough public discussion was not available, the 
implementation of public involvement strategies or stakeholder recommendations 
could fail.  For example, one interviewee said, 
Interviewee: In fact, the government agency had been collaborating (with the 
citizens) very well until then.  There was a trust between them.  …  
But the government agency lost its patience… In a nutshell, a 
provisional permit for the project was issued, and they needed to 
expedite the urban planning decision processes, as well as the EIA, 
as soon as possible.  So, they had to make the formal decision 
immediately, and they hurried too much.. 
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The agency prepared detailed plans for the project even though local stakeholders 
who had collaborated with the government through a participatory committee did 
not reach an agreement about its details.  The trust between the agency and the 
residents deteriorated quickly, and the latter organized a social movement against 
the proposed project. 
Avoiding failures in the Kita-josanjima experiment 
Did those contextual factors pose a threat to the effective management of the 
Kita-josanjima experiment?  They probably would have if the experiment had 
not involved any adaptation or organizational change.  In fact, the variety of 
adaptations and organizational changes that the convenor, the neutrals, and the 
stakeholders made to accommodate the experiment addresses all the Japanese 
Contextual factors that led to 
failures in other cases 
Adaptation/organizational change in the Kita-josanjima 
experiment that attended to each contextual factor 
Hierarchy Involving academics, using the shingikai system 
Aversion to info. 
sharing and pub. 
involvement 
Incorporating traditional ways of interagency negotiation, Representation 
of stakeholding interests in public forums and “mochikaeri” 
Govern- 
ment 
Lack of 
motivations to 
change the 
practice 
Using the shingikai system, Incorporating traditional ways of interagency 
negotiation 
Organiza- 
tional 
Consultant Kō-otsu 
relationship 
Relationship between government agencies and consultants, NPO as a 
process manager 
Can’t speak out Keeping conflict assessment interviewees anonymous, Meeting each 
member in the nemawashi fashion 
Partici- 
pation 
norms Free-wheelers Choosing the lead facilitator based on the age, Integrating workshop 
techniques 
Normative 
Group 
dynamics 
Nemawashi Involving community leaders, meeting each member in the nemawashi 
fashion 
Regula- 
tive 
Personnel transfers Developing the work plan to fit with the fiscal year 
Setting Slow pace Developing the work plan to fit with the fiscal year 
Figure 8-2: Relationship between contextual factors and adaptation/organizational 
change in the Kita-josanjima experiment. 
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contextual factors identified in the previous section. (See Figure 8-2.)     
Summary: Implications to future projects in Japan 
The contrast between the Kita-josanjima experiment and other failed cases in 
Japan informs us about the importance of adaptation and organizational change in 
transferring consensus building processes from the US to other countries with 
substantially different backgrounds.  Before moving to the conclusion of this 
dissertation, I will summarize the findings regarding adaptation and 
organizational change from the Kita-josanjima experiment. 
In Japan, efforts to introduce new approaches to public participation and 
consensus building in infrastructure planning occasionally failed when they did 
not fit the Japanese context properly.  In some cases, such attempts were rejected 
by sponsoring agencies before they were ever implemented in the field, and in 
other cases they were implemented but did not produce meaningful outcomes.   
One way to avoid such failures in Japan is to adapt processes so that they will 
fit the Japanese context.  In the Kita-josanjima experiment, the following nine 
process adaptations were identified: 
− An academic was involved in organizing the experiment.; 
− The leading facilitator was chosen based on age.; 
− Community leaders were invited to sit on the committee.; 
− Conflict assessment interviewees were given an option to remain 
anonymous.; 
− Iinkai was established to gain legitimacy within the ministry.; 
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− Conventional frameworks for interagency negotiation were integrated 
into the process.; 
− Work plan was designed to reduce the impact of the fiscal year.; 
− Workshop techniques were used to improve the communication 
between each committee member in the meeting.; and 
− Third-party team tried to get acquainted with each member in the 
nemawashi fashion. 
 
The other way to avoid failures is to change the environment.  In the 
Kita-josanjima experiment a few contextual factors in the organizational realm 
were transformed so they would mesh with consensus building as practiced in the 
US.  Although they were less visible than some of the process adaptations 
mentioned above, they were also important. 
− The standard kō-otsu relationship between the government agency 
and the engineering consultant was relaxed during the experiment.; 
− The representative of the convening agency tried to avoid mochikaeri 
and to be responsive at the meetings.  Many other committee 
members also tried to speak for the interests that they were 
representing; and 
− A not-for-profit organization, Commons, took the role of process 
manager.  This circumvented the influence of the conventional 
kō-otsu relationship on committee management. 
 
Not all of those process adaptations were mapped out from the beginning.  
Team members made some of these, such as the integration of conventional 
arrangements for interagency negotiations, as they encountered unintended 
situations throughout the process.   
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On the other hand, organizational changes were mostly planned at the 
beginning of the process.  For example, the convenor intentionally distanced 
itself from the consultant in order to let it function as an independent assistant to 
the committee without the influence of the kō-otsu relationship.  Commons got 
involved in the experiment as the process manager, not because its assistant 
turned out to be necessary in the middle of the process, but because this would be 
the most effective way of organizing the experiment.  In addition, these changes 
were demanding for those involved in the experiment because the new 
arrangements differed from their familiar routines.  Uncertainty, unfamiliarity, 
and instability associated with such changes might have added to both the 
psychological and physical burdens on organizations as well as individuals 
involved in the experiment.   
In particular the convening agency experienced different kinds of 
organizational changes in the Kita-josanjima experiment.  The shingikai system 
was strategically used to legitimize certain changes.  The Kita-josanjima effort 
was labeled as an “experimental” project; the term implied that other ongoing 
projects would not be influenced.  Notwithstanding those provisions, the 
representative from the convening agency told me, “This was difficult” after the 
final meeting.  Various forms of organizational change for the Kita-josanjima 
experiment required more preparations to implement than some of the process 
adaptations. 
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Based on my field observations, interview vignettes, and on-line survey results, 
it is highly likely that the experiment would not have produced recommendations, 
which are highly likely to be implemented in the fiscal year of 2006, without the 
process adaptations and organizational changes that occurred.  Compared to 
adaptation, organizational change seemed to be more difficult to implement 
because it required involved parties to plan ahead, give up familiar routines 
temporarily, and adopt new ways of doing businesses.  In the next chapter, I will 
translate these findings into general guidance for those who want to transfer 
consensus building processes to other foreign locations. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
Implications of this dissertation 
This dissertation employed a relatively unique research strategy, compared to 
more conventional cross-national comparative case studies, in that it tried to 
identify various conditions for “importing” a kind of social 
technology—consensus building—by focusing on only one country (i.e., Japan), 
using a single case study, based on participant observation.  The research, 
however, succeeded in identifying the hidden context for infrastructure planning 
in Japan by drawing insiders’ perspectives through 40 in-depth interviews with 
Japanese practitioners.  It would be almost impossible to explore the Japanese 
context at the level of that detail if the research were focused on comparisons 
between several countries.  The context was so deeply embedded in the everyday 
practice of infrastructure planning that it could not be identified by an outsider 
through structured interviews or surveys.  It had to be “dug out” through 
dialogue between the researcher and a number of practitioners as well as 
participatory observation of a project.  My key findings are twofold: the 
influence of the Japanese context in infrastructure planning (discovered through 
in-depth interviews; results are summarized in Chapter 4) and the importance of 
adaptation and organizational change (discovered through the Kita-josanjima 
experiment, which are described in detail in Chapters 5 to 7). 
 344  Chapter 9 
The Japanese context in infrastructure planning 
I interviewed forty Japanese practitioners in the field of infrastructure planning 
and succeeded in eliciting 79 stories of projects in Japan.  Their interview 
vignettes were qualitatively analyzed by attaching and classifying codes using a 
computer software package called NVivo.  The analysis discovered the existence 
of various contextual factors for infrastructure planning in Japan.  The Japanese 
context informs each practitioner and stakeholder regarding how one “should” 
deal with different kinds of situations.  In other words, it defines the range of 
appropriate behaviors and interactions in various infrastructure planning situations 
in Japan.  Those findings are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Influence of implicitly-shared context 
The significance of this research is not limited to the discovery of each 
contextual factor.  It also identified the existence of contextual factors implicitly 
shared among planning practitioners and their influence on everyday practice.  
They are not espoused in legislation, guidelines, or textbooks.  They exist only in 
the practitioners’ minds and inform them of the appropriate designs of, and 
behaviors in, various planning processes.  Because of the high contextuality of 
Japanese communications406, it is insufficient for researchers studying 
policy-making processes in Japan to focus only on “espoused theories.407”  They 
                                                 
406 Hall, E. and Hall M. (1987). Hidden differences: Doing business with the Japanese. New York, 
NY: Anchor Books. 
407 Argyris, C. and Schön, D. (1974). Theory in practice: Increasing professional effectiveness. San 
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass 
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must pay close attention to theories-in-use as well in order to solve the puzzle as 
to why Japanese policy-makers take certain actions.   
The Japanese context 
This dissertation grouped interview vignettes into three main categories: 
organizational, normative, and regulative realms.  In the organizational realm, 
five types of organizations—government, consultants, community organizations, 
political organizations, and academics—are identified.  They all have distinct 
organizational management and decision-making styles.  Some of them 
maintained particular relationships, such as the kō-otsu relationship in which 
consultants function as a kind of retainer to government agencies.  In the 
normative realm, four types of norms—interpersonal norms, participation norms, 
group dynamics, and substantive norms—were identified.  They inform each 
stakeholder appropriate behaviors in various forums for deliberation and 
negotiation regarding infrastructure planning.  Finally, three key contextual 
factors—public laws, guidelines, and fiscal year requirements—and their 
implications to the practice of infrastructure planning were identified in the 
regulative realm.  In addition to the contextual factors in these three realms, 
information about the common settings for infrastructure planning as well as other 
basic information about Japan are summarized at the end of Chapter 4.  
The importance of adaptation and organizational change 
This dissertation’s core argument is the importance of process adaptation and 
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organizational change in introducing consensus building processes (as practiced in 
the US) to resolving infrastructure disputes outside the US.  The idea was 
conceived by reviewing the relevant theoretical literature and confirmed by close 
observation of an experimental consensus building process in Tokushima, Japan. 
Theoretical underpinnings 
Based on the literature review in four fields of academic discipline (i.e., policy 
transfer, international transfer of organizational innovations, negotiation and 
dispute resolution, and relationship between institution and individual actions), I 
hypothesized the need for process adaptation and organizational change in 
transferring different kinds of social technology to a location with substantially 
different contextual backgrounds (see Figures 3-1408 and 3-2409).  Even though 
the majority of literature was concerned with adaptations to such technologies for 
the local context, a few others were touched on the possibilities of transformations 
in the context after adopting a new social technology.  A few researches that 
focused on the international transfers of organizational innovations discussed both 
adaptation and organizational change. 
The Kita-josanjima experiment 
In order to explore the relationship between the context and the need for 
process adaptation and organizational change, this dissertation reviewed an actual 
                                                 
408 See Chapter 3 (p. 109). 
409 See Chapter 3 (p. 113). 
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instance of introducing consensus building—a kind of social technology—in 
Japan.  An experimental consensus building effort focused on possible safety 
improvements to the Kita-josanjima Intersection in Tokushima, Japan involved an 
elaborate conflict assessment as well as five meetings of a stakeholder committee 
that was designed and managed by a team of neutral facilitators.   
Close observation of the experiment reveals a wide array of process adaptations 
to the local context.  Certain individuals were involved in introducing consensus 
building.  Processes were adjusted to meet the needs of government agencies.  
Meetings were managed in a way that was responsive to the needs of the 
participants.  In addition, three instances of organizational change were 
identified.  They were: 
• Temporary revocation of the kō-otsu relationship between government 
agencies and consultants; 
• Organized representation of stakeholder interests by each representative and 
the reduction of the mochikaeri syndrome; and  
• Involvement of a not-for-profit organization as a process manager. 
 
These exemplify the importance of process adaptation and organizational change 
in “importing” consensus building processes from the US.  Without these 
transformations, the experiment would have failed.  In particular, organizational 
change was crucial to the successful introduction of consensus building in Japan.  
For example, if the MLIT (i.e., the convening agency) had exercised its power of 
kō-otsu relationship in order to control the analysis by the technical assistant team 
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(i.e., a consulting firm that provided neutral assistance to the stakeholder 
committee on technical matters), its outputs would have been much less 
acceptable to other stakeholders.  On the other hand, organizational change could 
not take place in certain areas.  Above all, the negotiation between the MLIT and 
the local police department had to follow a formal procedure that was already 
regulated.  It was, instead, accommodated by an adaptation—interagency 
negotiation in a conventional format was conducted outside the public arena—and 
the results were reported back to the stakeholder committee. 
Two views on the experiment: success or failure? 
Stakeholders’ evaluations were generally favorable; however, they reveal a 
difficult, but innate, tradeoff between efficiency and fairness in consensus 
building.  Eight recommendations were unanimously supported by the members 
of the stakeholder committee.  In addition, based on their evaluation, the final 
agreement was most likely to be implemented by the MLIT in the next fiscal year.  
The committee’s goal was to prepare such an implementable plan, and the goal 
was achieved.  Therefore, the experiment was “successful.”   
On the other hand, some stakeholders—in particular physically challenged 
people—seemed to be less satisfied with the final agreement because it did not 
fully address their concerns.  The outcome seemed to be unavoidable.  The 
committee was convened to produce recommendations that could be implemented 
in the short term.  It turned out in a committee meeting that none of the options 
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for accessibility improvements could be implemented in the short term.  They 
would take at least several years to obtain the funds, purchase land, and build 
facilities.  That is why the agreement did not include any specific commitment to 
accessibility improvements.  From the perspective of physically-challenged 
people, the experiment might look like a “failure” because it did not offer an 
opportunity to address their real concerns.  Their evaluations are unlikely to 
change until the convenor starts a new forum that will allow a discussion of 
long-term improvements, as recommended in the final agreement. 
In this dissertation, consensus building processes were investigated as a kind of 
social technology that would help people achieve certain goals that were given.  
My evaluation of the experimental process therefore focused on whether the 
stakeholder committee produced recommendations, or not, that would be 
implemented in the short term.  This goal was set forth by the MLIT at the 
beginning of the process.  If the experiment was evaluated from another 
perspective, however, such as the role of consensus building in achieving social 
justice, it may well be regarded as a failure because accessibility for 
physically-challenged people was not fully achieved by the final agreement.  
This dissertation does not emphasize that perspective because I focused on the 
instrumental effectiveness of consensus building (as practiced in the US) in 
assisting infrastructure planning in Japan, as well as its interaction with various 
contextual factors.  Therefore, the experiment was analyzed as a successful 
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instance of introducing consensus building processes in a Japanese setting.  
Readers, however, should be aware of the existence of other perspectives for 
evaluating consensus building outcomes. 
Temporary change versus long-term implications 
Finally, the organizational changes I observed are not necessarily permanent.  
Instances of organizational change observed in the Kita-josanjima experiment 
were, in fact, limited to the framework of the experiment.  None of the three 
types of organizational change identified was institutionalized by the Ministry or 
by the field office; they were a temporary arrangement for the duration of the 
experiment.  Such temporary changes were necessary to make the experiment 
successful. 
Are such temporary changes sufficient for the introduction of consensus 
building to Japan?  Probably not.  The focus of this dissertation is limited to the 
short-term success of the experiment because it tested the usability of consensus 
building in Japan.  If I extend the scope to long-term institutionalization in Japan, 
temporary changes are an insufficient indicator of for institutionalization.  To 
institutionalize organizational changes, they need to be embedded in the culture 
permanently so that future uses of consensus building do not require ad hoc 
changes each time. 
The experiment was not completely devoid of evidence regarding the long-term 
institutional shifts.  For instance, Commons is ready to take the role of neutral 
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facilitator in a much more controversial discussion over the Yoshino River master 
plan, which is discussed in Appendix 1-A410.  The Kita-josanjima experiment 
certainly had an impact to the way Commons will manage the new Yoshino River 
project; the organization exchanged a formal agreement with the convenor about 
its independence.  Compared to its previous experience with the workshop 
techniques, the organization has become much more sensitive to the need for 
neutrality.  The Ministry also agreed with this unusual arrangement.  In fact, it 
seems that participants in the experiment have drawn lessons from their 
experience and are already applying them to emerging practice.  Organizational 
changes resulting from the experiment might be limited to the experiment, but 
their implication are already filtering into general public awareness.   
 “Failures” and the Japanese context 
A number of new approaches to participatory planning have been tried in Japan 
over the last few years; as many as fourteen techniques were identified in the 
interview vignettes411.  These also indicated various “failures” in introducing 
such new approaches to infrastructure planning or achieving the outcomes they 
had promised.  In Chapter 8, I analyzed relationships between those “failures” 
and various failures in adapting them for the Japanese context, by incorporating 
additional data from an Internet-based survey (n=24).  A brief analysis of those 
                                                 
410 Commons. (2006, May 30). “Yoshino-gawa ryūiki jūmin-no iken-wo kiku-kai” fashiritētā 
haken-irai ni-tsuite. Press release. 
411 See Chapter 4 (p. 191). 
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data reveal the influence of the Japanese context on such failures.  Failure to 
adapt newly-introduced processes to the Japanese context, or transform relevant 
organizations so that they permit the introduction of new processes, have led to 
disappointing results.  I think it is fair to conclude that the introduction of new 
approaches to infrastructure planning is likely to fail if they are not adapted to the 
context or organizations do not change to accommodate the use of the new 
approaches. 
Implications of the findings for international transfer of consensus 
building processes  
Need for adaptation 
Willingness to adapt them 
First of all, any practitioner of participatory planning and consensus building 
working internationally has to acknowledge the need for adaptation in the 
techniques he or she is trying to implement in foreign locations.  When a 
practitioner wants to introduce a process in another country, he or she may feel 
pressured to be consistent with the guidelines or manuals that have been produced 
in the “exporting” country.  Especially when local stakeholders are unsure about 
the effectiveness of these new approaches, he or she might be (to be honest, I was) 
tempted to present such written guidelines as a shortcut to success.  Such blind 
faith in the original program is likely to result in a failure of transfer.  Sponsoring 
agencies may reject the idea, or the first few trials may not produce any practical 
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outcome.  Process adaptation is necessary not only to meet the needs of the 
relevant authorities, but also to fit with the cultural norms that regulate the 
“appropriate” interactions among the participants.  Therefore, adaptation of the 
processes to the local context is necessary even if the transfer is intended to 
facilitate democratization, a kind of organizational change, by introducing what 
one regards as a good democratic policy-making process. 
Learning by doing 
Based on my observations in the field, process adaptation seems to be relatively 
easier than organizational change.  Adaptation does not have to be planned at the 
outset; it can be made even after the stakeholder dialogue has begun.  In fact, it 
would be extremely difficult to foresee all necessary adaptations at the outset.  
For example, the Kita-josanjima experiment did not envisage the need to 
incorporate the institutionalized system for interagency negotiation between the 
MLIT and the police department.  The team of neutrals modified the work plan 
in the middle of the process to accommodate these negotiations.  In other words, 
the flexibility of the work plan, which allowed the team’s “learning by doing412,” 
enabled flexible adaptation in the face of unexpected results.  If the team had not 
changed the work plan, the final agreement would have been less likely to be 
unanimously supported by the committee members.  The same is true with other 
efforts to try consensus building in foreign locations.  Transfers abroad must be 
                                                 
412 Dewey, J. (1963). Experience and education. New York, NY: Collier Books. 
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designed as an occasion for experiential learning to allow flexible adaptation, 
even after the process has started. 
Finding the right partner 
The Kita-josanjima experiment may well have succeeded in producing a 
meaningful agreement partly because it was organized and implemented by local 
practitioners (i.e., Professor Yamanaka and the members of Commons).  Even 
though this argument is no more than speculation, it is evident from my 
dissertation research that the knowledge of local context was indispensable.  In 
particular, process managers must be familiar with the context.  They do not 
have to be able to explain everything, but must have an ability to “sense” 
incompatibility between the new approach and what is expected.  Otherwise, the 
they are likely to lose the support of local stakeholders. 
US-based practitioners who want to work in a foreign setting must be careful to 
choose the right partners in the target location413.  Local partners must be 
familiar with the context in all three areas—organizational, normative, and 
regulative realms.  Otherwise they are unlikely to identify the need for 
adaptation, and initial trials will probably fail to help stakeholders reach 
agreement.  It is probably more desirable to find an “ambidextrous” expert who 
is familiar with both American and local cultures.  Such an expert can detect the 
                                                 
413 Consensus Building Institute (1997, Fall). Exporting Dispute Resolution: Are There Limits? CBI 
Reports. 
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need of adaptation and organizational change more effectively because he or she 
understands how local stakeholders will react to the American culture that 
influenced the development of consensus building as practiced in the US today. 
Organizational change 
The choice between adaptation and organizational change 
Organizational change is more complicated than adaptation.  Such change is 
particularly difficult because it requires people and organizations to abandon 
routines with which they are familiar with and to learn new ways of doing things.  
On the other hand, adaptations to newly introduced processes let them maintain 
the status quo in terms of organizational practice.  The possibility of dealing with 
the incompatibility between the process and the context through adaptation 
presents an additional hurdle to organizational change.  For instance, 
conventional systems for interagency negotiation between the MLIT and the 
police department could have been modified and integrated into the 
Kita-josanjima stakeholder process; however, such organizational change would 
have been extremely difficult.  Procedures for the negotiation were prescribed by 
the Road Law and the Road Traffic Law, which functioned as the regulatory 
context.  Does this suggest that organizational change is not a prerequisite for 
transferring consensus building across borders because incompatibility with the 
local context can be addressed by technology adaptation instead of organizational 
change?  The answer is, “No.”  If every incompatibility with the local context is 
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attended through adaptation, it is likely that consensus building will be modified 
to such a great extent that may not be recognizable as “consensus building 
processes” any more.  For example, if the conventional kō-otsu relationship in 
Japan, in which government agencies have strong influence on the conduct of 
consultants, had remained intact and the analysis by the “neutral” engineering 
consultants in the Kita-josanjima experiment had favored the convening agency’s 
interests, the experiment could not be accepted as a “consensus building” 
experiment.  If the consultant had functioned as a “retainer” for the MLIT, the 
neutrality of the consultant would have been compromised and the conditions for 
“neutral” management of stakeholder processes would have been violated.  
There are several properties of consensus building that should not be altered even 
when they are transferred to a foreign location414.  The host of the imported 
process must change itself to some extent in order to accommodate any  
incompatibility with the context (or abandon the idea of importing such a 
process). 
Stimulating the government for change 
It seems to me that convening agencies must be willing to accept organizational 
changes through the introduction of consensus building because they are often the 
                                                 
414 Innes, J. and Booher, D. (1999). Consensus building and complex adaptive systems: A framework 
for evaluating collaborative planning. Journal of the American Planning Assoc., 65(4), 412-424.; 
Susskind, L. (1999). An alternative to Robert’s rules of order for groups, organizations, and ad hoc 
assemblies that want to operate by consensus. In Susskind, L., McKearnan, S., and Thomas-Larmer, J. 
(Eds.) The consensus building handbook. (pp. 3-57). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
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stakeholder most affected by the introduction of new approach to policy-making.  
In the Kita-josanjima experiment, the convening agency (i.e., the MLIT) was 
willing to accept such changes.  The momentum for change was strengthened by 
shingikai meetings that gave the green light to the experiment.  If the convening 
agency had resisted the organizational changes identified in the Kita-josanjima 
experiment, the trial would have failed.   
As organizational theorists argue, institutional changes cannot be implemented 
either by imposing these from the top, or mobilizing a few low-ranking officers at 
the bottom415.  In Japan, the pressure from the top seemed to be relatively 
effective because of the hierarchical nature of the organizational management in 
government agencies416.  For example, if consensus building had been first 
experimented in the Tokyo Gaikan project, which had been protested by local 
residents for more than 40 years, the pressure for change would have been much 
more important than it was in the Kita-josanjima experiment.  Changing the 
system would also have been much more difficult in such controversial cases 
because they involve a wide variety of bureaucrats with differing interests, 
complex regulations, and huge risks associated with the change.  In such cases, 
practitioners who advocate for the introduction of new approaches cannot be too 
careful in developing a strategy for organizational change in convening agencies. 
                                                 
415 Beer, M., Eisenstat, R. & Spector, B. (1990). Why change programs don't produce change. 
Harvard Business Review, 68(6), 158-166.; Kohn, A. (1993). Why incentive plans cannot work. 
Harvard Business Review, 71(5), 54-63. 
416 See Chapter 4 (p. 140). 
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Implications for a future research agenda 
This dissertation is highly exploratory and needs to be supplemented by 
additional research on the interactions between context and new social 
technologies.   
Analyzing various attempts to transfer consensus building processes 
The analytical framework developed in this dissertation—focusing on process 
adaptation and organizational change—needs to be applied to other transfer 
efforts.  Such research can either involve cross-national comparison (i.e., 
comparing past instances of such transfers in multiple countries) or one-nation 
focused (i.e., close observation of one or two carefully selected instances of 
transfer to a country).  Because of the difficulties involved in understanding the 
hidden context in each nation or region, the latter seems to be a more promising 
strategy.  In any case, scholars in the field of public dispute resolution should 
engage in more rigorous evaluations of various international efforts to transfer 
consensus building processes.   
Application of the framework to different kinds of social technologies 
This framework for analyzing the transfer of social technology can also be 
applied to different kinds of social technologies other than consensus building, 
such as other innovations in the field of public policy.  In Japan, there are still a 
number of examples of social technologies that are being imported from foreign 
countries.  Pressures from foreign governments, known as gaiatsu, spin the such 
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importation of institutional innovations from abroad.  For example, CSR, which 
stands for “corporate social responsibility,” has been a managerial fad in the past 
few years.  For such social technologies to be effective in Japan they probably 
have to be adapted to the Japanese context, and the Japanese organizations will 
have to change.   
Theorizing about the better use of consensus building processes abroad 
This dissertation casts doubt on the usefulness of consensus building processes 
that are merely transplanted from the US to foreign locations.  On the other hand, 
it also advocates for a more widespread use of such processes in foreign locations 
after proper process adaptation and organizational change.  For instance, they 
could be used as a powerful tool to democratize environmental governance in 
rapidly developing countries (e.g., China) by encouraging new approaches to of 
environmental decision-making.  The question that the scholars have to address 
is, “What is the best strategy for cross-national transfers of such processes?”  In 
order to answer this question, more information about the practice of such 
transfers must be synthesized and analyzed comparatively.  Unfortunately, there 
is no repository of such information.  Research institutions and professional 
organizations should work together to create such a database so that practitioners 
can share best practices of international transfer of consensus building around the 
world. 
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Appendix 1-A: Illustrative cases from Japan 
 
In this section, two cases of recent infrastructure disputes are presented to 
familiarize readers further with infrastructure disputes in Japan.  Those 
long-lasting public disputes demonstrate the difficulty of resolving public disputes 
by introducing a public referendum or relying on a conventional blue ribbon 
advisory committee. 
Yoshino River Daiju River Barrage (yoshino gawa kakō zeki) 
In Tokushima, where my experimental case study (see Chapter 5~7) took place, a 
dispute over the construction of a dam became a nationally debated issue in the late 
1990s.  The existing Yoshino River Daijū Barrage, at 8.7 miles from the sea, was 
initially constructed in 1752 for the purpose of diverting the water into Old Yoshino 
River (kyū yoshino gawa).  It was constructed with natural pebble stones and 
sands, with intricate patterns of pebbles on the surface to guide the water smoothly.  
This fixed weir intercepts the water flow of the main Yoshino River and leads it 
into Old Yoshino River in the dry season.  In the wet season, the water flows over 
the fixed weir into Yoshino River as well.  Because of recurring torrents after 
typhoons, the dam has been damaged and repaired many times since its 
construction.  It Indeed, it has been repaired at least 11 times since the dam 
became a property of the national government in 19651.  In a 1982 master plan for 
the management of Yoshino River, the Ministry of Construction announced that the 
                                                 
1 MLIT (undated) dai-jū zeki ni tsuite. [WWW Document] URL 
http://www.toku-mlit.go.jp/river/jyuzeki/kaitiku/4p/4p1.htm (visited 2005, February 14). 
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current fixed weir should be replaced by a sluice-gate dam. 
The actual planning effort started in 1991 when the project funding was approved 
by the national government.  Local environmentalists, however, cast doubts on the 
likely effectiveness of a sluice-gate dam.   
Meanwhile, the proposed construction of the Nagara River Barrage in Gifu 
Prefecture became a nationally debated issue.  Environmentalists across the 
country were inspired by the movement against the Nagara River Barrage.  Most 
of the dam construction projects became under attack by environmentalists as well 
as the media.  Yoshino River project faced this trend against dam.  
In Tokushima, local environmentalists, including Masayoshi Himeno who later 
became the leader of the movement for a public referendum, directed questions to 
the Ministry of Construction’s local field office (note: this office later took the 
convenor’s role in the consensus building experiment studied in this dissertation). 
In response, the Ministry organized “Dam and Other Projects Deliberation 
Committees (damu tō shingi iinkai)” across the country in 1995.  One committee 
was organized in Tokushima to discuss the Yoshino River Barrage.  Its members 
were appointed by the prefectural governor of Tokushima, even though local 
environmentalists opposed their selection.  The first few meetings were closed to 
the public.  Both environmentalists and the local media criticized the Ministry’s 
decision to close the doors.  Later, observers were allowed after the third meeting.  
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Twelve meetings were held during a three-year period.  In 1998, the committee 
concluded that a sluice-gate dam should be constructed. 
Local environmentalists were furious about the committee’s recommendation.  
They pointed out that the deliberation was neither inclusive nor conclusive.  In 
opposition to the recommendation, environmentalists launched a movement for 
putting the debate on a public referendum.  Because there was no ordinance that 
stipulated procedures for public referendums in Tokushima City, activists formed a 
civil society group for the purpose of passing an ordinance for public referendums 
in the city council.  In Japan, anyone can request the enactment of an ordinance 
directly to the mayor once he or she collects petitions from 1/50 of eligible voters.  
The local group, in fact, collected signatures from 48.8% of voters in Tokushima.  
The mayor and local council, however, rejected the citizens’ request.  In the next 
year, there was an election for the Tokushima City Council and a majority turned 
out to be pro-referendum.  The new council passed a new ordinance for the 
referendum in June 1999. 
The actual referendum on the Daijū River Barrage project took place on January 
23, 2000.  If the majority of eligible voters did not turn out, the referendum would 
be considered invalid and the votes would not even be counted.  Newspaper 
articles reported that the pro-sluice dam faction encouraged citizens to boycott the 
referendum so that the majority of registered voters in Tokushima would not turn 
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out2.  In the end, 55% of registered voters showed up.  The result was that 91.6 % 
of the ballots were against the project.   
The project was put on hold.  There has been almost no discussion for the 
project in the last few years, even though the project is still “on hold.”  It is 
reported that the local office of the MLIT will start comprehensive planning for the 
Yoshino River watershed in the early 20063.  It will take at least a few years until 
the watershed management plan, including a decision about what to do with the 
Daijū Barrage, is produced. 
Gaikan Highway (Neighboring Communities Committee) 
The Tokyo External Circumferential Highway project (tōkyō gaikaku kanjō dōro), 
often abbreviated as Gaikan, is a proposal for a ring bypass surrounding central 
Tokyo, with a radius of approximately 15 km (about 10 miles).  It cuts through 
three prefectures (Chiba, Saitama, and Kanagawa) and the Tokyo Metropolitan 
District.  Even though the project would be implemented by the Ministry of 
Construction, the project needed Urban Planning (toshi keikaku) decisions by each 
prefecture and the metropolitan government.  The controversial Tokyo segment, 
which I shall discuss in this dissertation, was attached to the Tokyo Metropolitan 
District’s Urban Plan in 1966.   
In the 1960s, communities along the proposed highway in Tokyo experienced 
                                                 
2 Tokushima Shinbun. (2000, January 18). tōhyō boikotto wo, kadō-zeki suishin-ha ga seimei.  
3 Tokushima Shinbun. (2005, December 28). hon-nendo chū ni kentō chakushu, yoshino-gawa seibi, 
kokkō-shō ga jōhō-kōkai wo shisa.  
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rapid residential development.  Those communities were inhabited by people who 
evacuated downtown Tokyo for a better living environment.  The proposal for 
Gaikan was harshly opposed by those residents.  In 1970, the Minister of 
Construction, Ryutaro Nemoto, announced that “the project should not be advanced 
forcefully without setting up an environment where we can start discussion with 
local residents.” in a meeting of Construction Committee in the national Diet4.  
His successor Shin Kanemaru said, “This is just an idea, but how about 
constructing the highway under the ground? … I never want to build highways by 
defying local resident’s wishes.  I want to build highways after dialogues.5”  The 
Tokyo segment of the Gaikan project was put on hold for several decades after 
those statements were made.  However, the Urban Plan decision that stipulated the 
alignment of the highway has never been revoked.  It remained intact while the 
national government took no initiative to implement the plan.  No building permits 
have been issued for the properties within the project area for more than 30 years 
simply because of the earlier decision. 
The arena for initiating a new round of debate was carefully set up, taking 
advantage of two popular political leaders.  The popular governor of Tokyo, 
Shintaro Ishihara, visited the area in October 1999, and announced that elevated 
highways couldn’t be built in such a residential environment.  Later he announced 
in a metropolitan council meeting that he preferred an underground alternative.  
                                                 
4 National Diet Library. kokkai kaigi-roku. (kensetsu iinkai. 1970, October 9). 
5 National Diet Library. kokkai kaigi-roku. (kensetsu iinkai. 1973, April 12). 
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On January 16, 2001, the Minister for Construction, Chikage Ohgi, set up an 
informal rendezvous of the Minister and the Governor with local residents.  At the 
meeting, she spontaneously mentioned that the highway needed to be built under 
the ground.  This “public relation” type of event was the formal initiation of the 
public dialogue. 
In April, the MLIT and the metropolitan government jointly issued an alternative 
“suggestion (tataki-dai an)” for an underground tunnel for the Gaikan highway.  
In May, the Minister Ohgi made a formal apology to the local residents that the 
Urban Plan has been left intact for 30 years, and stated her intention to start a 
dialogue with them. 
In September 2001, the Road Bureau of the MLIT in the Kasumigaseki 
headquarters organized a research committee, a typical shingikai, in order to study 
the ways to build consensus on highway projects.  It was evident from the outset 
that the recommendations from the committee would be applied to the Gaiikan 
highway, as an official document by the MLIT located this committee in a 
schematic timeline for the Gaikan project6.  The committee finalized its 
recommendations after three meetings in two months.  Following the committee’s 
recommendations at the national level, a field office and the metropolitan 
government set up another blue-ribbon committee in December 2001 for 
overseeing the public involvement processes for the Gaikan highway.  It produced 
                                                 
6 MLIT (2001, September 13). dōro gōi keisei kenkyū-kai no setti oyobi kaisai ni tsuite. Press Release. 
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an interim recommendation on April 5, 2002 suggesting the creation of a public 
participation committee7. 
Then, a forum for deliberation between the local residents and relevant 
authorities, called PI (public involvement) Gaikan Neighboring Communities 
Committee (pee-ai gaikan ensen kyōgikai), was convened on June 5.  The 
committee was composed of 18 representatives from local communities, heads of 
planning department from 8 neighboring municipalities, 2 officials from the MLIT, 
and 2 officials from the Tokyo Metropolitan government.   
A manager from the MLIT’s field office assumed the role of moderator for these 
meetings.  The MLIT and the metropolitan government took the role of secretariat, 
as is often seen in the case of shingikai.  In the first meeting, a participant 
suggested that the committee hire an independent neutral to assist the committee, 
although public officials turned down the idea in a vague tone8.  The initial few 
meetings were spent on the discussion of ground rules as to how the meeting would 
proceed.  A few participants stressed that the need for building a highway had not 
yet been agreed upon by the committee.  After the fourth meeting, the committee 
slowly shifted its attention to substantial issues. 
The first turbulence came after the experts’ committee overseeing the PI 
Committee published its final report in November 2002.  The report indicated that 
                                                 
7 Experts Committee on Tokyo Gaikaku Kanjō Dōro. (2002, April 5). dai ichi-ji teigen. 
8 Transcript of the 1st Gaikan Neighboring Committee. p. 5. 
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the neighbors’ committee would discuss an underground tunnel option as a default 
option, and consider the need for a junction as an auxiliary option.  However, the 
committee was still discussing whether there was a legitimate need to build the 
highway itself, and some members felt that the recommendation was undercutting 
with their authority.  In the following meeting on December 3rd, several members 
criticized the legitimacy of the membership of the oversight committee and the 
recommendation.  Due to the limitation of the time, the meeting ended without 
reaching a conclusion. 
Several committee members were further infuriated by an announcement by 
Ohgi and Ishihara on January 10, 2003 about their intention to build the highway 
quickly by using the deep-bore method.  In the next committee meeting on 
January 21, a few representatives from local communities issued a statement 
requesting that the minister and the governor respect the discussion of the 
committee while admitting its slow progress.  Officials from the MLIT and the 
metropolitan government who participated in the committee responded to the 
statement by saying that their leaders’ statement had indeed been just one proposal, 
not a resolution.  While several members cast doubts on the authorities’ true 
intentions, the committee at its next meeting resumed a dialogue over what 
happened in 1966. 
The third blow, the hardest one, came in the summer of 2003.  On July 15, 
Minister Ohgi mentioned in a press conference that the environmental impact 
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assessment (EIA) process for the Gaikan project would start soon.  On July 18, the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Government formally announced that it would start the EIA 
process based on the old Urban Plan.  Under the current system, starting the 
process does not necessarily mean that a project will be implemented, but some 
local residents once had a bad experience with the old EIA process in which they 
thought their views had been completely ignored.  In the next meeting on July 
24th, a few members issued another statement, and left the table after reading it.  
A scheduled meeting on August 21 was cancelled, and a committee meeting could 
not be held until October. 
On October 31st, major newspapers reported that the Gaikan project would be 
built without any junctions between Nerima and Yōga junctions.  The newly 
appointed Minister of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport Nobuteru Ishihara (the 
governor’s son) announced that he would not construct any junction.  He 
announced such an intention in the flyer for his re-election campaign.  His 
rationale for this alternative was to implement the link between the two end points 
as quick as possible without much disruption.  He stressed in a press conference 
that the speed of the planning process must be accelerated.  This was an 
unexpected turn of events for a few municipalities that wanted a junction, as a 
representative from the City of Komae said, “… we consider the minister’s 
comment was ignoring the will of our PI committee and the meetings of the 
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municipalities’ heads9.”  Because one of the sources of conflict was the proposed 
construction of a junction between the two endpoints, this statement by the Minister 
was supposed to reduce the level of conflict.  Indeed, most of the committee 
members did not respond to the minister’s announcement as they had in response to 
the EIA announcement.   
In October 2004, the committee was adjourned after its 41st meeting.  They 
could not reach agreement on anything but the meeting ground rules.  They 
reconvened in January 2005 with the same members.  Some members argued that 
they should start discussing environmental impacts by defining a few possible 
alternatives, while others stressed the importance of developing a shared 
understanding of what went wrong when the initial plan was announced in 1966.   
The second committee was finally disbanded on August 23, 2005, three years 
after its creation, with no apparent agreement among its members.  On September 
16, only three weeks after the final meeting, the Ministry and the metropolitan 
government announced a new alternative, involving an underground structure with 
a unidirectional entrance.  Such an alternative had never been discussed by the 
committee.  Following the announcement, the committee was reconvened to 
discuss the proposal.  Committee members criticized the substance of the new 
plan as well as the lack of reference to the input from the committee. 
                                                 
9 Transcript of the 28th Gaikan Neighboring Committee. p. 2. 
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Appendix 4-A: A sample solicitation letter 
 
 
[Addressee] 
 
I must first apologize for sending this unexpected letter.  My name is MATSUURA who 
conducts research on social decision making at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
Mr. A referred to you as a person who would be helpful for my research. 
 
Currently, I am conducting interviews with those who have experiences in the field of 
infrastructure planning in order to understand the norms and implicit rules in the field of 
consensus building in Japan.  I feel indebted to ask for this considering your busy 
schedule, but I would appreciate very much if you could consider the participation in my 
research.  
 
- Preferred Date: 2005 October 3 - 5, or 7. 
- Length: Approximately one hour. 
- Location: Your office, or any alternative locations you prefer. 
- Researcher : Masahiro Matsuura, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Urban Studies and 
Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
- Confidentiality Your story may be published in a form that does not allow anyone to 
identify individuals (Of course names will be removed.  For other types of information, 
such as project name and locations, I will use pseudonyms).  
 
If you are willing to participate, please reply to me at masam@mit.edu by indicating time 
ranges during which you will be available for the interview.  
(I am sorry to tell this, but please indicate all of your availability so that I will be able to 
conduct as many interviews as possible during the period.  Thank you).  
 
October 3 (Monday). [Before 3PM]:  
October 4 (Tuesday):  
October 5 (Wednesday) [Afternoon]: 
October 7 (Friday):  
 
That’s it.  I feel indebted to ask for this considering your busy schedule, but I would 
appreciate very much if you could give it a thought.  
 
Masahiro Matsuura, MCP 
Ph.D. Candidate, 
Department of Urban Studies and Planning 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Email: masam@mit.edu 
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Appendix 4-B: Interview guideline 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDELINE 
Note: If the interviewee starts to discuss abstract concepts, ask, “Could you illustrate by 
referring to particular episodes or interactions?” 
 
Q1. Among the cases you were involved in as a planner or a public official, please 
describe one example of a difficult public policy-making situation (e.g., urban 
planning, infrastructure planning, or public policy implementation) that involved 
substantial opposition or a dispute.   
1-1. What kind of project or policy was that? 
1-2. What was the goal of the project? 
 
Q2. Please explain your role in the project. 
(1) Encounter with the case 
2-1. How did you get involved in the case? 
2-2. On this project, with whom did you work with?   
 
(2) Contact/Relationship with Stakeholders 
2-3. Who do you think was the key person or group in the dispute?   
2-4. Why do you think so? 
2-5. How did the interaction with that person/group proceed?   
2-6. Did the relationship change, or not?  What was the most memorable moment in 
the continued interactions? 
(3) Relationship between Stakeholders 
2-5. What was the relationship like between organizations and citizens in the dispute?  
How were you involved in the dispute between those parties?  How did you 
intervene to improve their relationship?   
 
Q3. Please explain your reflections on the project. 
3-1. What lessons did you take from the experience?  How did you apply these 
lessons in other situations? 
3-2. How did the experience influence your career? 
 
Q. Please recommend prospective interviewees who have experiences of dealing with 
public disputes. 
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Appendix 4-C: Japanese contexts that readers should be aware of 
In this section, other contextual factors that are not identified in the interview 
vignettes and could not be fit into one of the realms and settings.  They are, 
however, crucial in understanding the Kita-josanjima experiment that this 
dissertation focuses on in the following chapters.  Readers who are not familiar 
with the Japanese geography, history, and other background information are 
encouraged to read through this section in order to familiarize themselves with the 
Japanese settings in which the experiment took place. 
Geography 
Japan is situated on the far east of the Asia.  The country’s population is 128 
million (approximately half of the US population) and the total land is 146 
thousand square miles (equivalent to the size of California).  While the country is 
composed of 6,852 islands, four major islands—Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and 
Shikoku—are considered the main land: others are often referred to as the “hermit 
islands (ri-tō).”  Two-thirds of the nation’s land is covered by forests (equivalent 
to the ratio of Brazil10).  Nearly half (49 %) of Japanese lives in floodplains, which 
consist of only 10 percent of the nation’s land11.  In fact, Japan is one of the most 
densely inhabited countries around the world.  The nation’s capital is Tokyo 
                                                 
10 FAO. (2005) State of world’s forests. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. 
11 MLIT. (undated) dam no hitsuyō-sei to kōka ni tsuite. [WWW Document] URL 
http://www.mlit.go.jp/river/jiten/nihon_kawa/ 
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whose population is 34 million12.   
History 
The history of Japan dates back to more than 10 thousand years ago.  Numerous 
archaeological sites across the country indicate that primitive people survived by 
hunting and gathering.  Around the 10th century B.C. techniques for rice 
harvesting were brought into Japan.  After the introduction of this technology 
early forms of governance emerged because rice harvesting necessitated a 
coordinated labor.  Waterways, reservoirs, and other types of infrastructure for rice 
harvesting were gradually developed.  By the 5th century, the nation became 
mostly unified by the Yamato regime.  Early metropolis, such as Heijō-kyō in 
Nara and Heian-kyō in Kyoto, were developed in the 8th century.  The 
development of farmlands, including waterways to support those farms, was pursed 
by private manors (shō-en).   
The development of public infrastructure, however, did not thrive until the 
beginning of the 17th century when Tokugawa Ieyasu won the battle of Sekigahara.  
Between 1603 and 1867 the Tokugawa family governed the country under the 
shogunate (baku-han) system.  During this Edo period infrastructures of Japan 
began to take shape.  Major roads (kaidō), drinking water supply (jōsui), levees, 
ports, and other kinds of infrastructure were developed across the nation to support 
                                                 
12 Population for the Tokyo region (tōkyō-ken) as an aggregate of those for the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Area (tōkyō-to), Kanagawa Prefecture, and Chiba Prefecture.  Source: Statistics Bureau. (2005) heisei 
17-nen kokusei chōsa. (2005 Census). [WWW Document] URL http://www.stat.go.jp/data/ 
kokusei/2005/youkei/index.htm 
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both agricultural and commercial activities.  Famous examples include five major 
roads originating at Nihon Bashi in Tokyo, Tamagawa water supply in the Western 
Tokyo, and Shingen levees in Yamanashi. 
The syogunate system was abandoned after Matthew Perry, a commodore from 
Newport, RI, came to Japan to demand the opening of the country.  Tokugawa 
government had an isolationist policy and allowed very limited amount of foreign 
trades with China and Holland.  U.S. and other modern Western countries wanted 
trades with Japan for strategic reasons.  Following a few civil wars, the Meiji 
government was established in 1868.  The new government did everything to 
catch up with the West, from the rigorous importation of industrial technologies to 
the massive exportation of Buddhism arts.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the nation’s 
fundamental institutions were modeled after the lessons from the West13.  In the 
early Meiji period, Western technologies for infrastructure development were 
imported as well.  Engineers and architects from the West, so called “hired 
foreigners (oyatoi gaikoku-jin),” such as Josiah Conder (British architect), Edmund 
Morel (British railway engineer), and Johannis de Rijke (Danish civil engineer), 
were invited to Japan for several years in order to train Japanese engineers.  The 
level of compensations to those hired foreigners suggest the significance of such 
investments by the Japanese government in learning from the West: their salary was 
somewhere between 2.4 and 4 million yen (20 to 33 thousand dollars) per month in 
                                                 
13 Westney, E. (1987). Imitation and innovation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. 
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today’s currency14.  Numerous public infrastructures were developed in the 
modern era, before the end of the World War II, by the national and prefectural 
governments.  The Japan Society of Civil Engineers has identified 2,800 important 
heritage infrastructures that were developed during the era before the WWII15. 
After the defeat of the Second World War in 1945 and a brief period of 
occupation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the new 
Japanese government as an independent state started in 1952.  The history of 
infrastructure developments after the liberation is portrayed in Chapter 1. 
Governance 
Japan adopts the constitutional monarchy system.  Emperor Akihito is currently 
the ceremonial head of the country.  The number of years after his accession is 
used to count the official year in Japan.  For example, the year of 2005 on the 
Gregorian calendar is Heisei 17 in the Japanese system.  This system is still used 
in most of the official documents in Japan.   
The national legislature has two houses: higher and lower.  242 members of the 
higher house (san-gi-in) are elected every six years (half of them are reelected 
every three years).  480 members of the lower house (syū-gi-in) are elected every 
four years.  Currently the majority leader is the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 
                                                 
14 Kamibayashi, Y. (1999). nihon-no kawa-wo yomigae-raseta gishi de reike. Tokyo, Japan: Sōshi-sha. 
p. 58. 
15 JSCE Civil Engineering History Committee. (2005). nihon-no kindai doboku isan. Tokyo, Japan: 
JSCE. 
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which has been enjoying the majority status since 1955 except for a brief period 
after 199316.  The National Diet has the power of appointing the Prime Minister 
who is the actual head of the government.  In return, the PM has the power of 
dissolving the lower house.   
Judicial system has a three-tiered hierarchical structure: the Supreme Court 
(saikō-saibansho), High Courts (kōtō-saibansho), and District/Family Courts 
(chihō/katei-saibansho).  Except that the Supreme Court judges are appointed by 
the Prime Minister, the judicial system is independent from the government.  To 
become a judge, or a lawyer, everyone has to pass rigorous national bar 
examinations whose success rate is less than 4 percent.  Generally speaking, all 
Japanese courts follow the decision by the Supreme Court.   
Road traffic 
Cars drive on the left side of the road.  Readers should bear in mind that right 
turns (usetsu), not left turns, intercept the traffic on the opposite side; otherwise the 
story of the Kita-josnajima experiment, which is elaborated in the next chapter, 
does not make sense.  Driver’s license is issued to those who are 18 years old or 
over.  Therefore, most high school students are not allowed to drive.  Automobile 
ownership in Japan (0.44 per capita) is equivalent to the rate in the US (0.46 per 
capita)17.  Bicycle is another major means of private transportation, especially for 
                                                 
16 Curtis, G. (1988). The Japanese way of politics. New York: Columbia Univ. pp. 1-44; Curtis, G. 
(1999). The logic of Japanese politics. New York: Columbia Univ. pp. 65-97. 
17 Automobile Inspection and Registration Association. (undated). jidōsha hoyū daisū suii hyō  
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high school students and housewives.  The ownership rate in Japan was 54% in 
200318. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
[WWW Document] URL http://www.aira.or.jp/data/data_r.html; Statistics Bureau. suikei jinkō.  
Federal Highway Administration. (2003). Highway Statistics 2003 [WWW Document] URL 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs03/index.htm) 
18 Japan Bicycle Promotion Institute. (2004). jitensha tōkei yōran (Vol. 38).  
380 Appendix 
Appendix 6-A: Press Release by the MLIT on January 31, 2005 
 
NPO will Lead the Investigation into the Improvement of a National Route 
Intersection 
- Opinions are sought for the improvements to the Kita-josanjima  
Intersection on National Route 11 - 
 
NR11 Kita-josanjima Intersection (Kita-josanjima Cho, Tokushima) is one of the 
most dangerous intersections in Tokushima Prefecture.  We aim to reduce the 
fatal and injury accidents by 30 percent by improving it in some ways before FY 
2007.  
The MLIT is considering an establishment of a public participation committee that 
will deliberate on the ways of improving the Kita-josanjima Intersection where many 
accidents occur. 
Before establishing the committee, we decided to investigate who has what kind of 
opinions on the improvements to the NR11 Kita-josanjima Intersection in order to 
identify those who should participate as representatives and the issues that should 
be discussed by the committee. 
This survey will be conducted by an independent third-party team of “the Japan 
Society of Civil Engineers” to whom we commissioned this work and “NPO 
Commons” that assists consensus building efforts. 
If you are one of the users of the Kita-josanjima Intersection and have ideas on 
improvements to this intersection, please review the attached document and send 
your ideas to NPO Commons. 
 
For more information (Survey Organization): 
NPO Commons.  TEL 088-652-7666.  Contact Kasai. 
 
Heisei 17, January 31 
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport. Shikoku Regional Bureau. 
Tokushima River Road Office 
 
For more information 
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport. Shikoku Regional 
Bureau. Tokushima River Road Office 
Tel 088-6554-9623 
Deputy Head (Road) Shigehisa Goto 
Director, Road Safety Division Hajime Honda 
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Appendix 6-B: Press Release by the MLIT on March 17, 2005 
 
NPO Completed the Stakeholder Analysis for the Investigation into the 
Improvement of a National Route Intersection 
- On the improvements to the Kita-josanjima Intersection on National Route 11 - 
 
The MLIT River Road Office has conducted a study (stakeholder analysis) for the 
investigation into the safety improvement measures to the NR 11 Kita-josanjima 
Intersection.  The work was commissioned to the Japan Society of Civil 
Engineers, with help of NPO Commons. 
 
The study team (JSCE and Commons) has completed the analysis of interviews 
with stakeholders (including other opinions collected from February 1) and 
prepared a recommendation for organizing a committee for road safety 
improvements to the intersection in FY 2005.  It is complied in a document titled as 
“Stakeholder Analysis for the Committee for the Road Safety Improvements to the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection (Final Report)” (Summary: Appendix 1; Whole 
Document: Appendix 2).  This is an announcement that the study team submitted 
the report to the Tokushima River Road Office today. 
 
Heisei 17, March 17 
The Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Shikoku Branch 
NPO (registered not-for-profit organization) Commons 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, Tokushima River Road Office 
 
For more information 
 
JSCE Shikoku Branch (University of Tokushima Faculty of Engineering) 
(Study Organization; Study Team) 
Susumu Namerikawa  Tel (088) 656-9877 
 
NPO (registered not-for-profit organization) Commons (Study Team) 
Yoshifumi Kasai   Tel (088) 652-7666 
 
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport. Shikoku Regional 
Bureau. Tokushima River Road Office 
Deputy Head (Road) Shigehisa Goto 
Director, Road Safety Division Hajime Honda 
Tel 088-6554-9623 
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Appendix 6-C: Press Release by the MLIT on July 19, 2005 
 
Improvements of a National Route Intersection will be Discussed in a Citizen 
Participatory Committee Managed by a Third-Party. 
- The First Meeting of the Committee for the Road Safety Improvements to the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection will be Held- 
 
The MLIT River Road Office will establish the “Committee for the Road Safety 
Improvements to the Kita-josanjima Intersection” (See Attached) in order to 
improve the NR 11 Kita-josanjima Intersection, which is one of the most dangerous 
intersection, following the “Stakeholder Analysis for the Committee for the Road 
Safety Improvements to the Kita-josanjima Intersection (Final Report)” submitted by 
the Study Team for Stakeholder Analysis on March 17.   
 
This Committee will discuss possible measures that can be implemented soon by 
listening to the local residents and businesses on the possible measures for road 
safety at the Intersection where a large number of traffic accidents occur.  We ask 
them to prepare “a better improvements to the Kita-josanjima Intersection” 
supported by each committee member hopefully by the end of November this year. 
 
In seeking an agreement between committee members, we will experiment with the 
“CB (Consensus Building) Processes,” which has been used mainly in the United 
States.  This will be its first experiment in Tokushima. 
 
The first meeting will be held at the following location: 
 
Date/Time: Heisei 17, July 22 (Friday). 15:00~17:00 
Location: Tokushima Educator’s Building 4F Training Room A (See Attachment-2) 
* Reporters and observers are always welcome. 
 
Web Site: http://www.toku-mlit.go.jp/road/01e_intro/kousaten2/index.html 
 
Heisei 17, July 19 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, Tokushima River Road Office 
 
For more information 
 
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport. Shikoku Regional Bureau. Tokushima River 
Road Office 
   Deputy Head (Road) 
   Director, Planning Division II  Tel 088-654-9612 
JSCE Shikoku Branch (University of Tokushima Faculty of Engineering) 
   (Stakeholder Analysis Study Team) Tel (088) 656-9612 
NPO (registered not-for-profit organization) Commons (Stakeholder Analysis Study Team) 
   Tel (088) 652-7666  
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Appendix 6-D: Press Release by the MLIT on February 7, 2006 
 
Improvements of a National Route Intersection will be Discussed in a Citizen 
Participatory Committee Managed by a Third-Party. 
- The Fifth Meeting of the Committee for the Road Safety Improvements to the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection will be Held- 
 
 
The MLIT Tokushima River Road Office has established the “Committee for the 
Road Safety Improvements to the Kita-josanjima Intersection” in order to improve 
the NR 11 Kita-josanjima Intersection, which is one of the most dangerous 
intersection (See Attached).  
 
The fifth meeting will be held at the following location: 
The committee held four meetings from July last year in order to discuss the issues 
surrounding the Intersection and possible improvements to them.  Based on those 
discussions, the committee will discuss the draft recommendation for the 
improvement of the Intersection.  If the committee members agree, this meeting 
will be the final one. 
 
Date/Time: Heisei 18, February 10 (Friday). 14:00~16:30 
Location: Hotel Senshū-kaku (Jichi-kaikan) (See Attachment) 
Agenda (Proposed): The draft recommendation of the commitee 
* Reporters and observers are always welcome. 
 
Web Site: http://www.toku-mlit.go.jp/road/01e_intro/kousaten2/index.html 
You can also find it in the Tokushima River Road Office web site by following the 
links: 
  [Road Information] -> [Projects: collaborative planning] -> [Kita-josanjima 
Committee] 
 
Heisei 18, February 7 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, Tokushima River Road Office 
NPO Commons 
Japan Society of Civil Engineering, Shikoku Branch 
 
For more information 
 
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport. Shikoku Regional Bureau. Tokushima River 
Road Office 
   Deputy Head (Road)          (Extension 205) 
   Director, Planning Division II  Tel 088-654-9612 
NPO (registered not-for-profit organization) Commons (Stakeholder Analysis Study Team) 
   Tel (088) 652-7666 
JSCE Shikoku Branch (University of Tokushima Faculty of Engineering) 
   (Stakeholder Analysis Study Team) Tel (088) 656-9612 
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Appendix 6-E: Meeting Agenda for July 22, 2005 
 
Kita-josanjima Intersection Road Safety Improvement Committee 
 
The First Meeting 
Time: Heisei 17, July 22 (Fri.) 15:00~17:00 
Location: Tokushima Educator’s Bldg. 4F 
Training Room A 
1-8-68 Kita-tamiya, Tokushima   
Tel: 088-633-1511 
 
■ Agenda 
1. Introduction * Welcome by the convenor 
 * Project history 
 * Introduction to the manager Ref. 1 
2. Self-introduction  Ref. 2 
3. The Committee * About the Kita-josanjima Intersection Road Safety  Ref. 3 
   Improvement Committee 
4. Committee 1) Introduction of the manager candidate 
  Management 2) About the management of the committee 
  * Procedure for the committee 
  * Structure of the committee 
  * Schedule and agenda for the committee 
  * Issues to be addressed by the committee 
 3) Approval for the management 
5. Others * Reference: Current status of the Kita-josanjima Appendix 
   Intersection 
 * Next meeting 
 
■ Handouts: 
Ref. 1 List of committee members 
Ref. 2 About the Kita-josanjima Intersection Road Safety  
 Improvement Committee 
Ref. 3 Summary of the final stakeholder assessment report 
Appendix Current status of the Kita-josanjima Intersection. 
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Appendix 6-F: Meeting Agenda for September 2, 2005 
Kita-josanjima Intersection Road Safety Improvement Committee 
The Second Meeting 
Time: Heisei 17, September 2 (Fri.) 
14:00~17:00 
Location: Tokushima Educator’s Bldg. 5F Small 
Conf. Hall 
1-8-68 Kita-tamiya, Tokushima Tel: 
088-633-1511 
■ Agenda 
1. Introduction * Opening remarks Ref. 1 
 * Self-introduction Ref. 2 
 * On the first meeting Ref. 3 
2. Sharing 2-1. Technical assumptions 
   Information 1) Reviewing documents 
 * Current status of the Intersection, projects surrounding the Ref. 4 
   Intersection, traffic accidents, case studies 
 2) mini-Q&A   
 2-2. Issues revealed in the stakeholder analysis 
 1) Reviewing documents Ref. 5 
 * Summary of the stakeholder analysis  Ref. 6 
 * List of issues based on the stakeholder analysis 
 2) mini-Q&A 
3. Discussion 3-1. Procedure for the discussion 
 3-2. [Group work] Discuss issues to be addressed 
 * [Yellow Post-it: Safety] Issues to be addressed 
 * [Blue Post-it: Usability] Issues to be addressed 
     Break 
3. Discussion 3-3. [Whole group] Discussion: issues to be addressed 
 * On safety 
 * On usability 
 3-4. [Whole group] Identify issues to be addressed 
4. Epilogue * Next meeting Ref. 7 
 * Closure 
 
■ Handouts: 
Ref. No. Title Remarks 
Ref. 1 Member list  
Ref. 2 Newsletter (Issue 1)  
Ref. 3 Minutes of the first meeting (draft)  
Ref. 4 Current state of the Intersection and case studies  
Ref. 5 Summary of the stakeholder analysis (safety)  
Ref. 6 Summary of the stakeholder analysis (usability)  
Ref. 7 On the third meeting  
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Appendix 6-G: Meeting Agenda for October 6, 2005 
Kita-josanjima Intersection Road Safety Improvement Committee 
The Third Meeting 
Time: Heisei 17, October 6 (Thu.) 
14:00~17:00 
Location: Tokushima Educator’s Bldg. 5F Small 
Conf. Hall 
1-8-68 Kita-tamiya, Tokushima Tel: 
088-633-1511 
■ Agenda 
1. Introduction * Opening remarks  
 * Self-introduction Ref. 1 
 * On the first meeting  
2. Reflecting on the 2-1. Reviewing documents [Whole Group] 
  Past Meetings * Reflecting on the second meeting Ref. 2 
 2-2. mini-Q&A  Ref. 3 
3. [Issue-1] 3-1. Reviewing documents [Whole Group] 
  Procedure for  * Procedure for discussing the improvement (draft) Ref. 4 
  Discussing the 
  Improvement 
4. [Issue-2] 4-1. Reviewing documents [Whole Group] 
  Options for * Options for the improvement (draft) Ref. 5 
  the Improvement   Method, options for each issue, list of options 
 * mini-Q&A 
     Break 
 
 4-2. Discussion [Group Work] 
 1) Understanding the options 
 2) Matching the options with the committee’s goal  
 4-3. Presentations by each group 
5. Epilogue * Next meeting Ref. 6 
 * Closure 
■ Handouts: Ref. No. Title Ref. 1 Member list Ref. 2 Newsletter (Issue 2) Ref. 3 Minutes of the second meeting (draft) Ref. 4 Procedure for discussing the improvement (draft) Ref. 5 Options for the improvement (draft) Ref. 6 On the fourth meeting 
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Appendix 6-H: Meeting Agenda for November 18, 2005 
Kita-josanjima Intersection Road Safety Improvement Committee 
The Fourth Meeting 
 
Time: Heisei 17, November 18 (Fri.) 
14:00~17:00 
Location: Tokushima Educator’s Bldg. 5F  
1-8-68 Kita-tamiya, Tokushima Tel: 
088-633-1511 
■ Agenda 
1. Introduction * Opening remarks  Ref. 1  
 * Reflecting on the third (previous) meeting Ref. 2 
 * Outline of the fourth (this) meeting Ref. 3  
2. Information 2-1. Reviewing documents [Whole Group] 
  Checking and * Progress so far and the procedure in the future (draft) Ref. 4 
  Sharing * Survey results Ref. 5 
 * Structure of the improvement options Ref. 6 
 * Relevance to the purposes and concerns Ref. 7 
 2-2. mini-Q&A  
3. Discussion: 3-1. Procedure [Whole Group] 
  Concerns about 3-2. Group discussion [Group Work] 
  Each (Suggested) 1) Concerns about each option [red card]  
  Option 2) Ways of attending to those concerns [blue card]  Ref. 
6 
 3) Others [white card]  Ref. 7 
4. Sharing the Presentation by each group [Whole Group] 
  Discussion Results Discussion + check-in issues to be resolved in the future 
5. Epilogue * Next meeting Ref. 7 
 * Closure 
 
■ Handouts: 
Ref. No. Title 
Ref. 1 Member list 
Ref. 2 Newsletter (Issue 3) 
Ref. 3 Minutes of the third meeting (draft) 
Ref. 4 Progress so far and the procedure in the future (draft) 
Ref. 5 Results from the impact evaluation survey  
Ref. 6 Structure diagram of the improvement options 
Ref. 7 Relevance to the purposes and concerns 
Ref. 8 On the next meeting 
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Appendix 6-I: Meeting Agenda for February 10, 2006 
Kita-josanjima Intersection Road Safety Improvement Committee 
The Fifth Meeting 
 
Time: Heisei 18, February 10 (Fri.) 
14:00~16:30 
Location: Hotel Senshū-kaku (Jichi kaikan) 6F 
Saiwai-cho 3-55, Toushima Tel: 
088-621-3333 
 
■ Agenda 
1. Introduction * Opening remarks  
 * Outline of the fifth meeting Ref. 1 
 
2. Reflection <> Reviewing documents  Ref. 2 
 * Reflecting on the fourth meeting Ref. 3 
  
3. Description <> Reviewing documents  
  of the Draft  * On draft recommendations Ref. 4 
  Recommendations   Ref. 5 
 
4. Confirmation <> On the committee and the draft recommendations 
  of the Draft  * Discussion Ref. 4 
  Recommendations  * Confirmation Ref. 5 
 
5. Epilogue * Closing remarks by the manager 
 * Closing remarks by the convenor 
 * Adjournment 
 
 
■ Handouts: 
Ref. 1 Member list 
Ref. 2 Newsletter (Issue 4) 
Ref. 3 Minutes of the fourth meeting (draft) 
Ref. 4 Draft recommendation for the safety improvement to the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection 
Ref. 5 Schematic diagram of the safety improvements to the 
Intersection  
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Appendix 6-J: Committee member list 
 
 Name Affiliation 
Tadashi OISHI Kita-jōsanjima 3 
Takeshi KUSAKA Suketō-honchō 6 
Masaaki 
KUSUKAWA 
Kita-jōsanjima 2 
Local residents 
Tsukumi NITA Suketō-bashi 4 
Yoshihito KAGATA Sumibi Yakitori (Japanese Bar) Benkei 
Toshihiro 
TSURUSAWA 
Honda Clio Tokushima (Car Dealer) Auto-terrace 
Div. Manager 
Local businesses 
Yoshiya TAMIKI Sushi Ginpachi 
Yoshiro TAKASE City of Tokushima, Hospital Division, Deputy 
Senior Manager and Subsection Chief 
Hiroaki AMO Tokushima City Jōtō High School, Student Affairs 
Chief 
Kiyoko NAKAYAMA Tokushima Junior High School, Vice Principal 
Akira IKEZOE Tokushima Federation of Handicapped Person’s 
Associations 
Toshio KODASHI Tokushima Federation of Handicapped Person’s 
Associations 
Kazuhiro KIMURA Tokushima Safe Driving Management Association, 
Executive Director 
Toshinori 
KUROKAWA 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 
Tokushima Transport Bureau, General Affairs 
Division, Chief 
Stakeholding 
organizations 
Hidenori NAKANO City of Tokushima, Transit Authority, Sales 
Division, Chief 
Hajime HONDA Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 
Shikoku Regional Bureau, Tokushima River Road 
Office, Planning II Division, Chief 
Norimoto FUKUDA Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 
Shikoku Regional Bureau, Tokushima River Road 
Office, Road Safety Division, Subsection Chief 
Ken-ichirō MIYAGI Tokushima Prefectural Police, Traffic Dept., Traffic 
Regulation Division (Regulation), Deputy Chief 
Masaaki SUGIMOTO Tokushima Prefectural Police, Traffic Dept., Traffic 
Regulation Division (Traffic Control), Deputy 
Chief 
Eiichi TOMINAGA Tokushima Prefecture, Land Development Dept., 
Road Management Div., Deputy Chief for 
Engineering 
Government 
agencies (Road 
and traffic 
management) 
Kazuyuki 
KINOSHITA 
City of Tokushima, Dept. of Public Works, Road 
Construction Div., Subsection Chief 
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Appendix 6-K: List of 47 options 
1 Remove the pedestrian overpass; install a 
zebra zone; and extend the green lights for 
pedestrians 
25 Change the signaling pattern (extend yellow 
and red lights) 
2. Move the bicycle crossing zones (BCZs) 
toward the center 
26 Install electronic signboards showing the 
time remaining for green lights for bicycles. 
3 Paint the BCZs 27 Prohibit U-turns 
4 Draw guidance lines for the right turn 
traffic 
28 Extend solid yellow line (meaning no lane 
change in Japan) and draw with high 
reflection ribbed paints 
5 Draw road markings for speed reduction 29 Install “no pedestrian crossing” signs 
6 Install speed bumps 30 Relocate the condo entrance to its west side 
7 Paint the road 31 Designate the condo access way as a 
one-way street 
8 Install electric signs warning excessive 
speed 
32 Remove the statute at the condo entrance  
9 Reduce the corner radius 33 Install a mirror at the corner of the condo 
entrance 
10 Extend the right-turn lane (from the south) 34 Draw lines between the road and the 
sidewalk at the condo entrance 
11 Designate “right turn only” lanes 35 Install a “stop” sign and a zebra zone; draw 
“stop” on the road 
12 Install night lighting equipments 36 Close the entrance to a store (on the north of 
the Intersection) 
13 Install self-lightening road studs 37 Paint the road nearby the entrance to a store 
(on the north of the Intersection) 
14 Install electric warning signs (for 
pedestrians and bicycles) 
38 Reduce the shoulder width 
15 Install warning signboards and draw 
warning messages on the road (for 
pedestrians and bicycles) 
39 Build an overpass for through traffic 
16 Install electric warning signs (for drivers) 40 Attach slopes to the pedestrian overpass; 
remove the BCZs 
17 Install warning signboards and draw 
warning messages on the road (for drivers) 
41 Build underground paths with sloped 
entrance; remove the pedestrian overpass 
and the BCZs 
18 Reconfigure and replace road signs 42 Attach slopes to the pedestrian overpass 
19 Add “Time-lagged signal” signboard 43 Build elevators for the pedestrian overpass 
20 Change the signaling pattern (improve the 
linkage with adjacent signals) 
44 Add a left-turn only lane 
21 Change the signaling pattern (stop all 
automobile traffic for bicycles) 
45 Add another right-turn only lane 
22 Change the signaling pattern (remove the 
green light for all direction; separate the 
traffic for each direction) 
46 Improve the Tokushima-honchō Intersection. 
23 Change the signaling pattern (remove the 
red light between green and right-turn 
only) 
47 Develop another route that would reduce the 
traffic through the Intersection 
24 Change the signaling pattern (extend green 
lights for right turn and east-west traffic) 
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Appendix 6-L: Schematic diagram showing final recommendations 
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In addition to those six five schemes, the final agreement included: 
(2) Installing night lighting equipments; 
(4) Adding a sign “Time-Lagged Signal (jisa-shiki shingō)” next to the signal (from the west); and 
(8) Adding a digital signboard for bicycles showing the remaining time for the green signal. 
(5) Installing a signboard to warn drivers of crossing bicycles 
(6) Drawing road markings to reduce the speed (on NR 11) 
An example of road marking 
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Appendix 7-A: Survey form  
 
 
The Committee for the Road Safety Improvements to the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection 
Follow-up Evaluation Survey 
 
 
This survey was intended to gather invaluable feedbacks from you, those who have 
participated in the the Committee for the Road Safety Improvements to the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection as a committee member so that we can develop better 
approach to consensus building that involves third-party organizations.  
 
Your answers will be used for our study after processing them statistically so that 
your identity is protected.  
 
 
Please provide your answers on this survey form, and respond to us by mail 
 
BEFORE FEBRUARY 24 (FRIDAY) 
 
using the attached envelope.  
 
 
 
Project sponsor： 
Japan Society of Civil Engineering 
Shikoku Chapter 
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For each of the following questions, please choose an 
option that is most approximate to your response and 
circle the number.  
 
Q1: 
Are you satisfied with the goal given to the committee (to explore improvement 
schemes that can be implemented in a short term)?  
Options: 
1. Very satisfied 
2. Mostly satisfied 
3. Not much satisfied 
4. Unsatisfied at all. 
 
Q2: 
Do you think the opinions of everyone who has a stake in the Kita-josanjima 
Intersection were reflected in the process through the stakeholder analysis 
(interviews) and the committee? 
Options: 
1. Everyone's opinions were reflected.  -> to Question 3 (Next page) 
2. Almost everyone's opinions were reflected.  -> to Question 3 (Next page) 
3. Only a portion of people's opinions were reflected. -> to the question below: 
4. No one's opinions were reflected  -> to the question below: 
 
If you chose 3 or 4 in response to the Question 2, please answer the following 
question. 
Whose opinions were not reflected?  Please specify them. 
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Q3: 
Do you think that you were given opportunities to express your opinions about the 
processes and the management of the committee? 
Options: 
1. Sufficient opportunities were given. 
2. Adequate opportunities were given. 
3. Not much opportunity was given. 
4. No opportunity was given at all. 
 
Q4: 
How important was the third-party management team (NPO Commons) in the 
committee? 
Options: 
1. Crucial 
2 Important 
3. Somewhat important 
4. Not important 
 
Q5: 
How important was the technical assistant team (Oriental Consultants and others) in 
the committee? 
Options: 
1. Crucial 
2 Important 
3. Somewhat important 
4. Not important 
 
Note) About the third-party management team and the technical assistant 
team 
Third-party management team: Those who moderated the meetings, facilitated the 
discussion at the tables, proposed the work plan for the 
committee, managed schedules, and conducted 
interviews (NPO Commons)  
Technical assistant team: Those who proposed and explained options to improve 
the Intersection (Oriental consultants and others)  
396 Appendix 
Q6: 
The third-party management team was given the role of managing the committee 
independently of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport.  Do you think 
the third-party management team was assisting from an independent standpoint? 
Options: 
1. Very independent 
2. Adequately independent 
3. Not much independent 
4. Not independent at all 
5. Don’t know.  
 
Q7: 
The technical assistant team (Oriental Consultants and others) was given the role of 
managing the committee independently of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and 
Transport.  Do you think the technical assistant team was assisting from an 
independent standpoint? 
Options: 
1. Very independent 
2. Adequately independent 
3. Not much independent 
4. Not independent at all 
5. Don’t know.  
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Question 8: 
How do you evaluate the process (stakeholder analysis by the interviews in January 
last year and the management of the committee by the third-party from July last 
year)? 
Options: 
1. Very favorable 
2. Favorable 
3. Unfavorable 
4. Very unfavorable 
 
How did you feel about the process?  How did or didn’t you like it?  Please 
describe.  We appreciate your inputs in order to improve our efforts in the future. 
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Q9: 
Do you think the users and the neighbors of the Kita-josanjima Intersection know 
the existence of the committee? 
Options: 
1. Almost everyone knows it. 
2. Some people know 
3. Not many people know it. 
4. No one knows about it. 
5. I don't know 
 
Q10: 
Do you think the users and the neighbors of the Kita-josanjima Intersection know 
what the committee has discussed? 
Options: 
1. Almost everyone knows it. 
2. Some people know 
3. Not many people know it. 
4. No one knows about it. 
5. Don't know 
 
Q11: 
Could you fully understand what other members of the committee were saying (were 
intended)? 
Options: 
1. Fully understood 
2. Mostly understood. 
3. Couldn't understand much 
4. Not at all 
 
Q12: 
Were the subjects discussed in the committee (to explore improvement schemes that 
can be implemented in a short term) interesting to you?  
Options: 
1. Everything was interesting 
2. Mostly interesting 
3. Not much interesting 
4. Not interesting at all 
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Q13: 
Did the level of your interest in the subjects discussed in the committee change?  
Options: 
1. Interested from the beginning to the end 
2. Lost interest during the committee 
3. Grew interest during the committee 
4. Not interested from the beginning to the end 
 
Q14: 
Did you reported back to your constituents (e.g., members, partners, colleagues, 
bosses, and etc.) about the progress of committee meetings? 
Options: 
1. No  -> to the Question 15 (Next page) 
2. Yes  -> to the question below 
 
If you chose “2. Yes” in response to the Question 14, please answer the following 
question.  
 
When did you report back?  Please choose all that apply.  
Options: 
1. Before the 1st meeting (before July 22, Heisei 17) 
2. Between the 1st and the 2nd meetings (July 22 ~ September 2)  
3. Between the 2nd and the 3rd meetings (September 2~ October 6) 
4. Between the 3rd and the 4th meetings (October 6 ~ November 18) 
5. Between the 4th and the 5th meetings (November 18 ~ February 10) 
6. After the 5th meeting (including your plan to do so)  
 
How did you report back?  Please choose all that apply.  
Options: 
1. Distributing the documents 
2. Reported in regular meetings and gatherings 
3. Reported in a special meeting about the committee 
4. Surveys 
5. Others (please explain:                                        
                                                            
 ） 
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Q15: 
Could you say what you had intended to say in the meeting? 
Options: 
1. I could say everything 
2. I could say most of them 
3. I couldn’t say much 
4. I couldn't say at all 
 
Q16: 
Could you learn something new about the function of the Kita-josanjima 
Intersection and its neighborhood by participating in the committee? 
Options: 
1. Could learn many things 
2. Could learn a few things 
3. Almost nothing new 
4. Nothing new at all 
 
Q17: 
Do you think the committee discussed innovative solutions and new ideas for the 
improvement?  
Options: 
1. Discussed many innovative ideas 
2. Discussed a few innovative ideas 
3. Not many innovative ideas. 
4. No innovative ideas at all 
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Q18: 
If the committee discussed the plan without help of the technical assistant team 
(Oriental Consultants and others), how do you think the plan would be compared to 
the actual plan? 
Options: 
1. Would be a much better plan 
2. Would be a little better plan. 
3. The same plan 
4. A little worse plan 
5. Really bad plan 
 
 
Q19: 
Do you think the committee explored options after recognizing all issues of the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection correctly? 
Options: 
1. Very much 
2. To some extent 
3. Not much 
4. Not at all  
 
 
Q20: 
How satisfied are you with the contents of the recommendations? 
Options: 
1. Fully satisfied 
2. Mostly satisfied 
3. Not much satisfied 
4. Not satisfied at all 
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Q21: 
Do you think the recommendations will be really implemented? 
Options: 
1. Everything will be implemented 
2. Mostly implemented 
3. Not much implemented 
4. Not implemented at all 
5. I don't know 
 
 
Q22: 
Do you think the recommendations will contribute to the reduction of accidents and 
the improvement of usability at the Kita-josanjima Intersection? 
Options: 
1. Will contribute very much 
2. Will contribute at least a little 
3. Not much changes 
4. A little negative impacts 
5. Very negative impacts 
 
 
Q23:  
Do you think the recommendation is "desirable" for the City of Tokushima as a 
whole? 
Options: 
1. Very desirable 
2. Desirable to some extent 
3. Not much desirable 
4. Undesirable at all 
5. Don't know 
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Q24: 
Do you think there are users who will be negatively impacted by the 
recommendations if they are implemented? 
Options: 
1. Not at all 
2. Not many 
3. A little 
4. Many 
5. Don't know 
 
 
Q25: 
Do you think you could get acquainted with those who weren't before by 
participating in the committee? 
Options: 
1. Yes. 
2. No.  
 
 
Q26: 
Were there any occasions other than the Kita-josanjima Committee where you 
worked or discussed together with any of the committee members? 
Options: 
1. Yes 
2. No 
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Q27:  
Finally, please tell us which committee meetings you attended (please circle one that 
applies to you). 
 
First meeting (July 22, Heisei 17) 
1. Attended   2. An alternate of mine attended   3. Absent 
 
Second meeting (September 2, Heisei 17) 
1. Attended   2. An alternate of mine attended   3. Absent 
 
Third meeting (October 6, Heisei 17) 
1. Attended   2. An alternate of mine attended   3. Absent 
 
Fourth meeting (November 18, Heisei 17) 
1. Attended   2. An alternate of mine attended   3. Absent 
 
Fifth meeting (February 10, Heisei 18) 
1. Attended   2. An alternate of mine attended   3. Absent 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation in the survey. 
Please return the form in the attached envelope. 
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Appendix 7-B: Responses to the survey 
 
Q1 
1. 
Ve
ry 
sa
tis
fie
d 
2. 
Mo
stl
y 
sa
tis
fie
d 
3. 
No
t m
uc
h 
sa
tis
fie
d 
4. Un
sa
tis
fie
d 
at 
all
 
No
 an
sw
er 
Are you satisfied with the goal given to the 
committee? 4 7 6 0 0
 
Q2 
1. 
Ev
ery
on
e's
 op
ini
on
s 
we
re 
ref
lec
ted
. 
2. 
Alm
os
t e
ve
ryo
ne
's 
op
ini
on
s w
ere
 
ref
lec
ted
. 
3. 
On
ly 
a p
ort
ion
 of
 
pe
op
le'
s o
pin
ion
s w
ere
 
ref
lec
ted
 
4. 
No
 on
e's
 op
ini
on
s 
we
re 
ref
lec
ted
 
No
 an
sw
er 
Do you think the opinions of everyone who has 
a stake in the Kita-josanjima Intersection were 
reflected in the process through the 
stakeholder analysis (interviews) and the 
committee? 0 11 5 0 1
 
Q3 
1. 
Su
ffic
ien
t 
op
po
rtu
nit
ies
 
we
re 
giv
en
 
2. 
Ad
eq
ua
te 
op
po
rtu
nit
ies
 
we
re 
giv
en
 
3. 
No
t m
uc
h 
op
po
rtu
nit
ies
 
we
re 
giv
en
 
4. 
No
 
op
po
rtu
nit
ies
 
we
re 
giv
en
 at
 al
l 
No
 an
sw
er 
Do you think that you were given opportunities 
to express your opinions about the processes 
and the management of the committee? 7 10 0 0 0 
 
Q4 
1. 
Cr
uc
ial
 
2 I
mp
ort
an
t 
3. So
me
wh
at 
im
po
rta
nt 
4. 
No
t 
im
po
rta
nt 
No
 an
sw
er 
How important was the third-party 
management team (NPO Commons) in the 
committee? 4 8 4 1 0 
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Q5 
1. 
Cr
uc
ial
 
2 I
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ort
an
t 
3. 
So
me
wh
at 
im
po
rta
nt 
4. 
No
t 
im
po
rta
nt 
No
 an
sw
er 
How important was the technical assistant 
team (Oriental Consultants and others) in the 
committee? 1 13 1 2 0
 
Q6 
1. 
Ve
ry 
ind
ep
en
de
nt 
2. 
Ad
eq
ua
tel
y 
ind
ep
en
de
nt 
3. 
No
t m
uc
h 
ind
ep
en
de
nt 
4. 
No
t 
ind
ep
en
de
nt 
at 
all
 
No
 an
sw
er 
The third-party management team was given 
the role of managing the committee 
independently of the Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, and Transport.  Do you think 
the third-party management team was 
assisting from an independent standpoint? 2 12 1 2 0
 
Q7 
1. 
Ve
ry 
ind
ep
en
de
nt 
2. 
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ua
tel
y 
ind
ep
en
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nt 
3. 
No
t m
uc
h 
ind
ep
en
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nt 
4. 
No
t 
ind
ep
en
de
nt 
at 
all
 
No
 an
sw
er 
The technical assistant team (Oriental 
Consultants and others) was given the role of 
managing the committee independently of the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and 
Transport.  Do you think the technical 
assistant team was assisting from an 
independent standpoint? 2 13 2 0 0 
 
Q8 
1. 
Ve
ry 
fav
ora
ble
 
2. 
Fa
vo
rab
le 
3. 
Un
fav
ora
ble
 
4. 
Ve
ry 
un
fav
ora
ble
 
No
 an
sw
er 
How do you evaluate the process? 4 8 3 0 2 
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Q9 
1. 
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ve
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kn
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t. 
2. 
So
me
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kn
ow
 
3. 
No
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kn
ow
 it.
 
4. 
No
 on
e k
no
ws
 
ab
ou
t it
. 
5. 
Do
n't
 kn
ow
 
No
 an
sw
er 
Do you think the users and the neighbors of 
the Kita-josanjima Intersection know the 
existence of the committee? 1 4 10 0 2 0 
 
Q10 
1. 
Alm
os
t e
ve
ryo
ne
 
kn
ow
s i
t. 
2. 
So
me
 pe
op
le 
kn
ow
 
3. 
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 it.
 
4. 
No
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ab
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t it
. 
5. 
Do
n't
 kn
ow
 
No
 an
sw
er 
Do you think the users and the neighbors of 
the Kita-josanjima Intersection know what the 
committee has discussed? 1 2 11 0 3 0 
 
Q11 
1. 
Fu
lly 
un
de
rst
oo
d 
2. 
Mo
stl
y 
un
de
rst
oo
d. 
3. 
Co
uld
n't
 
un
de
rst
an
d 
mu
ch
 
4. 
No
t a
t a
ll 
No
 an
sw
er 
Could you fully understand what other 
members of the committee were saying (were 
intended)? 1 14 0 0 0 
 
Q12 
1. 
Ev
ery
thi
ng
 
wa
s i
nte
res
tin
g 
2. 
Mo
stl
y 
int
ere
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ng
 
3. 
No
t m
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h 
int
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ng
 
4. 
No
t 
int
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ng
 at
 
all
 
No
 an
sw
er 
Were the subjects discussed in the committee 
interesting to you?  5 12 0 0 0 
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Q13 
1. 
Int
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d f
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g t
o 
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 en
d 
No
 an
sw
er 
Did the level of your interest in the subjects 
discussed in the committee change?  9 5 3 0 0 
 
Q14 1. No 2. Yes No answer 
Did you reported back to your constituents 
about the progress of committee meetings? 4 12 1
 
Q15 
1. 
I c
ou
ld 
sa
y 
ev
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thi
ng
 
2. 
I c
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ld 
sa
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os
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3. 
I c
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't 
sa
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h 
4. 
I c
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ldn
't 
sa
y a
t a
ll 
No
 an
sw
er 
Could you say what you had intended to say 
in the meeting? 1 13 2 1 0 
 
Q16 
1. 
Co
uld
 le
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 th
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Co
uld
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3. 
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thi
ng
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w 
4. 
No
thi
ng
 
ne
w 
at 
all
 
No
 an
sw
er 
Could you learn something new about the 
function of the Kita-josanjima Intersection and 
its neighborhood by participating in the 
committee? 5 10 2 0 0 
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Q17 
1. 
Dis
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 at
 al
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er 
Do you think the committee discussed 
innovative solutions and new ideas for the 
improvement?  1 6 9 1 0 
 
Q18 
1. 
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ch
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2. 
Wo
uld
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4. 
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ittl
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5. 
Re
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ad
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No
 an
sw
er 
If the committee discussed the plan without 
help of the technical assistant team (Oriental 
Consultants and others), how do you think the 
plan would be compared to the actual plan? 1 1 6 4 3 2 
 
Q19 
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3. 
No
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4. 
No
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t 
all
 
No
 
an
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er 
Do you think the committee explored options 
after recognizing all issues of the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection correctly? 3 9 4 0 1 
 
Q20 
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4. 
No
t 
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d 
at 
all
 
No
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er 
How satisfied are you with the contents of the 
recommendations? 0 12 5 0 0 
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Q21 
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5. 
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Do you think the recommendations will be 
really implemented? 3 12 1 0 1 0 
 
Q22 
1. 
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trib
ute
 
ve
ry 
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2. 
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4. 
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5. 
Ve
ry 
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e 
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No
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sw
er 
Do you think the recommendations will 
contribute to the reduction of accidents and 
the improvement of usability at the 
Kita-josanjima Intersection? 0 14 2 1 0 0 
 
Q23 
1. 
Ve
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de
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4. 
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all
 
5. 
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n't
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No
 an
sw
er 
Do you think the recommendation is 
"desirable" for the City of Tokushima as a 
whole? 2 12 2 1 0 0 
 
Q24 
1. 
No
t a
t 
all
 
2. 
No
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3. 
A l
ittl
e 
4. 
Ma
ny
 
5. 
Do
n't
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No
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er 
Do you think there are users who will be 
negatively impacted by the recommendations 
if they are implemented? 2 7 7 1 0 0 
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Q25 1. Yes 2. No No answer 
Do you think you could get acquainted with 
those who weren't before by participating in the 
committee? 10 7 0
 
Q26 1. Yes 2. No No answer 
Were there any occasions other than the 
Kita-josanjima Committee where you worked or 
discussed together with any of the committee 
members? 7 10 0 
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Appendix 8-A: Summary of process adaptations 
 
Kita-josanjima experimental process in Japan: process adaptation and 
organizational change. 
 
1. Backgrounds 
My dissertation focuses on the transfer of 
consensus building techniques from the United 
States to Japan.  In particular, it analyzed (i) 
how consensus building processes are adapted 
to the Japanese context and (ii) how the 
Japanese users of consensus building go through 
organizational change (i.e., give up their 
routines and adopt new ways of doing business).  
I assumed that consensus building efforts in 
Japan would not help stakeholders reach a 
practical agreement without such 
transformations.  In order to test this theory, I 
observed an experimental use of consensus 
building in Japan. 
 
2. Experimental process 
Consensus building was applied to an effort 
to prescribe a short-term improvement plan for 
the Kita-josanjima Intersection in the City of 
Tokushima.  At the intersection, there had been 
many traffic accidents involving motor vehicles, 
bicycles, and pedestrians. 
The convenor was a field office of the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport 
(MLIT).  A local not-for-profit organization 
called Commons assumed the neutral’s role.  
Several faculty members and students from the 
University of Tokushima provided support as 
well.  Transportation engineering consultants 
were also involved as a technical assistant team that would provide technical analysis to the 
whole stakeholder group. 
Stakeholder assessment took place between January and March 2005.  The team of 
neutrals interviewed 54 stakeholders and produced a conflict assessment report.  The team 
and the convenor exchanged a nondisclosure agreement that would allow the team to keep 
each interview confidential.  The actual stakeholder process was convened on July 22, 
2005 with 21 stakeholder representatives.  Its membership consists of local residents, local 
 
The Kita-josanjima Intersection: 
pedestrians must use the 
overpass structure to cross the 
busy streets 
 
The committee meeting: 
negotiating group was 
occasionally divided into multiple 
subgroups to encourage active 
participation of each member in 
the discussion. 
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business owners, handicapped person’s 
association, and relevant government agencies.  
They were selected by Commons and the 
convenor based on findings from the 
stakeholder analysis.  Five meetings were held.  
In the first meeting, committee members 
unanimously agreed with suggested ground 
rules and work plan, as well as to hire Commons 
as the neutral facilitator.  Each meeting was 
facilitated by Commons.  They were trained as 
meeting facilitators: they had successfully 
facilitated various “workshop” style meetings in 
the past.  The ground rules assured that the 
committee members could dismiss Commons if 
its services were unsatisfactory.  The convenor 
paid all costs; however, participants were not 
compensated for their time and travel. 
There were several conflicts.  First, local 
residents and businesses were concerned about 
negative impacts from reconfiguring the 
intersection (e.g., restricted entry to their 
parking lots).  Second, the convenor and the 
police department would have to reach an 
interagency agreement.  Until the negotiation 
occurred no one could tell if their interests were aligned.  Third, physically challenged 
people were very unsatisfied with the current configuration (i.e., they can’t cross the street 
at this intersection) even though the resource available for this particular short-term project 
would not allow building a new accessible facility.   
Notwithstanding these conflicts, the stakeholder group unanimously reached a final 
agreement, including eight recommendations, in the fifth meeting on February 10, 2006.  
It also suggested that the group continue to discuss long-term solutions such as the 
construction of accessible facilities for physically challenged people.  The convenor 
accepted the recommendations and expressed its intent to implement them in 2006.   
 
 
3. Process adaptation 
The following process adaptations were observed in the experiment. 
 
[1. Choosing right persons based on the Japanese context] 
1-1. Involving academics 
In Japan, university professors have a substantial influence in infrastructure planning 
as policy advisor.  In the experiment, a university professor was involved from the 
outset to help the neutrals.  His involvement provided a leverage to the neutrals in 
 A map indicating specific 
recommendations to the 
Intersection 
 President of Commons hands in 
the final agreement to the 
convenor 
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negotiating with the convenor. 
1-2. Choosing the lead facilitator based on the age 
Age is an important factor in determining one’s status (i.e., trustworthiness) in Japan.  
In the experiment, the most elderly team member took the lead facilitator’s role. 
1-3. Involving community leaders 
Each neighborhood in Japan has a residents’ association.  Its leader usually represent 
the neighborhood in negotiating with government agencies.  In the Kita-josanjima 
experiment, local associations’ leaders were invited to the stakeholder dialogue in 
addition to other stakeholding parties in the neighborhood. 
1-4. Anonymizing conflict assessment interviewees 
To list interviewees’ names in the conflict assessment report was considered as the 
breach of confidentiality agreement even if they were not attributed to each 
commentary because the act of speaking out one’s concerns--no matter what the 
concerns are--is the subject of privacy protection in Japan.  As a compromise, the 
team asked each interviewee if they agreed to have their name listed in the final report.  
The majority of interviewees from local residents and businesses declined to have their 
names listed.  On the other hand, all public official interviewees agreed. 
 
[2. Adapting processes to accommodate the needs of government agencies] 
2-1. Using the shingikai system 
In Japan, government agencies often create an advisory committee (known as 
shingikai in Japanese) in order to obtain an endorsement by key decision makers to 
experiment with new public policy tools.  In the experiment, the convenor established 
such a committee, involving high rank officials and academics, aside from the 
stakeholder committee. 
2-2. Incorporating traditional ways of interagency negotiation 
Regulations require the MLIT (Japanese equivalent of DoT) and local police 
departments to negotiate and reach an agreement before reconfiguring streets.  
Traditionally, the negotiation has been conducted privately (There is no “sunshine 
law” requirement in Japan).  In the experiment, those agencies held a private caucus 
aside from the whole stakeholder committee in order to meet the interagency 
negotiation requirement. 
2-3. Developing a work plan to fit with the fiscal year system 
In Japan, every government-funded project must start and complete within a single 
fiscal year between April and March next year.  In the experiment, consensus 
building processes were divided into two segments.  Conflict assessment was 
conducted in the first fiscal year, and the stakeholder process was convened in the 
second fiscal year.   
 
[3. Adapting processes to maximize their effectiveness] 
3-1. Integrating workshop techniques 
The team of neutrals had previously learned various skills for “workshop” style 
meeting management.  In the experiment they utilized such skills in managing the 
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stakeholder committee.  For example, they used specially designed Post-it notes to 
encourage candid reactions from committee members who were reluctant to speak out 
in a public forum.  This technique had been frequently used in “workshop” meetings 
in Japan. 
3-2. Meeting each member in the nemawashi fashion. 
In Japan, project proponents usually meet privately with a few key individuals to 
negotiate on construction proposals before making official announcements in public 
meetings.  This practice of sounding out everyone’s interests is called nemawashi in 
Japanese.  In the consensus building experiment, the team of neutrals occasionally 
went to the representatives’ office and home (especially if they were absent from 
meetings) in order to give updates and obtain their candid reactions through private 
meetings.   
 
PLEASE TELL ME HOW YOU THINK ABOUT THESE PROCESS 
ADAPTATIONS. 
 
While the process adaptation seems to be an essential element in using consensus building 
in a foreign country, there is a concern about too much adaptation: consensus building 
might be modified to the extent that the core concepts of consensus building are lost in 
translation. 
 
Do you think these process adaptations that I observed in the Japanese experiment 
removed core concepts of consensus building in the US?  In other words, do you 
think the experimental effort in Japan can still be considered as a “consensus 
building” effort even after these adaptations? 
 
I would appreciate it very much if you could send your comments  
   to  Masa Matsuura (masam @ mit.edu) 
   by  May 30.     
 
If you have any question, please contact me by email.  Your comments may be quoted in 
my dissertation, which I plan to defend in June. 
 
Thank you very much for reviewing this document.  I am looking forward to hearing 
from you soon! 
 
Masahiro --Masa-- Matsuura 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Department of Urban Studies and Planning 
77 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 7-303, Cambridge, MA 02139 
E-mail: masam@mit.edu 
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Appendix 8-B: On-line survey questions 
Coversheet 
 
 
Survey on the stories from the field of consensus building (gōi keisei) 
 
・ This survey is intended to grasp what kind of difficulties were the practitioners of 
consensus building and public participation in infrastructure planning efforts 
in Japan. 
・ There are two questions, and they can be answered in 15 minutes.  This system is 
operating until February 4. 
・ There is a chance to win a gift (MIT/Harvard T-Shirts) for 5 persons if you enter. 
・ This research project, which will be a part of my doctoral dissertation, deals with 
the practice of negotiation and dispute resolution in making policies and plans for 
infrastructure development in Japan. The purpose of this project is to explain how 
cultural contexts have influenced/are influence the practice of dispute resolution.  
This research is will be primarily for a graduate thesis for Ph.D. degree, which will 
be published. 
・ Information about your identity will not be disclosed to anyone and organization 
other than the investigator. 
・ Your answers might be quoted in research papers after removing the following 
information. 
 Information that would easily lead to your identity. 
 Information that would identify projects and stakeholders (proper nouns. e.g., 
names of persons, locations, projects, corporations, and organizations). 
 
Please take a moment to participate in the survey. 
 
If you agree with the conditions mentioned above, please click the button below.  The 
survey will start. 
 
[ I will participate in the survey. ] 
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First question 
 
 
Question 1: 
 
I would like to hear your experience of planning and strategy building for the events for 
consensus building and public participation. 
 
In your experience, please think about a situation where “You tried to implement 
something or proposed something, but it could not be implemented.”  For instance;: 
 
・ You proposed to introduce a facilitator to a consultative meeting, but the convenor 
rejected it. 
・ You planned to publish a newsletter, but there was no budget available for it. 
・ You planned to propose a participatory committee, but pulled the idea because it 
was unlikely to be profitable to your firm. 
 
Please tell me such experiences in as much concrete and detailed format as possible.  If 
you don’t have such an experience, please type “No experience” in all boxes. 
 
Project Name (Voluntary. Informal name is OK. Project name will not be disclosed to 
the public.  It will be considered only in the analysis). (No more than 100 Japanese characters) 
[ ] 
What did you propose? (e.g., In this project, I tried to introduce a facilitator because …) (No more than 1,000 Japanese 
characters) 
[ ] 
What were the immediate reasons for the failure? (e.g., The staff member has been transferred… and 
budget was not available because it was the beginning of the fiscal year) (No more than 1,000 Japanese characters) 
[ ] 
What were the contextual reasons behind the immediate reason you mentioned above?  
Your guesses are welcome.  (e.g., In Japan projects were terminated in March and the next…) (No more than 1,000 
Japanese characters) 
[ ] 
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Second question 
 
 
Question 2: 
 
I would like to hear your experience of organizing events for consensus building and 
public participation. 
 
In your experience, please think about a situation where “You did something, but·it 
failed, it went wrong, or it disappointed you.”  For instance;: 
 
・ You organized consultative meetings in many locations but not many people came. 
・ A citizen’s committee prepared recommendations but none of them were 
implemented. 
・ A citizen’s committee was organized but it couldn’t prepare recommendations by 
the target date. 
 
Please tell me such experiences in as much concrete and detailed format as possible.  If 
you don’t have such an experience, please type “No experience” in all boxes. 
 
Project Name (Voluntary. Informal name is OK. Project name will not be disclosed to 
the public.  It will be considered only in the analysis). (No more than 100 Japanese characters) 
[ ] 
What did you introduce? (e.g., A citizen’s committee was organized… by inviting regular citizens…) (No more than 1,000 
Japanese characters) 
[ ] 
What were the failures?  What went wrong?  What disappointed you? (e.g., Its discussion 
could not focus on anything… and it could not produce recommendations by the target date.) (No more than 1,000 Japanese characters) 
[ ] 
Why didn’t it go well?  What else could you do to avoid them? (e.g., We could have set the 
deadline… could have introduced a facilitator…) (No more than 1,000 Japanese characters) 
[ ] 
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Glossary of Japanese terms 
 
Administrative guidance .................................................... tsu-tatsu 
Advisor............................................................................... adovaizā 
Advisory committee ......................................................... iinkai 
Agenda ............................................................................... giji shidai 
Akashi Strait Bridge........................................................... Akashi kaikyō ōhashi 
Assessor ............................................................................. hyōka-sha 
Barrier-Free Transportation Act ......................................... kōtsu baria-furī hō 
Behind ................................................................................ ura 
Bicycle crossing zone (BCZ) ............................................. jitensha-ōdanta 
Brainstorming..................................................................... burein-sutohmingu 
Business cards ..................................................................meishi   
Committee.......................................................................... iinkai 
Common sense ................................................................... jōshiki 
Conflict assessment............................................................ funsō asesumento 
Construction ..................................................................... kensetsu 
Consultative meetings ........................................................ setsumeikai 
Convenor............................................................................ shōshū-sha 
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